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Abstract 
This thesis examines how an officer with so many perceived detractors reached senior 
leadership positions in the Royal Air Force of the Second World War; that officer is Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Utilising prosopography as a methodology, and 
grounded in an understanding of leadership theory, though recognising the limitations of 
applying modern language to historical analysis, this thesis surveys the development 
processes used by the RAF to nurture officers for senior positions. Furthermore, this thesis 
argues that the RAF, bounded by the Service’s culture and ethos, took an interest in the 
leadership development of its officer class as it had a stake in producing able leaders 
capable of defending its independence. This was done through modern conceptions, such 
as socialisation, job assignments, action learning and nurturing. These concepts formed the 
basis of nurtured officers shared experiences, and this thesis illustrates how Leigh-Mallory 
was representative of the type of officer the RAF wanted to lead the Service. The 
experiences outlined in this thesis focus on training, education and job assignments, which 
included aspects, such as the importance of Staff College attendance, command experience 
and staff duties. Participation in these key shared experiences made officers such as Leigh-
Mallory ‘visible’ to those able to further nurture officers careers while giving them the 
knowledge required to lead at the senior level. By understanding the culture and context of 
the development of the senior leadership of the RAF of the Second World War, this thesis 
now allows for a more considered understanding of the effectiveness of officers such as 
Leigh-Mallory during that conflict. 
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Introduction 
 
I.1 Collective Memory and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
Generated by cognitive distortions, Josh Tosh noted that collective memory leads ‘us to 
highlight some aspects of the past and to exclude others’.1 Reinforced by cultural artefacts 
like film, art and media sources, these distortions revolve around processes of learning, 
forgetting and remembering. This process develops a repository of perceived 
understanding, which underpins identity and drives popular historical perceptions. 
Nowhere is this perhaps truer in the history of the Royal Air Force (RAF) than the career 
of Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who holds a specific place in the 
Service’s collective memory.2 This view can be summed up by the interpretations of the 
late Vincent Orange and Williamson Murray; Orange stated that Leigh-Mallory was either 
‘misguided or incompetent, or at worst both’, while Murray claimed that he was ‘ambitious 
and duplicitous’.3 These are serious accusations. They not only concern Leigh-Mallory’s 
competency, but also raise questions over the organisation that nurtured him.  
Represented by three key images, this negative view has filtered into the public’s 
collective memory. The first image is Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Air 
Officer Commanding (AOC) 12 Group, RAF Fighter Command in 1940, while the second 
is ACM Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Air Commander-in-Chief (Air C-in-C) of the Allied 
Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) during Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of 
Normandy, in 1944. This is strengthened by a third, more powerful image, the portrayal of 
                                                          
1 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History, Third Edition 
(London: Longmans, 1999), p. 1. 
2 All rank abbreviations are derived from the March 1939 edition of The Air Force List. When first mentioned, 
officers are referred to by their full name and the rank applicable to the reference. Subsequently, they are 
referred to by their surname. If referring to a specific event, then their appropriate rank will be used.  
3 Vincent Orange, ‘The British Commanders’ in Sebastian Cox and Henry Probert (eds.), The Battle Re-Thought: 
A Symposium on the Battle of Britain (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1991), p. 40; Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in 
War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 175. 
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Leigh-Mallory by Patrick Wymark in Guy Hamilton’s iconic 1969 film The Battle of Britain, 
which is, perhaps, most responsible for fixing a negative image of the latter in the public’s 
collective memory.4 Wymark’s selection was significant given his portrayal of the 
Machiavellian businessperson John Wilder in The Plane Makers and The Power Game between 
1963 and 1969.5 Wymark would have been instantly recognisable to audiences, who would 
have transplanted this characterisation onto Leigh-Mallory. Indeed, the fictional depiction 
of Leigh-Mallory’s debates with AVM Keith Park in ACM Sir Hugh Dowding’s office in 
the film has left an indelible mark on our understanding of both the Battle of Britain and 
Leigh-Mallory’s abilities as a leader.6 While the film, based on Derek Wood and Derek 
Dempster’s 1961 book The Narrow Margin, initially performed poorly on release, its regular 
appearance on terrestrial television has reinforced specific, but questionable, views of the 
battle and its key commanders.7 For example, Park, before the aforementioned scene, flies 
into an unidentified RAF station, while Leigh-Mallory did not, thus juxtaposing an image 
that suggested the latter was not a flyer; however, the image of the flyer, as Martin Francis 
showed, was central to RAF culture and ethos.8 Such cinematic images, as this thesis 
illustrates, distort and decontextualise Leigh-Mallory’s rise to senior leadership in the RAF. 
For example, little is known about 2nd Lieutenant Leigh-Mallory of the 4th Battalion of the 
Lancashire Fusiliers and the wound he suffered at Bellewaerde Ridge on 16 June 1915 
                                                          
4 Leonard Mosley, Battle of Britain: The Making of a Film (London: Pan Books, 1969), pp. 157-72; S.P. 
Mackenzie, The Battle of Britain on Screen: ‘The Few’ in British Film and Television Drama (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007), pp. 75-98; Michael Paris, From the Wright Brothers to Top Gun: Aviation, Nationalism and 
Popular Cinema (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 132-33; Garry Campion, The Good Fight: 
Battle of Britain Propaganda and The Few (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 276-7 
5 In 1965, Patrick Wymark received a British Television Award for Best Actor for these portrayals. 
6 The scene is based on details of a meeting held  at the Air Ministry on 17 October 1940 to discuss tactics 
employed by Fighter Command towards the end of the Battle of Britain, see: TNA, AIR 16/735, Minutes of 
a Meeting held in the Air Council Room on October 17th 1940, to discuss Major Day Tactics in the Fighter 
Force. 
7 Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power, 1930-1949 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2003 [1961]). 
8 Martin Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force, 1939-1945, Paperback Edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 14-31. 
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while serving with the 2nd Battalion of the South Lancashire Regiment. Similarly, the 
career of Wing Commander (WgCr) Leigh-Mallory, who was closely involved in the 
development of ideas surrounding tactical air power in the RAF during the 1920s, has 
largely been ignored; however, these important ‘characters’ in Leigh-Mallory’s leadership 
development need to be understood to contextualise his progress in the Service. Thus, the 
narrative of Leigh-Mallory’s rise to senior leadership requires revision before any attempt 
to judge his effectiveness can be undertaken. This thesis provides that revision by analysing 
Leigh-Mallory’s leadership development within his organisational context and through a 
comparison with his peers. 
 
I.2 Literature Review 
Split into four sections, this literature review examines views relating to Leigh-Mallory, the 
historiography of the inter-war RAF, relevant material covering the British Army and Royal 
Navy (RN), and finally a brief overview of key leadership works that informed the 
conceptual framework used in this thesis. 
Through a teleological view of history, distorted views of Leigh-Mallory’s career 
remain which have filtered through the historiography and shaped historians understanding 
of his effectiveness. Flanked between the experience of the First and Second World Wars, 
this teleological view mirrors broader patterns in the history of inter-war air power, which 
often assumes a direct causality between the two conflicts with little examination of 
contingency. For example, Alistair McClusky’s recent chapter on direct air support during 
the Battle of Amiens in 1918 assumed: 
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to a large extent the lessons from Amiens were responsible for the flawed 
conduct of Air-Land operations in France and Flanders in 1940 and the 
resultant catastrophic Allied defeat.9  
 
McClusky subsequently claimed that this was because of the ‘dysfunctional outlook of the 
Air Staff in the interwar period’.10 This ‘dysfunctional outlook’ was, according to McClusky, 
a serving British Army officer in 2014, an outgrowth of the RAF’s focus on fighters in air 
superiority roles that degraded their ability to ‘attack ground targets’, which was left to 
bombers that suffered heavy losses from ground based air defences during the French 
campaign of 1940.11 However, this analysis, clouded by service bias, ignores broader 
conceptual discussions about air power employment that were on-going between the RAF 
and the Army and the context of inter-service friction that characterised much of the 
period. As Chapter Seven notes, inter-service co-operation between the wars was more 
complicated as it related to debates in the Army over future force structures and over the 
way the RAF, as the supporting service, worked with them. Importantly, Leigh-Mallory was 
involved in these debates.  
Bill Newton Dunn’s and Orange’s writings concisely represent the debate over 
Leigh-Mallory’s competency, as they are the antithesis of one another. Dunn was 
hyperbolic and hagiographic, and set out to defend Leigh-Mallory, while Orange was 
heavily critical; though, as an academic, at least the work of the latter was more rigorous 
concerning source analysis. Explained by his familial relationship to Leigh-Mallory, Dunn’s 
hagiographical approach is highlighted by his continual reference to the former by his 
                                                          
9 Alistair McCluskey, ‘The Battle of Amiens and the Development of British Air Land Battle, 1918-1945’ in 
Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray (eds.), Changing War: The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and The Birth of 
the Royal Air Force, 1918 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), p. 232. 
10 Ibid, p. 241. 
11 Ibid. For more balanced analyses of the RAF during the Battle of France, see: David Ian Hall, Strategy for 
Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Greenwood, CT: Praeger, 2007), pp. 41-54; 
Matthew Powell, ‘Army Co-Operation Command and Tactical Air Power Development in Britain, 1940-
1943: The Role of Army Co-Operation Command in Army Air Support’, (PhD Thesis, University of 
Birmingham, 2014), pp. 71-106.  
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sobriquet, L-M; Leigh-Mallory’s friends used this moniker in communication with him. 
Dunn is Leigh-Mallory’s great nephew, as his mother, Barbara Newton Dunn, was the 
daughter of Leigh-Mallory’s eldest sister, Mary.12 In his own words, Dunn laudably set out 
to understand ‘What forces create two men like him and his legendary brother?’13 Leigh-
Mallory’s eldest brother was the noted mountaineer, George Mallory.14 The book, however, 
failed to rehabilitate Leigh-Mallory’s reputation due to poor scholarly standards. At a basic 
level, Dunn struggled with the military context and sub-text of his subject. For example, 
Dunn referred to Operation JUBILEE, the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942, an 
operation for which Leigh-Mallory acted as air commander, as Operation 
SLEDGEHAMMER, an entirely separate contingency operation planned for 1942 to 
relieve pressure on the Eastern Front.15 More worrying is Dunn’s lack of references and 
that he did not attempt to explain context and contingency in the evidence deployed. Basic 
research would have solved many mistakes in Dunn’s work, such as claiming that there is 
no evidence for why Leigh-Mallory sought to join the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) in 1915; 
however, an examination of Leigh-Mallory’s 1925 RAF Staff College essay would have 
solved that conundrum.16 When discussing the Normandy Campaign, Dunn cited verbatim, 
without any references, Leigh-Mallory’s operational diary, which he maintained during the 
campaign. Simply, Dunn claimed that Leigh-Mallory’s ‘thoughts and aspirations […] are 
                                                          
12 Bill Newton Dunn, Big Wing: The Biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 
1992).  
13 Ibid, p. 4. 
14 For the most recent account of George Mallory, see: Wade Davis, Into the Silence: The Great War, Mallory and 
the Conquest of Everest (London: The Bodley Head, 2011). 
15 On the RAF at Dieppe, see: Ross Mahoney, ‘“The support afforded by the air force was faultless”: The 
Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942’, Canadian Military History, 21(4) (2012), pp. 17-32. 
16 Dunn, Big Wing, p. 23; The National Archives, Kew (TNA), AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on 
Wartime Service (1914-1918) by Wing Commander T.L. Leigh-Mallory, 28 September 1925. 
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best expressed in the following extracts from his diary’.17 Placing these thoughts into the 
context of the Normandy Campaign, and what fellow commanders wrote, would have 
been a more fruitful exercise, and the failure to do so highlights Dunn’s lack of academic 
training.  
Orange criticised Leigh-Mallory’s abilities. For example, in a 1995 review of John 
Ray’s work on the Battle of Britain, which provided a balanced view of the debates over 
fighter tactics extant in Fighter Command in 1940, Orange stated resolutely that, ‘Dowding 
and Park were right, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory were wrong’.18 Orange’s views were 
coloured by his sympathy for ACM Sir Keith Park, the subject of his first biography.19 
Furthermore, Orange argued that the failure of a paper exercise on 29 January 1941, which 
sought to test whether large fighter formations were appropriate in the context of 11 
Group’s defensive operations, showed Leigh-Mallory’s ‘incompetence’.20 There is no 
evidence that this system was used operationally, and Leigh-Mallory’s experimentation 
through a paper exercise arguably illustrated a leader testing new ideas. Orange’s bias 
transposed to other officers with whom Park clashed. In his 1936 work Air Power and 
Armies, WgCr John Slessor, later a Marshal of the Royal Air Force (MRAF) and Chief of 
the Air Staff (CAS), criticised 48 Squadron’s performance in 1918, which Park, then a 
Major, commanded.21 From Park’s perspective, this created enmity between these two 
officers. As Orange argued, Park believed that ACM Slessor, then Air Member for 
Personnel (AMP), blocked his substantive promotion to ACM on the former’s retirement 
                                                          
17 Dunn, Big Wing, p. 126. Leigh-Mallory’s Normandy Diary can be found in TNA, AIR 37/784, Daily 
Reflections on the Course of the Battle by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, KCB, DSO, 5 June 
to 15 August 1944. Leigh-Mallory dictated this diary to his personal assistant, Hillary St George Saunders. 
18 Vincent Orange, ‘The Battle of Britain – New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War by John Ray 
(Book Review)’, Journal of Military History (JMH) 59 (2) (1995), pp. 348-9. 
19 Vincent Orange, Park: The Biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park GCB, KBE, MC, DFC, DCL 
(London: Grub Street, 2001 [1984]). 
20 Ibid, p. 138. 
21 Ibid, p. 31; J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2009 
[1936]), p. 54. Oxford University Press first published Slessor’s important work in 1936. 
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in 1946.22 Significantly for this thesis, Orange began planning a biography of Leigh-Mallory 
in 1985; however, he abandoned it when he found out someone else, presumably Dunn, 
had completed a similar project.23 
Besides numerous memoirs, autobiographies and biographies of key officers, the 
historiography concerning the RAF divides into works on policy, doctrine and personnel. 
The best biographies remain Orange’s work on MRAF Lord Tedder, Denis Richards’ 
sympathetic work on MRAF Viscount Portal and Henry Probert’s biography of MRAF Sir 
Arthur Harris.24 The literature primarily focuses on policy and doctrine, which is 
paradoxical given the importance that CAS, MRAF Viscount Trenchard, then an Air 
Marshal (AM), placed on the RAF’s human element in 1919.25 This is, in part, to borrow 
Malcolm Smith’s description, because the RAF’s history has been ‘short, complex and 
                                                          
22 Orange, Park, p. 240. 
23 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London (LHCMA), Personal Papers of Group 
Captain Eric Douglas, File 5, Correspondence between Vincent Orange and Mrs Douglas-Jones, 21 
November and 7 December 1985. 
24 In addition to Dunn’s and Orange’s works already cited, key memoirs, autobiographies and biographies for 
officers considered in this thesis include: Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision (London: Collins, 1962); 
R.H. and J.J. Clark-Hall, Air Marshal Sir Robert Clark-Hall, KBE, CMG, DSO: Autobiographical and Biographical 
Reminisces (Christchurch, NZ: The Raven Press, 1995); Air Vice-Marshal Raymond Collishaw with R.V. 
Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot’s Story (London: William Kimber, 1973); Marshal of the Royal Air Force 
Lord Douglas, Years of Combat: The First Volume of the Autobiography of Sholto Douglas, Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside (London: Collins, 1963); Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Douglas with 
Robert Wright, Years of Command: The Second Volume of the Autobiography of Sholto Douglas, Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside (London: Collins, 1962); Anthony Furse, Wilfrid Freeman: The Genius Behind Allied 
Survival and Air Supremacy, 1939-1945 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999); Air Marshal Sir Victor Goddard, Skies to 
Dunkirk: A Personal Memoir (London: William Kimber, 1982); Marshal of the Royal Air Force Air Arthur 
Harris, Bomber Offensive (London: Greenhill Books, 1990 [1947]); Prudence Hill, To Know the Sky: The Life of Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Roderic Hill (London: William Kimber, 1962); Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté, 
The Fated Sky: An Autobiography (London: Hutchinson, 1952); John Laffin, Swifter than Eagles: A Biography of 
Marshal of the RAF Sir John Salmond GCB, CMG, CVO, DSO (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1964); 
John Lea, Reggie: The Life of Air Vice-Marshal R.L.G. Marix CBE, DSO (Bishop Auckland: The Pentland Press, 
1994); John L. Pattinson, LAP: The Life of Air Marshal Sir Lawrence Arthur Pattinson KBE, CB, DSO, MC, DFC 
(Privately Published, 2011); Arthur Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910-1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946); 
Roderic Owen, Tedder (London: Collins, 1952); Henry Probert, Bomber Harris - His Life and Times: The Biography 
of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris, the Wartime Chief of Bomber Command, Paperback Edition 
(London: Greenhill, 2006); Sir Patrick Playfair and John Jarvis, ‘Pip’ Playfair: A Founding Father of the RAF 
(Ilfracombe: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1979); Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford: The Life of Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force Viscount Portal of Hungerford, KG, GCB, OM, DSO, MC (London: Heinemann, 1977); Dudley Saward, 
‘Bomber’ Harris: The Authorised Biography (London: Cassell, 1984); Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John 
Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London: Cassell, 1956). 
25 See: TNA, AIR 8/12, A Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on the ‘Permanent Organization of the 
Royal Air Force’, 25 November 1919.  
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controversial’.26 Viewed through a teleological lens, RAF history is controversial because of 
the focus on inter-service debates and campaigns like the strategic air offensive against 
Germany during the Second World War. It is complex because of the character of the 
Service’s antecedents, the RAF’s controversial relationship with the other services, the 
development of air power theory and doctrine, and enduring questions over its efficacy. 
Apart from John James’ 1991 study The Paladins; little serious attention has been focused on 
the RAF’s human element from an organisational perspective or in terms of experience or 
development processes.27 Other than E.B. Haslam’s narrative of the RAF (Cadet) College 
at Cranwell, only Tony Mansell’s work on recruitment has offered an insight into officers’ 
social backgrounds and pre-service education, while C.G. Jefford provided a competent 
discussion of the place of non-pilots in the RAF.28 Mansell, however, did not place enough 
weight on the degree of continuity between the RAF and the Army regarding their 
respective relationships with public schools, which, they believed, produced officers with 
the right leadership characteristics while reinforcing class proclivities. While the RAF Staff 
College at Andover has formed a sub-section of numerous works, the focus has been on its 
role in the production of doctrine rather than its primary purpose of developing educated 
staff officers who would emerge as senior leaders.29 Even Allan English did not go far 
enough in this respect due to his focus on the links between Andover and Air Staff 
policies, which are indicative of the aforementioned historiographical challenge.30 Mark 
Wells and Maryam Philpott, with a focus on the Second and First World Wars respectively, 
                                                          
26 Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 1. 
27 John James, The Paladins: A Social History of the RAF up to the Outbreak of World War II (London: Futura 
Publications, 1991). 
28 E.B. Haslam, The History of Royal Air Force Cranwell (London: HMSO, 1982); Tony Mansell, ‘Flying Start: 
Educational and Social factors in the Recruitment of Pilots of the Royal Air Force in the Interwar Years’, 
History of Education, 26(1) (1997), pp. 71-90; Wing Commander (ret’d) C.G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators and 
other Non-Pilot Aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 2001). 
29 From this point on, the RAF Staff College will be referred to by its location, Andover. 
30 Allan English, ‘The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of RAF Strategic Bombing Policy, 1922-1929’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies (JSS), 16(3) (1993), pp. 408-31. 
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examined elements of combat experience, but no one yet has detailed this process for the 
inter-war RAF.31 Francis’ The Flyer focused more generally on broader cultural elements of 
the RAF, including its relationship with the civilian population.32 While Philpott is more 
chronologically relevant to this thesis, Wells’ study contained a useful chapter on leadership 
and morale covering what the RAF understood by such concepts.33 Philpott’s work is 
disappointing. First, its comparative approach – justified on the basis that both 
organisations were high-end users of technology – led to a light touch on both 
organisations compared, the RN and the RFC. However, this comparison is questionable, 
as the former was a service, while the latter was an arm of the Army and influenced by its 
cultural processes. Philpott failed to recognise differences generated by this distortion and 
made many basic mistakes, such as describing Arthur Marder as the official historian of the 
RN while the official history of the RAF is described as written by ‘veteran pilots’.34  The 
authors of the RN’s official history of the First World War were Sir Julian Corbett and Sir 
Henry Newbolt.35 While H.A. Jones, the author of volumes two to six of the RAF’s official 
history, was a retired officer, Philpott’s claim ignored the status of his predecessor, Sir 
Walter Raleigh, who was Merton Professor of English Literature at the University of 
Oxford from 1904 to his death in 1922. After Raleigh’s death, there was a drawn out 
process to select the latter’s replacement, with T.E. Lawrence being amongst the 
candidates.36 Eventually, Jones was selected; however, he appeared at the bottom of several 
                                                          
31 Maryam Philpott, Air and Sea Power in World War I: Combat and Experience in the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal 
Navy (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013); Mark Wells, Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the 
Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1995). 
32 Francis, The Flyer. 
33 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, pp. 137-60. 
34 Philpott, Air and Sea Power, p. 14, 48.  
35 For example, see: Sir Julian Corbett, Naval Operations Volume I: To the Battle of the Falklands, December 1914 
(London: Longmans, 1920); Sir Henry Newbolt, Naval Operations Volume IV: From Jutland to February 1917 
(London: Longmans, 1928). 
36 Specifically, see: TNA, AIR 5/497 Pt I, Appointment of a Successor to Dr Hogarth for Continuation of 
“The History of the War in the Air”, date opened 24 March 2914; TNA, AIR 5/495 Pt II, Appointment of a 
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lists of authors because of his lack of reputation.37 In addition, Philpott failed to make use 
of documents, like officers reflective essays from Andover, which would have enriched her 
work. Grounded in a socio-cultural framework inspired by Joanna Bourke, her doctoral 
supervisor, Philpott, unlike Wells, focused on negative aspects of leadership, did not refer 
to what the services understood by the term, and failed to cite key works, such as Gary 
Sheffield’s Leadership in the Trenches.38 Similarly, Philpott did not discuss what teaching 
officers received on leadership, despite discussing morale, which was the cornerstone of 
the British military’s understanding of the concept at that time.39 In 2002, Richard Overy 
remarked that, ‘The sociological analysis of [Air force] personnel is still in its infancy’.40 
Sadly, despite the above cited works, this remains the case.  
The dearth of research on the human element of the RAF is countered by that 
focused on strategy, policy and doctrine. The standard work on British air policy remains 
H. Montgomery Hyde’s ineloquent, but thorough, study on the subject.41 Malcolm Cooper 
furthered Hyde’s work by examining the emergence of the RAF as an independent service 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Successor to Sir Walter Raleigh for Continuation of “The History of the War in the Air”, date opened 27 May 
1922. For a specific reference to Lawrence, see: TNA, AIR 2/495 Pt 1, Minute from CAS to the Secretary of 
State for Air, 24 March 1924. 
37 TNA, AIR 5/497 Pt I, List B of Names Considered in 1922. On the issue of Jones’ reputation, see: TNA, 
AIR 5/497 Pt I, Minute to CAS and Secretary of State for Air, 24 March 1924. For an examination of the 
RAF’s official history of the First World War, see: Christina Goulter, ‘British Official Histories of the Air 
War’ in Jeffrey Grey (ed.), The Last Word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 133-46; John J. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I: British 
Naval Aviation and the Defeat of the U-Boats (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 131-41. 
38 G.D. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era 
of the First World War (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000). For the purpose of this thesis, references derive from the 
1994 PhD thesis on which the book is based, see: Gary Sheffield, ‘Officer-Man Relations, Morale and 
Discipline in the British Army, 1902-22’, (PhD Thesis, King’s College London, 1994). 
39 Philpott, Air and Sea Power, pp. 70-1; Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in 
Twentieth Century History (London: Basic Books, 1999).  
40 Richard Overy, ‘Introduction’ in Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray (eds.), Air Power History: Turning Points from 
Kitty Hawk to Kosovo (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. xi 
41 H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976). Research 
for this work was conducted while Hyde held a Leverhulme Research Fellowship at the Royal Air Force 
Museum in the 1970s. The original typescript of Hyde’s work can be found at the Archives Division at the 
RAF Museum, see: Royal Air Force Museum (RAFM), Hendon, DC 76/48/1-4, Typescript of British Air 
Policy between the Wars, 1918-1939 (1975). 
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during the First World War.42 Smith focused on the inter-war years and placed the 
emergence of the doctrine of the ‘knock-out’ blow in its social and political contexts, while 
Barry Powers focused on the development of strategic thinking during this period.43 David 
Omissi’s study into air policing provided a key marker in the debates over independence 
that feature in works on air policy.44 As Omissi contended, the RAF argued that air power 
provided an efficient method of managing internal threats to the British Empire, which 
maintained Service independence. Linked to this is the evolution of RAF thinking and 
doctrine as derived from higher policy and Tami Davis Biddle has provided an erudite 
examination of British thinking on strategic bombing.45 Scot Robertson argued that rather 
than doctrine, the RAF had a policy, backed up by theory. However, the problem with 
Robertson’s work stems from his argument that ‘almost no realistic effort was made at 
exploring the [translation of] strategic hypothesis into sound doctrine’ (emphasis in 
original).46 Though, for a work intent on exploring doctrine, Robertson only cited the 
RAF’s capstone manual, AP1300, The War Manual, once, which raises the question, which 
the author never satisfactorily answered, of whether he analysed doctrine or theory.47 
Similarly, while numerous articles from the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 
(JRUSI) and The Royal Air Force Quarterly (RAFQ) appeared in his bibliography, Robertson 
made little use of these, which makes his overall argument unconvincing. Conversely, 
Neville Parton’s 2009 PhD thesis provided a thorough examination of the production of 
                                                          
42 Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1986). 
43 Smith, British Air Strategy; Barry Powers, Strategy without Slide Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914-39 (London: 
Croom Helm, 1976). 
44 David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1990). 
45 Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-
1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
46 Scot Robertson, The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 
p. 95. 
47 Ibid, p. 132, fn. 28. 
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RAF doctrine at all levels and took account of both formal and informal sources. Informal 
sources included JRUSI and RAFQ, which officers contributed to, and which formed a key 
aspect of their leadership development.48 However, when writing about Andover, Parton 
naturally focused on its importance in a doctrinal sense rather than in terms of leadership 
development, which cannot be discounted, but rather re-conceptualised. This is, in part, 
because of Parton’s background as the modern RAF’s Director Defence Studies (DDefS) 
between 2006 and 2009. DDefS is responsible for military academic advice to CAS, speech 
writing and manuscript drafting, and the RAF’s post-graduate programme; therefore, 
Parton’s professional understanding of military education cannot be unduly ignored in his 
analysis. The importance of this foregoing literature review is that the officers examined in 
this thesis, including Leigh-Mallory, interfaced with strategy, policy and doctrine in 
differing ways and with increasing degrees of responsibility as those nurtured rose to senior 
leadership positions. This relationship ranged from their studies at Andover to developing 
policy and doctrine in staff positions at the Air Ministry, or applying it in operational 
commands.  
While leadership and leaders remain a key element in the process of formulating 
and applying policy and doctrine, their development and an understanding of the 
organisation that developed them remain understudied areas. For example, there is 
currently no effective study of the evolution of the Air Ministry from an organisational 
perspective. The last volume to deal with the Air Ministry remains C.G. Grey’s 1940 
volume A History of the Air Ministry.49 Grey was the founding editor of Aeroplane and a noted 
aviation journalist up to his death in 1953. Grey held strong views on the importance of 
aviation, and, as his obituary in Flight noted: 
                                                          
48 Neville Parton, ‘The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939’, (PhD Thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 2009). 
49 C.G. Grey, A History of the Air Ministry (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1940). 
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he never once failed to express either an original thought or to reveal an 
unexpected viewpoint on some current topic.50  
 
While Grey is a useful contemporary source, his work now requires revision. Filling this 
historiographical gap would allow for an understanding of why policy and doctrine evolved 
in the manner they did. Related to this would be a broader study of the organisational 
culture that shaped policy and doctrine. Chapter Two, from a leadership perspective, 
provides a start to that discourse. One recent study that has bridged the conceptual gap 
amongst the three strands of policy, doctrine and personnel, though focused on one 
particular controversy, the strategic air offensive against Germany, is Peter Gray’s 
examination of the leadership challenges involved in this campaign.51 Grounded in modern 
leadership theory, Gray’s examination involved a consideration of key officers’ 
backgrounds.52 Thus, this thesis builds on Gray’s brief reflection on officers’ backgrounds 
by delving into the social, cultural and operational issues that underpinned leadership 
development in the RAF. 
Given that, this thesis examines issues related to pre-RAF backgrounds, like 
education and service in the Army or RN; it is worth highlighting works that have 
informed this study. Concerning public schools and their links to the development of 
leaders, Gary McCulloch’s study Philosophers and Kings offered a necessary corrective to the 
so-called ‘British disease’ school of thought advanced by Martin Wiener.53 The ‘British 
disease’ is the argument that from 1870 onwards, the British economy went into absolute 
decline, a view that historians like David Edgerton have more recently challenged with, in 
                                                          
50 ‘“C.G.G”‘, Flight, 18 December 1953, p. 803. 
51 Peter Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception to 1945 (London: 
Continuum, 2012). 
52 Ibid, p. 40.. 
53 Gary McCulloch, Philosophers and Kings: Education for Leadership in Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991); Martin Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980, Second 
Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 132-136. Wiener’s influential work first appeared 
in 1981. 
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the latter’s case, particular reference to Great Britain’s arms industry.54 Revisionists like 
Edgerton suggested that rather than absolute decline, the British economy went through 
relative decline. Therefore, the question is how countries such as Germany and the United 
States became productive, rather than why Britain declined.55 Wiener’s ‘cultural critique’ 
contended that public school education was a key cause of decline; however, W.D. 
Rubinstein has countered this by noting the widening of recruitment at these institutions 
and that pupils tended to follow in their fathers professional footsteps.56 Furthermore, 
McCulloch, though not uncritical, placed public schools into their pedagogical context and 
suggested that given their purpose of creating public leaders, they were, in part, successful 
in this aim. J.A. Mangan’s Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School remains the 
key work on sport in public schools and its role in developing leadership traits.57 Chapter 
Four, however, discusses the use of the term ‘athleticism’ and notes that its appropriateness 
to the development of military leaders remains open to question. Reinforced by J.D. 
Campbell’s 2012 study of physical culture in the Army, the key work on sport in the 
military is Tony Mason’s and Elisa Reidi’s excellent 2010 study, which illustrated the 
importance of such activity to the services and how it related to building ethos and spirit 
amongst personnel.58  
Several notable works on the Army and RN provided useful context not only to the 
careers of officers considered in this thesis, but also to the influence these organisations 
                                                          
54 In particular, see: David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
55 David Edgerton, ‘The Decline of Declinism’, The Business History Review, 71(2) (1997), p. 202. 
56 In general, see: W.D. Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture, and Decline in Britain, 1750-1990, Paperback Edition 
(London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 102-39. 
57 J.A. Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an 
Educational Ideology, New Edition (London: Routledge, 2000). 
58 Tony Mason and Elisa Reidi, Sport and the Military: The British Armed Forces, 1880-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); J.D. Campbell, ‘The Army Isn't All Work’: Physical Culture and the Evolution of 
the British Army, 1860–1920 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). The role of sport in the RAF remains a 
historiographical gap to be filled. 
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had on the RAF’s evolving structures and culture. David French’s study of the Army’s 
regimental system highlighted the many tensions created by this structure. As Chapters 
Two and Three suggest, the emergence of the General Duties (GD) Branch was an attempt 
to remove the problem of seniority associated with the regimental system.59 French utilised 
an understanding of culture that reinforces points made in this thesis concerning the 
relationship amongst culture, organisational structure and leadership. Timothy Bowman 
and Mark Connelly’s 2012 study on the Edwardian Army provided a useful counter-
balance to more progressive analyses of this period, like Spencer Jones’ 2012 analysis of 
tactical reform in the Army.60 While recognising that change did occur, Bowman and 
Connelly, utilising a bottom-up analysis, showed how class and social divisions fragmented 
the Army before the First World War. While the RAF did broaden its recruitment base, as 
Chapter Four discusses, elements of class and social division did remain, which, arguably 
stemmed from the Service’s Victorian and Edwardian origins and illustrates a degree of 
continuity between the services. Robert Davison’s analysis of the challenges faced by the 
Executive Branch of the RN illustrated how changing social and cultural factors 
encouraged change as the Service sought to professionalise. This change emerged as the 
Executive Branch’s position became increasingly tenuous in the face of technological 
change and the professional ethic of engineers.61 
While this thesis fills a historiographical gap concerning the inter-war RAF, it is also 
necessary to consider the state of leadership literature, as concepts from this field provide 
the conceptual framework for this study. Given the scope of the literature on leadership, 
                                                          
59 David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People c. 1870-2000 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); John James, ‘The Branch Structure of the RAF’, The Royal Air Force 
Quarterly incorporating Air Power, 18(3) (1978), pp. 249-60. 
60 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British Army, 
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what follows is but a brief overview of key trends and debates as they relate to this thesis.62 
As with many constructed concepts, leadership, split into its historical, social science, 
psychological and business schools of thought, continues to evolve and become more 
complex. However, it remains a field that suffers, as Chester Barnard stated in 1948, from 
being ‘the subject of an extraordinary amount of dogmatically stated nonsense’.63 This so-
called ‘nonsense’ emerges from the fact that everybody with some form of leadership 
experience believes they are qualified to write on the subject. An entire genre exists of 
‘airport lounge’ texts, which pervades the business school, with many drawing analogies 
from ideas developed from the writings of major military thinkers like Sun Tzu and Carl 
von Clausewitz while failing to understand their context.64 Retired officers offering their 
services to business does not help this situation. For example, Colonel (ret’d) John Warden 
III, a noted United States Air Force air power theorist, set up Venturist Incorporated in 
1995 to provide: 
an eloquent, comprehensive approach to strategy creation and execution that 
provides leaders and managers with a powerful new tool to prevail in the 
toughest competitive environments.65 
 
Clearly, Warden is trying to sell his military expertise to a market ready to accept a ‘one-size 
fits all’ solution to leadership problems. Developed through the so-called Prometheus 
Process, this system emerged out of Warden’s writings on air power theory before his 
                                                          
62 For a useful broad overview and introduction to leadership, see: Richard Bolden, Beverley Hawkins, 
Jonathan Gosling and Scott Taylor, Exploring Leadership: Individual, Organizational and Societal Perspectives 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
63 Chester Barnard, ‘The Nature of Leadership’ in Keith Grint (ed.), Leadership: Classical, Contemporary, and 
Critical Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 89. This chapter originally appeared in Chester 
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64 For example, see: Gerald Michaleson, Sun Tzu: The Art of War for Managers – 50 Strategic Rules, New Edition 
(Avon, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 2000). 
65 Quote taken from Venturist Incorporated website; http://www.venturist.com – Accessed on 17 November 
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retirement.66 Similar challenges exist in the literature on leadership development, with 
biographies and autobiographies on noted businesspeople filling shelves for those seeking a 
panacea on how to succeed.  
Leadership studies divides into four key approaches that have progressively 
followed, and built upon, one another: trait, situational, contingency and constitutive.67 
Trait theory emerged out of Thomas Carlyle’s 1841 work on heroes and heroic history, 
which formed the historic basis of ‘Great Man’ theory, which sought to identify leadership 
qualities.68 This is contextually significant for this thesis, as it formed the basis of writings 
present during Leigh-Mallory’s career that he might have read. As Chapter One explains, 
leadership during this period, in a heroic mould, focused on the way it was done rather 
than what it was. It is here that historical analysis is useful to furthering an understanding 
of leadership. For example, Sheffield’s work highlighted the importance of paternalism and 
deference in officer-man relations in the Army of the First World War, while both 
Jonathan Fennell’s and Wells’ works, albeit in differing service settings, illustrated the 
interrelationship between leadership and morale.69 These elements were key considerations 
during the inter-war years in military writings. Post-Second World War, situational analysis 
emerged based on R.M. Stodgill’s work on leadership in organisations, which stressed 
factors like context and culture, which shaped leadership styles.70 More recently, this 
                                                          
66 John Andreas Olsen, John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 
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Archaeologists in Victorian England, 1838-1886, Paperback Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 3.   
69 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches; Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The 
Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 188-218; Wells, 
Courage and Air Warfare, pp. 137-60. 
70 R.M. Stodgill, ‘Leadership, Membership, Organization’ in Grint (ed.), Leadership, p. 113. This piece first 
appeared in Psychological Bulletin, 47 (1950), pp. 1-14. 
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understanding evolved into contingency and constitutive approaches. These focused on 
understanding and challenging the nature of a leader’s context. These approaches 
developed an increasing understanding of the role of context and culture in developing 
leadership styles, which also influenced a leader’s development. While focused on 
command, Eitan Shamir rightly observed the role organisational culture plays in attempting 
to change leadership styles and leaned heavily on Edgar Schein’s own important writings 
on the subject.71 Chapter One explores the interrelationship of command and leadership; 
however, it is worth noting here that much of the literature on the former, like Martin van 
Creveld’s Command in War, focused on the system rather than the leaders in charge of it.72 
Social scientists dominate the leadership literature; however, historians increasingly 
provide necessary context to the subject. For example, as Gray’s work illustrated, cross-
pollination between the two fields can engender greater understanding of complex 
problems.73 This is not a one-way process with social scientists drawing heavily on 
historical data for analysis. Keith Grint’s work on the Normandy Campaign applied 
leadership concepts, notably Horst Rittel and Melvin Weber’s notion of ‘tame’ and ‘wicked’ 
problems, to examine decision-making challenges that confronted leaders in 1944.74 Linked 
to management, ‘tame’ problems relate to the idea that some challenges may be 
complicated but have pre-identified solutions.75 Correlated to leadership, ‘wicked’ problems 
are complex and ambiguous and have no definite short-term solutions.76 Grint built on this 
taxonomy to include ‘critical’ problems, and he is a good example of a social scientist 
                                                          
71 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, British, and Israeli Armies 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 19-23; Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 
Fourth Edition (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010). Schein’s work was first published in 1985.  
72 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
73 In general, see: Gray, Leadership. 
74 Keith Grint, Leadership, Management and Command: Rethinking D-Day (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008); Horst 
Rittel and Melvin Weber, ‘Dilemmas in the General Theory of Planning’, Policy Sciences 4(2) (1973), pp. 155-69. 
75 Keith Grint, ‘Problems, Problems, Problems: The Social Construction of ‘Leadership’’, Human Relations, 
58(11) (2005), p. 1473. 
76 Ibid. 
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utilising history effectively.77 ‘Critical’ problems focus on self-evident issues with short 
timelines for solutions, which Grint associated with the role of the commander.78 While a 
useful construct, it is, however, worth relating, as Chapter One notes in general, that such a 
distinct demarcation between command, leadership and management is potentially 
unhelpful. Gray and Sebastian Cox’s 2002 edited collection Air Power Leadership provided a 
well-balanced comparison of theoretical and historical explorations of leadership in an air 
power context.79 From the perspective of leadership development, Dennis Drew’s chapter 
on professional competency provided a framework that Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
explore: training, education and experience.80 The use of historical data by non-historians, 
however, can lead to poor and biased analysis. This is notable amongst psychological 
works. Based on extreme examples and lacking an understanding of context, Norman 
Dixon’s 1976 work The Psychology of Military Incompetence represented this field. Driven by 
Dixon’s training as a psychologist, it holds a place in the historiography that defies 
academic rigour.81 In development terms, Dixon failed to understand the structures 
involved in the production of leaders in the military while also holding biased views 
towards the public school system. Similarly, Pois and Langer, whose work also lacks rigour 
despite their backgrounds as an historian and psychologist respectively, utilised a narrow 
analysis to argue that Harris, ‘Like the cat, […] never believed there was life beyond the 
box’.82 While there is something to this argument, Pois and Langer’s analysis, unlike Gray, 
                                                          
77 This cross-pollination is perhaps unsurprising given that Grint and Gray were colleagues at the United 
Kingdom’s Defence Academy when the latter served as Director of the Defence Leadership and 
Management Centre. 
78 Grint, ‘Problems, Problems, Problems’, p. 1473. 
79 Peter Gray and Sebastian Cox (eds.), Air Power Leadership: Theory and Practice (London: The Stationary Office, 
2002). 
80 Colonel Dennis Drew, ‘The Three Pillars of Professional Competency: Imperatives for Air Power Leaders’ 
in Gray and Cox (eds.), Air Power Leadership, pp. 54-67. 
81 Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Pimlico, 1994 [1976]). 
82 Robert Pois and Philip Langer, Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2004), p. 169. 
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ignores wider contextual elements that influenced Harris’ leadership, while also being 
driven by an agenda to discredit the strategic air offensive of the Second World War on 
moral grounds.  
Besides Grint, notable names in the leadership field include John Adair, Bernard 
Bass, J.M. Burns and Barbara Kellerman. Illustrated by the fact that the latter is the James 
MacGregor Burns Lecturer in Public Leadership at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Burns and Kellerman exemplify some of the high quality work 
done in the leadership field. Adair, who developed the concept of action centred 
leadership, which focused on ‘team’, ‘task’ and ‘individual’, is highly relevant, as his ideas 
emerged from his teaching at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and have become 
standard in the British military since the 1960s.83 Before Adair’s work, a valid question 
existed: whether and how leadership, rather than command, was taught in British military 
establishments. However, Adair’s model has been criticised for being too authoritarian, 
which is probably a product of the context from which it emerged. Burns, a historian and 
political scientist, has been instrumental in the shift towards contingent models of 
leadership based on the distinction between transformational and transactional leaders that 
Bass built upon with his ‘Full Range Model of Leadership’, which sought to balance these 
two factors.84 Transformational leadership refers to those leaders able to enact change by 
identifying challenges and applying vision to inspire and motivate followers. Transactional 
leadership refers to those leaders who rely on contingent rewards, such as pay, to lead. Bass 
suggested that there are four key elements to effective leadership: individualised 
                                                          
83 For Adair’s first leadership work, see: John Adair, Effective Teambuilding: How to Make a Winning Team, New 
Revised Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009). Published in 1968, Adair has since published up to forty 
books expounding his concept of team, task and individual. On the introduction of the formal study of 
leadership at Sandhurst by Adair, see: Patrick Mileham, ‘British Army Officership: Paradigm Evolution, 1960-
2001’, (PhD Thesis, University of Lancaster, 2001), p. 139.  
84 James Macgregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Bernard Bass, Leadership and 
Performance: Beyond Expectations (New York: Free Press, 1985). 
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consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation and idealised influence. 
However, separating transformational from transactional leadership is problematic as good 
leaders recognise which is appropriate based on the context of the situation. Nevertheless, 
the broad importance of the shift towards contingency and constitutive approaches, which 
these authors represent, lies in the recognition that followers influence leadership. 
Followership is an area that Kellerman explored with specific reference to the impact of 
bad leadership and empowerment.85 Driven by good morale, empowerment in subordinates 
derives from effective leadership, which is important for two reasons. First, morale and its 
relationship with leaders was how the RAF viewed the subject of leadership. Second, 
Leigh-Mallory is often portrayed as a ‘bad leader’. Cox, Head of the RAF’s Air Historical 
Branch (AHB), used Leigh-Mallory as an example of a ‘bad leader’ in a 2006 conference 
paper on the subject of leadership. Cox questioned Leigh-Mallory’s level of professional 
competence and raised questions concerning his development.86  
Research into situational and contingency models of leadership has moved thinking 
towards the idea that effective leaders can be developed rather than just born. As with 
leadership itself, the literature is large and often open to fashions that fix to specific 
organisational paradigms. David Day offered the clearest overview of the subject in his 
2000 Leadership Quarterly article.87 Day recognised a clear delineation between leader and 
leadership development, and separated the subject between processes that develop skills 
and functions and those that produce greater benefits for organisations. However, many 
authors, including contributors to Harry Laver and Jeffrey Matthews’ 2008 edited 
                                                          
85 Barbara Kellerman, Bad Leadership: What It Is, How It Happens, Why It Matters (Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2004); Kellerman, ‘Bad Leadership – The Role of Followership’ in John Jupp (ed.), 
Air Force Leadership: Changing Culture (Sleaford: Royal Air Force Leadership Centre, 2007), pp. 34-5. 
86 Sebastian Cox, ‘Sholto Douglas and Leigh-Mallory’ in Jupp (ed.), Air Force Leadership, p. 47. 
87 David V. Day, ‘Leadership Development: A Review in Context’, The Leadership Quarterly, 11(4) (2000), pp. 
581–613. 
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collection The Art of Command, utilised the latter term as convenient shorthand.88 In 
conjunction with John Fleenor et al, Day has provided a timely update to his article, which 
reiterated many of the points made in 2000.89 Additionally, related to development 
processes is the emergence of specific patterns and career rhythms, which are framed by an 
organisation’s culture and ethos.90 As subsequent chapters illustrate, interfacing with these 
patterns as a military professional supported an officer’s development. More broadly, this 
literature parallels early writings on civil-military relations and professionalisation, especially 
that of Morris Janowitz, who suggested that specific career patterns existed for those 
seeking to enter the realms of the military elite.91 This is significant, as Leigh-Mallory and 
his peers viewed themselves as professionals and, ultimately, became members of the 
military elite. Indeed, as Alistair Finlan noted, while Janowitz and Samuel Huntington 
might not have used such language, their work on the sociological organisation of armed 
services has helped frame discussions over military culture, which inform Chapter Two.92  
 
I.3 Thesis Rationale, Research Questions and Structure 
Rather than rescuing Leigh-Mallory’s reputation, this thesis seeks to understand his rise to 
senior positions through a balanced and objective analysis of his leadership development 
up to 1937. This is a logical end to Leigh-Mallory’s development. Thereafter, Leigh-Mallory 
                                                          
88 Ibid; Harry S. Laver and Jeffrey J. Matthews (eds.), The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George 
Washington to Colin Powell (Lexington, KT: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008). 
89 David V. Day, John W. Fleenor, Leanne E. Atwater, Rachel E. Sturm, Rob A. McKee, ‘Advances in Leader 
and Leadership Development: A Review of 25 Years of Research and Theory’, The Leadership Quarterly, (2013), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2013.11.004  
90 Victor P. Corona, ‘Career Patterns in the U.S. Army Officer Corps’, Public Organization Review, 11(2) (2011), 
pp. 109-34. 
91 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: NY: Free Press, 1960). For 
an overview of the development of civil-military relations, see: Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, 
Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: NY: Free Press, 2002), pp. 225-48. 
92 Alistair Finlan, Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies: US and UK Armed Forces in the 21st Century 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 2; Samuel P. Huntington, Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practise of Civil-
Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959). 
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occupied a number of increasingly senior appointments in times of peace and war, which 
moved from group command to his final position of Air C-in-C AEAF. These positions 
increasingly encompassed challenges like implementing vision, managing relations with key 
constituents, operations, and training, amongst other aspects. However, while the 
leadership literature separates out between the roles of lower-, middle- and senior-level 
leaders, which move from technical knowledge through applying policy and strategy to 
conceptualising vision, formal distinctions like these do not easily translate to command at 
the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.93 While group command suggests a 
middle-level position, this ignores the fact that officers in these roles were involved in 
formulating and providing feedback on policy. In many respects, they were on the cusp of 
senior leadership, and many would emerge into roles where they influenced and shaped 
policy and doctrine within both an operational and organisational capacity. Furthermore, as 
Chapter One suggests, the RAF did not explicitly define what was required at different 
levels. Rather, the RAF, from the perspective of succession planning, recognised that 
attendance at Andover and the IDC, and relevant job assignments like staff duties, 
developed the capacity necessary to undertake senior roles. Furthermore, the idea that 
senior officers of two-star and above all operated at the senior/strategic level is incorrect. 
For example, Dowding, as an ACM, a senior leader, did not operate at the strategic level, as 
Fighter Command’s mission related to the operational level of war, the area at which 
campaigns are planned and fought.94 This brings into question Stephen Zaccaro’s modern 
view that senior leadership embraces three- and four-star officers, though this was derived 
                                                          
93 David V. Day and Robert G. Lord, ‘Executive Leadership and Organizational Performance: Suggestions 
for a New Theory and Methodology’, Journal of Management, 14(3) (1988), p. 459. 
94 On the debate over the operational level of war, see: Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, 
Revised and Enlarged Edition (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 
112-37. On Britain’s experience in general, see: Hew Strachan, ‘Operational Art and Britain, 1909-2009’ in 
John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld (eds.), The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 96-136.  
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from an examination of the American military and cannot be easily transferred to historical 
examples.95 Nevertheless, if it is accepted that senior leadership involves greater strategic 
planning and the targeting of areas like policy and resources, then command at the group 
level did indicate elements of this. For example, in his 1937 RUSI lecture on air policing, 
AC Portal noted that he was required, as AOC Aden Command, to interface with various 
external organisations.96 Accepting this methodological challenge of defining senior 
leadership, this thesis accepts that one- and two-star appointments were at least moving 
towards this sphere for which officers had been nurtured; the focus of this study. 
This thesis examines Leigh-Mallory’s rise to senior leadership through an 
interdisciplinary methodology utilising prosopography and modern leadership theory. It 
seeks to answer several questions concerning Leigh-Mallory and, more broadly, the RAF’s 
development of leaders. First, it strives to understand how an officer with so many 
perceived detractors reached senior leadership positions by comparing his experience to 
385 peers from March 1918. Second, it answers the question of how the RAF viewed 
leadership and examines its links to the development of social and organisational capital. 
Third, it considers whether the RAF implemented a policy of succession planning through 
the adoption of specific career processes and promotion procedures, which actively 
nurtured specific officers’ abilities in preparation for senior leadership. Finally, this thesis 
argues that to understand specific career rhythms and patterns, an understanding of an 
organisation’s culture and ethos is required to conceptualise how leadership development is 
both constrained and reinforced by this factor. 
                                                          
95 Stephen J. Zaccaro, The Nature of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis of Success 
(Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2001), p. 27. 
96 Air Commodore C.F.A. Portal, DSO, MC, idc, ‘Air Force Co-Operation in Policing the Empire (lecture)’, 
JRUSI, 82 (1937), pp. 343-58. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Introduction Page 35 
 
While summaries appear at the start of each chapter, this thesis is split into seven 
sections and follows a thematic outline with each section building a layered interpretation 
of the RAF’s leadership development processes. Chapters One and Two provide the 
intellectual context for this thesis. Chapter One examines key leadership concepts while 
seeking to understand how the RAF defined and applied this term. In particular, it focuses 
on the relationship between leadership and fighting power, which formed the nexus of the 
RAF’s understanding of the concept at this time, though the language used to describe it 
was immature. This chapter then links this understanding to a discussion of leadership 
development and of how the RAF used modern techniques like nurturing, socialisation, 
action learning and job assignments to develop its organisational capacity. However, the 
use of such language remains a challenge, given what the RAF understood by such terms 
and how the Service measured and tracked performance. Nevertheless, these techniques 
are linked to a framework that identifies training, education and experience as the key 
pillars of leadership development, which form the core of Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
Chapter Two builds on the previous chapter by exploring the organisational culture and 
ethos of the RAF. It argues that the assumptions, beliefs and values that underpinned RAF 
culture found their outgrowth in its organisational structure, the GD Branch, and its 
leadership development processes. This was further reinforced by pilot ethos, which led to 
the targeting of specific types of officers for nurturing. Chapter Three begins the process 
of analysing data that emerged from the prosopography study of Appendices Three and 
Four. It highlights the key patterns that emerged, which form the basis of a broader 
qualitative analysis in subsequent chapters, and then discusses some of the challenges 
inherent in the promotion system of the RAF as they relate to leadership development. 
Chapter Four begins the process of broadening the analysis of the patterns identified in 
Chapter Three by examining the importance of public school education and related 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Introduction Page 36 
 
aspects, such as partaking in team sports and membership of the Officer Training Corps 
(OTC). It highlights the transposition of broader social values, as taught through various 
means in public schools, to those valued by the military. Chapter Five examines the role of 
training in terms of providing a shared experience and ethos for those officers considered 
in this thesis. However, this chapter recognises the challenge of considering the role of 
training, given that it was split between pre-war regulars, who went through Army and RN 
regimes, and those who received wartime preparation. Key here was the role of pilot 
training in reinforcing the emerging ethos of flying. Chapter Six examines the important 
issue of military education and covers attendance at Andover, the other service’s staff 
colleges and the IDC, as well as considering whether anti-intellectualism pervaded the RAF 
through an examination of what officers wrote. This latter aspect is identified as a key 
aspect of action learning and did not retard promotion prospects, but was limited to trusted 
officers who had Staff College experience, thus highlighting the importance of this job 
assignment. Finally, Chapter Seven examines the role that key job assignments like 
operational command experience, staff duties, and teaching and training positions played in 
the career patterns and leadership development of nurtured officers. This aspect is 
important because it was widely recognised that, while it was crucial, education could not 
counteract the value of experience.  
 
I.4 Methodology and Sources 
Leigh-Mallory’s sudden death on 14 November 1944 created a methodological conundrum 
for this thesis; his Avro York, which was transporting him and his wife to his new 
command as Air C-in-C South East Asia, crashed into a mountain ridge east of Grenoble 
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in France.97 Principally, unlike many peers, Leigh-Mallory never wrote a memoir and left 
scant personal papers. Held by the RAF Museum (RAFM) and described by Guy Revell, 
Assistant Curator in the Archives Division, as ‘disappointingly devoid’ of any paperwork 
relating to his RAF service, Leigh-Mallory’s paltry papers are a collection of photographs 
and letters covering personal aspects of his early life and military service.98 While Jeremy 
Black lamented that ‘Military biography has provided another way to make operational 
military history commercially successful’, Leigh-Mallory’s papers are hardly enough with 
which to construct a rigorous academic biography.99  However, biographies by authors like 
Orange, Richards and Probert represent useful examples of the genre that are grounded in 
more than just personal papers, which could distort objectivity and interpretation. Treated 
with care, these have been used accordingly in this thesis. Furthermore, a biography would 
provide little insight into the organisational culture that nurtured Leigh-Mallory’s leadership 
competency, and would therefore not allow this thesis to answer its central question of 
how he reached senior leadership positions. Another research challenge related to access to 
the RAF’s Annual Confidential Report (ACR), Form 367, which would offer an insight into 
an officer’s abilities. However, those ACRs, contained within service records, related to 
officers who served after 1922 are held by the RAF and are only available to relatives. 
Therefore, this thesis utilises prosopography as a methodology to construct a comparative 
career map of Leigh-Mallory and his peers as they emerged into senior leadership positions 
during the inter-war period, thus overcoming the source issue identified above. Alongside 
an examination of key job assignments, this methodology suggests that the RAF nurtured 
                                                          
97 Paperwork related to issues that emanated from Leigh-Mallory’s crash can be found in various Air Ministry 
files. For example, see: TNA, AIR 2/10593, Court of Inquiry into the disappearance of aircraft York MW 126 
on 14 November 1944 with Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory on board; TNA, AIR 37/1109, 
Missing York aircraft carrying Air Chief Marshal Leigh Mallory, date opened 15 November 1944. 
98 Letter to the author dated 13 June 2008. 
99 Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. 37. 
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officers like Leigh-Mallory. It is through this methodology that this thesis delivers its social 
aspect, as it examines the shared experiences and characteristics of a group of officers who 
reached senior leadership positions. 
Prosopography gained prominence amongst ancient and medieval historians, who 
used it to re-discover the collective history of groups of people lost to the present. It has 
also been utilised by political historians seeking to analyse quantitative patterns related to 
career and social backgrounds. Recent key proponents have been Gideon Cohen, Kevin 
Morgan and Andrew Flinn, who worked on an Economic and Social Research Council 
funded project on the prosopography of ‘Communism and the British Labour 
Movement’.100 The project analysed:  
the activities of communists within the broader labour and trade union 
movement and specifically their contribution to the distinctive patterns of 
British industrial relations. (Emphasis added)101 
 
The emergence of ‘distinctive patterns’ is the key advantage of prosopography, as it allows 
for an analysis of typical patterns that occur in the population. While prosopography 
remains an underused tool in military history, several recent studies into Army officers of 
the First World War have made use of it to examine patterns in their selected 
prosopography populations.102 Peter Hodgkinson, a clinical psychologist and historian, 
utilised The Army List, in both its quarterly and monthly variants, in much the same way this 
thesis uses The Air Force List (AFL) to provide basic biographical details from which to 
                                                          
100 For details of this project, see: ‘Communism and the British Labour Movement: A Prosopographical 
Analysis’, Economic and Social Research Council - http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-
esrc/grants/R000237924/read  - Accessed on 16 January 2014. 
101 Ibid. The key output from this project remains Kevin Morgan, Andrew Flinn and Gidon Cohen, 
Communists and British Society 1920-1991: People of a Special Mould (London: Rivers Oram Press, 2007). Also, see: 
Gidon Cohen, ‘Propensity-Score Methods and the Lenin School’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 36(2) 
(2005), pp. 209-32. 
102 Peter Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First World War (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 
Hodgkinson’s book is based on his 2014 University of Birmingham PhD of the same name. Also, see: Paul 
Harris, ‘The Men who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army 1914-1918’, (PhD Thesis, 
King’s College London, 2014).  
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analyse the similarities and disjunctions in each work’s respective prosopography 
populations.103  In its basic form, prosopography is:  
the inquiry into the common characteristics of a group of historical actors by 
means of a collective study of their lives.104  
 
Essentially a collective biography, prosopography parallels methods utilised in sub-
disciplines like biography and genealogy, which all have a role in providing data for the 
process. From a leadership perspective, John Shoup argued that, ‘Leadership studies will 
benefit from […] prospography on exemplary and competent leaders’.105 Therefore, it is 
accepted that leadership development will also benefit from prosopography because it 
encourages interdisciplinary study.106 Thus, bringing together a conceptual framework 
linked to leadership theory, this methodology allows for a consideration of how the RAF 
and its institutions nurtured future leaders and their development, as well as examining 
wider questions, such as the role and effectiveness of military education generally and 
Andover more specifically. Furthermore, prosopography allows for an examination of key 
career patterns and job assignments present for those officers who reached Air Rank by 
1939 as well as the rhythms extant in the selected population. By identifying key similarities 
and disjunctions between Leigh-Mallory and his peers, it is possible to offer an insight into 
which factors and processes were present in the RAF that led to his rise in a comparative 
context. 
                                                          
103 Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders, pp. 6-7. 
104 Lawrence Stone, ‘Prosopography’, Daedalus, 100(1) (1971), pp. 46-79. Stone remains the common cited 
work on prosopography; for example, for a recent citation, see: Kathleen E. Kennedy, ‘Prosopography of the 
Book and the Politics of Legal Language in Late Medieval England’, Journal of British Studies, 53(3) (2014), p. 
566, fn. 2. For a broader examination of prosopography’s definition, see: Koenraad Verboven, Myriam 
Carlier and Jan Dumolyn, ‘A Short Manual to the Art of Prosopography’ in K.S.B. Keats-Rohan (ed.), 
Prosopography Approaches and Applications: A Handbook (Oxford: Unit for Prosopographical Research, 2007), pp. 
37-41. 
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(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), p. 12. 
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Prosopography, however, as with any methodology, is not free from criticism. In 
1973, just two years after Lawrence Stone’s commonly cited work on the subject, T.F. 
Carney provided a critique of prosopography.107 Carney was critical of the question of 
sources used in prosopography and argued that their variable quality, as it related to the 
classical world, meant that historians had to make assumptions about their subject matter, 
which in turn affected the quality of subsequent analysis.108 This also applies to modern 
studies where memoirs, biographies and autobiographies tend to be key sources. The 
challenge here is that such published works have already been through one analytical filter, 
and their overuse can lead to the acceptance of inherent bias. Similarly, the overuse of 
published sources tends to lead to a focus on those leaders who have produced their own 
memoir or have had a biography written about them, which raises the challenge of source 
subjectivity and their utility. While this thesis makes use of biographies and memoirs, an 
attempt has been made to abrogate against the aforementioned methodological challenge 
by returning to primary material, like personal papers and operational records, to develop 
an empirical study. Other potential challenges include the thematic nature of the 
prosopography population and the ability to differentiate between correlation and causality. 
By focusing on Leigh-Mallory’s peers, this thesis examines only those officers who were 
pilots. However, the importance of this is that it brings into sharp relief a key aspect of the 
RAF; the importance of pilot ethos and its links to leadership development, which is 
considered in Chapters One and Two.109 On the challenge of correlation, the use of 
primary sources concerning the key themes examined in this thesis allows for a qualitative 
analysis that seeks to correlate between the general patterns identified and how they relate 
                                                          
107 T.F. Carney, ‘Prosopography: Payoffs and Pitfalls’, Pheonix, 27(2) (1973), pp. 156-79. 
108 Ibid, pp. 164-73. 
109 Verboven, Carlier and Dumolyn, ‘A Short Manual to the Art of Prosopography’, p. 51-2. 
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to Leigh-Mallory specifically, in order to reconceptualise his place in the RAF’s leadership 
development processes.110  
The key contemporary source utilised to construct the prosopography population is 
the AFL.111 Utilisation of the AFL grounds the analysis in this thesis in a consistent source 
around which other material is used to build up an understanding of leadership 
development in the RAF. First published in April 1918 and underused by academic 
historians, the AFL is widely used as a genealogical tool to trace individual careers. James, 
in his social history of the inter-war RAF, The Paladins, remains the only study to 
substantively utilise the AFL. James, a civilian psychologist who worked for the Air 
Ministry during the Cold War, introduced some of the social and organisational issues 
faced by the RAF in this period; however, he did not utilise the AFL in a systematic 
manner to examine them. Instead, statistics drawn from the AFL reinforced James’ 
assumptions rather than driving analysis. James’ chapter on ‘Officers and Pilots’ made 
selective use of data from the May 1933 edition of the AFL to outline details of officers 
postings, but did not analyse patterns derived from this source.112 James made no further 
use of these statistics in his study. Nevertheless, the AFL contains a multitude of useful 
information, though it was an ever-evolving document with changing content. For 
example, by 1939, due to the expansion of the RAF, the AFL only provided a list of 
squadrons rather than including officers attached to these units. The AFL also outlined the 
RAF’s structure, from the Air Ministry and Air Council down to individual squadrons. 
Provided in various ways, information on officers in the AFL ranged from their rank and 
                                                          
110 On the challenge of qualitative and quantitative analysis in prosopography, see: Gidon Cohen, Andrew 
Flinn and Kevin Morgan, ‘Towards A Mixed Method Social History: Combining Quantitative and Qualitative 
Methods in the Study of Collective Biography’ in Keats-Rohan (ed.), Prosopography Approaches and Applications, 
pp. 211-30. 
111 For a brief outline of The Air Force List, see: Simon Fowler, Peter Elliott, Roy Conyers Nesbitt and 
Christina Goulter, RAF Records in the PRO (London: PRO Publications, 1994), p. 30. 
112 James, The Paladins, pp. 133-4. 
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seniority in the gradation list to their appointments and postings details, highlighting the 
date at which each position began. It is also possible to track individual careers through the 
AFL. It is possible to map the rise and fall of the service’s strength using the gradation list, 
as the total number of officers is given at the end of each rank in each RAF branch. For 
example, in March 1920, there were six AVMs in the GD Branch, whereas there were 24 
by March 1939.113 This was Leigh-Mallory’s rank in 1939. 
Instead of using data selectively to track the career of an individual officer, the 
AFL is used to map the careers of Leigh-Mallory and 385 of his peers. Found in Appendix 
Three, this mapping exercise focused on officers holding appointments as either Squadron 
or Wing Commanders in the March 1918 editions of The Army List and the January 1918 
edition of The Navy List; the latter was produced quarterly. Chosen as this was the last 
month before the formation of the RAF on 1 April 1918, March 1918 provided an 
opportunity to compare officers of similar ranks and appointments from the RFC and 
Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). The prosopography population divides into 295 
Squadron and 91 Wing Commanders, which were appointments rather than ranks.114 
Squadron Commanders in the RFC held the rank of Major, while Wing Commanders were 
Lieutenant-Colonels (LtCol). These officers represent Leigh-Mallory’s peers and include 
notable names such as Portal and Tedder. Of the officers selected, 57 Squadron 
Commanders and 14 Wing Commanders remained in service in March 1939. This thesis 
focuses on patterns and rhythms extant in the careers of those 71 officers, though more 
specifically it engages closely with the 43 who reached Air Rank by March 1939. Left out 
are notable names like Slessor and Park, which illustrates the key limitation of this thesis: 
the arbitrary decision to start the analysis of officers’ progression in March 1918. However, 
                                                          
113 The Air Force List, March 1920; The Air Force List, March 1939. 
114 The Army List, March 1918; The Navy List, January 1918 
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while both significant officers; Slessor and Park were Flight Commanders in March 1918. 
The addition of this group would have made the methodology unnecessarily large and time 
consuming for the purpose of the analysis herein, though it is admitted it might have 
further enriched this study. Nevertheless, broadly, both Park and Slessor went through 
similar patterns, such as attendance at Andover and the IDC, and staff work; though, as 
noted elsewhere, the former did not experience positions in the Air Ministry, nor as DS. 
While Slessor did serve as DS and experienced Air Ministry appointments, he did not 
attend the IDC due to the outbreak of the Second World War, but did become its 
Commandant in 1948.115 
Besides the AFL, and in an attempt to avoid being criticised as being hagiographic, 
this thesis draws on numerous sources to develop a qualitative understanding of officers 
careers. In terms of printed materials, contemporary sources like The London Gazette and 
Flight, and secondary material including biographies and The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, are utilised to confirm biographical details and key events. This thesis draws on 
material extant in personal papers located at archival institutions, such as Portal’s papers at 
Christ Church, University of Oxford. For officers who reached Air Rank, the author has 
been able to draw on public relations files held at the RAFM, which contain information 
collated by the RAF during careers.116 On personal papers, it is worth highlighting that, 
while a valuable source, they vary considerably both in scope and quality. Some, like the 
papers of AVM Sir Hazleton Nicholl and Group Captain (GC) George Carmichael, contain 
useful unpublished memoirs with valuable information of experience both during and pre-
                                                          
115 However, it should be recognised that Slessor’s appointment as Commandant was tied up in the question 
of who should succeed Tedder as CAS, see: Orange, Tedder, p. 319. 
116 Held at the RAFM, this material can be found in DC76; however, it should be noted that records of 
service in these files are not available to members of the public. 
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service.117 Andover’s records, located at the RAFM, have been assiduously used, as have 
personal recollections by Staff College students, which are located in AIR 1 at The 
National Archives, Kew. Additionally, files drawn from Admiralty, Air Ministry and War 
Office files at Kew provide the necessary context to many of the experiences shared by 
these officers. This information, combined with the AFL, allowed for the construction of a 
comparative biography that provides a firm foundation for analysing the markers laid out 
above and examined further in subsequent chapters.  
                                                          
117 RAFM, Personal Papers of Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hazleton Nicholl, X005-0949/001, Journeys and Records, 
1915-1939 (Unpublished Memoir, ND); RAFM, Personal Papers of Group Captain George Carmichael, 
B2191, Life Record of Group Captain George Ivan Carmichael RAF, DSO, AFC (Unpublished Memoir, ND). 
Chapter One 
Leadership, Leadership Development and the Royal Air Force 
 
The modern system of command has in fact guillotined generalship, hence, 
modern battles have degenerated into saurian writhings between headless 
monsters. 
Major-General J.F.C. Fuller1 
 
While focused on aspects of heroic leadership, simply defined as that done by ‘gifted, 
committed, brave, ambitious or […] exceptional, individuals’, Fuller’s work suggested 
characteristics, like courage and creative thinking, that military leaders required in order to 
be effective, as well as offering thoughts on how to remedy the problems that he identified 
in British generals of the First World War.2 On courage, Fuller suggested that it was the 
‘driving force’ of an army because it was ‘a living thing, built of flesh and blood and not 
iron and steel’.3 While not using modern language, Fuller argued that effective leadership 
development abrogated against what he perceived as the impersonal effects of modern 
industrialised warfare, which he suggested, in part, led to the challenges encountered in the 
First World War. Most radically, Fuller supported the Napoleonic view that generals over 
45 should not be active; though, significantly for this study, he also advocated effective 
education as the most appropriate basis for a leader’s development.4 Fuller’s study is a key 
example of inter-war leadership literature and replicated themes prevalent in British military 
doctrine. Fuller also lectured at Andover, which key officers attended.5 By 1939, Fuller’s 
                                                          
1 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship – Its Disease and their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1933), p. 16. 
2 Bolden et al, Exploring Leadership, p. 15. 
3 Fuller, Generalship, p. 14.  
4 Ibid, pp. 32-5. 
5 RAFM, AIR 69/57, Lecture on the Supremacy of Air Power by Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, CBE, DSO, 30 
November 1928. 
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work Generalship regularly appeared on the reading list at Andover.6 However, Fuller, as a 
leading military thinker, pursued an agenda on how he felt the Army and the broader 
military establishment should be managed. Fuller also held strong opinions on senior 
leaders like Field Marshal Earl Haig. For example, with specific reference to ‘Plan 1919’, 
which Fuller drew up in 1918 as a means of breaking trench warfare, he wrote in his 
memoir that the concept remained a ‘sealed book to Sir Douglas Haig and his like’.7 
However, as Albert Palazzo argued, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) could afford 
neither the manpower nor the materials required to implement Plan 1919 despite Fuller’s 
subsequent views.8 Furthermore, as Sheffield and David Jordan illustrated with specific 
reference to air power, Haig used Trenchard as a subject matter expert and regularly 
listened to his key advisors, which counters Fuller’s critique.9  However, Fuller’s focus on 
heroic leaders fits the ‘Great Man’ theory of history predominant in leadership writings of 
the period. Fuller quoted Carlyle, writing that ‘heroism’ is ‘the divine relation’ that ‘unites a 
Great Man to other men’.10 Nevertheless, to this day, leadership remains an often discussed 
but widely misunderstood phenomenon. For example, as Gray suggested, leadership during 
the inter-war years was more about ‘what one did, rather than what was studied’.11 
However, as this chapter illustrates, officers did understand something about the subject. 
Thus, this chapter does not seek to expound a new paradigm, but rather explores key 
leadership thinking and its development to provide the conceptual framework to this 
                                                          
6 RAFM, AIR 69/279, Appendix “B” to Exercise No. 10 on Reading – Leadership and Morale: Bibliography 
of Books Available in the Library, 17th Course, RAF Staff College, April 1939, p. 5. It is interesting to note 
that a typographic error crept into this list and listed Fuller’s work as Comardeship – Its Disease and their Cure, 
which was probably not what was being aimed for.  
7 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936), 
p. 461. 
8 Albert Palazzo, ‘Plan 1919 – The Other One’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research (JSAHR), 77 
(1999), pp. 39-50. 
9 Gary Sheffield and David Jordan, ‘Douglas Haig and Air Power’ in Gray and Cox (eds.), Air Power 
Leadership, pp. 264-82. 
10 Fuller, Generalship, p. 19. 
11 Gray, Leadership, p. 39. 
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thesis. First, linked to the concept of fighting power, this chapter argues that leadership was 
the nexus of RAF thinking on war. It then considers what the RAF understood by 
leadership and the key characteristics it valued. The chapter then focuses on the interrelated 
themes of leader and leadership development and suggests that the RAF tangentially 
recognised elements of both processes as it sought to nurture future senior officers. It then 
links this to professionalism and succession planning.  
 
1.1 The Importance of Leadership 
Before examining RAF views on leadership, it is useful to outline its relationship to the 
effective application of military force that centres on the delivery of fighting power. 
Defined as the effective delivery of military capability to fight battles, campaigns and wars, 
modern capstone British Defence Doctrine (BDD) separates fighting power into a trinity of 
moral, conceptual and physical components, which Diagram 1.1 illustrates. Capstone 
defines doctrine that enunciates strategic principles to a service, or, in the case of BDD, a 
joint concept of operations for the British military. Each component splits further, with the 
conceptual element consisting of the principles of war, doctrine and theoretical 
innovation.12 The generation of effective fighting power is central to military organisations, 
as it is what they spend their time training for in peace. The physical component consists of 
manpower, equipment, readiness, sustainability and collective performance, while the moral 
constitutes morale, motivation and, most importantly, leadership.13 Fighting power as a 
term is inconsistently applied; for example, Murray, Allan Millett and Kenneth Watman 
lacked a clear differentiation between it and combat power, while Stephen Biddle preferred 
                                                          
12 British Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, Fourth Edition (Shrivenham: The Development, 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2011), pp. 4-1. 
13 Ibid. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Leadership, Leadership Development and the Royal Air Force Page 48 
 
the term ‘military power’.14 As suggested below, the RAF, and the British military in 
general, understood the term fighting power with specific reference to the moral 
component of war. However, a reciprocal relationship exists between these components, 
with leadership forming the core of this trinity as it drives the moral component on which 
the success of other elements is contingent. With reference to the conceptual component, 
the development of doctrine requires capable leaders to develop it while effective 
manpower management develops morale and motivation in the moral sphere. Even 
Creveld admitted that leadership, ‘perhaps more than any other [factor,] decides the 
outcome of wars’, while Alan Howley argued, ‘It is axiomatic in a military population that 
fighting power requires appropriate leadership’.15 Geoffrey Sloan challenged this argument, 
suggesting that both the physical and moral components are contingent on the conceptual 
element, which highlights a doctrinal view of the delivery of fighting power that Biddle 
supported.16  
                                                          
14 Allan Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’ in 
Allan Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War (Boston, MA: 
Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 2-3; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 5-9. 
15 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour 
Press, 1983), p. 127; Alan Howley, ‘People not Personnel: The Human Dimension of Fighting Power’ in Hew 
Strachan (ed.), The British Army, Manpower and Society in the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 
213. This trinity has been replicated in leadership theory, see: Brian Howieson and Howard Kahn, 
‘Leadership, Command and Management: The Officer’s Trinity’ in Gray and Cox (eds.), Air Power Leadership, 
pp. 15-40. 
16 Geoffrey Sloan, ‘Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis 
and Theory’, International Affairs, 88(2) (2012), p. 243; Biddle, Military Power, p. 1. 
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Diagram 1.1 – The Three Components of Fighting Power (Source: BDD) 
 
Sloan’s doctrinal view derived from the British military’s own refocus towards the 
operational level of war in the 1980s, which sought to find a panacea to the challenges of 
modern war in the late- and post-Cold War era.17 Before this, the British military 
maintained a more flexible doctrinal approach that relied heavily on a leader’s decision-
making abilities, which is an aspect lacking in both Biddle’s and Sloan’s analysis. While 
doctrine is a useful guide to how a service thinks about its role, it can be easy for it to 
become a set of prescribed rules, as well as being influenced by external factors, such as 
changing perceptions of the character of the defence establishment. For example, in 2013, 
                                                          
17 In general, see: Sangho Lee, ‘Deterrence and Defence of Central Europe: The British Role from the Early 
1980s to the End of the Gulf War’, (PhD Thesis, King’s College London, 1994). It worth noting that the 
modern RAF have been supportive of this doctrinal shift, and, in conjunction with factors like the 
establishment of the post of DDefS in 1977, the Service has slowly felt its way towards a new capstone 
doctrine of its own, AP3000 British Air Power Doctrine, which was first published in 1991, see: Lee, ‘Deterrence 
and Defence’, pp. 168-170; Group Captain Christopher Finn, ‘British Thinking on Air Power: The Evolution 
of AP3000’, RAF Air Power Review (APR), 12(1) (2009), pp. 56-67. For a modern critique of AP3000 and its 
perceived shortcomings at identifying differences between the strategic and operational levels, see: Squadron 
Leader John Moloney, ‘Talking Point – A Critique of RAF Air Power Doctrine’, The Hawk Journal (1995), pp. 
72-8. The Hawk was the independent journal of the RAF Staff College and is discussed in Chapter Six. 
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AP3000, British Air and Space Power Doctrine became Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30, UK Air 
and Space Power Doctrine, which illustrates the further integration of the RAF into the joint 
sphere that has become increasing common in the twenty-first century.18 The modern 
conception of authoritative doctrine is potentially unhelpful in any analysis of the period 
covered in this thesis, as the codification of such terms was immature. 
For the RAF, its conception of command, leadership and morale paralleled modern 
thinking on the moral component of war. RAF officers grasped the importance of 
leadership and its implications for generating fighting power. This was because the RAF 
argued that good leadership affected factors such as morale, motivation and esprit-de-corps, 
which influenced unit cohesion and effectiveness.19 External factors like different doctrines, 
language, training and culture also created friction and played a contingent role in 
influencing the actions of leaders and their ability to generate fighting power. A failure to 
recognise the importance of these factors can lead to the mishandling of inter- and intra-
service relations and those in coalitions. Concerning Leigh-Mallory, at a senior level, there 
are genuine questions surrounding his ability to manage friction in his relationships with 
fellow commanders and the influence this had on the generation of fighting power at the 
operational and strategic levels. For example, valid questions can be asked of Leigh-
Mallory’s ability to enunciate aspects like doctrine and operational directives to 
subordinates, of how well he managed the preparations of the physical components of his 
commands, such as manpower, and regarding the implications this had on their 
                                                          
18 UK Air and Space Power Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30 (Shrivenham: The Development, Concepts 
and Doctrine Centre, 2013). 
19 RAFM, AIR 69/61, Conference No. 5, Morale: Espirit-de-Corps in the RAF, RAF Staff College, 7th Course, 
18 July 1929. WgCr Arthur Tedder oversaw this conference. For a useful overview of cohesion, and one that 
stresses the role of leadership, see: W.D Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element (Washington DC: National 
Defence University Press, 1985). The starting point for discussion on the relationship between cohesion and 
motivation remains Edward Shills and Morris Janowitz, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in 
World War II’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 12(2) (1948), pp. 280-315. For an up to date overview, see: Simon 
Wessely, ‘Twentieth-Century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown’, Journal of Contemporary History 
(JCH), 41(2) (2006), pp. 269-86. 
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effectiveness as at 12 Group in 1940. Additionally, Leigh-Mallory’s management of key 
relationships with the other services of the British military and with allies in 1944 requires 
further examination. This discussion, while ostensibly lying outside of the scope of this 
thesis, stimulates questions concerning Leigh-Mallory’s preparation for senior leadership 
that constitute its focus, and asks whether he was suitable for the responsibilities ultimately 
devolved to him through various appointments.  
Flexible leadership was recognised as vital in generating fighting power. In 1939, 
General Sir Archibald Wavell suggested in his Sir Lees Knowles Lectures at Trinity College, 
University of Cambridge that commanders required an effective knowledge base about 
each service and their respective doctrines to ‘bring success for a future war’.20 Wavell’s 
views derived from both his personal experience and the Army’s Field Service Regulations 
(FSR). The Times published these lectures as a pamphlet in 1941, and, despite his most 
recent biographer contending that they were not widely distributed, a copy can be found in 
AM Ralph Sorley’s papers at the RAFM, which illustrates their distribution within the 
services.21 A more overt statement concerning the importance of leadership emerged as 
early as 1913 in an article on naval tactics in the first issue of The Naval Review (TNR). It 
stated:  
All the elements of fighting power are functions of the human element. It is 
evident that leadership is the central influence of the battle; on its direction 
depends the right application of all the other elements of force. (Emphasis 
added)22  
 
                                                          
20 General Sir Archibald Wavell, Generals and Generalship (London: The Times, 1941), p. 10; RAFM, Personal 
Papers of Air Marshal Ralph Sorley, AC 72/19/26/5, Personal Copy of Generals and Generalship. 
21 Victoria Schofield, Wavell: Soldier and Statesman (London: John Murray, 2006), p. 124. 
22 Anon, ‘Studies in the Theory of Naval Tactics – I’, The Naval Review (TNR), 1(1) (1913), p. 24. This article 
was attributed to Captain E.W. Harding RMA, who served as the assistant to the Director of Naval 
Operations. See: Appendix C: ‘Author List for The Naval Review 1913-1930’ in James Goldrick and John B. 
Hattendorf (eds.), Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral 
Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1993), pp. 341-405. On the history of The Naval 
Review see: Peter Hoare (ed.), From Dreadnought to Daring: 100 Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in The 
Naval Review (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2012). 
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Flanking the period covered by this thesis, both of these sources illustrate the continuity 
present in many military writings of this period as well as the prevalent focus on the moral 
component that made its way into RAF capstone doctrine. Chapter III of AP1300 on 
‘Command, Leadership and Morale’ further stated that ‘success in war’, the generation of 
fighting power, ‘depends more on moral than on physical qualities’, illustrating a cognitive 
link between these facets of fighting power, with leadership driving the physical 
components.23 A degree of osmosis appeared between the services thinking on the subject 
of fighting power, and, as Parton further noted, CD22, the RAF’s first capstone doctrine, 
derived from FSR I - Operations, and this influence filtered into AP1300.24 Indeed, the line 
‘Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities’ in AP1300 is a direct 
quote from the 1909 edition of FSR I.25 These ideas derived from a shared set of 
‘Principles of War’, which, as Alaric Searle argued, helped the British military develop a 
broad strategic culture based on common ideas.26 Broadly, leadership thinking in the British 
military followed this path and provided a common framework from which such principles 
emerged. As Chapter Six illustrates, effective military education through the staff colleges 
and the IDC provided the leadership development necessary to produce officers 
conversant in broad strategic principles, as well as those of their own service, which 
influenced the conceptual component of war. AP1300 further noted that the application of 
the principles of war required leadership skills like perception and balanced judgement that 
emerged from a ‘sound knowledge of war based on practical experience and study’.27 While 
this was tempered by RAF culture and the recognition that ‘personal experience’ could be 
                                                          
23 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III, Para. 1. 
24 Parton, ‘Royal Air Force Doctrine’, p. 73 
25 War Office, Field Service Regulations Part 1 – Operations (London: HMSO, 1909), p. 11. 
26 Alaric Searle, ‘Inter-service Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture: The ‘Principles of War’ in the 
British Armed Forces, 1919–1939’, War in History (WiH), 21(1) (2014), pp. 4-32. 
27 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. I, Para. 10. 
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‘strictly limited’, job assignments like staff duties prepared nurtured officers to look up and 
out of their single service ‘silo’.28 Furthermore, in a 1932 RAFQ article, WgCr H.N. 
Gordon-Dean wrote:  
War is, and will ever be, a matter between human beings, and […] the intimate 
relationship between mankind will still be the greatest factor in the art of war.29  
 
This link between leadership, morale and fighting power remained explicit in various 
publications including The Hawk, Andover’s journal.30 Leadership as a central influence on 
the conduct and outcome of war was a precept that Leigh-Mallory understood. 
 
1.2 Defining Leadership 
Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, as with many former senior officers, like the former’s 
bête noir Field Marshal Viscount Slim of Burma, understood the intangibles associated with 
leadership and recognised the challenges inherent in ensuring one’s subordinates followed 
orders.31 In his 1961 volume The Path to Leadership, Montgomery noted: 
Expressed in its simplest terms, a leader is one who can get people to follow 
him. Such a person can, of course, be good or bad.32 
 
Slim’s view centred on an understanding of maintaining morale to deliver fighting power.33 
This focus on leader-follower relationships is, in a modern sense, indicative of 
transformational leadership. Burns and Bass saw the need to maintain a balance between 
                                                          
28 Ibid, Chap. 1, Para 10; Gray, Leadership, pp. 2-3. 
29 Wing-Commander H. Gordon-Dean, AFC, psa, RAF, ‘The Development of Leadership and Morale in the 
Royal Air Force’, The Royal Air Force Quarterly (RAFQ), 3(1) (1932), p. 23. 
30 Anon, ‘Leadership and Morale’, The Hawk: The Journal of the Royal Air Force Staff College, 2 (1929), pp. 161-71; 
Anon, ‘Leadership and Morale’, The Hawk, 11 (1938), pp. 119-20 
31 The relationship between Slim and Montgomery became contentious when the latter preferred and 
mentored Lieutenant-General Sir John Crocker as his successor as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 
1949. Instead, the Prime Minister, Sir Clement Attlee, appointed Slim, which created tension, see: Ronald 
Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer (London: Wordsworth, 1999 [1976]), pp. 263-5; Douglas Delaney, ‘A Quiet 
Man of Influence: General Sir John Crocker’, JSAHR, 85(3) (2007), pp. 185–207. 
32 Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, The Path to Leadership (New York: Putnam’s and Son, 
1961), p. 9. 
33 Field Marshal Viscount Slim of Burma, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in India and Burma, 1942-1945 
(London: Cassell, 1956), p. 182. 
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leader-followers as a prerequisite to improve organisational performance.34 Bass further 
suggested that this relationship is generated through influence, motivation, stimulation and 
consideration. It is a relationship based on balancing factors like morale, cohesion and 
empowerment of subordinates. However, Bolden et al rightly identified that 
transformational leadership can quickly become toxic, which has been an area of enquiry 
for the modern US Army during recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.35 While falling 
outside of the scope of this thesis, given the prevailing, but questionable, views on Leigh-
Mallory’s competency, it is tempting to suggest that the focus on heroic leadership by the 
RAF, which paralleled the charismatic aspects identified here, saw his conduct go ‘toxic’ 
during the Second World War. This question requires a deeper psychological study of 
Leigh-Mallory to suggest whether he illustrated the characteristics indicative of a toxic 
leader, which include being insular, intemperate, inflexible and narcissistic, and a bully 
amongst others. It is worth recognising, however, that either Leigh-Mallory was just a bad 
leader or his leadership style did not always suit some of those under his command. 
Similarly, many views of Leigh-Mallory’s leadership emerged after the Second World War, 
when he was not able to defend himself. Furthermore, Kellerman’s own 2004 study into 
toxic leadership was actually entitled Bad Leadership, thus illustrating the conflicting nature 
of this modern term and the potential pitfalls of applying it historically.36  
                                                          
34 In general, see: Burns, Leadership; Bass, Leadership and Performance.  
35 Colonel George E. Reed, ‘Toxic Leadership’, Military Review (2004), pp. 67-71: Bolden et al, Exploring 
Leadership, pp. 31-2. 
36 Kellerman, Bad Leadership. Also, see, Jean Lipman-Blumen, The Allure of Toxic Leaders: Why We Follow 
Destructive Bosses and Corrupt Politicians--and How We Can Survive Them (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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Diagram 1.2 – A Simple Interrelationship of Leadership, Command and Management (Source: Howieson and 
Kahn, ‘Leadership, Command and Management: The Officer’s Trinity’, p. 16) 
 
Modern theory discusses the relationship between leadership and management. 
However, Brian Howieson and Howard Kahn’s ‘Officer’s Trinity’, which Diagram 1.2 
illustrates, discussed the addition of the third factor of command, which found its way into 
Stephen Bungay’s model of the ‘Executive’s Trinity’, where authority, as a form of 
legitimate power, and responsibility are now more widely recognised as key contingent 
factors in this relationship.37 Bungay borrowed BDD’s conceptualisation of fighting power 
and split this relationship into its moral, conceptual and physical components, with the 
moral heavily reliant on Adair’s functional work on ‘team’, ‘task’ and ‘individual’.38 Indeed, 
Diagram 1.2 graphically illustrates the problem of deconstructing leadership, command and 
management as each is clearly reliant on the other. Furthermore, BDD recognises 
                                                          
37 Howieson and Kahn, ‘Leadership, Command and Management: The Officer’s Trinity’, pp. 15-40; Stephen 
Bungay, ‘The Executive’s Trinity: Management, Leadership – and Command’, 360°: The Ashridge Journal, 
(2011), pp. 34-9. While Bungay did not cite the origins of his idea in this idea, he did reference Howieson and 
Kahn in his recent work on leadership, see: Stephen Bungay, The Art of Action: How Leaders Close the Gaps 
between Plans, Actions and Results (London: Nicholas Brealey, 2011), p. 272, fn. 19. 
38 Bungay, ‘Executive Trinity’, p. 36. 
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command as an all-embracing construct under which leadership and management occurs, 
and notes that the former is ‘a critical aspect of command’.39 AP1300 also stressed the 
importance of command as an all-embracing concept where Chapter III employed the 
taxonomy of ‘Command, Leadership and Morale’. AP1300 defined commanders as having 
‘a strong and resolute will and a ready acceptance of responsibility’.40 Concerning 
command, BDD defined it as a position that: 
embraces authority, responsibility and accountability. It has a legal and 
constitutional status, codified in The Queen’s Regulations, and is vested in a 
commander by his or her superior.41  
 
This definition stressed responsibility as a key aspect of command, and, for Leigh-Mallory, 
outlined in the 1924 edition of The King’s Regulations and Air Council Instructions, those 
responsibilities were ‘discipline, training and efficiency of the air forces in his command’.42 
BDD defined leadership as the ‘projection of personality and purpose to influence 
subordinates to prevail in the most demanding circumstances’, while the definition of 
leadership in AP1300 was even simpler: ‘the power to inspire and influence men’.43 This 
latter statement enunciates a central tenet of leadership; influence in the leader-follower 
relationship. The idea that leadership is about influencing people and encouraging 
followers to undertake tasks remains present in the literature. In the military sphere, it 
ultimately comes down to leading and influencing people in an act of violence; either its 
commission or avoidance. Thus, the above definitions provide two key pillars that link 
modern to historical thinking: influence and responsibility.  
                                                          
39 BDD, p. 4-10. 
40 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III, Para. 4. 
41 BDD, p. 5-2.  
42 TNA, AIR 10/974, AP958 – The King’s Regulations and Air Council Instructions for the Royal Air Force Volume 1 – 
Regulations, 1924, p. 6. 
43 BDD, p. 4-10; TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III, Para. 8. 
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There is, however, discord between modern and historical thinking concerning the 
process of management, for which no definition existed in AP1300. Simply defined, 
management relates to control of resources, both human and physical.44 Modern critiques 
suggest that drawing a distinction between leadership and management is unhelpful and 
actually discredits the importance of the latter.45 This is because a semantic and distinct line 
is often drawn between the ‘art’ of leadership and the ‘science’ of management, which has 
led to the denigration of the latter and is arguably a distinction that would not have been 
recognised by the RAF. In 1945, ACM Sir Robert Brooke-Popham decried the proposed 
use of the term ‘Man Management’ in a planned Air Ministry pamphlet on ‘The Duties of 
an Officer’ when he wrote: 
Management of poultry, yes, when to give them castor oil and when a 
peppercorn, but not to men, or women either, Leadership is quite enough.46  
 
Brooke-Popham emerged as a recognised authority on the subjects of leadership and 
education in the RAF due to his own job assignments, which included attendance at the 
Army Staff College at Camberley between 1910 and 1912, service as the first Commandant 
of Andover, 1922 to 1926, and service as Commandant of the IDC, 1931 to 1933.47 Apart 
from the historical need to recognise what was written in AP1300, this critique of 
leadership and management is one of the reasons this thesis prefers to link both terms 
together rather than provide an explicit distinction. While management involves dealing 
with complexity and leadership relates to change, they are inexorably linked; for example, 
coping with the latter typically involves applying vision to enact transformation. This was 
                                                          
44 Howieson and Kahn, ‘Leadership, Command and Management: The Officer’s Trinity’, p. 21. 
45 Bolden et al, Exploring Leadership, pp. 24-25. 
46 LHCMA, King’s College London, Personal Papers of Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, 
9/11/6, Letter from Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham to Air Commodore G.F. Smylie, Director 
of Technical Training, 24 April 1945.  
47 From this point onwards, the Army Staff College will be referred to as Camberley. Similarly, the Indian 
Army Staff College at Quetta will be referred to by its location. 
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certainly the case in the RAF, and vision was a trait recognised by the Service. Additionally, 
BDD avoids the explicit use of the term ‘management’, but does recognise that ‘control’, as 
the preferred terminology, allows for ‘the co-ordination of activity, through processes and 
structures that enable a commander to manage risk and to deliver intent’.48 The RAF was 
not ignorant of the need to ‘co-ordinate’ its activities. The second part of the War Manual, 
AP1301, which outlined organisation and administration, preferred the latter term, which it 
defined in terms of control of personnel and material that was enacted by a command’s 
‘policy staff’. This referred to key staff officers who enacted a commander’s directives, 
which is similar to modern conceptions of management of resources.49 This, however, did 
not form part of the RAF’s primary thinking on the subject of leadership, but rather was 
subsumed by it. 
AP1301 provides an important insight into RAF thinking on the subject of 
command and control, and first appeared in 1929 as a provisional manual. Unlike AP1300, 
AP1301 did not receive a second edition until 1954 and remains an underutilised source by 
historians.50 Instead, it was continuously updated through various amendments during the 
1930s, which filled in missing sections. For example, chapters on organisation, command 
and staff duties appeared in 1929, while intelligence appeared as a later amendment. As 
staff duties was a core subject at Andover, nurtured officers, who also served in staff 
positions, would have been aware of the concept of control enunciated in AP1301. This 
was decentralised execution, which formed the core of RAF command culture, which 
centred on the importance of communication to empower change and decentralise 
                                                          
48 BDD, p. 5-3. 
49 Air Ministry, AP1301 – Royal Air Force War Manual Part II – Organization and Administration of the Royal Air 
Force, 1st Edition with Amendment List No. 10 (London: Air Ministry, 1939), Chap. 1, Paras, 10-12. 
50 TNA, AIR 10/2313, AP1301, Royal Air Force War Manual Part II – Organization and Administration 
(Provisional), 1st Edition, August 1929. 
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decision-making.51 Broadly, philosophical debates over command and control tend to shift 
between discussions over mission versus prescriptive top-down styles, which, from an air 
power perspective, transposed onto the considerations over centralised control and 
decentralised execution.52 AP1301 noted: 
Commands decide upon a suitable policy and issue the necessary orders and 
instructions to groups. Groups in turn decide upon the best action to take to 
implement the instructions passed down to them by commands and then issue 
appropriate orders to their wings and stations, who finally decide upon the 
detailed employment of the units.53 
 
This decentralisation required effective leadership and skills, like the ability to influence and 
empower subordinates to achieve specific goals, which were only attainable through 
effective development. There is clearly an issue of balance in how much a follower is 
empowered before they potentially become insubordinate. Thus, the management of this 
relationship is contingent on the leadership styles an organisation adopts, the culture 
created in it and the vision of senior leaders.  
Rather than management, morale was the third aspect of the officers’ trinity for the 
RAF. Morale was defined as ‘the general spirit or state of mind of a group as reflected by 
their behaviour under all conditions’.54 This conception, in conjunction with the RAF’s 
view of command, illustrates an understanding of the importance of the interrelated facets 
of followership and empowerment that transcends levels of responsibility and highlights 
the inter-personal skills required of leaders.55 It recognises that maintenance of morale 
                                                          
51 This is similar to modern ideas surrounding matrix management, see: Kevan Hall, Making the Matrix Work: 
How Matrix Managers Engage People and Cut through Complexity (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2013). 
52 For two recent discussions of this side of the debate over leadership and command, see: Shamir, 
Transforming Command; Patrick Rose, ‘Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian 
Campaign, 1943-1944’, JSS, 36(1) (2013), pp. 42-75. On the debate over command and control of air forces, 
see: Air Commodore Stuart Peach, ‘The Airmen’s Dilemma: To Command or Control?’ in Peter Gray (ed.), 
Air Power 21: Challenges for the New Century (London: The Stationary Office, 2000), pp. 123-52. 
53 TNA, AIR 10/2313, AP1301, 1939, Chap. I, Para. 5. 
54 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III, Para. 13. 
55 See: Keith Grint, ‘Followership: The Anvil of Leadership’ in Jupp and Grint (eds.), Air Force Leadership, pp. 
135-50. 
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allowed for the exploitation and achievement of goals through effective leadership. It also 
provides the reason for Brooke-Popham’s preference for the inclusion of management 
under the rubric of leadership in 1945, as well as providing a conceptual link to fighting 
power. AP1300 suggested that good morale allowed officers to ‘rise to heights of 
achievement which could not be attained by professional skills alone’, which derived from 
a belief in traits like skill and temperament.56 These were believed to be necessary for 
effective leadership.  
Exposed to the above ideas, officers attending Andover regularly examined 
command, leadership and morale through the prism of noted leaders and their forces. SL 
Portal’s 1922 essay examined morale in the forces of Oliver Cromwell, Admiral Sir Horatio 
Nelson and Giuseppe Garibaldi.57 Influenced by Brooke-Popham’s teachings at Andover, 
these essays formed the RAF’s body of knowledge on leadership, which derived from 
doctrine and the state of understanding during this period. Portal’s essay stressed 
characteristics like ‘desire’, ‘discipline’, ‘patriotism’, ‘ambition’, ‘confidence’ and 
‘comradeship’ as key to generating good morale and further noted, ‘Personal courage in the 
leader ha[d] a triple value in securing high morale’.58 This linked to the views present in 
AP1300 and in Fuller’s work, which argued that success in war depended more on ‘moral’ 
than ‘physical’ aspects, which related to the idea that the interrelationship of leadership and 
morale was key to generating fighting power.59 Interestingly, at the end of the First Course 
at Andover, Portal and several fellow students utilised the leadership themes they had 
                                                          
56 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III, Para. 14; Carlyle, On Heroes and Hero Worship; Nathan Harter, 
‘Great Man Theory’ in Antonio Maturano and Jonathan Gosling (eds.) Leadership: Key Concepts (London: 
Routledge, 2007), p. 69; Kenneth Levine, ‘Trait Theory’ in Maturano and Gosling (eds.) Leadership, pp. 163-
64.  
57 TNA, AIR 10/973, Squadron Leader C.F.A Portal, ‘An Essay on Morale’, in AP956 – A Selection of Lectures 
and Essays from the Work of Officers attending the First Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College, 1922-1923 
(December 1923), pp. 143-9. This collection contained two more essays on the same subject by Squadron 
Leader L.L. Maclean and Flight Lieutenant N.W. Wadham, which both espoused similar views. 
58 TNA, AIR 10/973, Portal, ‘An Essay on Morale’, in AP956, pp. 143-5. 
59 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III, Para. 1. 
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explored as the basis for a play, which illustrates that they had at least tangibly taken on 
board the importance of these concepts.60 Portal completed his essay noting that good 
leaders ‘have no fears for the fighting spirit of [their] men’.61 Many of these writings, 
including Portal’s, were published and distributed amongst the RAF as Air Publications 
(AP), which were expected by ‘Command of the Air Council’ to be read by ‘all 
concerned’.62 Presumably, this was aimed at those officers seeking to attend Andover who 
would go on to lead the RAF during the Second World War. APs containing essays from 
Andover’s cohort emanated annually and contained at least one piece on an aspect of 
leadership; this continued when The Hawk emerged at Andover in 1927.63 Similar ideas 
appeared in publications like JRUSI and RAFQ, which, as Chapter Six illustrates, officers 
engaged with from 1919 onwards.64 As key repositories of knowledge, these sources 
illustrate RAF thinking about key subjects such as leadership, which mirrored those of the 
Army and RN. Codified in pre-First World War Army doctrine like FSR I and Infantry 
Training, the prevalent focus on morale emerged from nineteenth century conceptions of 
war that stressed the role of moralism and esprit-de-corps.65 Though not codified, the RN held 
similar views because, as already noted, the first volume of TNR contained several articles 
that illustrated its view of leadership, which was broadly consistent with those held by the 
                                                          
60 RAFM, AIR 69/28, Script for End of Course Play, 28 March 1923. 
61 TNA, AIR 10/973, Portal, ‘An Essay on Morale’, in AP956, p. 149. 
62 Ibid, front page. 
63 TNA, AIR 10/1109, Squadron Leader Sir N.R.A.D. Leslie, Bt, CBE, ‘Morale’ in AP1097 – A Selection of 
Lectures and Essays from the Work of Officers attending the Second Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College, 1923-1924 
(August 1924), pp. 107-17; TNA, AIR 10/1159, Wing Commander J.T. Babington, DSO, ‘The Relative Value 
of Enthusiasm and Discipline in a Fighting Force’ in AP1152 - A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of 
Officers attending the Third Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College, 1924-1925 (July 1925), pp. 82-97; TNA, AIR 
10/1269, Squadron Leader Hon. R.A. Cochrane, AFC, ‘A Study of Marlborough and Napoleon’ in AP1233 - 
A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of Officers attending the Fourth Course at the Royal Air Force Staff 
College, 1925-1926 (October 1926), pp. 76-90. 
64 For example, see: Flight Lieutenant Edgar Kingston-McLoughry, ‘Morale and Leadership’, Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution (JRUSI), 74 (1929), pp. 305-11; Gordon-Dean, ‘The Development of Leadership 
and Morale in the Royal Air Force’, RAFQ, pp. 18-24. 
65 FSR Part 1 (1909), p. 11; War Office, Infantry Training (London: HMSO, 1914), pp. 1-3. 
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Army and latterly the RAF.66 This osmosis illustrates the continuity of organisational and 
cultural practices between the RAF and its antecedents; Brooke-Popham’s own views 
undoubtedly stemmed, in part, from his time at Camberley, despite Sheffield’s and Timothy 
Travers’ divergent warnings of its influence.67  
 
1.3 The Characteristics of Leadership 
In a 1929 JRUSI article, Flight Lieutenant (FL) Edgar Kingston-McLoughry, whom Robin 
Higham identified as one of the RAF’s key intellectuals, wrote that morale was the product 
of confidence and enthusiasm, which was reliant on good leadership, as there was an 
inherent relationship based on ‘faith’ in a commander’s ability.68 Kingston-McLoughry 
identified key characteristics that he felt produced good leadership. These were ‘will’, 
‘reason’ and ‘imagination’, and the identification of such characteristics opens the question 
of what features the RAF expected its officer class to display; many of them are readily 
identifiable with the idea of how you ‘do leadership’.69 Driven by its heroic view of 
leadership, AP1300 discussed concepts like ‘ability’, ‘resolution’, ‘responsibility’, 
                                                          
66 See: Anon, ‘Individual Preparation for War’, TNR, 1(1) (1913), pp. 44-52; Anon, ‘A Suggested Training for 
Naval Cadets’, TNR, 1(2) (1913), pp. 76-81. While published anonymously, the former article can be traced to 
a Captain W.H. Boyle RN.  
67 Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum Press, 2011), pp. 25-8; Tim 
Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern War, 1900-1918 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2003 [1987]), pp. 85-100. 
68 Kingston-McLoughry, ‘Morale and Leadership’, JRUSI, pp. 305-11; Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals 
in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1966), pp. 220-30 
69 Kingston-McLoughry, ‘Morale and Leadership’, pp. 305-11. One recent study into military leadership 
identified what its editors viewed as its nine essential characteristics, which included ‘integrity’, 
‘determination’, ‘vision’, ‘adaptability’, ‘charisma’, ‘understanding’, ‘exemplification’ and ‘technological 
knowledge’; Laver and Matthews (eds.), The Art of Command. To this can be added ‘intelligence’, ‘decision-
making’, ‘communication’, ‘flexibility’, ‘inspiration’, ‘courage’ and ‘character’ as well as numerous other 
concepts that might fit any author’s working paradigm of effective leadership. For various overviews of 
military leadership characteristics, see: G.D. Sheffield, ‘Introduction: Command, Leadership and the Anglo-
American Experience’ in G.D. Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience 
since 1861, Revised Edition (London: Brassey’s, 2002), pp. 1-16; Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr., 
‘Introduction’ in Christopher Kolenda (ed.), Leadership: The Warriors Art, Second Edition (Carlisle, PA: Army 
War College Foundation Press, 2001), pp. xxix-xxxvi; Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (USMC Ret.), 
‘Foreword’ in Robert Taylor, William Rosenbach and Eric Rosenbach (eds.), Military Leadership: In Pursuit of 
Excellence, Sixth Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), pp. xiii-xvi. 
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‘professional knowledge’, ‘self-confidence’, ‘courage’, ‘sympathy’, ‘energy’, ‘patriotism’, 
‘espirit-de-corps’ and ‘discipline’ as characteristics required of RAF officers, as well as being 
key organisational values.70 This heroic focus developed from the nature of aerial combat 
and the intellectual context of the time, though they remain present in modern RAF 
writings on leadership.71 However, concepts like sympathy had their antecedents in Army 
practices and resembled the concept of paternalism, which suggested that society was 
hierarchical and that each class had specific responsibilities. For the middle and upper 
classes, for example, this included providing appropriate guidance and leadership to the 
working class.72 Specifically, concerning sympathy, AP1300 noted that leaders needed to 
understand the ‘needs and interests of others’, a clear example of paternalism.73 
Furthermore, organisationally, the personnel structure of the RAF favoured pilots. A 
symbiosis existed between pilots, the Service’s organisational structure and public schools 
that espoused broader social ideas that fitted with the characteristics noted above. This was 
because the RAF preferred recruits from public schools, as they were perceived to have the 
right leadership abilities. While there existed a degree of class self-reinforcement by senior 
officers who preferred public school recruits, it is clear that concepts like courage gained 
currency between these institutions, as illustrated in the discussion of Portal’s Andover 
essay above. This heroic view was widely held at the time; for example, Wavell, writing on 
the subject of ‘The Good General’, extolled virtues prevalent in trait theory, suggesting that 
                                                          
70 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III. For a post-Second World War RAF view on these characteristics, 
see: Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, ‘Command and Leadership’, RAFQ and Commonwealth Air Forces 
Journal, 1(2) (1949), pp. 89-96. 
71 A 2005 anthology by the Royal Air Force Leadership Centre outlined ‘Sense of Belonging, ‘Duty and 
Service’, ‘To Be a Leader’, ‘Morale’, ‘Courage’, Communication’, ‘Leading by Example’, ‘Know Your People’, 
Vision and Decisiveness’, ‘Trust’ and ‘Command’ as key leadership values for the RAF, see: John Jupp (ed.), 
Leadership: An Anthology (Sleaford: The Royal Air Force Leadership Centre, 2005). While the language has 
shifted, in 2009, the second edition of this anthology outlined similar leadership values. For an examination of 
the argument that the RAF maintained a focus on heroic leadership until at least the 1970s, see: Oscar 
Grusky, ‘Education and Military Commitment’, Armed Forces and Society (AFS), 6(1) (1979), pp. 132-47. 
72 Sheffield, ‘Officer-Man Relations’, pp. 8-14. 
73 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III, Para. 10. 
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an ‘unconquerable sprit’ was at the heart of good leadership.74 In a publically available 
declaration on The Royal Air Force as a Career from 1925, it was affirmed that the RAF 
sought recruits who had ‘Individuality, resource, and rapid judgement’, and that by the time 
they graduated from Cranwell, they would have ‘a high standard of self-respect, reliability, 
and professional keenness’.75  
While the RAF identified characteristics desired of officers, the Service struggled, 
or did not feel the need, to conceptualise leadership at different organisational levels. 
Nevertheless, GD Branch officers took on a number of differing leadership responsibilities 
ranging from operational command to staff duties in the Air Ministry, which reinforces the 
importance of job assignments as part of the RAF’s nurturing process. As already noted, 
leadership was about how you ‘did it’, and studies into its relevance at different levels of 
responsibility did not exist. Apart from The Kings Regulations, which focused on a 
commander’s legal responsibilities, only AP1301 and Air Ministry Weekly Order (AMWO) 
No. 284 in 1928 outlined potential leadership roles. Specifically, these focused on staff and 
the administrative duties of Officer Commanding (OC).76 These were prescriptive outlines 
concerned more with responsibility and authority than with the leadership vision required 
to implement them. It was generally felt that able officers nurtured though methods 
described below would feel their way towards understanding their leadership 
responsibilities as their careers progressed towards senior positions. In 1923 and 1928, 
AMP produced reports into issues facing the GD Branch concerning promotion, age and 
                                                          
74 Wavell, Generals and Generalship, pp. 1-10, p. 26. 
75 TNA, AIR 10/1112, AP1100 – The Royal Air Force as a Career (1925) p. 6, 32. This publication was available 
to purchase for the price of 3s. 
76 TNA, AIR 10/2313, AP1301, Chaps. III-VI; TNA, AIR 72/10, Air Ministry Weekly Order (AMWO) No. 
284 – Administrative Duties of Commanding Officers, 26 April 1928. 
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the RAF’s requirements of an officer.77 While CD52, the 1928 report, outlined the 
opportunities and processes available for officer advancement, it did not enunciate the 
characteristics required for those seeking development. However, in addition to CD52, 
AMWO No. 426, which, while published before the former was based on findings from its 
investigation, did highlight an important taxonomy; specifically, it was noted that the RAF 
required four classes of personnel: 
(i) Officers for Command, staff and administrative duties. 
(ii) Officers for technical duties. 
(iii) Personnel for junior flying duties. 
(iv) Skilled tradesmen78 
 
While not proscribed, it is clear that the first class of officers were those who were 
nurtured for senior leadership. For example, in the prosopography population in Appendix 
Four, only one per cent of officers undertook specialist training such as engineering or 
navigation; the balance clearly focused on command and staff duties. While this might well 
have changed in time, it is worth reflecting that AMWO No. 426 also clearly stated, on 
dismissing the need for a technical branch: 
Under this policy the danger is avoided of developing technical branches out 
of touch with flying and fighting requirements, and out of sympathy with 
officers who fly and fight.79 
  
While altruistically stating that this should not bar specialist officers from senior positions, 
the formation of a separate Technical Branch, as Chapter Two notes, suggests this was not 
the case. Thus, characteristics outlined in AP1300 generally became those applied to all 
levels of command. As with the maturation of many ideas, the inter-war period represented 
                                                          
77 TNA, AIR 10/1208, SD5 – Analysis of the Officer Position in the Royal Air Force as Regards Promotion and Age, 
July 1923; TNA, AIR 10/1336, CD52 – An Inquiry into the Requirements in Officers of the Royal Air Force: Part 1, 
September 1928. 
78 TNA, AIR 72/10, AMWO No. 426 – The Constitution of the General Duties Branch, 21 June 1928, p. 1. 
79 Ibid, p. 2. 
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a time when the RAF felt its way towards a broader understanding of leadership. This lack 
of codification paralleled the British military’s approach to doctrine.  
Modern theory differentiates between lower-level leadership focused on technical 
and administrative knowledge and that employed at the highest levels where the focus is on 
developing organisations and strategies.80 Senior, or strategic, leadership is about setting 
vision, tempo and goals within an organisation while developing the competencies required 
to deliver them.81 The ability to move through leadership levels requires a step-change in 
awareness. Central is the concept of vision, which the RAF recognised as a trait. Thus, it 
was here where the RAF recognised the need to equip officers with the knowledge to 
support their development as potential senior leaders. Air Commodore (AC) Brooke-
Popham, in his ‘Preliminary Lecture to Students’ at Andover, suggested that once students 
completed the course, they were expected to operate outside of their ‘own little command’, 
which suggests they were being prepared to set the vision necessary to transcend different 
organisational levels.82 Further developed if officers attended the IDC, vision, a concept 
shared between the services, provided an inter-organisational perspective for nurtured 
officers that would allow them to operate effectively at the senior level, thus providing a 
step-change in their leadership development. Brooke-Popham further emphasised that 
students emanating from Andover would have to begin to consider problems from an 
organisational perspective, a key difference between leadership at lower and senior levels 
where the former focused on short-term challenges.83 For Adair, taking responsibility for 
                                                          
80 David Day and Robert Lord, ‘Executive Leadership and Organizational Performance: Suggestions for a 
New Theory and Methodology’, Journal of Management, 14(3) (1988), p. 459. 
81 Bolden et al, Exploring Leadership, pp. 84-91. 
82 LHCMA, Brooke-Popham Papers, 1/5/6, Preliminary Lecture to Students, N.D., p. 3. For a brief overview 
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83 LHCMA, Brooke-Popham Papers, 1/5/6, Preliminary Lecture, p. 3. 
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the organisation was central to a senior leader’s responsibilities.84 The key issue with the 
RAF’s recognition that vision was important, and that a step-change in understanding was 
required, was that, as an organisation, it was limited to those able to pursue development 
through Staff College attendance. This route gave Leigh-Mallory and those of his peers 
who reached Air Rank access to the military elite as the system sought to nurture identified 
officers. However, these views, apart from dissemination through the publications already 
noted, were not widely available outside of this small select group of officers. The 
acceptance of this narrow development process raises the question of what the RAF 
understood by leadership development and succession planning. 
 
1.4 Professionalism, Leadership Development and Succession Planning 
Any discussion of leadership and its development links to questions over an organisation’s 
professionalism. Underpinning this is the problem of defining professionalism and its 
related derivatives of professionalisation and professionals. David Trim offered a useful 
prescriptive list of seven factors that define professionals: occupational identity, formal 
hierarchy, permanence, formal pay systems, distinctive expertise and means of education, 
efficiency in expertise, and distinctive self-conceptualisation.85 While a useful list, which 
largely conforms to Huntington’s definition that military professionals are distinguished by 
expertise, responsibility and ‘corporateness’ [sic] concerning the central skill of managing 
violence, it also opens up questions regarding the applicability of these factors.86 For 
example, the issue of identity relates to the question of ethos, which Chapter Two argues 
                                                          
84 Adair, Effective Strategic Leadership, p. 1. 
85 David J.B. Trim, ‘Introduction’ in David J.B. Trim (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military 
Professionalism (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 6-7. 
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encapsulates an organisation’s culture and separates out organisational distinctiveness. For 
example, the Army’s regimental ethos in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
created friction against an emerging professional ethic that was at odds with its amateur 
tradition. In the RAF, pilot ethos, linked to the Service’s culture, separated GD Branch 
officers from other professionals. This delivered power and prestige to those who were 
part of this ‘tribe’, to which they owed their loyalty.87 Additionally, it was to GD Branch 
officers that the RAF looked for senior commanders, which reinforces the view that this 
structure carried more cultural weight and importance within the Service than other 
branches. Furthermore, command was a key element of this identity. In terms of CAS, all 
except Trenchard and MRAF Sir Edward Ellington experienced squadron command. This 
replicated the pervasive system that senior officers in the services came from certain 
regiments, posts or career paths.88  
Despite the challenge of defining professionals, Huntington provided a framework 
for understanding military professionalism, defining professionals as those officers who 
were competent in their field and in the management, planning, generation and application 
of fighting power, which, as this thesis suggests, was centred on effective leadership. 
However, as Brian Linn reflected, Huntington’s analysis encapsulated a ‘cherished belief’ in 
                                                          
87 Military organisations can be broken down into their tribal elements, for example, as Finlan wrote 
concerning the Army, the ‘concept of the regiment dominates the ideational and tribal realm of the service’, 
see: Finlan, Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies, p. xv. For a recent modern air power based view 
of the concept of ‘tribalism’, see: Mark Wells, ‘Tribal Warfare: The Society of Modern Airmen’, Air and Space 
Power Journal, 29(3) (2015), pp. 82-7. 
88 While the appointment in 2013 of ACM Sir Andrew Pulford as CAS represents a subtle shift away from 
fixed wing pilots holding the RAF’s most senior post, he would have at least undertaken ab initio training on 
fixed wing platforms, thus giving him tangential membership of this ‘tribe’. Pulford spent much of his career 
as a rotary wing pilot, and until this point, CAS had always been, albeit with variable experience, a fixed wing 
pilot. Interestingly, the recent appointment of AVM Richard Knighton, an engineer, to the position of ACAS, 
represents a key moment in the RAF’s professionalisation as it illustrates a broadening of posts available to 
non-pilots and the ability of the Service to ‘break the glass ceiling’. Similarly, AVM Sue Gray, also an engineer 
and currently Director of Combat Air at Defence Equipment and Support, was the second female in the RAF 
to be promoted to two-star rank, which suggests that as the Service evolves it is not only becoming more 
professional but also more diverse. However, this was clearly not always the case. On the politics of 
integration of women, see: Kathleen Sherit, ‘The Integration of Women into the Royal Navy and the Royal 
Air Force, Post-World War II to the Mid 1990s’, (PhD Thesis, King’s College London, 2013). 
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the American military that they would self-reform if left free from political interference, 
which ignores the need for some political oversight in any system.89 Additionally, 
Huntington’s historical analysis was too deterministic and did not take account of the 
‘many wrong turns’ encountered in the post-US Civil War era, which were a key focus for 
his thesis.90 Nevertheless, membership of the GD Branch made officers like Leigh-Mallory 
the RAF’s core military professionals because as pilots and, by 1918, as squadron 
commanders, they were involved in the generation of fighting power at the tactical level. As 
Chapter Three notes both flying and command were key criterion for promotion. 
However, this did not mean they exuded the leadership characteristics noted above. In 
addition, the numerous entry routes into the British military, which, from the perspective 
of permanent officers, did not change until the 1960s, nullified the existence of a 
professional ethic in the services as a homogenous group.91 
Related to the process of leadership development outlined below, Janowitz 
furthered the idea of professionalism by suggesting that a process existed whereby officers 
who entered the military elite developed and managed their careers through ‘many years of 
professional education, training, and experience’, which paralleled the pillars of professional 
competencies recognised to reinforce leadership.92 While subsumed by the debate over 
civil-military relations and associated considerations of social conflict between political and 
military elites, the latter term related to those directly in control of military forces at a 
senior level. While emerging from an aristocratic model, it is clear that Britain maintained a 
democratic ideal of civil-military relations due to the maintenance of political control over 
                                                          
89 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007), p. 41. 
90 Ibid. 
91 It worth noting that a study remains to be undertaken to understand the extent to which the RAF has gone 
through a process of professionalisation since its formation. 
92 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 125; Drew, ‘The Three Pillars of Professional Competence’, pp. 54-67. 
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the military, with positions like Secretary of State for Air providing oversight and being 
responsible to Parliament.93 The connection between CAS and the Secretary of State 
remained important, and Trenchard’s fractured relationship with Lord Rothermere, which 
ended his first term as CAS, and his successful association with Winston Churchill and 
Viscount Templewood, illustrate this. Considered for the position of AMP in 1944, as an 
AC, Leigh-Mallory had entered the ranks of the military elite by 1937 and steadily 
progressed through them until his death.94 In 1945, Trenchard described the position of 
AMP to ACM Sir Wilfrid Freeman as ‘challenging’, and one that, if undertaken 
successfully, could lead to appointment as CAS.95 Applied to Leigh-Mallory, this would 
have required him to have what Freeman described in 1944 as ‘wide operational 
experience’, ‘knowledge of the RAF’, ‘competen[ce] to stand up to the Civil Service’, and, 
have ‘vision’.96 Thus, training, education and experience provided the methods for 
developing leadership that professionals engaged with to provide organisational capacity. 
This led to preferred characteristics that emerged through immersion in the developmental 
processes of the RAF, which formed the basis of the Service’s succession planning.  
It is worth identifying the difference between leader and leadership development, as 
it had implications concerning the RAF’s ability to produce effective senior leaders. 
Defining these ideas helps one understand whether the RAF was developing individual 
leaders or those who build:  
networked relationships among individuals that enhance cooperation and 
resource exchange in creating organizational value.97  
 
                                                          
93 Morris Janowitz, ‘Military Elites and the Study of War’, Conflict Resolution, 1(1) (March 1957), pp. 9-18.  
94 Christ Church, University of Oxford (CC), Personal Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount 
Portal of Hungerford, File 7, Folder A, Letter from Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman to Marshal of the 
Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, 25 May 1944. 
95 CC, Portal Papers, File 3, Folder K, Letter from Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard to Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, 5 January 1945. 
96 CC, Portal Papers, File 7, Folder A, Freeman to Portal, 25 May 1944. 
97 Day, ‘Leadership Development’, p. 585. 
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The above suggests a focus on the importance of socialisation, which allows leadership 
development to expand ‘the collective capacity of organizational members to engage 
effectively in leadership roles and processes’.98 Conversely, leader development centres on 
developing an individual’s ‘knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with formal leadership 
roles’, which mirrors the definition Bernard Burnes gave for management development.99 
This semantic difference further reinforces the problem of separating terms like command, 
leadership and management. However, the key difference here is that leader development 
focuses on human, rather than social, or organisational, capital. At its conceptual base, this 
is the difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal leadership, and leader 
development links to the idea that individuals are effectively equipped to pursue specific 
functions in an organisation. In the RAF, this was about equipping an officer with skills 
necessary to command a unit and perform adequate staff duties or related administrative 
functions. This required self-awareness and motivation to achieve those objectives and 
positions in a hierarchical organisation through promotion and the development of 
professional knowledge. Conversely, leadership development is about developing leaders 
who are able to look up and out of their ‘silo’ and provide organisational capacity and 
deliver value by equipping officers with the vision to cope with unforeseen challenges that 
they increasingly encounter at senior levels.100 While military education acted as a nexus to 
leadership development, this remained a much more complex process to achieve and 
required broader engagement that was not just limited to formal conceptions of training. It 
included areas like officers thinking about and engaging with their profession, such as 
writing for and lecturing on aspects of their job as well as undertaking and being identified 
                                                          
98 Ibid, p. 582. 
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100 For a consideration of the ability to do this, in the context of the RAF and with specific links to the 
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for appropriate appointments. This required individuals to take ownership of their 
development while seeking to expand their competencies beyond those simply required for 
everyday functions. Central to this was the decision to pursue job assignments like 
attendance at Andover. However, for the RAF, or any military organisation, it is not 
realistic to separate professional knowledge from leader or leadership development process. 
In a modern sense, as Bolden suggested, an integrative approach to development between 
leader and leadership approaches provides for a balanced consideration that is contingent 
on social, organisational and cultural perspectives that shape context.101  
Returning to the ways of leadership development, for the purpose of this thesis, the 
processes of training and education are separated and conform to the definitions provided 
in 2007 by the then Director of the United Kingdom’s Defence Academy, Lieutenant-
General Sir John Kiszely, who defined the former as ‘preparing people, individually or 
collectively, for given tasks’. Education concerns ‘developing […] mental powers and 
understanding’.102 It is worth highlighting that this separation was indistinct in the RAF, 
which labelled courses as training regardless of whether they developed something more 
than just specific skills. As Chapter Five explores, it is worth noting that training includes 
aspects of education. AMWOs grouped all courses under the rubric of ‘Courses of 
Instruction’.103 Officers were encouraged to attend various courses and rewarded with time 
antecedents for promotion. On 18 January 1939, the outgoing Commandant of the IDC, 
AM Sir Arthur Longmore, described ‘Training for Higher Command’ in a RUSI lecture 
that represented an educational view of an officer’s rise to senior command and highlighted 
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the stove piped process of development already alluded to.104 For Longmore, the route to 
senior command ran from initial officer training through the staff colleges, senior officer 
courses and the IDC. However, Longmore was adamant that attendance did not guarantee 
an effective ‘Higher Commander’ but might lead to ‘an extremely intelligent and highly 
trained staff officer’, and that development was also contingent on ‘His past record with his 
unit in the less senior ranks’; this highlights the relationship amongst education and training 
with the third pillar of development, experience.105 This was a clear indication that heroic 
leaders were expected to emerge as well as being nurtured by the RAF, which is, in part, 
why public schools were an important part of leadership development. As the second 
edition of the provisional manual of RAF Drill and Ceremonial stated in 1926, ‘Leadership is 
not born of learning; it depends on straightforward human qualities’.106 In many respects, 
this provisional manual illustrates that the RAF was still working its way towards an 
understanding of leadership. Nevertheless, the RAF placed great faith in public schools to 
develop those ‘qualities’ before an officer joined up, though of course this also reinforced 
class boundaries. 
Perhaps the clearest indication that the RAF understood something greater than 
leader development is that it recognised the value that attendance at institutions like 
Andover and the IDC generated. Due to be delivered by Trenchard, who was unable to 
attend, this broader value was enunciated in the opening address to students at Andover on 
4 April 1922 that was delivered by AOC Inland Area, AVM Sir John Salmond. It was stated 
that Andover was to be ‘the cradle […] of our brains’.107 While written for a captive 
audience of senior officers and students of Andover’s First Course, this phrase is often 
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linked to the development of doctrine; however, a deeper inference can be derived from 
this statement. This statement made clear that officers attending Andover delivered value 
to the RAF not only in specific areas like policy, but also in its organisational leadership 
capacity, because the Air Ministry regularly reminded the Commandant that it was from 
these men that future senior leaders would emerge.108 The RAF also understood that it was 
necessary to learn and interact with the other services and regularly sent officers to 
Camberley, the Indian Army Staff College at Quetta and the Royal Naval Staff College at 
Greenwich, as well as the RN Senior Officers’ War Course (sic) (SOWC) and the Army 
Senior Officers’ School (sic).109 Trenchard was a fervent supporter of the IDC, as he 
understood the advantages that such a combined institution had for both officers and the 
RAF. Broadly, these courses not only allowed for the development of professional 
knowledge, but also introduced a process of socialisation into their development that was 
useful during the course of the Second World War, as many officers had a shared language 
that allowed them to communicate effectively at the operational and strategic levels.110  
The RAF, however, did not effectively measure development in a manner readily 
identifiable today. Modern methods like 360-degree feedback, executive coaching and 
mentoring simply did not exist, as the latter two processes require a one-to-one interaction 
that was alien to the RAF. While coaching, practical goal focused one-to-one learning and 
mentoring – pairing juniors with senior leaders to learn – are increasingly used in the 
modern military, 360-degree feedback continues to struggle to find widespread acceptance 
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because it requires views from a wide range of peers.111 Nevertheless, it is possible to 
identify the presence of several processes related to leadership development in the RAF. 
Rather than intrapersonal interaction, the closest evidence that a similar process to 
coaching and mentoring occurred in the RAF was at an organisational level, which can be 
characterised as ‘nurturing’ officers through key job assignments. As Table 1.1 highlights, 
the RAF recognised networking, job assignments and action learning, though it did not use 
the language present here. Socialisation, a term this thesis uses, is a more appropriate term 
for networking, a process defined as ‘fostering broader individual networks’.112 Action 
learning is a process whereby leaders learn from undertaking project-based assignments to 
solve challenges they will encounter.113 In the RAF, this typically occurred in Andover’s 
classrooms and found an outgrowth in pedagogical methods employed, such as war games. 
Table 1.1 ascribes some of the key aspects of Leigh-Mallory’s career to these processes. 
Broader discussions of the relationship of these processes form the basis of subsequent 
chapters and illustrate the significance of key institutions like Andover. The question of 
training is dealt with in more depth in Chapter Five; however, here it is suffice to note that, 
apart from the shared identity generated through pilot training, there is little identifiable 
leadership development in this sphere. Nonetheless, effective training, and the 
improvement in skills based knowledge, which linked to leader development, produced 
core competencies required by military professionals that formed the basis of further 
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nurturing. Effectively undertaking these competencies made officers visible for further 
development through processes identified herein. 
Table 1.1 – Evidence of Leadership Development Processes with Reference to ACM Sir Trafford 
Leigh-Mallory’s inter-war RAF Career 
 Training Education Experience 
Nurturing Not present  RAF Staff College 
 Imperial Defence 
College 
 Directing Staff at the 
Army Staff College, 
Camberley 
 School of Army Co-
Operation 
Networks and Socialisation Not present  RAF Staff College 
 Imperial Defence 
College 
 Royal United 
Services Institution 
 
Job Assignments Not present  RAF Staff College 
 Imperial Defence 
College 
 8 Squadron 
 School of Army Co-
Operation 
 Directing Staff at the 
Army Staff College, 
Camberley 
 RAF Member at the 
Geneva 
Disarmament 
Conference 
 Staff Appointments 
Action Learning Not present  RAF Staff College 
 Imperial Defence 
College 
 Royal United 
Services Institution 
 
(Source: Derived from Day, ‘Leadership Development’, p. 588) 
 
Apart from ACRs, produced by an officer’s OC, the RAF failed to assess officers’ 
development and progression effectively. While AMP’s Department managed personnel 
files and RAF promotion processes, there is some tentative evidence to suggest that certain 
officers were nurtured, like those selected to attend staff courses. ACRs began with an OC 
providing their view of an officer’s capability.114 These reports went through three more 
levels as a wing or station commander, and then a group commander provided comments, 
and finally remarks were made by an AOC or other OC. ACRs formed the key source of 
information in RAF promotion procedures. The ACR was split into four sections, with the 
first part dealing with administrative details like rank, branch, type of commission held and 
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duties upon which engaged.115 The second section dealt with ‘Conduct’ and covered issues 
like temperament, performance and an officer’s ability to set an example, which was 
explicitly noted as being significant for officers above the rank of SL.116 In dealing with an 
officer’s conduct concerning ‘the handling of men’ and ‘performance of his duties’, OCs 
were given a choice of four descriptions to apply: ‘Exceptional’, ‘Above the average’, 
‘Average’ and ‘Below the average’. The third section on ‘Ability’ is particularly instructive, 
as it utilised the aforementioned criteria in a series of questions dealing with technical, 
administrative, professional and staff knowledge. It also qualified an officer’s flying abilities 
by recording the number of hours flown. It sought to qualify an officer’s ‘Power of 
command’ and ‘Power to impart knowledge’, which suggests that the RAF placed 
significance on knowledge transfer and leadership. Combined with the idea of providing an 
adequate ‘example to his juniors’, which appeared in the ‘Conduct’ section, it is clear that 
leadership by example was an aspect of an officer’s progression, because, as Chapter Three 
illustrates, command experience was a criterion for promotion. The final section dealt with 
‘General’ aspects like medical fitness and referred to participation in sport and knowledge 
of foreign languages. Sport was important, not only in terms of officers keeping physically 
fit for active duty, but also due to its perceived links with developing leadership 
characteristics. This was particularly important given the links between sport in public 
schools and its importance to the RAF. Two key aspects of the ACR were that, first, the 
final section sought to provide recommendations as to an officer’s eligibility to attend 
Andover and whether he was in the promotion zone. The second aspect concerned the 
nature of these reports and their links to leadership development. While the reports were 
described as confidential, officers were aware of their contents, with it stated that, 
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‘Whatever be the nature of the annual report, it is to be communicated to the officer 
reported on and the fact noted hereon’.117 While aware of their OC’s views of their 
performance, officers had no right of reply and only saw a senior officer’s view if the 
report was adverse. For example, in 1934, SL Leslie Hollinghurst formally questioned what 
he believed to be an ‘adverse’ comment on his ACR. While it is not possible to examine the 
comment, the reply it elicited from the Air Council illustrated the closed nature of such 
reports when it was noted ‘that protests of a trivial nature […] regarding remarks of their 
superior officers […] [were] to be deprecated’.118 This closed view potentially shut officers 
off from understanding their own progression, though, in the case of Hollinghurst, being 
aware of an adverse report did not hinder his rise to senior leadership; Hollinghurst retired 
as an ACM. Thus, while the ACR tracked performance for the RAF, and was the key 
source of information for promotion, it had little value to the individual, as they could not 
question its contents. Its only potential value was in giving officers an indication of what 
their direct superiors thought of them, though only if it was adverse. This in itself provided 
an indication of their potential for progression, though they did not receive personal 
feedback on how they might improve their leadership abilities. A similar confidential report 
was produced on officers completing ‘Courses of Instruction’, like at Andover. Here, 
recommendations were made concerning the award of the post-nominal psa (Passed Staff 
College, Andover).119  
The above consideration of how the RAF tracked performance opens up the link 
between leadership development and succession planning. This concerns the question of 
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whether the RAF recognised that it was selecting, identifying and educating future officers 
for senior leadership by implementing structures that nurtured leaders’ abilities. Succession 
planning: 
is more than knowing who will take the reins if the corporate jet crashes 
tomorrow. It’s about growing your own talent to ensure your company's future 
over the long term.120  
 
It is a process driven by an organisation’s senior leadership, and, as Adair noted concerning 
the functions of high-ranking leaders, one key element of their role concerns the process of 
succession planning and leading by example.121 Trenchard’s biographer, Andrew Boyle, 
historicised the debate over succession planning in the RAF when he suggested that certain 
officers were marked out for senior command.122 Specifically, Boyle highlighted three of 
Leigh-Mallory’s peers, Portal, Tedder and Slessor, whose names Trenchard is presumed to 
have marked out in a copy of the AFL.123 By the time Boyle published his biography of 
Trenchard, Portal, Tedder and Slessor were the first three CASs to emerge from those 
officers without pre-First World War experience.124 They were obvious examples to be 
included in a passage stressing Trenchard’s centrality to the development of the RAF. 
While this copy of the AFL might have existed, Boyle failed to identify where it resides. 
Boyle went further and suggested that in stepping aside as CAS for his brother, ACM Sir 
Geoffrey Salmond, ACM Sir John Salmond had, ‘at one improvident stroke’, broken ‘the 
line of succession prepared by Trenchard’.125 This episode led to the appointment of ACM 
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Ellington as CAS, whom Orange described as a ‘liability’.126 Orange’s views reinforced 
Boyle’s by noting that Ellington did not have ‘necessary training or self-confidence to 
assert himself’ at the senior level, where he was required to interact with ministers during a 
period of rapidly changing geo-strategic priorities.127 Historians like Parton have repeated 
these claims, writing, ‘Ellington appeared to be afraid of taking on the political 
establishment’.128 Conversely, the Marquis of Londonderry, who served as Secretary of 
State for Air during Ellington’s tenure, described him as a ‘tower of strength’ and the right 
officer to succeed Geoffrey Salmond, despite emerging younger officers; however, 
Londonderry clearly had his reputation to defend in his memoir.129 
While officers like Portal and Slessor maintained correspondence with Trenchard 
after 1929, it is not clear that this had a purpose other than keeping a key RAF advocate in 
the House of Lords and a serving five-star officer informed of current developments.130 
Thus, Trenchard was able to defend RAF interests even after his term as CAS ended. 
Furthermore, while, in 1963, MRAF Lord Douglas recalled his ‘admiration’ for Trenchard 
for taking him ‘under his wing’, such recollections should be treated with care, as they 
come from senior officers viewing the latter through a hagiographic lens.131 No evidence 
exists that Leigh-Mallory maintained correspondence with Trenchard. Therefore, his post-
1929 career needs to be explained more systematically than just relying on patronage; 
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though, as Chapter Seven illustrates, they did know each other in the 1920s, and this could 
not have hurt his career. As Haslam suggested, only in 1940, while vying for a senior 
position himself, did Trenchard have some further influence over RAF appointments.132 
Rather than the perceived importance that Boyle inferred of Trenchard’s direct patronage, 
it was nurturing and socialisation with senior officers at an organisational level that was a 
factor in nurturing careers. This came through contact with senior officers during service at 
the Air Ministry, which was a key pattern in a nurtured officer’s rise to Air Rank.  
While familiarity with Trenchard was advantageous, this thesis argues that, from the 
perspective of leadership development, his key role was in having the vision to develop the 
institutions and structures that nurtured officers and provided a foundation for subsequent 
career progression. The existence of Andover highlights the importance of the institutions 
as the RAF recognised the need to offer development opportunities. Effective senior 
leaders such as Trenchard recognised the need for long-range planning that might not 
come to fruition for several years. It was this, rather than mentoring individual officers, 
that Trenchard understood. Trenchard’s 1919 paper on ‘The Permanent Organization of 
the Royal Air Force’ recognised the need for Andover, stating that it ‘must be opened as 
soon as possible’.133 The Air Ministry and the Secretary of State for Air vehemently 
opposed any suggestion that either Cranwell or Andover be located close to or merged 
with similar Army or RN institutions, which both the War Office and Admiralty desired. 
The Air Ministry recognised the value of these institutions in maintaining independence as 
well as providing nurtured officers with ascribed cultural practices.134 Furthermore, this 
                                                          
132 Group Captain E.B. Haslam, ‘How Lord Dowding came to leave Fighter Command’, JSS, 4(2) (1981), pp. 
175-86. 
133 TNA, AIR 8/12, Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force,, p. 6. This memorandum was presented 
to parliament with a note by the Secretary of State for War and Air, Winston Churchill, on 11 December 
1919. 
134 Hansard, HC Deb, 21 March 1922, Vol. 152, Cols. 342-394. 
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challenges the suggestion by Janowitz and Arthur Davies that officers reaching the pinnacle 
of their profession followed a less conventional career path.135 While Trenchard is an 
example of this, it is not the case for other RAF officers of this period who emerged to 
take up senior leadership roles. The typical process for the RAF, as this thesis illustrates, 
was for officers to follow characteristic paths through institutions like Andover, whether 
formally laid down in regulations or not. For example, from Appendix Three, Alexander 
Shekleton, who joined the RFC in 1913, only became a GC in 1935 and remained in this 
rank until his death in 1941. Shekleton’s protracted promotion rate is explained by his 
decision to specialise in engineering rather than staff duties, which was the more 
characteristic route. Longmore’s conception of the process of reaching senior command 
through the staff colleges and the IDC is indicative of the existence of emblematic lines of 
succession planning that allowed officers to enter the military elite.136 Written 21 years after 
the foundation of the RAF, Longmore’s article suggested that by 1939, a typical path had 
emerged that saw officers engage with accepted processes. Watched over by the Air 
Ministry and Trenchard, these processes encouraged action learning and socialisation by 
officers through appropriately timed job assignments, despite little formal understanding of 
leadership development. By following these structures, officers delivered organisational 
value to the RAF while ascribing to its cultural practices. Thus, Trenchard’s greatest 
achievement was not in mentoring these men but in creating structures and processes that 
provided the RAF with a committed body of military professionals through broad 
succession planning arrangements.  
 
1.5 Summary  
                                                          
135 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 151; Arthur K. Davies, ‘Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer 
Corps’, Social Forces, 27(2) (December 1948), pp. 143-53.  
136 Longmore, ‘Training for Higher Command’, pp. 463-478. 
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This chapter has highlighted the challenge of utilising a modern understanding of 
leadership theory and applying it to the past. It is clear that modern terminology and 
conceptions would be alien to those officers under consideration in this thesis. However, it 
opens up valid questions concerning what the RAF understood by leadership and its 
related conceptions. The RAF had a clear conception of what it viewed as leadership, 
which linked to the conduct of war and the need to generate fighting power. The RAF 
readily identified that an officer’s primary purpose linked to war fighting, and, thus, they 
should be prepared for such ends. The emphasis on morale, which was evident in RAF 
doctrine and teachings, had its roots in nineteenth century military thinking that stressed 
the importance of moralism and espirit-de-corps in offensive doctrines.  
Despite a simpler view of leadership, the RAF grasped the idea that it was required 
as a profession to provide some form of leadership development, though officers were 
expected, through public school attendance, to already have some of the basic leader traits 
necessary. If one chose to pursue technical rather than command and staff training, this 
limited oneself to leader development. As officers progressed through Andover and the 
IDC, they were exposed to broader conceptions of organisational leadership underpinned 
by professional knowledge. These institutions became the archetypal sources of senior 
leaders’ development, despite the RAF’s inability to engage in some form of coherent 
management of the process beyond the use of ACRs. However, the establishment of 
institutions like Cranwell, Andover and the IDC highlights the recognition that there was 
some need to strategically plan through the implementation of a succession planning 
system, which identified and nurtured key talent. Given that these processes were in 
evidence, albeit constrained by the lack of understanding as to what these modern terms 
meant, this thesis uses the concepts of leadership development and succession planning as 
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the basis of analysing Leigh-Mallory’s progression through his training, education and 
experience. 
Chapter Two 
Leadership and Royal Air Force Culture and Ethos 
 
Malleable, Nebulous, but Useful. 
Jeremy Black1 
Black’s critique of culture illustrates both its advantage and disadvantage, as it can be a 
useful analytical lens but has been used in differing ways by scholars. As with leadership, 
culture remains an often used but ill-defined concept, despite its increasing use. However, 
broadly, culture is the values, beliefs and behaviours common to any group. Since the so-
called ‘Cultural Turn’ of the late 1960s, which led to the emergence of ‘New Military 
History’, cultural analyses of military history have focused on the common experience of 
warfare and the behaviours of those involved.2 Since the 1970s, however, culture has 
increasingly been used in strategic studies to examine policy options pursued by states. The 
concept of strategic culture emerged from Jack Snyder’s 1977 RAND study on the Soviet 
Union and links to the question of ways of war, which splits into national, military and 
service level analysis.3 Strategic culture also mirrors on-going debates over ‘Revolutions in 
Military Affairs’ and military innovation.4 More recently, scholars like Elizabeth Kier have 
examined these policy choices in terms of organisational culture.5 However, Kier, writing 
on the development of British defensive doctrine, neither adequately defined RAF culture 
                                                          
1 Jeremy Black, War and the Cultural Turn (London: Polity Press, 2012), pp. 42-3; Edgar Schein, ‘Organisational 
Culture’, American Psychologist, 45(2) (1990), p. 111. 
2 See: Joanna Bourke, ‘New Military History’ in Matthew Hughes and William Philpott (eds.), Palgrave Advances 
in Modern Military History (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 258-80.  
3 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: RAND, 
1977); Searle, ‘Inter-Service Debate’, p. 6. 
4 See: Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, JSS, 29(5) (2006), pp. 916-9; Elizabeth 
Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars’, International Security, 19(4) (1995), pp. 65–93. 
For a useful overview that bridges the discussion between ‘ways of war’ as a school of historical thought and 
modern strategic cultures, see: Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006). 
5 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997). 
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nor noticed similarities between the services. For example, on discussing leadership, Kier 
criticised the Army for its focus on drill while writing that the RAF was more liberal and 
free thinking due to its technological foundations.6 This ignores the shared leadership 
values between the services, and, as Chapter Four makes clear, the RAF recruited from the 
same sources as the Army; public schools. Nevertheless, leadership, and the development 
of leaders, is contingent on cultural factors, which influence an organisation’s behaviour, its 
structure and how it perceives itself. However, while Francis broadly talked of the ‘distinct 
culture and ethos’ of the RAF, beyond talking about the ‘allure of the flyer’, he failed to 
define this.7 Similarly, Markus Mäder, writing on modern RAF doctrine, provided an 
overview of what he described as the Service’s culture in terms of being the ‘junior service’; 
however, Mäder, like Francis, provided no definition of the concepts underpinning this 
culture beyond a doctrinal discussion of independent air power.8 This chapter seeks to 
reverse this trend.  
This chapter examines RAF organisational culture and ethos, its relationship to 
leadership, and how individual officers interfaced with Service philosophy as they emerged 
as senior leaders. This is important because officers like Leigh-Mallory regularly interfaced 
with the sources that underpinned culture. In particular, this chapter explores and codifies 
RAF culture and defines it in terms of its key assumption, basic belief and core value. The 
chapter also explores the relationship between pilot ethos and culture and highlights the 
significance of membership of the GD Branch and of flying as the core competencies for 
the military professionals of the RAF. This use of culture as an analytical lens brings 
together a top-down, or organisational, analysis with a bottom-up, or social, examination to 
                                                          
6 Ibid, pp. 129-33. 
7 Francis, The Flyer, p. 14. 
8 Markus Mäder, In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine in the Post-Cold 
War Era, 1989-2002 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 105-12. 
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consider how the two interfaced in the realm of the leadership development processes of 
the RAF, as it was the bridge between them.   
 
2.1 Leadership and the Importance of Culture 
The idea of culture is important due to the relationship between service, or organisational, 
culture and a nation’s way of war. For the British, historically, the preferred way of war has 
been to conduct campaigns in the most efficient manner possible, which, as French 
illustrated, has seen a continuing shift between continental commitments and naval 
approaches.9 The decision over preferred commitments derived from the question of 
efficiency, and the use of a naval blockade and commitment to the Western Front during 
the First World War illustrate this preference, as they were, despite debates, considered the 
most effective way of conducting the conflict.10 While the question of means concerning 
land, naval or air power remained a contextual variable, as Searle showed, the British 
military shared a common awareness of principles governing war, which contributed to a 
joint strategic culture.11 A preference for efficiency found its way into air power theory 
through the idea of the knockout blow, presupposing that the application of concentrated 
air power on selected targets would end wars quickly. Doctrinally, RAF culture can be 
framed in terms of the logic of efficiency, with ideas revolving around control of the air 
linked to the most effective manner of conducting operations. For example, the idea of 
blockades as an efficient form of conducting war found its way into air power thinking.12 
                                                          
9 David French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
10 On the debate over British strategy, in particular the debate between ‘Westerners’ and ‘Easterners’, in the 
First World War, see: David French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-1916 (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1986); Brock Milman, Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 2001). 
11 In general, see: Searle, ‘Inter-Service Debate’.  
12 Air Commodore P.F.M Fellowes, DSO, ‘Aerial Blockade’, JRUSI, 82 (1937), pp. 530-5. 
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As Major-General (MajGen) Frederick Sykes, CAS from 1918 to 1919, noted in his 1918 
memorandum on the ‘Air Requirements of the Empire’: 
Highly specialised air forces are now essential components of all fighting 
efficiency, and aviation also provides a distinct and separate striking force of 
tremendous potentiality. (Emphasis added)13 
 
Furthermore, in his 1925 work Paris, or the Future of War, Basil Liddell Hart, who coined the 
phrase ‘British Way in Warfare’, suggested the use of air power to secure victory, and 
Brooke-Popham recommended it to Trenchard.14 This was because Liddell Hart viewed 
technology as a force multiplier that could reduce casualties. Liddell Hart’s views were 
heavily influenced by his assessment of the conduct of the First World War and his belief 
that the war was conducted inefficiently. However, Liddell Hart’s preference for the 
indirect approach ignored the historical reality, noted above, that Britain had never 
overlooked its continental commitment.15 The broader strategic idea of efficiency filtered 
into the beliefs and assumptions that defined aspects of RAF culture. For example, 
efficiency influenced RAF organisational structures. The creation of the GD Branch can be 
viewed as part of a desire to manage personnel efficiently while developing a feeling of 
membership through the shared ethos of being pilots. 
                                                          
13 TNA, CAB 24/71/79, Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on ‘Air Power Requirements of the 
Empire’, 9 December 1918, p. 1. The idea that air power was an efficient means of conducting war was not 
unique to Britain and pervaded the prevailing views of many theorists, including Giulio Douhet and Brigadier 
William Mitchell, of the inter-war years, see: Mark Clodfelter, Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of 
American Air Power, 1917-1945 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2010); Thomas Hippler, Bombing 
the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundations of Air-Power Strategy, 188-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
14 RAFM, Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/140, Air Vice-Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham to Captain T.B. 
Marson, 17 July 1925; B.H. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber, 1932); B.H. Liddell Hart, 
Paris, or the Future of War (London: Kegan Paul, 1925). 
15 French, British Strategy and War Aims, p. xi. Liddell Hart’s idea of the ‘British Way in Warfare’ first appeared 
in a 1931 RUSI lecture, see: Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, ‘Economic Pressure and Continental Victories’, 
JRUSI, 76(503) (1931), pp. 486-510. This was then further developed in 1932, see: Hart, The British Way in 
Warfare. Further editions were published in 1935 and 1942. For an overview of the legacy of Liddell Hart’s 
idea, see: Brian Holden Reid, The British Way in Warfare: Liddell Hart ’s Idea and Its Legacy, The RUSI 
Journal, 156(6) (2011), pp. 70-6. 
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Underpinning culture are the assumptions, beliefs and values which are codified in 
‘artefacts’, ‘histories’, ‘stories’, ‘rituals’ and ‘symbols’.16 Assumptions and beliefs are 
established concepts based either on experience or on a preconscious recognition of their 
importance. Learned rather than instinctive, values require greater awareness of what they 
deliver to an organisation.17 More broadly, as Charles Kirke argued, these processes remain 
‘consciously or unconsciously learned rather than innate’; thus, the officer class of the RAF 
was influenced and moulded by its culture as they were gradually exposed to it through 
processes like military education.18 Ethos, described below, also played a role in shaping 
RAF culture. In addition, RAF culture delivered self-identity by developing a feeling of 
belonging that mirrored the pillars involved in leadership development. By generating a 
distinct culture, though not using the language deployed here, the RAF affected an overt 
influence on the Service’s defence mission by shaping perceptions and behaviours related 
to the debate over the use of air power. This was enacted by officers who emerged through 
the leadership development processes of the RAF, who subsequently defended its 
independence, as they were well versed in its views while also able to manage relationships 
with the other services. Under the rubric of efficiency, RAF culture can be broadly defined 
in the following terms: a key assumption of independence, the basic belief in ‘Command of 
the Air’ and the underlying value of the ‘Air Force Spirit’. These ideas were not monolithic, 
and the RAF reshaped views on ‘stories’ like doctrine. These cultural markers derived from 
the RAF’s understanding of its primary defence mission, as this justified its ‘existence and 
                                                          
16 For useful overviews of military culture, see: Peter Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, JMH, 72(1) (2008), 
pp. 11-41; Allan D. English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective (Kingston, ON: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2004). 
17 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, p. 14. 
18 Charles Kirke, ‘Social Structures in the Regular Combat Arms of the British Army: A Model’, (PhD Thesis, 
Cranfield University, 2002), p. 9. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Leadership and Royal Air Force Culture and Ethos Page 90 
 
claim on resources’, which allowed the Service to manage external threats.19 This mission 
was the defence of ‘national and imperial safety’, with air power viewed as the most 
efficient means of achieving this end.20   
While acting in accordance with a general set of strategic principles as a way to 
conduct operations efficiently, the RAF argued that air power was the preferred means, 
albeit in a joint environment. This preference was conditioned by pilot ethos, which 
influenced leadership and organisational preferences through the Service’s beliefs and 
assumptions. Air Staff Memorandum (ASM) No. 43, The War Aim of the Royal Air Force, a 
document that Leigh-Mallory, as a GC and Deputy Director of Staff Duties (DDSD), had 
responsibility for disseminating, stressed the inherent tension between the ends of Britain’s 
strategic culture and its ways and means.21 ASM No. 43, and subsequent re-drafts, is 
contentious amongst historians, as Biddle noted that, in conjunction with Trenchard’s May 
1928 memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) Committee, it left a ‘confused legacy’ for 
the RAF.22 Trenchard argued that the war aim of the RAF was ‘to break down the enemy’s 
means of resistance’, and this included industrial targets. While Trenchard’s memorandum 
sought to answer questions surrounding the legality of this strategic view of air power’s 
employment, it generated enmity from both the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) 
and the First Sea Lord.23 Furthermore, Trenchard failed to illustrate broader RAF thinking 
on air power, which might have lessened the other services hostility; for example, as 
                                                          
19 Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, p. 18. 
20 TNA, AIR 6/19, Memorandum of the Post-War Functions of the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force, 13 
November 1918. 
21 RAFM, Air Staff Memoranda No. 43 - The War Aim of the Royal Air Force, October 1928; TNA, AIR 2/675, 
Air Vice-Marshal Philip Joubert de la Ferté, Commandant, RAF Staff College to Group Captain Trafford 
Leigh-Mallory, Deputy Director of Staff Duties, 25 May 1933. 
22 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, pp. 94-102. Trenchard’s Chief of Staff Memorandum is reprinted in Webster and 
Frankland’s official history, see: ‘Appendix 2 – Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff and Comments by 
his Colleagues, May 1928’ in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against 
Germany, 1939-1945 – Volume IV: Annexes and Appendices (London: HMSO, 1961), pp. 71-83. 
23 For CIGS’s and the First Sea Lord’s notes, see: Frankland, Volume IV: Annexes and Appendices, pp. 76-83. 
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Chapter Six illustrates, officers were clearly able to think deeply about the broader use of 
air power.  
In leadership terms, assumptions, beliefs and values built upon, related to and 
provided the foundation for the developing identity and ethos of the RAF, and, while it 
seems axiomatic, effective leaders were vital in generating culture. Schein argued that 
leaders shaped culture as they communicated an organisation’s vision and beliefs and 
transferred them through leadership development processes.24 Therefore, the methods of 
leadership development identified in Chapter One not only provided organisational 
capacity, but also shaped individual ability in a manner considered desirable by the RAF. 
For example, socialisation allowed for the communication of key cultural values between 
key stakeholders, both in an inter- and intra-service context, which linked to those able to 
innovate. The military innovation literature recognises this aspect of leadership 
development; as Stephen Rosen suggested: 
if military leaders […] attract talented young officers with great potential for 
promotion to new ways of war and then […] protect and promote them they 
[can] produce new, usable military capabilities.25 
 
This is because nurtured officers made themselves visible for further development and 
promotion as they interfaced with key practices in the RAF. Therefore, nurtured officers 
became trusted agents able to enunciate a new military capability. This identification 
allowed senior leaders to promote cultural change through nurtured officers who 
encountered processes like military education. Senior leaders who had the necessary vision 
were able to set targets and goals for the organisation as well as generating change as 
represented by John Kotter’s Eight Stage Process, which includes the following aspects: 
                                                          
24 In general, see: Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership. 
25 Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University 
Press, 1991), pp. 252. For a view that innovation is externally shaped, see: Barry R. Posen, The Sources of 
Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars, (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 
1984). 
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creating urgency, guidance, vision, communication, empowerment, determination and 
flexibility.26 While Trenchard illustrated aspects of this modern concept, applying a current, 
conceptual framework like Kotter’s is fraught with challenges. Notably, Kotter’s model, as 
a list for enacting change, can be criticised for being too mechanistic. Additionally, Kotter’s 
top-down focus did not take account of the social aspects of an organisation and the 
experience of people within it. Similarly, while establishing how change can occur, not 
enough consideration is given to how this is maintained. Thus, understanding leadership 
development in an organisation like the RAF is vital to a consideration of how to maintain 
cultural change. As such, despite the issues identified above, Trenchard was central to the 
development of the RAF, as his views, outlined in his 1919 ‘Permanent Organization’ 
paper, influenced service culture.27 In this important cultural ‘artefact’, Trenchard 
recognised the need for an effective framework for the development of officers by creating 
urgency and communicating his vision for the Service through the establishment of key 
institutions like Andover. While Trenchard argued that squadrons would provide an 
‘identity’ like the regimental system, this remained challenging and is why identifying as a 
pilot, as a member of the GD Branch, became a more pervasive identity in the RAF of this 
period.28 Additionally, it should be noted that ‘Permanent Organization’ was written for a 
Secretary of State, Churchill, who had an Army background and would have identified with 
Trenchard’s line of reasoning concerning the regimental system. Furthermore, as Gray 
asserted, Trenchard illustrated the ability to interface with both his organisation and its 
wider context while ensuring RAF survival.29 Concerning the production of official 
statements on air power, such as ASM, Slessor recalled of Trenchard in 1978: 
                                                          
26 John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Harvard, CT: Harvard Business School Press, 1996). 
27 TNA, AIR 8/12, Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force. 
28 Ibid, p. 3.  
29 Gray, Leadership, pp. 101-3. 
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He’d send for you and talk away. Well you’d go and produce the paper that he 
told you to produce, you bring it back next morning, and by that evening, 
you’d be sent for and be told, “This is a very bad paper. You haven’t 
understood me at all”, and then it would be covered in Lady Trenchard’s 
writing because his writing was ineligible. He then would say, “Now go away 
and produce another one” and off you go and produce another one and 
eventually you get the right answer, or more or less the right answer.30 
 
This recollection illustrates Trenchard’s hands on style of leadership as well as his role in 
controlling key ‘artefacts’, ‘histories’ and ‘stories’ that underpinned RAF culture. These 
sources ranged from formal doctrine like ASM and capstone publications like AP1300, 
through to external and informal ‘stories’, such as the official history of the RAF in the 
First World War, articles in JRUSI and RAFQ, and key books on air power that emerged 
during this period.31 The themes identified in many of these ‘artefacts’ tell historians as 
much about RAF culture as they do about its thinking. External ‘stories’ included 
statements written by serving officers but published for general consumption. While many 
titles were published on air power, perhaps most significant of these sources was J.M. 
Spaight’s Air Power and War Rights, which gained acceptance outside of the RAF due to his 
position in the Air Ministry and his experience as a jurist.32 Several key future senior RAF 
officers, like Slessor and Kingston-McCloughry, also produced notable volumes.33 The 
importance of these ‘histories’ and ‘stories’ is that several appeared on reading lists at key 
points in an officer’s development. They also reinforced and furthered RAF cultural 
practices to both an open internal audience and external onlookers as the Service sought to 
                                                          
30 IWM, 3176, Interview with Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, 3 August 1978. 
31 For a personal overview of the emergence of RAF doctrine in this period, see: Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert 
Brooke-Popham, ‘The Development of Royal Air Force Doctrine’, RAFQ and Commonwealth Air Forces Journal, 
2(2) (1950), pp. 111-4. 
32 J.M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (London: Longmans, 1924). Air Power and War Rights received new 
editions in 1933 and 1947. Spaight also wrote for the RAFQ, see: J.M. Spaight, CB, CBE, LLD, ‘The Chaotic 
State of the International Law Governing Bombardment’, RAFQ, 9(1) (1938), pp. 24-32. On Spaight’s 
influence, see: Gray, Leadership, pp. 54-7. 
33 Slessor, Air Power and Armies; Air Vice-Marshal E.L. Gossage, National Defence – The Royal Air Force 
(London: William Hodge and Company, 1937); E.J. Kingston-McCloughry, Winged Warfare: Air Problems of 
Peace and War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937). 
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inform on-going debates on air power and promote air-mindedness.34 This was especially 
the case with officers like Leigh-Mallory who were involved in ‘selling’ air power to the 
other services, either through writing or as DS at Camberley. Potentially, these cultural 
sources represented a form of indoctrination that limited thinking if an officer’s views did 
not fit the organisation’s prescribed assessments. However, as Chapter Six suggests, there 
was a great deal of variety in the material produced by nurtured officers. Finally, while 
senior officers are important for the development of culture and leadership, they cannot be 
separated from their situational context.35 For example, as Chapter Four examines, there 
were clear links with broader social views that were developed through public schools. This 
had particular resonance for the RAF, as public schools were its preferred source of 
recruitment. 
 
2.2 Beliefs, Assumptions, and Values 
The development of key assumptions and basic beliefs was imperative for RAF culture 
because officers engaged with these concepts during their leadership development. These 
processes were underpinned by various characteristics, such as the RAF’s attitude towards 
war, military education and its perceptions of itself as a profession. As suggested elsewhere, 
the RAF perceived itself as a profession that encouraged meritocracy and the provision of 
education opportunities. However, these characteristics often reinforced a self-perception 
that the RAF desired as it sought to set itself apart from its antecedents. The overarching 
assumptions and beliefs of the RAF found outlets in both formal and informal statements 
                                                          
34 For the most recent analysis of air-mindedness in Great Britain, see: Brett Holman, ‘The Next War in the 
Air: Civilian Fears of Strategic Bombing in Britain, 1908-1941’, (PhD Thesis, University of Melbourne, 2009). 
This has recently been published as The Next War in the Air: Britain’s Fear of the Bomber, 1908-1941 (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2014). 
35 Martin Chemers, ‘The Social, Organisational and Cultural Context of Effective Leadership’ in Barbara 
Kellerman (ed.), Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 91. 
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on air power that officers read, studied or even produced. For example, ‘Command of the 
Air’ was the basic belief of the RAF and derived from Andover’s opening address, where 
parallels were drawn with the naval conception of ‘Command of the Sea’.36 Given the 
broader educational and leadership implications of this speech, which have been alluded to 
in Chapter One, this concept was significant for a nurtured officer’s development as they 
engaged with views that influenced it. Brooke-Popham, as a Major then serving in the 
Army, used the phrase as early as 1912 in an article in The Army Review, which derived from 
a lecture he delivered at Camberley on 3 November 1911 while a student there.37 At a 
conceptual level, this belief filtered through from the Army Manual of Military Ballooning 
through the RFC Training Manual into AP1300. A doctrinal term, ‘command of the air’ 
incorporated concepts, such as control of the air, air superiority and neutralisation, which 
became increasingly prevalent.38 Therefore, while ‘Command of the Air’ presented an 
overarching cultural concept, at the doctrinal level it is clear that it was anything but 
monolithic and it diffused into joint doctrine, such as the Manual of Combined Operations.39 
Doctrinally, it was inherently offensive in nature, as AP1300 stated: 
The maxim that offence is the best defence applies truly in air warfare more 
than any other operation of war.40  
 
The question of how ‘Command of the Air’ was to be achieved incorporated elements of 
both technological and cultural assumptions, as bombers were seen as the key method of 
employment, while centres of morale, like industry, were targeting choices due to the belief 
in their fragility. This morale-based view of the offensive had its antecedents in nineteenth 
                                                          
36 TNA, AIR 5/881, Opening Address, p. 2. 
37 H.R.M. Brooke-Popham, ‘Military Aviation’, The Army Review (1912), p. 96. For a recent, and most 
thorough, examination of the concept of air superiority in early British air power doctrine, see: James Pugh, 
‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air: British Military and Naval Aviation, 1911-1918’, (PhD 
Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012). 
38 On the use of neutralisation in RAF doctrine, see: Air Ministry, AP1300 – Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 
I – Operations, Second Edition (London: Air Ministry, 1940), Chap. VII, Paras. 15-24. 
39 For a discussion of this, see: Mahoney, ‘“The support afforded by the air force was faultless”’, pp. 17-9. 
40 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. VII, Para. 5. 
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century military thinking, and it paralleled the idea of spirit prevalent in leadership 
philosophy of the period.41 As Gray noted, doctrine in this period was more akin to 
‘principles of belief’ that slowly evolved as the RAF did as an organisation.42 Doctrine 
manuals and various APs were also cultural ‘artefacts’, as they contained the knowledge 
that underpinned RAF assumptions, values and beliefs and were a key form of transmitting 
this information. While the RAF held a strategic view encapsulated by the need for air 
superiority as the most efficient manner of conducting operations, the ways, means and 
ends of this doctrinal language, as Pugh highlighted, as well as its physical application, 
continued to evolve in the same manner as leadership.43 The RAF was quick to begin a 
codification process, if only to stake a claim on the subject of air power employment and 
ensure its assumption of independence. By comparison, the Army only published its first 
capstone doctrine in 1909, while the Naval War Manual of the RN did not appear until 
1925.44 This has led some historians to prefer to use the idea of an ethos of doctrine, rather 
than a doctrinal culture, for the earlier services, while the latter is more appropriate for the 
RAF.45 Some historians’ narrow focus on strategic bombing ignores the broad scope of 
both parts of the War Manual, which was inherently flexible in conception. Rather than 
acting as a proscriptive manual, AP1300 was a statement of intent.46 Finally, as suggested 
below, belief in ‘Command of the Air’ found an outgrowth in RAF ethos and in its 
organisational structure through the focus on pilots and flying as a key element of a GD 
                                                          
41 Tami Davis Biddle, ‘Air Power Theory: An Analytical Narrative from the First World War to the Present’ 
in J. Boone Bartholomees Jr (ed.), US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd Edition 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), p. 340. 
42 Gray, Leadership, p. 19. 
43 Pugh, ‘Control of the Air’, pp. 20-6. 
44 TNA, ADM 186/66, Naval War Manual (1925); FSR Part 1 (1909). 
45 For a recent example, see: Jones, From Boer War to World War, pp. 37-70; Albert Palazzo, Seeking Victory on 
the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), pp. 
8-17. 
46 On doctrine in the RAF more generally, see: Parton, ‘Royal Air Force Doctrine’. 
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Branch officer’s career. Therefore, many of the themes picked up in doctrine codified 
processes inherent in cultural aspects of the RAF. 
Independence, the key assumption of the RAF, owes its existence to the findings of 
the Smuts Report, which emerged from the government’s 1917 Committee on Air 
Organisation and Home Defence against Air Raids, which noted that an ‘air service […] 
can be used as an independent means of war operations’.47 This independent view of air 
power’s efficacy as the strategic arm of Britain’s defence establishment remained constant 
throughout this period. It was a key reason for the internecine battles between the RAF 
and RN over the apportionment of resources that characterised inter-service relations in 
the 1920s. Indeed, independence remained an assumption because the perceived efficiency 
of an independent air force had not been proven. Thus, this assumption also formed part 
of an on-going pursuit to ensure independence. Therefore, by nurturing of suitable officers 
well versed in aspects of their profession, the RAF sought to ensure independence as these 
officers both ‘sold’ and educated the other service about the role of air power in war. For 
the RAF, and its officer class, there was a clear link between its ethos and technology that 
saw the emergence of a more efficient means of conducting military operations. This was 
reflected more broadly in the emergence of what Edgerton described as ‘liberal militarism’ 
in Britain’s body politic.48 In 1938, an Air Staff paper on ‘The Role of the Air Force in 
National Defence’ argued that due to air power, the traditional methods of defence, 
centred on the RN, were at a disadvantage and that the best source of deterrence now lay 
                                                          
47 TNA, AIR 8/2, Second Report of the Committee of the Committee on Air Organisation and Home 
Defence against Air Raids, 17 August 1917. Also, see: John Sweetman, ‘The Smuts Report of 1917: Merely 
Political Window Dressing?’, JSS, 4(2) (1981), pp. 152-74. 
48 David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), pp. 41-3. 
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with an independent air force.49 However, the RAF did not discount the fact that it must 
operate in a joint environment. For example, in terms of leadership development, Leigh-
Mallory’s army co-operation specialism did not act as a bar on his career progression as he 
bridged the intellectual gap between the assumption of independence and a realisation that 
future conflict required co-operation between the services. In 1931, Leigh-Mallory stressed 
the need for air superiority as the most efficient means of supporting the Army, thus 
further illustrating the links between cultural concepts, doctrinal statements and the broad 
thinking the RAF engendered.50 Key institutions like Cranwell and Andover acted as key 
enablers in the development of the assumption of independence as they established and 
nurtured a feeling of membership for the officer class of the RAF. 
The assumption of independence found an outgrowth in RAF material culture, 
which highlighted the Service’s need to define its activities in the eyes of politicians. As 
Dalia Gavriely-Nuri suggested, the award of decorations represents an act of 
legitimatisation by governments concerning the use of force, as ‘they support the 
conversion of physical-military power into social-symbolic power’ and in return they 
convert ‘social power and interests into military power’.51 From an organisational 
perspective, through its relationship with pilot ethos, RAF cultural ‘artefacts’, such as ranks 
and medals, encapsulated the Service’s culture and saw its activities legitimised by the state, 
which helped develop a feeling of membership. Ranks and medals also linked to the belief 
in ‘Command of the Air’, as the titles chosen for such ‘artefacts’ stressed the importance of 
flying. While the RAF assumed the importance of its own independence, these ‘artefacts’ 
                                                          
49 TNA, AIR 8/243, Role of the Royal Air Force in National Defence, 5 July 1938. On air power and the 
concept of deterrence in this period, see: Richard Overy, ‘Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory 
before 1939’, JSS, 15(1) (1992), pp. 73-101. 
50 Wing Commander T.L. Leigh-Mallory, ‘The Maintenance of Air Superiority in a Land Campaign’, RAFQ, 
2(2) (1931), pp. 245–52. 
51 Dalia Gavriely-Nuri, ‘‘It is not the heroes who need this, but the nation’: The Latent Power of Military 
Decorations in Israel, 1948–2005’, Journal of Power, 2(3) (2009), p. 403. 
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also replicated its views on the subjects that came out in ‘stories’ like doctrine, as the 
Service sought to pursue freedom from the other services during this period. In 1919, the 
Air Council recognised that the adoption of distinct ranks was important for ‘preserving a 
separate identity’ for the RAF.52 This distinct identity underpinned independence and 
provided the RAF with an image set apart from its sister services. It also highlighted the 
relationship between the parochial issue of inter-service tribalism and ownership amongst 
the RAF and the other services over the basic assumption of independence. As ‘tribes’, the 
Army and RN sought the return of what they perceived as their air arms. In terms of 
cultural ‘artefacts’, this issue was usefully summarised by the Admiralty’s displeasure over 
the rank of AC in 1919. The RN utilised the rank of Commodore as a specific appointment 
conferred on senior Captains, and they believed that the RAF was impinging on naval 
tradition.53 The Admiralty suggested the rank of Air Brigadier and believed that, as the 
senior service, their traditions were more significant than either the Army’s or the newly 
formed RAF’s.54 Similarly, during discussions over the status of military decorations in 
general in 1926, the principle of area of actions and demarcations as applied to the award 
of medals was raised by AMP, AVM Sir Philip Game, who stressed that air power had 
changed the terms that should be applied concerning direct contact with the enemy.55 The 
RAF preferred the use of the term ‘flying’ in its medals, as it represented its primary 
                                                          
52 TNA, AIR 1/9/15/1/33, Minutes from the 81st Meeting of the Air Council with notes relating to ‘New 
Titles for Officer Ranks of the RAF’, 18 March 1919. In 1917, to provide a degree of distinctiveness to the 
RAF, a series of Gaelic titles were suggested for the RAF. They were ultimately rejected, and the suggestions 
can be found in TNA, AIR 2/105, Proposed Rank and Title for RAF Officers, date opened 22 October 1917. 
53 The appointment of Commodore in the RN did not become a substantive rank until 1997. 
54 TNA, AIR 1/9/15/1/33, Admiralty to Secretary, Air Ministry, 13 June 1919. 
55 TNA, AIR 2/294, Air Member for Personnel to Keeper of the Privy Purse, Sir Frederick Ponsonby, 6 
February 1926. This letter portents a similar debate twenty years later concerning the award of a Bomber 
Command Medal. See: Peter Gray, ‘A Culture of Official Squeamishness?: Britain’s Air Ministry and the 
Strategic Air Offensive against Germany’, JMH, 77(4) (2013), pp. 1349-77. 
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function; for example, the proposed Conspicuous Flying Medal started life as the Aviation 
Medal, and the change of title reinforced pilot ethos.56  
The key element of RAF culture related to leadership was the value of the ‘Air 
Force Spirit’. Values require greater awareness than assumptions and beliefs, as they 
necessitate an explicit understanding of what they bring to an organisation’s development, 
rather than directly framing ‘stories’. Additionally, elements of both beliefs and 
assumptions can be found in values; for example, concerning education, which was an 
outgrowth of the ‘Air Force Spirit’, nurtured officers defended the assumption of 
independence as trusted agents of the Air Ministry, as they were well versed in the belief in 
‘Command of the Air’. From a leadership perspective, the value of this spirit, enacted 
through key institutions like Andover, was to develop an understanding of its importance. 
Trenchard enunciated the importance of this concept in his 1919 paper on ‘Permanent 
Organization’, which contained a sizeable section on the ‘Extreme Importance of Training’ 
and stated: 
We now come to that on which the whole future of the Royal Air Force 
depends, namely, the training of its officers and men.57  
 
Trenchard directly linked independence to the importance of education and training as 
pillars of RAF development and that of its personnel. Trenchard further noted that to 
create ‘an Air Force worthy of the name, we must create an Air Force spirit’.58 Andover 
was a key element of this, but Cranwell was the central institution that laid the foundation 
for new entrants to the RAF. However, it is worth reiterating that the idea of Andover as 
the ‘Brain’ of the RAF was a furtherance of the value of the ‘Air Force Spirit’ as the Staff 
College was seen as important to the Service’s development. Furthermore, the Air 
                                                          
56 TNA, AIR 2/294, Air Member for Personnel to Keeper of the Privy Purse, Sir Frederick Ponsonby, 19 
May 1926. 
57 TNA, AIR 8/12, Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force, p. 4. 
58 Ibid. 
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Ministry’s continual reiteration, as Chapter Six illustrates, of the importance of officers with 
psa suggests that the idea of the ‘Air Force Spirit’ was not just a tacit acknowledgement of 
the importance of education, but that it had enduring relevance for RAF leadership 
development processes. On Cranwell, in 1922, the Secretary of State for Air, Captain 
Frederick Guest, described it as the ‘home of our future chiefs of the Air Staff’.59 A great 
deal of time was spent considering modes of entry and education required for service in the 
RAF, which placed emphasis on public school backgrounds and saw an independent cadet 
college as vital.60 As the Secretary of State for War and Air, Churchill, noted in a debate on 
15 December 1919 concerning RAF pay and conditions, Cranwell was ‘the Air Force 
Sandhurst’.61 Churchill drew out the analogy that an independent service required its own 
cadet college and recognised its significance, and this was reinforced in leadership terms 
when, in 1932, GC Douglas Evill enunciated at length the advantages of Cranwell 
graduates compared to officers holding a Short Service Commission.62 Churchill’s view of 
Cranwell’s importance probably derived from his own time at Sandhurst, which he recalled 
in 1930 as being a ‘hard but happy experience’.63  
 
2.3 Codifying RAF Ethos  
                                                          
59 Hansard, HC Deb, 21 March 1922, Vol. 152, Col. 291. The first CAS to emerge from Cranwell, MRAF Sir 
Dermot Boyle, followed many of the patterns present in this thesis, including attendance at Andover and the 
IDC, see: Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Dermot Boyle, My Life: An Autobiography (Privately Published, 
1989). 
60 See the files contained in TNA, AIR 2/100, Conference to Discuss the Regulations of the RAF Cadet 
College, file opened 18 June 1919; AIR 2/100, Appointment of Committee under Lord Hugh Cecil on the 
Preliminary Education of Candidates for Commissions, file opened 27 January 1919; Longmore, From Sea to 
Sky, pp. 84-7.  
61 Hansard, HC Deb, 15 December 1919, Vol. 123, Col. 135. 
62 RAFM, Personal Papers of Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill, AC 74/8/27, The Cranwell Entry by 
Group Captain D.C.S. Evill, DSC, AFC, 1932. This derived from a report Evill, as a WgCr, wrote in 1931, 
which is discussed further in Chapter Four. 
63 Winston S. Churchill, A Roving Commission: My Early Life (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1930), p. 
59. 
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Ethos, as with leadership and culture, remains a nebulous term; however, it can be broadly 
considered the ‘characteristic spirit of a culture or community’.64 As already suggested, RAF 
ethos bounded its culture.65 Peter Lee, in examining the modern challenge of remoteness 
concerning Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems (RPAS) and pilot ethos, recognised the 
nebulous nature of the latter. In quoting modern RAF thinking on the subject, Lee 
identified elements of character and shared identity developed through tradition that are 
central to the production of ethos and generation of esprit de corps.66 This mirrors broader 
sociological literature on military culture, which suggests that, alongside discipline, cohesion 
and ceremony, professional ethos is a reciprocal element of an organisation’s behaviour. As 
English suggested, officers play a key role in generating and modifying both the culture and 
ethos of an organisation.67 For the RAF, ethos can be characterised in terms of being a 
pilot and flying, which was reinforced by the Service’s organisational context. While 
Christopher Coker argued that the RAF was professional compared to the ‘swashbuckling’ 
Luftwaffe, and Francis highlighted the importance of flying, neither recognised its formal 
legitimacy through the GD Branch and the importance of pilots as the military 
professionals and preferred future senior leaders of the RAF.68 Flying was a codified 
element of an officer’s development. Therefore, despite John Buckley’s criticism that the 
focus on ‘fighter aces, chivalry and flying’ has distorted the historiography of the First 
                                                          
64 AP1 – Ethos, Core Values and Standards, 2nd Edition (Royal Air Force, 2008), p. 4. 
65 For an overview of the RAF’s evolving ethos, see: Michael Paris, ‘The Rise of the Airmen: The Origins of 
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World War in the air, from a leadership perspective, flying provided an officer’s 
professional context, which was reinforced by the character of the GD Branch.69 
The challenge for the RAF in 1919 was that it lacked any real tradition to help 
ensure continued independence. By codifying its ethos, the RAF reinforced ownership of 
air power related resources. Institutions, ‘stories’ and ‘artefacts’ reinforced this emerging 
ethos by transmitting key cultural values and behaviours. Furthermore, at least in Britain, 
during this period, being a military pilot was a profession unique to the RAF. This was 
certainly the case until 1937, when the RN regained control of the Fleet Air Arm. In 
America, where being a military pilot was a profession split between the US Army and 
Navy, the competition for resources made it difficult for both sides to enunciate effectively 
their air power requirements.70 This highlights one advantage of having a single service that 
is able to generate a culture and ethos commiserate with its defence mission, though those 
values can create inter-service rivalry.71 However, being a pilot remains the key element in 
rising to the pinnacle of the RAF. AM Sir John Curtiss, who served as a navigator in 
Bomber Command during the Second World War and as the Air Component Commander 
during the Falklands War, remarked in his foreword to Jefford’s Observers and Navigators, 
‘It’s a pilots air force’, and ‘pilots have always been more equal than others’.72 Curtiss is an 
                                                          
69 John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (London: UCL Press, 1999), p. 42. 
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exception to the general rule that non-pilots could not rise to senior ranks in the RAF. 
Despite this, it is worth noting that many officers, including Portal and Leigh-Mallory, 
started their flying careers as observers, albeit in a period when it was normal to shift 
between these roles.  
In 1919, Lord Hugh Cecil’s report on the preliminary education of those seeking 
commissions in the RAF began a process of codifying pilot ethos when it stated, ‘every 
officer in the air force should learn to fly’.73 On 31 July 1919, AMWO No. 866, which dealt 
with Permanent Commissions, stated that, with certain exceptions, all officers so awarded 
were required to ‘qualify as pilots within 12 months from 1st August 1919’.74 Additionally, 
AMWO No. 866 recorded that, except for Stores Branch officers, commissioned service in 
the RAF would only be open to ‘flying officers’.75 Further codified in 1929, AP1334 stated 
flying requirements for officers up to the rank of WgCr: 
2. An officer […] employed on ground duties in a flying unit or at a ground training 
school will fly at least four hours per month. 
3. An officer […] employed on staff duties at a station where there is a flying unit will 
fly at least four hours per month. 
4. An officer […] employed at the Air Ministry or at a station where there is no flying 
unit with fly at least six hours per annum.76 
 
AP1334 derived from The Kings Regulations and various AMWOs published from 1918 
onwards. AMWO No. 1042 of 19 September 1918 stated that officers ‘commanding flying 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Joseph, 1945), p. 8. Nevertheless, this term was endearingly used, and, as Leigh-Mallory, as an AM and AOC-
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73 TNA, AIR 2/100, Report of the Committee on the Preliminary Education of Candidates for the Royal Air 
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74 TNA, AIR 72/1, AMWO No. 866 – Award of Permanent Commissions in the RAF, 31st July 1919, p. 2 
75 Ibid. 
76 TNA, AIR 10/1730, AP1334, Extract from the King’s Regulations and Air Ministry Orders 1928: Regulations 
Relating to Flying, 1st Edition, March 1929, p. 259. 
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units should look on flying as a definite part of their routine duties’.77 Concerning 
promotion, ACRs regularly recorded the numbers of hours flown by officers, and this 
ethos became pervasive in publications like RAFQ. In 1932, an article appeared on the 
subject of ‘Compulsory Flying’ under the pseudonym “Seagull”, which was derived from 
AP1334.78 The significance of this pseudonym derives from the analogy that to get a seagull 
to fly, you must throw stones at it; suggesting an epithet for officers less than willing to 
undertake flying duties. Despite later distortions created by popular media, like the 
enduring image of him as a non-flyer in the 1969 film The Battle of Britain, Leigh-Mallory 
and his peers identified with pilot ethos, as it formed a core competency of their chosen 
profession, with flying hours regularly recorded and flying encouraged by senior officers.79 
It is also reasonable to presume that Leigh-Mallory continued to enjoy flying. By the time 
Leigh-Mallory was appointed as AOC 12 Group, he did have a personal pilot; however, 
this was not unusual, as AM Sir Patrick Playfair, as AOC 1 Group, Bomber Command, also 
had a personal pilot. For Leigh-Mallory, the geographical scope of 12 Group defined his 
need to have a pilot, as the command stretched north to Scotland from a line that dissected 
the Britain east to west just north of London. Not until the formation of 13 Group in 
March 1939 did that geographical scope change. Twelve Group remained a more 
geographically dispersed command than 11 Group and had fewer squadrons spread over 
this area. To inspect airbases and units effectively, it was reasonable that Leigh-Mallory 
required a personal pilot for longer flights, which could have allowed him to conduct vital 
work while being flown around.  
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From a leadership perspective, ethos, in terms of shared identity and unit cohesion, 
was vital to generating esprit de corps, which was vital to maintain morale and generate 
fighting power. The challenge, which the RAF recognised, was the transient nature of its 
primary combat formation, the squadron, which, due to the character of the GD Branch, 
had personnel transferring in and out of the unit. Unlike regimental loyalties in the Army 
and sailors’ similar feeling towards their ships, RAF personnel did not identify themselves 
with squadrons as institutions, though they might have positively recalled service with a 
specific unit. For example, Leigh-Mallory’s 1925 Staff College essay describes with some 
pride the work 8 Squadron performed with the Tank Corps in 1918; however, there is no 
evidence that he desired to return to it at any further point.80 The challenge of identity was 
regularly discussed at Andover, with it being questioned whether allegiance was held at 
station, rather than at squadron, level.81 This conundrum was never fully solved, though the 
RAF readily identified the problem of generating espirit de corps at squadron level; therefore, 
the development of pilot ethos as a shared identity was vital to maintaining morale, which 
mapped RAF writings on leadership.  
 
2.4 Leadership, Culture, Pilot Ethos and the General Duties Branch 
The GD Branch encapsulated key aspects of RAF culture and ethos. Additionally, officers 
still serving post-1923 were members of this organisational structure, which essentially 
formed the executive branch of the RAF. However, it is worth reflecting here that, while 
the RAF stated a preference for pilots early on, the GD Branch evolved slowly as the 
Service reduced in size. The first mention of the ‘GD Branch’ in the AFL came in April 
1923; until this point, it was referred to as the ‘General’ or ‘Gradation List’, and officers 
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were still associated with various ‘branches’, though these tended to relate to current duties 
rather than any fixed definition. For example, Chart 2.1 illustrates that in 1919, 62 per cent 
of officers from Appendix Three were members of the Aeroplane Branch, though such 
definitions were often derived from whether they served with the RFC or RNAS.82 For 
example, all officers listed as part of the Aeroplane and Seaplane Branch were formerly 
members of the RNAS. Similarly, those who made the RAF their career, as Chapter Three 
illustrates concerning airship officers, ensured they retrained as heavier-than-air pilots, 
which highlights the potential challenge of correlating patterns from the prosopography 
population. Nonetheless, the GD Branch provided the RAF with a structure consistent 
with its mission and values, which, as Max Weber suggested in 1920, were central to 
defining institutional authority.83 While little has been written about this aspect of the RAF, 
James suggested that the decision to form the GD Branch derived from Trenchard’s 
regimental experience and that the RAF was a ‘single regiment’.84 While the GD Branch 
might be thought of as a ‘regiment’, there is little archival evidence to support James’ 
assumption beyond Trenchard’s reference in ‘Permanent Organization’ and the fact that his 
previous service might have influenced the organisational context of the RAF. While 
Trenchard was certainly influential, such assumptions ignore the effect that the evolving 
branch system of the RN had on organisational choices.85 As Chapter Four relates, in its 
early years, the senior leaders of the Air Ministry split evenly between those with Army or 
RN backgrounds and their influence on key decisions cannot be dismissed. The branch 
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system of the RN separated out command functions from technical branches in much the 
same way the RAF would by 1940. Furthermore, given Trenchard’s experience of the 
regimental system, it can be argued that he was seeking a more flexible system. If there was 
an Army influence, it came from the specialist corps of the Royal Artillery and Royal 
Engineers, whose branch system was derived from the idea of merit and allowed for 
horizontal and vertical promotions and appointments, which is what the GD Branch did 
for the RAF. By ignoring the RAF’s naval antecedents, James did a disservice to an 
evolving branch system that sought to bring together the best of the Army’s and RN’s 
systems while avoiding their pitfalls.  
The GD Branch encapsulated RAF culture, and of specific importance was the 
belief in ‘Command of Air’, though a reciprocal relationship existed with the assumption of 
independence. The GD Branch was a group of officers who held a shared identity, 
encouraged by pilot ethos, which helped ensure independence by promoting RAF culture. 
As related above, GD Branch officers were expected to be pilots, and this occurred before 
any technical specialisation took place, thus subsuming technical to heroic leadership. 
Furthermore, as Chapter Three illustrates, RAF promotion procedures referred to both 
flying and command experience; thus, through the GD Branch, pilot ethos linked to 
leadership development.86 In addition, most RAF officers shared a common interest in 
flying that reinforced and engendered feelings of membership, and pilots were the 
pervasive form of senior personnel in the RAF. Similarly, for the period covered by this 
thesis, with the exception of non-military professionals like doctors, all officers reaching 
senior leadership positions belonged to the GD Branch. For example, while logistics, 
managed by the Stores Branch, was a vital element in enabling air power, officers who 
                                                          
86 TNA, AIR 2/100, Preliminary Education of Candidates for the Royal Air Force Commissions, p. 1.  
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staffed this branch struggled until the outbreak of the Second World War to enter the 
military elite. Similarly, Stores Branch officers were not entitled to apply to attend Andover 
until 1928, which was six years after this important institutions foundation.87 Indeed, until 
this time, regulations for entrance to Andover explicitly noted that candidates had to be 
‘qualified as pilots’, thus reinforcing this value of this aspects of RAF culture and ethos.88 
While Trenchard’s 1919 ‘Permanent Organization’ paper suggested that appropriate 
technical specialisation would not bar officers from senior positions, illustrating his 
altruistic, and possibly egalitarian, hopes for the RAF, this was not to be the case, as typical 
patterns emerged that focused on flying, Staff College and staff experience.89 The pace of 
technological change, which led to the formation of the Technical Branch in 1940 to 
manage maintenance in the RAF, did not help this egalitarian hope.90 The Second World 
War also saw further branches form, such as Administrative and Special Duties Branches 
that worked against Trenchard’s ideals. In essence, pilots, and by default senior officers, 
were not to be burdened with responsibilities beyond their specialisation of flying and the 
conduct of air warfare. By 1951, questions were raised about the potential creation of an 
‘Air List’ that would see selected officers appointed to it for ‘the purposes of posting and 
higher promotion’.91 These officers would come from all branches.  
From a leadership perspective, the preference for so-called ‘heroic’ traits was 
reinforced by the preference generated by membership of the GD Branch. Technical 
                                                          
87 TNA, AIR 72/10, AMWO No. 22 – Regulations for Entry of Students to the RAF Staff College, 12 
January 1928. 
88 TNA, AIR 72/8, AMWO No. 536 – Regulations for Entry of Students to the RAF Staff College, 7 
October 1926. 
89 TNA, AIR 8/12, Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force, p. 5 
90 Wing Commander M.E. Pulvermacher, ‘The Development of the RAF Technical Branch’, JRUSI, 103 
(1958), p. 404. 
91 Wing Commander K.R.C. Slater, OBE, AFC, ‘Is the Branch System Producing the Leaders we need in the 
Royal Air Force?’, RAFQ and Commonwealth Air Force Journal, 3(2) (1951), p. 138. The same edition of RAFQ 
saw a proposal to merge the Equipment and Technical Branches into one Material Branch, see: Korax, ‘A 
Material Branch for the Royal Air Force’, RAFQ and Commonwealth Air Force Journal, 3(2) (1951), pp. 131-7. 
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leadership, which focused on developing specific skills for particular roles, was secondary 
to officers’ primary concerns, despite them receiving rewards for undertaking specialist 
courses. For example, while the Army recognised the importance of administration and set 
up a ‘Class for the Administrative Training of Army Officers’ under Halford Mackinder at 
the London School of Economics in 1907, which was re-established in 1924 after the First 
World War, there is no evidence the RAF sent officers to this course.92 Given that the RAF 
regularly sent officers to experience various Army and RN courses, this decision reinforces 
the Service’s negative view of administration. Even the Army closed this course down in 
1932. Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of the RAF in the 1930s forced it to consider the 
question of administration more closely, and, as a 1939 report on this subject stated, ‘the 
inexperience of junior officers [made] it difficult to delegate responsibility to any great 
extent’.93 This report led to the formation of the Administrative Branch and School of 
Administration in 1940. The formation of this branch separated administrative functions 
from the GD Branch; in part, because it did not fit the RAF paradigm: 
[T]o become fully efficient in operational and flying matters an officer cannot 
afford to divert any part of his time or energies to other subjects.94 
 
Given the importance of staff duties as a job assignment, this interesting quote illustrates 
the tensions between GD Branch officers’ operational responsibilities and the need to 
understand administration as it linked to leadership and command through key experiences. 
Furthermore, through senior staff positions, GD Branch officers still typically led those 
involved in administration. A job assignment undertaken rather than sought, GD Branch 
officers continued to serve in staff positions, and, as MRAF Sir William Dickson recalled in 
                                                          
92 Geoffrey Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackinder: A Radical Experiment in British Military Education?’, WiH, 19(3) 
(2012), pp. 322-52. 
93 RAFM, X004-0415, Report of the Committee on Royal Air Force Administration, 1939, p. 6 
94 Ibid. 
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1978, when the issue of increased pay for staff officers was raised, Trenchard apparently 
retorted: 
“certainly not”, he did not agree for staff pay for air staff officers […] They 
were merely flying in another capacity.95 
 
During this period, through the GD Branch, the RAF showed an evidential preference for 
pilots. The RAF nurtured selected GD Branch officers as future leaders, as they exhibited 
the traits that the Service valued, which linked with the generation of a distinct culture and 
ethos that has been considered herein. This was, as Chapter One related, more focussed on 
those with command and staff experience. Those who specialised in areas such as 
engineering, as Chapter Four notes, struggled to be nurtured. This reinforces the view that 
leadership, and its development, was contingent on organisational and cultural practices, 
and the ability of officers to engage with these allowed them to emerge into senior 
leadership positions. 
 
2.5 Summary 
The importance of the foregoing discussion has been to illustrate that, while not using the 
language deployed here, the RAF quickly developed a cultural identity built around 
concepts like efficiency, independence and the ‘Air Force Spirit’, which found their 
outgrowth in pilot ethos, which, in turn, influenced the Service’s organisational structure, 
the GD Branch. Furthermore, the RAF codified its ethos through AMWOs, and, linked to 
its leadership preferences, this suggested a specific type of officers that it wished to nurture; 
pilots. The above concepts underpinned aspects of leadership development because, as 
subsequent chapters illustrate, nurtured officers engaged with institutions like Andover and 
                                                          
95 IWM, 3168, Interview with Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson, February 1978. Such a 
retort might well be the origins of the commonly utilised term in the RAF and other air forces of ‘flying a 
desk’. 
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the Air Ministry; the latter through staff duties as a job assignment. Officers such as Leigh-
Mallory and his peers in the prosopography population of Appendix Four were, in part, 
successful because they engaged with this culture and made themselves ‘visible’ for 
nurturing and promotion. A desire not to engage with these cultural sources hampered 
officers’ promotion prospects and development. Thus, they found it difficult to progress 
their careers. In 1919, LtCol F.L.M Boothby, formerly a RNAS officer, wrote a scathing 
indictment of the Air Ministry in the pages of TNR that suggested: 
The time has now come when the RAF should be taken over by the Admiralty, 
and run as a separate department, similar to the Royal Marines.96  
 
Boothby, unsurprisingly, decided not to pursue a permanent commission in the RAF, and it 
is hard to see how he would have progressed had he so chosen, given his views concerning 
independence.  
                                                          
96 Lieutenant-Colonel F.L.M. Boothby RAF, ‘The Air Ministry: A Suggested Policy’, TNR, 7(4) (1919), p. 444. 
This view remains a contentious issue between naval and air power historians, with Cumming recently noting 
that the ‘dynamic’ RNAS should have absorbed the ‘moribund’ RFC. See: Anthony Cumming, ‘Smuts: An in-
depth examination of the personalities and circumstances which lead to the formation of The Royal Air 
Force’, The Phoenix Think Tank History of Air Power Series, No. 1 (2011) – Accessed at 
http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2011/07/smuts-report-the-birth-of-airpower-series-paper1/. It is worth 
noting that the Phoenix Think Tanks is an external pressure group seeking to defend the status of the RN. 
Chapter Three 
Career Patterns and Promotions in the Royal Air Force 
 
The formation of the RAF in 1918 meant it became responsible for the career 
management, and by implication the leadership development, of its officers. Central to this 
was an effective promotion system. In a 1928 JRUSI article, C.G. Colebrook, aviation 
correspondent for The Times from 1923 to 1930, wrote that the RAF had developed a 
promotion system that was ‘an ingenious marrying of promotion by seniority and by 
merit’.1 The nexus of this ‘ingenious marriage’ was the GD Branch, which allowed for 
horizontal and vertical promotions and appointments, unlike the limitations placed on the 
Army and RN by their respective branch systems. As Chapter Five notes, the promotion 
systems of the Army and RN, based on seniority, were complicated by problems like 
patronage and favouritism. Promotion provided key markers in an officer’s career, and, on 
average, those listed in Appendix Four spent four years at each rank. Awarded a permanent 
commission as a SL on 1 August 1919, Leigh-Mallory became a WgCr on 1 January 1925, 
GC on 1 January 1932, AC on 1 January 1936 and AVM on 1 November 1938. This 
compares well to Portal, who, on receiving his permanent commission as a SL in 1919, was 
promoted to WgCr on 1 July 1925, GC on 1 July 1931 1932, AC on 1 January 1935 and 
AVM on 1 July 1937.2 
Through promotions and appointments, certain characteristic career trajectories 
became identifiable in large organisations like the RAF. These career rhythms and patterns 
were influenced by factors like emerging professionalism and culture.3 In a modern sense, 
                                                          
1 C.G. Colebrook, ‘Promotion in the Royal Air Force: The New Scheme’, JRUSI, 73 (1928), p. 737. 
2 All promotion dates in this chapter derive from The Air Force List. For a brief overview of Portal’s career, 
see: Henry Probert, High Commanders of the Royal Air Force (London: HMSO, 1991), pp. 23-6.  
3 Corona, ‘Career Patterns in the U.S. Army Officer Corps’, pp. 109-34. 
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successful officers interacted with RAF culture and structures to make themselves ‘visible’ 
to senior leaders, who identified and nurtured talent. This occurred through an interaction 
with key job assignments like staff duties and military education. Drawn from work on 
civil-military relations, such as David Moore and B. Thomas Trout’s ‘Visibility Theory of 
Promotion’, this axiomatic deduction had specific relevance for the RAF because the 
Service’s culture shaped officers who chose the military as their profession.4  
Using the prosopography populations in Appendices Three and Four, this chapter 
explores the key rhythms and patterns, both before and during his time in the RAF, that 
relate to Leigh-Mallory’s rise to senior leadership. The patterns that emerged from this 
analysis are further explored in subsequent chapters and are compared with the experience 
of his peers. This chapter also explores the challenges that affected the promotion 
procedures of the RAF as it sought to learn from the defects present in the systems of the 
Army and RN. Finally, as a key marker in the process of professionalisation, though not 
one generally affecting officers in Appendix Four, the introduction of the RAF’s 
promotion examination is considered to illustrate how the Service sought to develop its 
personnel. 
 
3.1 Pre-Service Educational Patterns 
Before examining the key service patterns in Appendices Three and Four, it is worth 
considering some of the trends identifiable concerning pre-service experience. Specifically, 
this relates to the importance of public school education to those RAF officers who 
reached Air Rank. Chart 3.1 illustrates that 82 per cent of officers in Appendix Four 
                                                          
4 David W. Moore and B. Thomas Trout, ‘Military Advancement: The Visibility Theory of Promotion’, The 
American Political Science Review, 72(2) (1978), pp. 452-68. 
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attended public school.5 While discussed in detail in Chapter Four, it is worth noting here 
that, in general, public schools were non-local, endowed, predominantly boarding, used by 
well-to-do families, dedicated to the education of boys, and had a long and prestigious 
history which imbued them with traditions and an ethos that transferred into pupils. 
However, the term ‘public school’ remains contested, and it is questionable how many of 
these institutions had a long history. For example, Haileybury School, which Leigh-Mallory 
attended, only formally opened in 1862, though it could trace its lineage to 1806. Linked to 
the gradual professionalisation of society during the Victorian and Edwardian periods, and 
increasingly used by the aspirational middle class, public schools were a vehicle for social 
conditioning. While four per cent of officers attended either a grammar or state secondary 
school, this ignores the fact that these institutions readily mimicked practices established by 
public schools, which were believed to produce more rounded individuals, both in 
leadership and in academic spheres.6 Thus, the officer class of the RAF developed a feeling 
of social membership through this shared experience. This was furthered by military service 
and the predisposition of the RAF for candidates who attended public schools. 
Nevertheless, there are some interesting divergences in secondary education, and Chart 3.1 
illustrates that seven per cent of future senior officers attended the Royal Naval College at 
Osborne, which was the first element HMS Britannia. For example, while AM Sir Philip 
Babington attended Eton College, his brother, AM Sir John Tremayne Babington, attended 
Britannia, which highlights the contingent character of the prosopography population, as 
many future RAF officers did not choose the military as their first career. Conversely, while 
ACM Sir Christopher Courtney attended Bradfield College, he left aged 15 to attend 
                                                          
5 Appendix Four lists the schools attended by these officers. Additionally, all charts cited in this chapter can 
be found in Appendix Two. 
6 McCulloch, Philosophers and Kings, p. 15. 
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Dartmouth and chose the RN as his profession.7 However, Britannia was widely considered 
the RN’s public school, thus replicating the issue of educational osmosis that also occurred 
between public and grammar schools during this period.8 Figures presented here reinforce 
those in David Boyd’s 1973 study Elites and their Education, which showed that at the end of 
1939, 66 per cent of 34 AVMs in the AFL, had public school backgrounds; similar figures 
exist for MajGens in 1939 but not for the RN, as its cadets typically entered Britannia aged 
13.9 While Boyd’s statistics are useful, his interpretation that these institutions maintained 
exclusivity has been questioned by historians. For example, Rubinstein suggested that due 
to the rise of the professions, ‘elite’ recruitment broadened.10 For Rubinstein, the social 
background of pupils included the landed gentry, businessmen and the professions, which 
encompassed both the upper and middle classes.11 However, as the professions widened, 
their desire to become part of the establishment increased, and they used public schools as 
a tool of social conditioning, though pupils tended to follow in their fathers professional 
footsteps.12 Thus, while broadening the recruitment sources for public school, they also 
reinforced exclusivity as leading jobs, including senior military positions, went to students 
from this source.13 Even post-Second World War, many senior officers maintained a belief 
in public schools; Slessor, who attended Haileybury, stated in his memoirs The Central Blue 
that he saw it as the key source of senior officers.14 AVM Robert Willock, who attended 
                                                          
7 ‘Obituary – Sir Christopher Courtney’, The Times, 25 October 1976, p. 15.  
8 For example, see: Anon, ‘Dartmouth College: The Naval Public School’, TNR, 9(1) (1921), pp. 66-70. 
9 David Boyd, Elites and their Education: The Educational and Social Background of Eight Elite Groups (Slough: 
NFER Publishing, 1973), pp. 82-3. On the RN and the education of its officers in the nineteenth Century, 
see: H.W Dickinson, Educating the Royal Navy: 18th and 19th Century Education for Officers (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2007). 
10 W.D. Rubinstein, ‘Education and the Social Origins of British Elites, 1880-1970’, Past & Present, 112(1) 
(1986), pp. 163-207.  
11 Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture, and Decline, pp. 115-19. 
12 Ibid, p. 119. 
13 In general, see: Boyd, Elites and their Education. For the contention that many Whitehall ‘mandarins’ had a 
‘public school and Oxbridge education’, see: Gray, ‘A Culture of Official Squeamishness?’, pp. 1374-5. 
14 Slessor, The Central Blue, p. 4. 
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Cheltenham, was proud of the connections that his ‘Old School Tie’ provided him, as 
noted in his unpublished memoir.15 While treated with care, these views reinforce the idea 
that senior officers illustrated a preference for nurturing candidates who came from similar 
class backgrounds, thus reinforcing those values in RAF structures.  
Unlike the Army, a greater proportion of RAF officers from Appendix Four had a 
university education. In comparison to Army figures of 11 per cent in 1913, Chart 3.2 
shows that 35 per cent of officers in Appendix Four attended university.16 This was an 
aberration, as by 1929, only 16 per cent of Permanent Commissions in the RAF came from 
universities.17 However, of 17 officers reaching four- or five-star rank in Appendix Four, 41 
per cent attended university; thus, men like Leigh-Mallory, Portal, Douglas and Tedder 
were distinct when compared to their Army counterparts and the average for the RAF. 
However, it must be considered that they were not distinct, in terms of being an absolute 
majority, when compared to peers, though this was a product of the plurality of sources 
from which the middle and senior leadership of the RAF came from. While both Portal 
and Douglas did not complete their degrees due to the outbreak of the First World War, 
they nevertheless, as Chapter Four notes, took lessons from their time at university. This 
distinctiveness further diverged from the preference of the RAF for technical degrees 
because of the character of the qualification gained; a liberal arts degree. The RAF wanted 
some officers to have degrees, but, typically, only those it could use, like mathematics or 
engineering. This view, arguably, links to the naval heritage of the RAF, where education 
was overwhelmingly technical. This is perhaps understandable given the technological basis 
of the RAF, the aircraft, though views did change, as Chapter Four shows. These figures 
reinforce the contingent relationship between the First World War and an officer’s pre-
                                                          
15 IWM, Private Papers of Air Vice-Marshal Robert Willock, RPW 1, Unpublished Memoir, 1965, p. 16. 
16 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 12-3. 
17 TNA, AIR 2/936, Memorandum dated 28 November 1929. 
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service background, which illustrates the bifurcation of experience between university 
education and initial military training at cadet institutions. It is arguable that many officers, 
including Leigh-Mallory, might not have pursued military careers had it not been for their 
First World War experiences. Leigh-Mallory was on the verge of a law career when war 
broke out.18 
Concerning universities, the most significant issue was institutional choice. Of 
those officers with a university background in Appendix Four, 57 per cent, including 
Leigh-Mallory, attended either Oxford or Cambridge, which were the Edwardian era’s 
dominant institutions. Another three attended the University of London, which was also 
widely considered an ‘elite’ institution. The growth of higher education in the late-
nineteenth century saw the emergence of a systematised taxonomy with Oxford, 
Cambridge and London at the top, followed by new civic universities and technical and 
training colleges.19 The elite status afforded to Oxbridge and London extended to St 
Andrews in Scotland and stemmed from their historic place in Britain’s educational 
landscape. Using Benjamin Disraeli’s 1845 conception of ‘two nations’ as an analogy, 
François Bédarida suggested that the systematisation of higher education, also linked to 
public schools, increased social bifurcation between ‘elites’ and the rest.20 However, as 
Rubinstein illustrated, our conception of what constituted the former during the late-
Victorian and Edwardian periods shifted as the number of professions grew.21 Members of 
the professional middle class increasingly used the ‘elite’ education mechanism to educate 
their children. Given that, as Chapter Four recognises, RAF recruitment came from a wider 
                                                          
18 Dunn, Big Wing, p. 17. 
19 R.D. Anderson, Universities and Elites in Britain since 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 
[1992]), p. 2, 13. 
20 François Bédarida, A Social History of England, 1851-1990, 2nd Edition (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 154. 
21 Rubinstein, ‘Education and the Social Origins of British Elites’, pp. 163-207.  
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spread of occupations, officers’ backgrounds mirrored social and educational practices 
prevalent in society.  
While Leigh-Mallory and several of his peers might not have considered it as a 
career pre-First World War, as Chart 3.2 illustrates, the military remained the profession of 
choice for many men, including those who entered through the reserve route. Taken as a 
whole, military service accounted for 44 per cent of officers preferred post-18 educational 
background in Appendix Four. Of those listed as ‘Military Reserve’, ACM Sir William 
Mitchell joined the Special Reserve battalion of the Dorsetshire Regiment in 1906; AVM 
John Tyssen was a Territorial Force officer, while AC Sydney Smith attended a crammer 
while a Special Reserve officer in 1913. Furthermore, AC A.A.B. Thomson joined the 
Special Reserve of the RFC as a 2nd Lieutenant on 25 June 1913, which illustrates a 
proclivity for adventurism and a desire to fly. Amateur routes like the Militia, the Territorial 
Force and the RN Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) existed for those who failed entry exams to 
cadet establishments or started their careers part-time. The balance for officers in 
Appendix Four split amongst traditional routes like Sandhurst (11 per cent), Woolwich 
(seven per cent) and Britannia (12 per cent), while five per cent attended the Royal Naval 
Engineering College at Keyham.  
Chart 3.3 highlights the key divergence prevalent between Appendices Three and 
Four about military training, in that there was a lack of homogeneity in this experience. For 
WgCrs listed in Appendix Three, three-quarters were pre-First World War regulars, 
compared to one-fifth for Squadron Commanders. While these divergent experiences are 
explored further in Chapter Five, here it is sufficient to note that training, in comparison to 
education, leaned more towards leader development due to its focus on skills, though it 
provided the foundation for further advancement. Pre-First World War officers went 
through cadet institutions, Woolwich, Sandhurst and Britannia, which helped them identify 
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as military professionals. The final route, and one directly associated with Leigh-Mallory, is 
wartime training in the Army; no officer in Appendix Four joined the RN during the 
course of the First World War. As Chart 3.3 illustrates, 42 per cent went through this 
experience. The figure distorts from that in Chart 3.2, as several officers listed as ‘None’ in 
the latter are represented in Chart 3.3 as ‘Other Ranks’. For example, Nicholl enlisted as a 
Private in the London Scottish Volunteers during the Second Boer War, though he did not 
serve overseas, and then transferred to the South Rhodesia Volunteers and reenlisted in 
1914.22  
 
3.2 Career Patterns in the Royal Air Force 
Axiomatically, officers in Appendix Four received Permanent or Short-Service 
Commissions. Conversely, not all in Appendix Three received them, because by March 
1920, approximately 25 per cent of this population had left the RAF, and by March 1921, 
this had risen to around 55 per cent had left. This illustrates a key challenge in correlating 
patterns in a prosopography population that does not map the changing strength of the 
RAF, which shrunk after 1918 and then began to expand in the 1930s. As such, while the 
qualitative evidence herein broadly supports the argument presented in this thesis, it should 
be treated as indicating general patterns. Officers left the RAF for a variety of reasons, 
including returning to civilian life or to the Army or RN; even though the latter decision 
could potentially hold back an officer’s career progression. For example, as early as 2 
October 1918, OC 10 (Operations) Group, Colonel Arthur Bigsworth, wrote to General 
Officer Commanding (GOC) South Western Area, MajGen Mark Kerr, stating that there 
existed ‘considerable anxiety on the part of both senior and junior officers […] as to their 
                                                          
22 RAFM, Nicholl Papers, Journeys and Records, 1915-1939, pp. 5-57. 
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future career’.23 In particular, Bigsworth noted that since he had joined the Naval Wing of 
the RFC in 1912, he had little experience of RN operations, and if not awarded a 
Permanent Commission he would have to return to that service, which would set back his 
career.24 Conversely, placed on the Unemployed List at his own request to work for 
Handley Page, Douglas was an exception to the typical experience of officers in Appendix 
Four. Apparently, at Trenchard’s request, Douglas returned as a SL on a Short-Service 
Commission, which became permanent on 25 November 1920.25 Douglas’ recollection 
should be treated with care given the reverence he had for Trenchard. However, Douglas 
claimed that Trenchard’s suggestion came by chance through a meeting. Given that 
Handley Page was a key aircraft supplier to the RAF, there might be some truth to the 
recollection. Douglas’ experience, however, highlights different routes into the RAF post-
1919, Permanent or Short-Service Commissions, which sought to alleviate the key 
personnel challenge for the RAF, the provision of enough officers to operate the Service in 
the short-term while providing for long-term senior leadership. This was a case of 
balancing current operational needs against providing the basis for future strategic 
requirements and was a problem that the Deputy Director of Air Personnel Service, 
Colonel Robert More, enunciated in a 1918 memorandum on ‘Permanent Commissions’.26 
Key to solving the latter aspect was Cranwell’s foundation, but the RAF also introduced 
Short-Service Commissions to manage operational needs and create a ready reserve. 
Promulgated through AMWO No. 781 of 7 July 1919, which covered those officers not 
granted Permanent Commissions in August 1919, and embodied in AP783, Regulations for 
                                                          
23 TNA, AIR 2/90, OC 10 (Operations) Group to GOC South Western Area, 2 October 1918. 
24 Ibid. 
25 TNA, AIR 72/2, AMWO No. 1003 – Grant of Permanent Commission to Officers holding Short Service 
Commissions, 25 November 1920; Douglas, Years of Command, p. 13. 
26 TNA, AIR 2/90, Memorandum on Permanent Commissions by the Deputy Director of Air Personnel 
Services, 14 October 1918. 
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Short Service Commission in the Royal Air Force, officers served for five years then transferred to 
the reserves for another four years, which could be extended to eight.27 As noted in 
AMWOs, suitable short-service officers, including Douglas and Slessor, received 
Permanent Commissions where possible, which suggests a move towards a meritocratic 
approach to keeping capable personnel.28 
Returning to Permanent Commissions, in 1919, AMWO No. 99 applied four key 
metrics to temporary officers seeking permanent commissions: age limit, details of war 
service, suitability as an officer and medical fitness.29 Concerning ‘Majors’ (Squadron 
Commanders) in Appendix Three, the age metric dictated a range between 25 and 38, while 
any officer older than 24 required at least three and a half years’ war service. While vaguely 
described as ‘educationally and morally’ fit for service, ‘suitability as an officer’ squarely 
focused on those with a public school background. Medical fitness was described as being 
‘Fit[ness] for G.S. [general service] as such’.30 Applications were made through ‘superior 
officers’ and channelled to Area Commands for forwarding to a Selection Board chaired by 
Brigadier-General Tom Webb-Bowen.31 However, while seeking to be meritocratic, the 
RAF sought officers based on a qualitative character assessment rather than any 
quantitative evaluation of capability. This clearly allowed bias to creep into the system. 
Leigh-Mallory met these criteria and applied for a Permanent Commission. The formal 
process of awarding Permanent Commissions saw the production of two nominal rolls, 
                                                          
27 TNA, AIR 72/1, AMWO No. 781 – Scheme for Immediate Temporary Entry of Officers into the RAF, 7 
July 1919; Group Captain Philip Joubert de la Ferté, CMG, DSO, RAF, ‘The Supply and Training of Officers 
of the Air Force in Time of War (lecture)’, JRUSI, 69 (1924), p. 44; TNA, AIR 2/147, AP783 – (Provisional) 
Regulations for Short Service Commissions in the Royal Air Force (General Duties Branch), Revised July 1921. It is 
interesting to note that Higham dates the scheme as starting in 1924, see: Robin Higham, Two Roads to War: 
The French and British Air Arms from Versailles to Dunkirk (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012) p. 77. 
28 TNA, AIR 72/2, AMWO No. 1003. 
29 TNA, AIR 2/90, AMWO No. 99 – Permanent Commissions in the RAF for Flying, Technical, and 
Administrative Officers now holding Temporary Commissions therein, 17 January 1919, pp. 1-2. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, p. 2. 
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which were communicated to operational commanders for comments and adjustment. 
Compiled from recommendations made by GOCs, the first nominal roll contained officers 
selected for Permanent Commissions, while the second enclosed those placed on a 
supplementary list.32 Granted in a communication to HQ RAF, Army of the Rhine on 13 
August 1919, Leigh-Mallory’s Permanent Commission as a SL, as with all awarded, was 
backdated to 1 April 1918.33 Concerning leadership, the language extant in an officer’s 
Permanent Commission certificate noted concepts like ‘Trust and Confidence in your 
Loyalty, Courage and Good conduct’ as well as exercising:  
discipline in Arms both the inferior Officers and Men serving under you and 
use your best endeavours to keep them in good Order and Discipline.34  
 
These ideas mapped to the heroic concepts explored in Chapter One and reaffirm the idea 
that leadership in this period was more action than study. 
Once commissioned, selected officers shared several service experiences: military 
education, staff duties, teaching and command, which established a characteristic pattern 
for future aspirants to senior leadership. Officers in Appendix Four gained experience in 
each of these professional pillars, which influenced their leadership development. An 
examination of officers in Appendix Three who still served in 1939 but had not reached 
Air Rank illustrates how the lack of one or more of these experiences acted as a bar on 
promotion. As Chart 3.4 shows, Staff College attendance was the nexus of this process in 
general, with the RAF preferring those emerging from Andover. Chapter Six explores the 
importance of Andover in more detail; however, it is worth highlighting a 1931 
                                                          
32 TNA, AIR 1/1161/205/4/2516, Director of Personnel to GOC Royal Air Force in the Field, June 1919. 
33 TNA, AIR 1/1161/205/4/2516, Nominal Roll of Officers Recommended for a Permanent Commission in 
the Royal Air Force in the Rank of Major (N.D.); AIR 1/1161/205/2/2518, Letter for the Air Staff to GOC 
HQ RAF, Army of the Rhine, 13 August 1919. 
34 RAFM, Personal Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Salmond, AC 71/20/5/13, Certificate 
of Permanent Commission for Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Salmond, 2 August 1919. 
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memorandum sent to the Staff College’s Commandant, AC Philip Joubert de la Ferté, 
which stated: 
It is from among officers awarded p.s.a. that the Air Council will, eventually, 
look to find their higher commanders, and it is improbable that an officer will 
ever reach a position of high command who is incapable of carrying out 
normal staff work.35 
 
Joubert highlighted this section of the letter to stress its importance. In leadership terms, 
the Air Ministry viewed those with the post-nominal psa as delivering organisational 
capacity to the RAF as they became experts in staff duties and conceptual aspects of war. 
In many respects, these officers became walking best practice for the RAF and an example 
for others to follow. Andover’s first four courses were the most statistically significant for 
future senior RAF officers of the Second World War. Of 80 officers on these courses, 57 
reached Air Rank during the Second World War, including three MRAFs and ten ACMs, 
including Leigh-Mallory. Other notable names included Portal, Douglas, Park, Slessor, 
ACM Sir Richard Peirse, Kingston-McCloughry, ACM Sir Roderic Hill and ACM Sir 
Norman Bottomley. Of nine ACMs in the AFL at the time of Leigh-Mallory’s death in 
November 1944, only ACM Sir Frederick Bowhill lacked any staff qualification. Of the 
other eight, only Dowding lacked psa; instead, he held psc (Passed Staff College), as he 
attended Camberley pre-First World War.36 Bowhill’s lack of military education is 
interesting, as he represents a quarter of officers in Appendix Four who progressed to Air 
Rank despite lacking this experience. Five of 11 officers in this sub-sample, ACMs Bowhill, 
Mitchell and Sir Charles Burnett, and AMs Playfair and Philip Babington, reached three- or 
four-star ranks, which further reinforces the contingent nature of the first permanent 
                                                          
35 TNA, AIR 2/355, Director of Organisation and Staff Duties to Commandant, RAF Staff College, 4 June 
1931.  
36 On Dowding’s time at Camberley, see: Orange, Dowding, pp. 16-7. According to Wright, it was at 
Camberley that Dowding earned his nickname, ‘Stuffy’, see: Robert Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain 
(London: Macdonald, 1969), p. 29. 
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officers of the RAF in 1919. Apart from Babington, each of the above officers served in 
the RFC before the First World War. By the time Andover opened, these officers, except 
for Mitchell, who was a senior WgCr, were GCs. This placed them outside the rank 
framework for Andover that provided education for officers from senior FLs through to 
junior WgCrs. This further changed after the opening of the IDC in 1927, which catered 
for WgCrs and GCs; thus, Andover provided military education primarily to SLs. Despite 
the discordant experience of the above noted officers, those with military education 
typically ended their careers at least at one- and two-star ranks. 
Another interesting aspect of Chart 3.4 is the number of officers selected to attend 
the staff colleges of the Army and RN. As Chapter Six explores, the Air Ministry selected, 
with no recourse to entry examinations, officers for these institutions. More broadly, Staff 
College experience was characteristic for officers in Appendix Four, but not for the RAF as 
a whole. Only 46 out of 386 officers in Appendix Three had Staff College experience as 
either students or DS. Of those, 34 reached Air Rank, which reinforced the importance of 
attendance in an officer’s progression to senior leadership, even though Staff College was 
not a mandatory career element. IDC attendance, as the next step in the leadership 
development of nurtured officers, was not characteristic. Only 28 per cent of Appendix 
Four, including Leigh-Mallory, experienced IDC as a student. 
Staff College attendance also raises the issue of experience as DS. For nurtured 
officers, this job assignment was part of a process that vested trust and responsibility into 
those appointed. Such officers, especially those serving at the IDC or Camberley, which, 
apart from Andover, were the only other institutions with RAF DS, acted as subject matter 
experts who provided trusted commentary on air power’s evolution, development and 
employment. These officers attempted to develop air-mindedness amongst the services to 
preserve RAF independence by educating Army and RN personnel in the use of air power; 
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they were not always successful in this aim. The uniqueness of these appointments is 
illustrated by the fact that only 26 per cent of officers in Appendix Four experienced them. 
Three officers, Portal, Douglas and Joubert, also served as DS at the IDC. At any point, 
there was only one member of the DS from each service at the IDC, and they served for 
three years in this appointment. Thus, those noted above represent three-quarters of RAF 
DS appointments to the IDC in its 12-year history before the outbreak of the Second 
World War. Furthermore, three of five inter-war Commandants of Andover, ACMs Sir 
Arthur Barratt, Freeman and Joubert, emerged from Appendix Four. Another, AM Sir 
Bertine Sutton, served as Commandant during the Second World War. Similarly, Longmore 
served as one of two RAF Commandants of the IDC pre-war. The other was Andover’s 
first Commandant, AM Brooke-Popham; this was a position that rotated between the 
services. Thus, out of 17 officers reaching four- or five-star rank from Appendix Four, 59 
per cent served as Commandants, DS, or both. Notable exceptions were Burnett, Bowhill 
and Mitchell, who were arguably too senior to serve as DS, and their lack of Staff College 
experience probably precluded their service as Commandant. Other exceptions were Hill, 
Harris and AM Sir Robert Goddard, though the former served as Andover’s Commandant 
from 1942 to 1943.  
Another key area for nurturing was staff experience. The GD Branch encouraged 
officers to integrate with staff duties as part of a triumvirate of operational appointments 
and, where selected, education or training postings. Most officers in Appendix Three 
served in a variety of staff positions; however, there were categorisations that separated out 
officers’ experience as they rose to senior positions. Key staff positions in the nurturing 
process were appointments at the Air Ministry or as a Chief Staff Officer or Senior Air 
Staff Officer (SASO) at command level, or, at best, both. These experiences developed 
nurtured officers’ knowledge of lines of responsibility and accountability as well as an 
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understanding of the organisation that they were being prepared to lead; Leigh-Mallory 
undertook both roles during his career. Added to this is the reality that there existed a 
hierarchy of senior staff positions in operational commands. As Chapter Seven suggests, 
SASO was preeminent alongside positions like Senior Engineering Officer and Senior 
Personnel Staff Officer (SPSO). However, Air Ministry experience, or service as SASO, 
was not typical for the officer class as a whole but rather limited to those emerging senior 
leaders. Derived from Appendix Three, of officers active in March 1939, only 23 had 
experience as SASO, while 43 had served in the Air Ministry. Nineteen officers with 
experience as SASO appear in Appendix Four, while 33 from this sample had Air Ministry 
knowledge. That Leigh-Mallory experienced each of these processes illustrates his active 
participation in RAF leadership development processes that made him more ‘visible’ for 
promotion as well as nurturing by the system. However, there are officers rated as Wing 
Commanders in 1918 who were too old to attend Staff College, an increasingly important 
qualification for this role, but still gained Air Ministry and senior staff experience. Bowhill, 
59 in March 1939, served as Chief Staff Officer at Coastal Area from 1921 to 1924 and as 
Director of Organisation and Staff Duties (DOSD) in the CAS’s Department from 1929 to 
1931, despite not having any military education. Conversely, there were those, like GC Ivor 
Lloyd, who had experienced characteristic patterns but had not entered the ranks of the 
military elite by 1939. Lloyd attended Andover in 1929 and served in the Directorate of 
Training in AMP’s Department between 1932 and 1934. In September 1939, Lloyd, as a 
GC, was serving as SASO at 18 (Reconnaissance) Group, Coastal Command, and 
eventually retired as an AC. This comparison between Bowhill and Lloyd illustrates the 
challenge of deriving general patterns from the prosopography population as undertaking 
key experiences did not always guarantee promotion. Other contingent factors, like 
contributing to service knowledge, also played a role in an officer’s rise to senior positions.  
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Linked to these experiences was the issue of promotion rates, and Chart 3.5 
illustrates this for 15 selected officers from Appendix Three. These 15 officers represent a 
sample from AMs down to WgCrs in 1939. Officers from Appendix Three who still held a 
commission in 1939 represent 18 per cent of the prosopography population, and, of these, 
only 28 per cent were AVMs; Leigh-Mallory’s rank in 1939. These men represented 63 per 
cent of serving AVMs present in the AFL. When focused on just Leigh-Mallory’s direct 
peers, Squadron Commanders in March 1918, this figure drops to 24 per cent, while the 
characteristic rank for this population in 1939 was GC, at 46 per cent, though, as Chart 3.6 
illustrates, this drops to 38 per cent when combined with Wing Commanders. For the 
remaining WgCrs in March 1939, the typical rank was either AVM or AM. No Squadron 
Commander had reached AM by March 1939. Based on the career trajectory of GC John 
Sowrey, who retired at the rank of AC, and given the evidential preference for GCs in 
Chart 3.6, the trend line in Chart 3.5 shows that officers like Leigh-Mallory enjoyed a faster 
rise to Air Rank. While distorted by factors like the conjoined nature of Wing and 
Squadron Commanders, officers whose careers conformed to the patterns discussed above 
clearly enjoyed better promotion prospects. The sample in Chart 3.5 purposely included 
two officers, Shekleton and WgCr J.V. Steel, as a base comparison with those not actively 
engaged with the leadership development processes identified in this thesis. In comparison, 
Leigh-Mallory interfaced with all of them, thereby making himself more ‘visible’ in an 
evolving system and improving his promotion chances. Additionally, in comparison with 
contemporaries in the Army and RN, the average age of RAF officers was significantly 
lower in equivalent ranks. The average age of officers still serving in 1939 from Appendix 
Three was 49. Leigh-Mallory reached two-star rank at 46, while his fellow component 
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commanders for OVERLORD, General Montgomery and Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey, 
did not reach the same rank until 50 and 52 respectively.37 They also spent longer in their 
respective services, suggesting that, as a young organisation, the RAF promoted nurtured 
talent more rapidly.   
This discussion has statistically shown, as Janowitz recognised in 1960, that certain 
‘Tactics of Promotion’ or experiences emerged as characteristic.38 Officers able to engage 
with these experiences increased their chances of entering the military elite. However, apart 
from nurturing through job assignments, these ‘tactics’ included other key elements of 
modern leadership development like socialisation and action learning, which improved an 
officer’s knowledge as well as developing the organisational capacity of the RAF. Key 
amongst these was playing a role in the development of the professional knowledge, such 
as writing for military journals. A careerist, as evidenced in this thesis more broadly, Leigh-
Mallory undertook every opportunity and contributed to RAF thinking on air power. It is 
clear that Leigh-Mallory, as a military professional, was developing his capacity and 
ensuring success, which many of his peers also did. Even Orange, while arguing that Park 
was ‘ambitious’, admitted that the key reason Park’s career did not prosper in the same way 
as his peers was because: 
[Park] never held an Air Ministry position, nor did he serve on the directing 
staff at the RAF Staff College at Andover, he never held an inter-service 
appointment at the Army Staff College at Camberley nor at the Imperial 
Defence College.39 
 
In Park’s case, operational excellence did see him rise to senior positions, but this tended to 
be the exception rather than the rule. 
 
                                                          
37 Montgomery was promoted to Field Marshal on 1 September 1944. 
38 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 145-8. 
39 Orange, Park, pp. 264-5. 
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3.3 Promotion and Appointments in the Royal Air Force 
The previous section discussed the rhythms and patterns that emerged from the analysis of 
the prosopography population. The promotion system of the RAF underpinned these 
patterns. This system saw officers move through the hierarchy of the RAF and was 
supported by the inherent flexibility provided by the GD Branch. RAF promotion 
procedures stemmed from an attempt to adjust the flaws in the seniority based systems of 
the Army and RN while managing its own organisational choice to promote on merit.40 
This suggests a progressive attitude, which sought to offer fair opportunities rather than 
carry over problems from the Army and RN. Furthermore, the GD Branch encouraged 
easier rotation amongst job assignments to develop officers’ leadership abilities and allowed 
for smoother reintegration into operational positions to gain further experience. This was 
because officers did not rotate out of their ‘regiment’. Instead, GD Branch officers 
expected to be employed on a variety of duties to gain experience; for example, staff duties 
were accepted as a normal posting. This was conditioned, however, by the recognition that 
the RAF, through the GD Branch, preferred pilots as its future senior leaders. 
Nevertheless, in 1918, the Air Ministry, through the Master-General of Personnel, MajGen 
Sefton Brancker, sought opinions from GOCs on preferred promotion methods.41 The 
views put forward, as Vice-Admiral Cecil Lambert, who became the RAF’s Director of 
Personnel (DoP) in 1919, admitted, often represented those developed from the officers 
                                                          
40 For an overview of British Army promotion in this period, see: David French, “An Extensive Use of 
Weedkiller’: Patterns of Promotion in the Senior Ranks of the British Army, 1919-1939’ in David French and 
Brian Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 
2002), pp. 159-74. Promotion systems remain an understudied area in military history. 
41 TNA, AIR 2/90, Master-General of Personnel to GOCs of Operational Areas, 19 September 1918. 
Interestingly, Brancker’s biographer, Basil Collier, did not discuss the challenges Brancker faced as Master-
General of Personnel apart from his unfortunate dealings with Violet Douglas-Pennant, whom he dismissed 
as Commandant of the Women’s Royal Air Force in August 1918, see: Basil Collier, Heavenly Adventurer: Sefton 
Brancker and the Dawn of British Aviation (London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1959), pp. 89-129. 
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Army or RN experience.42 GOC North Eastern Area, MajGen the Honourable Sir 
Frederick Gordon, preferred for promotion to Major ‘to be guided by seniority’ (emphasis 
in original), which arguably represented his class views.43 In general, however, many officers 
sought to break free from the problems of the older systems, and on 25 September 1918, 
GOC London Air Defence Area, MajGen E.B. Ashmore, stressed his preference for a 
selection-based system.44 
Despite occasional divergent views, the RAF settled on a broadly meritocratic 
system when AMWO No. 1176 of 30 October 1919 announced the formation of the 
Service’s first Selection Board.45 The board’s function was to regulate promotion processes 
and debate the merit of recommendations received to fill ranks up to GC, though 
appointments to the latter rank and WgCr also required approval by the Secretary of State 
for Air.46 This political oversight sought to ensure suitability and enforce civilian control 
due to the responsibilities associated with appointments linked to these ranks. This 
oversight became increasingly important with appointments to Air Rank. The question of 
civilian control lies at the heart of the debate over civil-military relations and the British 
system focused on increased military professionalism to achieve objective control, or that 
related to idea that civilians set policy and the military enact it, which relies on the 
institution to self-govern. The alternative to this system was subjective control through 
civilianisation or politicisation, which sees the generation of increasing political oversight in 
defence strategy.47 While Janowitz argued that the latter could be used to increase civilian 
                                                          
42 TNA, AIR 2/90, Rear Admiral Cecil Lambert to the Master General of Personnel, 25 September 1918. 
43 TNA, AIR 2/90, GOC North Eastern Area to the Master-General of Personnel, 8 October 1918. 
44 TNA, AIR 2/90, GOC London Air Defence Area to the Master-General of Personnel, 25 September 1918. 
45 TNA, AIR 72/1, AMWO No. 1176 – Post-War Officers – Selection Board, 30 October 1919. 
46 TNA, AIR 2/233, Constitution and Functions of the Promotion Selection Board, 17 September 1922. 
47 Cohen, Supreme Command, pp. 227-228; Erik Hedlund, ‘Civil-Military Control over the Swedish Military 
Profession: An Analysis from the Perspective of the Officer Rank and Officer Education’, AFS, 39 (1) 
(2013), pp. 137-41. For an interesting view of the move from subjective to objective control in Spain as it 
transitioned to democracy after the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco, see: Narcis Serra, The Military 
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engagement and increase democracy, it was also a method of control readily identifiable in 
totalitarian regimes.48 This is a key critique of subjective control as it relates to the abuse of 
power by political elites, something also possible in a democratic society. Conversely, the 
lack of effective oversight regarding objective control can lead to the military gaining 
power. Both ideals rely on a degree of trust in the area of civil-military relations that can 
easily break down.49 Arguably, the answer lies in what Douglas Bland referred to as a 
unified theory of civil-military relations, which takes account of differing circumstances, 
historical perspectives and contexts, and accounts for change in societal values, issues, 
interests, personalities and threats that are at the centre of this relationship.50  
For the RAF, in specific zones of promotion for each rank, officers had to meet 
key criteria like age, time in rank and war service. SLs were required to be a minimum of 32 
and have four years’ service in their present rank before promotion to WgCr. OCs 
produced ACRs outlining an officer’s suitability for promotion, which they forwarded to 
AOCs, who in turn fashioned two lists; one consisting of those meeting required criteria, 
and one of those who did not. These were forwarded to the Selection Board, which 
consisted of CAS, AMP, Air Member for Supply and Research (AMSR) and the Air 
Secretary to the Secretary of State for Air, for discussion and decision.51 The Air Secretary 
and the Military and Naval Secretaries existed to guide and manage officers’ careers, and 
they were important appointments, as they acted as a gate on the suitability of potential 
senior leaders. However, the RAF disestablished this position in 1923 after the last post 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). From 1982 to 
1991, Serra served as Minister of Defence in the Spanish government. 
48 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 347-416. 
49 For example, the decision in 2010 to enshrine Britain’s Military Covenant into law illustrates the challenge 
created when trust and, from a leadership perspective, responsibility break down. On the evolution of the 
Military Covenant, see: Sarah Ingham, The Military Covenant: Its Impact of Civil-Military Relations in Britain 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2014). 
50 Douglas Bland, ‘A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations’, AFS, 26 (1) (1999), pp. 7-25. 
51 TNA, AIR 2/113, Minute to P.4 from the Director of Personnel, 1 December 1919; TNA, AIR 2/233, 
Constitution and Functions of the Promotion Selection Board. 
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holder, GC Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, was appointed to another command. No evidence has 
been found why this occurred; however, what is clear is that the position was established at 
the behest of the Secretary of State for War and Air, Churchill, in 1919 and that its 
disestablishment in 1923 coincided with the establishment of the position of AMP in 1922 
as a separate seat on the Air Council.52 It is arguable that the Air Council felt that AMP, 
who sat on the Selection Board, could fulfil a similar role. However, the lack of an Air 
Secretary post-1923 had the potential for the increased misuse of powers through 
favouritism by both senior officers and politicians alike. The post of Air Secretary did not 
re-emerge until 1957, and a 1956 report authored by DoP, AC R.W.L. Glenn, admitted that 
the lack of this post meant that RAF ‘career planning [was] generally on an “ad hoc” 
basis’.53 The Glenn Report made clear that by 1944, it was widely recognised that the 
AMP’s department was too overloaded with work to manage careers effectively, despite 
that, in theory, this had been its primary focus through the ‘Maintenance of the Royal Air 
Force in officers’.54 In practice, the directorates that made up the AMP’s department were 
too disparate to provide coherent career planning, though clearly the RAF thought it could 
cope. This lack of central planning, underpinned by leadership development, reinforces the 
view that the RAF nurtured rather than mentored officers like Leigh-Mallory who emerged 
by making themselves ‘visible’ to suitable senior leaders, who then brought them up 
through the ranks by sending them to institutions like Andover that further developed their 
abilities. As Chapter One noted, it is difficult to find evidence of individual patronage; 
therefore, it appears that RAF senior leaders collegiately nurtured officers whose potential 
for high rank was identifiable by making favourable impressions. This was, as Chapter Six 
                                                          
52 For correspondence with the Treasury over the establishment of the Air Secretary’s post, see: TNA, AIR 
2/121, Air Secretary, date opened 12 February 1919. 
53 AIR 2/13309, Report on the Proposed Introduction of an Air Secretary’s Department into the Permanent 
Organisation of the Air Ministry by Air Commodore R.W.L. Glenn, 16 February 1956, p. 20. 
54 Ibid, pp. 1-3; TNA, AIR 20/7502, Air Ministry – List of Staff and Distribution of Duties, 11 July 1924, pp. 31-5. 
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notes, particularly notable at Andover, which was a key gate in the leadership development 
process. 
The Selection Board’s composition paralleled that used by the Army.55 Two key 
promotion criteria reinforced RAF culture – command and flying experience – and, apart 
from the addition of a Promotion Exam in 1926, the principals established remained largely 
unchanged during this period. Promotion to WgCr and GC explicitly noted the need to 
have ‘held an actual command in his present rank’; therefore, SLs had to have held a 
command appointment to be promoted.56 For most in Appendix Four, this covered their 
First World War experience, though SL Arthur Wright was passed over for promotion in 
June 1924 when the Selection Board noted that he ‘should be given a command’ to develop 
his abilities.57 By 1929, the Air Council clarified the question of squadron command for 
such appointments and concluded that this included positions that ‘call[ed] for the display 
of very similar qualities’. This consisted of twin-engine bomber flights, RN carrier 
appointments and flying boat flights, commanding officers of a squadron of flight cadets at 
Cranwell, and chief instructors at flying training schools.58 Driven by the RAF’s small size, 
this offered sufficient suitable command experiences to developing officers. 
Codified in AP1334, the importance of flying ethos concerning promotion went 
further as the RAF showed a preference for ‘heavier-than-air’ pilots.59 During the 
Washington Naval Conference in 1922, the RAF decided to remove airships from its force 
structure, which placed airship officers in an awkward position.60 The RAF did not wish to 
                                                          
55 French, ‘Patterns of Promotions’, p. 161. 
56 TNA, AIR 2/233, Secretary to the Air Ministry to all Air Officers Commanding, 15 August 1922. 
57 TNA, AIR 2/233, Minutes and Decision of the June 1924 Promotions Board. 
58 TNA, AIR 2/233, Letter to AOC operational commands, June 1929. 
59 TNA, AIR 2/233, Note in connection with half-yearly meeting of Promotion Selection Board, December 
1922; TNA, AIR 10/1730, AP1334. 
60 1922 [Cd. 1619] Proceedings of the Second Air Conference held on 7th and 8th February 1922, p. 10. Airship 
development would continue after abolishing the branch under the Director of Civil Aviation but effectively 
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lose well-trained officers, and encouraged them to re-train for ‘flying duties on heavier-
than-air craft’.61 For example, both WgCr A.D. Cunningham and SL Douglas Harries re-
qualified as pilots to enhance their promotion prospects.62 Both Cunningham and Harries 
also illustrate one challenge of drawing conclusions from a correlation of the data in 
Appendix Three; namely that in 1919 these officers were graded as staff officers rather 
than members of the Airship Branch. This is because this represented their job assignment 
in 1919 and not their operational background. However, as the Secretary of State for Air, 
Guest, stated in 1921, airship officers would be ‘absorbed […] according to their 
qualifications and abilities’.63 This was a simple and elegant solution to a potentially 
challenging problem, and it fitted with the policy that GD Branch officers should be 
graded as pilots. This problem also led to much needed clarification concerning the criteria 
of command and flying experience regarding promotion to Air Rank.64 In the background 
of discussions over airship officers, AMP, in preparation for the December 1922 meeting 
of the Selection Board, clarified the position regarding officers seeking promotion to GC. 
Successful completion of a minimum of two years’ service as a GC was the necessary 
springboard to Air Rank. AMP stressed that WgCrs must be ‘chosen because of their 
outstanding fitness for advancement’ to GC and beyond.65 Because of this, officers were to 
be qualified ‘heavier than air’ pilots and have proven operational command abilities. The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ended with the crash of R.101 in 1931, see: Robin Higham, The British Rigid Airship, 1908-1931: A Study in 
Weapons Policy (London: G.T. Foulis, 1961). 
61 TNA, AIR 2/249, Minute from AMP to CAS and AMSR, 10 October 1923. 
62 TNA, AIR 2/249, Air Ministry to the AOC RAF Iraq, 12 November 1923. 
63 TNA, AIR 2/249, Minute from S.7 to AMP, 19 September 1923. 
64 TNA, AIR 2/249, Wing Commander W.C. Hicks to the Secretary, Air Ministry, 29 November 1923; AIR 
2/249, Squadron Leader E.J. Sparling to Air Commodore John Steel, 11 December 1923; AIR 2/249, S.7 to 
Wing Commander A.D. Cunningham and Squadron Leader Douglas Harries, 8 April 1924. 
65 TNA, AIR 2/233, Note in connection with half-yearly meeting of Promotion Selection Board – December 
1922. 
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system was also expected to be flexible enough to cope with ‘war or sudden and 
unforeseen circumstances’.66 
Besides managing promotion up to GC, the Air Ministry also established a Senior 
Promotion Board that examined appointments to Air Rank. Promotion to GC and above 
did not require examination, and candidates were considered on merit due to the political 
sensitivity of many appointments that went with these ranks.67 For example, as noted 
elsewhere, the outgoing AOC Aden Command, AC Portal, recalled in 1937 that his 
command required the management of several stakeholders, including co-operation with 
the Army and political agents in country.68 Similarly, appointments to Air Rank brought 
with them attendant responsibilities, a key element of good leadership, which reinforced 
the need to appoint those deemed most appropriate for the position. Additionally, by 1939, 
many would have experienced appropriate appointments such as attendance at Andover.  
Promotion zones for ACs and AVMs were two to four years, after which officers were 
typically retired or placed on half-pay. Due to potential sensitivities, appointment to Air 
Rank required the approval of the Secretary of State for Air. All appointments above three-
star level additionally required Royal Assent.69 An examination of the AFL shows that 
officers like Leigh-Mallory were regularly promoted over those more senior, thus 
illustrating a progressive attitude to meritocracy. For example, when promoted to AC on 1 
January 1936, Leigh-Mallory was, in November 1935, seventeenth out of 68 GCs in the 
AFL.70 Aided by RAF expansion in the 1930s, the promotion of more capable officers to 
Air Rank linked to the relative size of command appointments. On formation, 12 Group, 
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which Leigh-Mallory took over on 17 December 1937, was, as with many operational 
groups, an AC appointment. In 1936, after the formation of the functional commands of 
the RAF, the Air Ministry agreed with the Treasury that 1 and 2 (Bomber) Groups and 11 
(Fighter) Group would be commanded by AVMs with an AC as SASO because they had 
an establishment of ‘fourteen to sixteen squadrons’.71 As Britain’s geo-strategic position 
changed and the RAF expanded, so did 12 Group tasks, which, in turn, led to an expansion 
of Leigh-Mallory’s responsibilities in geographical terms and squadron numbers. This 
explains the date of seniority for his appointment as an AVM on 1 November 1938, which 
was out of alignment with standard promotion dates. 
While the RAF established promotion criteria and procedures, it was not without 
its challenges and criticism. The key challenge for the RAF emerged during expansion in 
the 1930s. Expansion forced the RAF to ensure a steady flow of middle-ranking officers 
through to Air Rank as well as increasing recruitment at lower levels. Key to managing 
these changes was AMP, AM Bowhill, who suggested in 1935 that the promotion zone to 
FL should be reduced from five to two and a half years to cope with increased officer 
recruitment.72 In effect, the RAF introduced ‘time’ promotion based on officers’ seniority; a 
system used by the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers.73 Similarly, in 1938, to ensure flow 
through to Air Rank, King George VI assented to an ‘abnormal’ procedure that allowed for 
the promotion of officers outside established criteria.74 This allowed for promotion of 
WgCr to GC and then to Air Rank. Bowhill recognised this problem in 1935 when he 
wrote a minute to CAS, Ellington, noting that promotion zones required shifting to cope 
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with changing operational requirements. However, to ensure promotion based on merit, it 
was stressed that AOCs should only forward names of those in whom they had the ‘fullest 
confidence’, whilst: 
only the very best officers should be forwarded and their recommendations 
should be based entirely on ability and no question of hard luck should arise.75 
 
Nonetheless, the RAF’s meritocratic system was open to potential manipulation due to 
favouritism or patronage, which was an on-going debate in the services during the inter-
war years.76 While merit remained simple to define, the quality of being good at something, 
the process of assessing it as it related to leadership development, remained problematic, as 
the RAF did not use any form of discrete psychometric testing.77 However, this is perhaps 
an unfair critique given that it was not until the Second World War that the Army 
introduced such techniques to select suitable officers.78 During the inter-war years, the RAF 
felt it could qualitatively assess, through ACRs, officers leadership potential, despite this 
being a stove piped document that had little real benefit for the officer to whom it related. 
Furthermore, as suggested below, ACRs could be a source of abuse, for positive and 
negative reasons, by OCs and AOCs. This problem was exacerbated by the lack of an Air 
Secretary after 1923 to manage careers.  
In hierarchical organisations, senior officers’ views mattered, as favouritism and 
patronage could support promotion. While direct and substantial evidence is hard to locate, 
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certain key senior leaders held strong views on some officers’ suitability for promotion, 
which came out in ACRs. At the June 1924 meeting of the Selection Board, SL P.A 
Shepherd, passed over for promotion based on the recommendation of his AOC, AC 
Webb-Bowen, was noted as having ‘reached the limit of his promotion’; however, by 
modern standards, there was no data to support this view.79 When, in 1938, time came to 
promote officers outside established criteria, superiors opinions mattered more than usual, 
as seen in the example of WgCr J.V. Steel, then SPSO at 11 Group. In addition to normal 
procedures, AOCs were required at this time to forward lists of officers outside of criteria 
suitable for promotion to the Air Ministry.80 Steel’s AOC, AVM Ernest Gossage, let his 
opinion be known to the Senior Selection Board that: 
he has not shown ambition to advance himself in the Service, nor that extra 
effort beyond what is normally expected, which should be shown by an officer 
of his seniority.81   
 
Steel’s seniority dated to 1 January 1928, and he had informed Gossage that he was 
considering retirement. Steel had already been passed over for promotion to GC seven 
times. Conversely, WgCr R.J. Mounsey, promoted to GC at this time, had only been 
recommended once.82 The continued employment of Steel rested largely on the expansion 
of the RAF and the need for middle-ranking officers. While AOCs played a key role, so did 
officers in the Air Ministry, including CAS, who chaired the Selection Boards. In extolling 
the merits of an officer, Trenchard could be a harsh but fair critic. When recommending 
GC Joubert for promotion, he noted that he was an ‘officer of some considerable ability 
and originality’ but that he could sometimes be a ‘little overwhelmed’.83 Conversely, in 
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1928, Trenchard extolled AC Dowding’s merit, describing him as having ‘intelligence, 
initiative and knowledge’ and noting that he ‘ha[d] been of great assistance to the Air Force 
since it was formed’.84 This compares favourably to their relationship in 1916, when 
Trenchard described Dowding as a ‘dismal Jimmy’, or a person who is always pessimistic. 
This sobriquet emerged after Dowding questioned the effect Trenchard’s offensive policy 
during the Battle of the Somme had on squadron morale.85 Furthermore, some officers 
were not averse to using their position to influence promotions. In 1937, Air Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) Bomber Command, ACM Sir John Steel, made 
representations for GC Wright, who had been passed over for promotion to AC on 1 
January 1937. Using his position, ACM Steel persuaded the Senior Promotion Board to 
reverse its decision, illustrating the prestige that the RAF invested in its most esteemed 
operational command.86 
 
3.4 The Promotion Exam and Education 
French, writing on officer education and training in the Army in this period, noted that 
promotion examinations were a compulsory element of an officer’s future development.87 
This also applied to the RAF post-1926, though discussions over the implementation and 
appropriateness of promotions examinations began as early as 1922. On 23 February 1923, 
the Director of Training and Staff Duties, AC T.C.R. Higgins, suggested to AMP, AVM 
Oliver Swann, that ‘examinations for promotions of officers should be started in due 
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course’.88 This suggestion sought to forestall any potential criticism levelled at RAF 
promotion procedures. The origins of RAF promotion examinations emerged as a 
command level innovation in 1922.89 Here, command described RAF key functional 
formations; for example, Inland Area. In June 1924, the then Director of Training (DoT), 
T.C.R. Higgins, noted to AOC Inland Area, AC Webb-Bowen, that Coastal Area had, in 
1922, ‘inaugurated a scheme by which two written examinations were held every year’ 
before selection for promotion.90 In parallel, these schemes and discussions merged to 
produce a standardised RAF promotion examination. Traced to their service in the Army 
and RN but merged with an attempt to remove defects identified in their respective 
systems, the introduction of a promotion exam derived from senior RAF officers’ previous 
experience, which informed its introduction. Swann had served in the RN pre-First World 
War, while both Webb-Bowen and Higgins had been Army officers. Furthermore, the 
introduction of promotion examinations supports J. van Doorn’s contention that a ‘special, 
well-integrated body of knowledge and skill’ strengthens professionalisation in 
organisations; officers who associated with their profession was a key element of leadership 
development in the RAF.91 
Promotion examinations, alongside doctrine, formal and informal, developed and 
reinforced RAF culture while developing the professional knowledge required by officers. 
However, only 12 per cent of Appendix Four ever undertook an examination because, by 
the time of its introduction, most officers considered were WgCrs. Thus, while officers like 
Leigh-Mallory were immersed into RAF culture through institutions like Andover, they 
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were not exposed to it further by the promotion exam. Promoted to WgCr on 1 January 
and 1 July 1927 respectively, two exceptions to this were Harris and AM Sir Richard Peck. 
The promotion examinations, called “A”, “B” and “C”, were applicable to officers up to 
the rank of SL. Flying Officers took Promotion Examination “A” for promotion to FL, 
“B” for FL to SL and “C” for SL to WgCr. A key criticism, as with attendance at Andover 
and other aspects of the RAF, was that exams initially only applied to GD Branch officers, 
which reinforced the Service’s proclivity for heroic leadership. During its development, the 
promotion examination came under other criticisms. In 1924, while debating subjects for 
the examination, AMP and AMSR held opposing views over the balance between technical 
and conceptual knowledge, which illustrates the tension inherent in the RAF in this area.92 
Eventually, examination content became increasingly conceptual in character as officers 
progressed through to WgCr, which illustrates that the RAF sought to change how 
developing leaders thought as they moved into more senior positions. It was a move from 
tactical, or technical, knowledge to broader strategic, or vision based, thinking that was 
being encouraged in this process. Concerning technical questions, on 3 March 1927, AOC 
RAF India, Sir John Salmond, wrote to the Air Ministry complaining that exam questions 
related to air-cooled engines, a type not used in his command, which he felt placed officers 
at a disadvantage.93 While sympathetic, the Air Ministry failed to offer any practical 
solution, as they thought that the latter form of engine would ‘eventually disappear’ and 
that most officers posted to India were trained on air-cooled engines and thus fully 
conversant with their properties.94 
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Although not directly relevant to Leigh-Mallory and many of his peers, it is worth 
briefly considering the examinations character because they illustrate how the RAF sought 
to provide a firm professional basis for the development of the Service’s officer class. 
Officers studied subjects like airmanship, drill, law, organisation and administration, air 
operations, imperial geography, and sanitation which sought to test the required knowledge 
of leaders several steps above their current duties and illustrated a move to the conceptual 
understanding required of senior leaders.95 Based on various sources of knowledge, like the 
King’s Regulations, the Manual of Air Force Law and, from 1928, the RAF War Manual, and 
while these tests were undeniably dry in content, each focused on the transmission of RAF 
culture.96 The second edition of the Manual of Air Force Law, published in 1933, suggested 
that, while the first edition was by its very nature a derivative of the Manual of Military Law, 
the previous 12 years had seen the RAF adapt its laws to its organisational context, though 
clear parallels existed amongst each of the services.97 Thus, this ‘stories’ development 
reinforces the importance of the assumption of independence, as by having its own legal 
manual, the RAF made a statement about its independent status. The Manual of Air Force 
Law also included an overview on the evolution of the RAF and its relationship to the 
manual.98 Thus, studying key texts like these and both volumes of the War Manual was an 
aspect of leadership development, which inculcated officers with knowledge that mapped 
to RAF culture and drove the Service’s evolution. For example, AP1300 outlined doctrinal 
elements of the belief in ‘Command of the Air’ in various chapters that discussed air 
operations and examined concepts such as air superiority. In Question II on ‘Air 
Operations’ in the September 1931 “C” examination, candidates were asked what the 
                                                          
95 TNA, AIR 2/311, AMWO No. 181 – Promotions Examination – Officers, March 1925. 
96 Ibid. 
97 TNA, AIR 10/822, AP804 – Manual of Air Force Law, 2nd Edition, January 1933 (Embodying Amendment 
List Nos. 1-8, 1939), p. iii. 
98 Ibid, pp. 12-7. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Career Patterns and Promotions in the Royal Air Force Page 144 
 
primary role of air power was in land operations. The examiner’s report noted that this 
referred to air superiority and stated that the answer could be found in Chapter XII of 
AP1300, which examined army co-operation and argued that the  principal task of the RAF 
was to gain ‘air superiority’.99 Overall, in this respect, paralleling the experience of the 
Army, but without its inherent structural flaw of the regimental system, the RAF used 
promotion examinations as an educational tool to prepare officers for future leadership by 
developing their professional knowledge.100 Made explicit in AMWO No. 181 in 1925, 
which stated that the purpose of the exams was to ensure that ‘officers attain and maintain 
the necessary professional knowledge’ expected of them, the Air Ministry, in various 
AMWOs, continuously reiterated this.101 The clearest indication that the RAF sought to 
professionalise its officer class and valued continuing development came from Trenchard, 
who stressed that the exam’s purpose was not to produce officers who ‘can pass exams’ 
but those with ‘qualifications necessary for the running of the service’.102 In essence, the 
RAF developed officers who could make the Service fit for its defence mission by 
encouraging effective organisational leadership. 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has examined some of the key elements that underpinned the experience of 
leadership development, like promotion. It has also examined the patterns and rhythms 
that emerged amongst the officer class of the RAF for those who entered the military elite 
by 1939. The RAF established a promotion system based on the idea of merit; however, 
though not unusual for the period, it relied on the opinions of senior officers to judge the 
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worth of nurtured officers. Thus, the procedures underpinning development were not 
without their challenges, like the potential abuse of key information sources, such as the 
ACR, which was used by the selection boards. However, key markers like attendance at 
Andover became preferred routes to senior leadership, and by making themselves more 
‘visible’, officers such as Leigh-Mallory continued to be identified for development. 
Concerning public schools, this helped officers get in to the Service because, as Chapter 
Four illustrates, the RAF perceived that these institutions produced men with the right 
leadership characteristics, though there was admittedly an element of senior leaders re-
affirming their predilection to appoint officers who shared their class background. This 
process was constrained by RAF culture, and by linking flying to the duties of a GD 
Branch officer, the Service made a firm statement about its preferred class of personnel.  
Chapter Four 
Social Origins, Pre-Service Education and the Development of Leaders 
 
Mansell, in his study of the educational and social factors affecting the recruitment of RAF 
pilots in this period, observed that one function of the Service’s senior leadership was to: 
recruit men who could create a distinctive ethos in its officer corps and also 
meet its technical demands.1  
 
This challenge led to the GD Branch’s formation with a view of immersing officers in RAF 
culture. Mansell’s article was an important contribution to understanding the social 
composition of the RAF, but failed to adequately build on the links between the Service’s 
and public schools views of leadership. The RAF’s heroic view of leadership included 
concepts such as courage, honour and duty that, as this chapter illustrates, were readily 
identifiable in aspects of public school curricula, though, as Sheffield noted concerning 
paternalism, many of these values could also be found in society more broadly.2 However, 
the link here is that it was believed that those from public schools were ‘imbued with 
leadership qualities’ and ‘shared a certain set of social values’.3 Furthermore, as this chapter 
shows using WgCr Evill’s 1931 report on Cranwell students, the RAF clearly believed 
technical skills could be taught, while broader leadership education could only be 
reinforced from that received at an earlier age in public schools. As earlier chapters show, 
technical knowledge, subsumed by pilot ethos, was viewed as a specialism within the GD 
Branch. As Bédarida suggested, education systems replicated and mapped the ‘prevailing 
values of […] society’ on to students; therefore, a reciprocal relationship emerged between 
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the RAF and public schools.4 Thus, future senior RAF leaders transplanted their public 
school values and class based views onto the Service. More specifically from a leadership 
perspective, these values revolved around a reciprocal relationship among concepts, skills 
and organisations that was important for the development of leaders. While contingent 
issues like career choice and the role of the First World War must be recognised as factors 
in the development paths of officers considered in the prosopography population, it is 
possible to identify the transmission of wider societal values that interfaced with the RAF 
to develop the type of officer it wanted. While Bédarida might be correct that education 
systems implant widely held values onto pupils, it can also be suggested that the preference 
for public school educated officers derived from a desire to maintain class structures in the 
RAF. However, it should not be assumed that this desire came from the upper class, 
because, as Rubinstein illustrated, it was the professional and middle classes that 
predominately made use of public schools.5  
This chapter analyses the pre-service background of officers from Appendix Four 
by examining several key developmental areas as well as exploring Leigh-Mallory’s own 
progression. First, it examines officers’ social origins and notes that, in general, these men 
originated from the business and professional elements of the middle class. While 
remaining contested terms due to perceptions of class conflict, Victorian and Edwardian 
society split into the two aforementioned sections plus the working class. The working 
class ranged from labourers through to educated workers. The middle class was even more 
expansive and ranged from clerks to members of company boards. A defining aspect of the 
middle class was the rise of the professions, which could be further split into lower and 
upper sections. The upper class proper was primarily limited to members of the gentry but 
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also included elements like the clergy and legal professions.6 Apart from any horizontal 
segregation of class, it separated along vertical lines too; for example, between the ‘old rich 
and the new’.7 Second, this chapter examines the importance of public schools and how the 
RAF attempted to foster and maintain relationships with these establishments during this 
period, thus highlighting their value to the Service. Third, it examines the importance of 
team sports to an officer’s development, both in public schools and in the RAF. Fourth, 
the emergence and importance of the OTC is considered. Finally, a survey of officers’ 
university education completes the chapter.  
 
4.1 Social Origins 
Born on 11 July 1892 in Mobberley, Cheshire, Leigh-Mallory was the youngest of four 
children, the most famous of which was his oldest brother, George, who died climbing 
Mount Everest in 1924.8 His father was a Rector at the local Anglican Church, where his 
forebears had been parsons for several generations. Leigh-Mallory’s upper class status, 
afforded to him by his father’s position, saw him develop links with important persons of 
the age; his Godfather was Sir Lees Knowles, 1st Baronet, noted philanthropist and 
politician, who maintained an interest in military history and bequeathed money to support 
the Sir Lees Knowles Lectures at his Alma Meta, Trinity College, University of Cambridge. 
Leigh-Mallory’s peer, Tedder, delivered these lectures in 1947.9  
The social origins of officers who reached Air Rank by March 1939 in Appendix 
Four parallels the divergence and broadening of occupations in this period. By the late-
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Victorian era, professionals like the civil service had gained stronger credence in society; 
before the Industrial Revolution, professions in Britain were limited to clerical and legal 
occupations.10 The emergence of the middle class and the broadening of Britain’s industrial 
base post-1750 led to greater state involvement and an associated growth in the number of 
civil servants who carried out policy. Similarly, the business class, who drove 
industrialisation, became more prominent in society as manufacturing overtook agriculture 
as the key economic sector. The professionalisation of society drove up living standards 
and shifted social structures from a class base to a professional hierarchy. This was not, 
however, obvious at the time, and the landed gentry remained present as a social and 
political entity throughout the late-Victorian period. Furthermore, the middle classes 
increasingly sought to identify themselves with the more established professions as well as 
ingratiating themselves with the upper or landed classes, and used public schools as one 
enabling mechanism to achieve this. 
While the broadening of the class system was not readily identifiable in the officer 
classes of the Army and RN, it was present in the RAF. Studies into the late-Victorian and 
Edwardian Army make clear that its officers largely emerged from upper-middle or upper 
classes, with a specific preference for those whose fathers’ occupational backgrounds 
included military, clerical and legal experience.11 As Bowman and Connelly argued, the 
Army consistently struggled to broaden its recruitment base in the face of social changes.12 
For example, a third of Edwardian Army officers were sourced from ‘Gentlemen’; those 
who could support the costs required to be an officer. Similar challenges faced the 
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Executive Branch of the RN, which struggled to cope with the impact that its Engineering 
Branch’s professionalisation had on both recruitment and status.13 Derived from a variety 
of sources like birth records, obituaries and memoirs, Chart 4.1’s classification of father’s 
occupation compares well to the Army and illustrates that officers from Appendix Four 
emerged from a broad conceptualisation of class.14 The RAF, in part due to contingent 
factors like volunteerism during the First World War, gradually widened the sources of its 
recruitment base. Twenty-seven per cent present in Chart 4.1 are classified as ‘Not 
Known’, though it is safe to presume that the figures presented are representative. The 
established professions are broadly represented, though the business class continued to 
dominate at 23 per cent. Even this classification can be further broken down into a variety 
of career paths including merchants, bankers and small landowners. For example, AVM Sir 
Paul Maltby’s father was a landowner and tea planter in Travancore, South India, while 
Mitchell’s father owned a brewery in Sydney, Australia.15 Despite increased occupational 
breadth, the military, as a profession, continued to play a role in the origins of RAF 
officers, with 14 per cent emerging from this context. Largely split between the British and 
Indian Armies, the only exception was Peirse’s father, who was the only RN officer 
present. Peirse’s father, Admiral Sir Richard Peirse, served as Inspector of Target Practice, 
1909 to 1911, and Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Station, 1912 to 1916.16 
Classified as ‘Other’, Portal’s father, Edward Robert, lived by independent means due to 
                                                          
13 In general, see: Davison, The Challenges of Command. 
14 Charts for this chapter can be found in Appendix Two. 
15 ‘Obituary – Sir Paul Maltby’, The Times, Tuesday 6 July 1971, p. 14; Robin Woolven, ‘Mitchell, Sir William 
Gore Sutherland (1888-1944)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; Online 
edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35047, accessed 27 Oct 2012]. 
16 ‘Obituary – Admiral Sir Richard Peirse’, The Times. Thursday 11 July 1940, p. 7. Usurped by a cheaper 
version developed by Captain Frederick Dreyer, and one part of the problem that led to the RN’s losses at 
the Battle of Jutland in 1916, significantly, Admiral Peirse was supportive of the development of Arthur 
Pollen’s rejected computer-based fire-control system, see: Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: 
Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914, Paperback Edition (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 154. 
On the debate over fire control at the Battle of Jutland, see: John Brooks, Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of 
Jutland: The Question of Fire Control (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
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the family’s success as wine merchants in the early- to mid-nineteenth century. This 
prosperity allowed Portal’s father to pursue a successful legal career and retire as an unpaid 
Justice of the Peace aged 30. This allowed the family to move into the upper class; a rare 
case of social mobility in this period.17 Thus, Portal was Leigh-Mallory’s and Sutton’s class 
peer, as their fathers were clergy, who had their own hierarchy and were socially distinct 
from the broader upper-middle class core present in Appendix Four.18 The only officer in 
this sample who had links to the landed gentry was AVM Henry Cave-Browne-Cave, 
whose father was Sir Thomas, who in turn was the third son of Thomas, the third son of 
the ninth Baronet, Sir William. While classified as upper class, the family’s removal from 
the hereditary line saw descendants seek alternative occupations; Cave-Browne-Cave’s 
father ended his Army career in 1900 as the Deputy Accountant-General.19 However, 
despite this general broadening of occupational backgrounds, it needs to be remembered 
that these officers shared the public school experience, which reinforced class boundaries.  
Chart 4.2 represents an under-recognised aspect of RAF officers’ origins, their 
imperial character, which is best represented by Joubert, who was born in India. Twenty-
four per cent of officers from Appendix Four were born outside Britain in the empire; for 
example, Joubert’s father was a Doctor in the Indian Medical Service, which was a remnant 
of the East India Company and served as a reserve to the Indian Army while providing a 
vital civilian function.20 It is clear that future officers born around the British Empire were 
there due to its expansion and the movement of the various professions in it. In this 
                                                          
17 Richards, Portal, pp. 6-11. 
18 ‘Obituary – Air Marshal Sir Bertine Sutton’, The Times, Tuesday 1 October 1946, p. 9; Keith Robbins, ‘The 
Churches in Edwardian Society’ in Donald Read (ed.), Edwardian England (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 
118. 
19 Charles Mosley (ed.), Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 107th Edition, Volume 1 (Wilmington, 
Delaware: Burke's Peerage, 2003), p. 728. 
20 Joubert, The Fated Sky, p. 8; Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Donald McDonald, BM, FRCSEd, IMS, ‘The Indian 
Medical Service: A Short Account of its Achievements, 1600-1947’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 
49(1) (1956), p. 16.  
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imperial context, the diffusion of professions linked back to Britain through education, 
thus illustrating a reciprocal relationship between them. Immersed into a system that 
developed a feeling of shared experience, these officers enjoyed an upbringing in the 
empire but were then sent back to Britain for education, typically to public schools. 
The character of these officers’ social origins raises several considerations that have 
implications for this chapter as a whole. Tempered by recognition of contingent factors, 
these officers were broadly representative of the changing professional character of the 
nineteenth century, which had a reciprocal relationship with public schools that was 
important to members of the emerging professions. However, the key factor is the 
relationship between career choice and the outbreak of the First World War. Caught up in 
the jingoistic atmosphere of 1914 and 1915, those RAF officers who did not seek a military 
career before the First World War largely volunteered out of patriotic duty. These officers, 
42 per cent of the prosopography population, had, as Chapter Three illustrated, potentially 
begun to pursue other education and employment avenues. While at university, Leigh-
Mallory considered pursuing a legal career, whilst Tedder had begun to build a successful 
Civil Service career as a Colonial Office cadet in Fiji.21 While Orange illustrated that Tedder 
did not volunteer out of some sense of ‘pseudo-patriotism’, it is clear that the latter felt his 
OTC training might be of use in the war.22 However, it is also clear that while patriotism 
might have been a contributing factor to joining up, the desire to fly was also present; for 
example, 13 per cent of officers joined the Special Reserve of the RFC in the early phase of 
the war, though these figures themselves can be questioned. For example, The Army List in 
March 1918 gives Harris as a member of the Special Reserve of the RFC, though it is 
known that his original service came with the Rhodesian Regiment in 1915. Nevertheless, if 
                                                          
21 Dunn, Big Wing, p. 17; Owen, Tedder, pp. 45-51; Orange, Tedder, pp. 17-22. 
22 Orange, Tedder, pp. 21-2. 
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these officers, as a group, are to be considered effective leaders, it must be recognised that, 
much like the birth of the RAF itself, these men were products of the circumstances of the 
First World War and the contingent nature of their decision to volunteer for military 
service. 
 
4.2 The Definition and Importance of Public Schools to the British Military 
Sheffield argued that the Army’s pre-First World War ‘officer class was educationally 
homogenous’, which supported C.B. Otley’s 1973 contention that even into the early 
1970s, public schools remained the key source for officers.23 This was an issue for the RAF, 
and on 21 November 1923, the Deputy DoP, GC Joubert, noted in a RUSI lecture that the 
RAF looked ‘primarily to the Public Schools and Universities to provide our needs for 
officers’, as they were perceived to produce those who could lead by example.24 For 
example, as Chapter Three explored, 82 per cent of officers from Appendix Four shared 
the public school experience. In 1919, when commenting on Cecil’s recommendations for 
the education of boys seeking Permanent Commissions in the RAF, the Director of 
Research, GC Brooke-Popham, who attended Haileybury, supported the view that a 
general ‘classical’ education was desirable for future candidates.25 Public schools, however, 
are a controversial subject; for example, in 1975, Geoffrey Best argued that they were a 
breeding ground for militarism, particularly through the OTC.26 As the Introduction noted, 
economic historians like George Allen accused the system of being a cause of the ‘British 
Disease’ of industrial decline. Allen wrote that they ‘instilled a distaste for the pursuits 
                                                          
23 Sheffield, ‘Officer-Man Relations’, p. 4; C.B. Otley, ‘The Educational Background of British Army 
Officers’, Sociology, 7(2) (1973), p. 204. 
24 Joubert, ‘The Supply and Training of Officers’, p. 40 
25 TNA, AIR 2/100, Memorandum from Director of Research to Director General of Supply and Research, 
24 October 1919. 
26 Geoffrey Best, ‘Militarism and the Victorian Public School’ in B. Simon and I. Bradley (eds.), The Victorian 
Public School: Studies in the Development of an Educational Institution (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1975), pp. 129-146. 
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which had made the country rich and powerful’.27 Concerning the Edwardian Army, 
Bowman and Connelly argued that public school Army Classes were ‘dumping grounds’ for 
failing pupils.28 These pluralistic, though teleological, perspectives remain questionable due 
to their simplistic analyses, which fail to consider public schools’ primary pedagogical 
purpose, leader development. Conversely, both McCulloch and Rupert Wilkinson 
recognised this role while arguing that public schools were key factors in the preparation of 
future leaders for civic duties while delivering value to the organisations they led. However, 
McCulloch at least recognised that an aspect of this was about preserving social values of 
the time.29  
Defining what a public school was, and is, is challenging, as it remains a malleable 
and transient term in the British education system; Mangan recognised this challenge as he 
noted that several emerging institutions used the term in the late-Victorian period.30 In 
general, public schools were non-local, endowed, predominantly boarding, used by well-to-
do families, dedicated to the education of boys, and had a long and prestigious history, with 
institutions like Eton founded as far back as 1440. They were part of an educational system 
that was split into two parts, one for the ‘elites’ and one for the ‘masses’; though, as already 
noted, the definition of the former term is open to debate. However, three key sources 
illustrate the challenge of definition. A first key definition emerged from those schools 
named by the Clarendon Commission, a Royal Commission set up in 1861 to examine the 
                                                          
27 George Cyril Allen, The British Disease: A Short Essay on the Nature and Causes of the Nation's Lagging Wealth 
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1979), pp. 37-38; Wiener, English Culture, passim. For a critique of the 
Allen/Wiener argument, see: Hartmut Berghoff, ‘Public Schools and the Decline of the British Economy 
1870-1914’, Past & Present, 129 (1990), pp. 148-67. 
28 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, p. 14. 
29 McCulloch, Philosophers and Kings, p. 22, 24; Rupert Wilkinson, ‘Political Leadership and the Late Victorian 
Public School’, BJS, 13(4) (1962), pp. 320-30. 
30 Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School, pp. 1-3. 
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problems inherent with the financial mismanagement of Eton.31 The Clarendon Report in 
1864 examined nine schools – Eton, Winchester, Westminster, Charterhouse, St Paul’s, 
Merchant Taylors’, Harrow, Rugby and Shrewsbury – and led to the passage of the Public 
Schools Act in 1868, which formalised ‘some’ into ‘the’ public schools and standardised 
their governance.32 Additionally, many of the institutions subject to the Taunton 
Commission of 1864 to 1868 were considered public schools by 1900; this commission 
examined the management of the remaining 784 endowed grammar schools.33 This 
commission led to the passage of the Endowed Schools Act in 1869. Finally, emerging 
from the Taunton Commission and formed in 1869, the Headmasters’ Conference 
harmonised the actions of grammar schools that morphed into ‘public’ schools. Under the 
leadership of Edward Thring, Principal of Uppingham, the Headmasters’ Conference 
initially consisted of 14 members. By 1889, when the Headmasters’ Conference published 
its first Public School Year Book, it consisted of 49 members, while J.R. de S. Honey 
calculated the existence of 64 leading institutions in the period 1880 to 1902.34 Many of the 
Clarendon schools never joined the Headmasters’ Conference. Haileybury, which Leigh-
Mallory attended, appeared in both Honey’s modern calculation and the Headmasters’ 
Conference list of 1889. Boyd, in his 1973 study, identified Haileybury as a ‘well-known’ 
public school.35 The Clarendon Commission could not have considered Haileybury, as it 
did not open until 1862 on the grounds of the former East India Trading Company 
                                                          
31 On the Clarendon Commission more generally, see: Colin Shrosbree, Public Schools and Private Education: The 
Clarendon Commission, 1861-64, and the Public Schools Acts (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). 
32 Parliamentary Papers (PP), 1868, An Act to make further Provision for the good Government and Extension of certain 
Public Schools in England. 
33 PP, 1867-68 (3966) Schools Inquiry Commission: Volume I – Report of the commissioners; Jonathan Gathorne-
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College, which had existed to train the company’s civilian administrators, and closed in 
1858.36  
The Headmasters’ Conference coordinated public schools’ growth, which by 1900 
consisted of 200 members.37 This growth, driven by the emergence of an aspirational 
middle class, led to a greater number of public schools that were run by headmasters who 
had moved from old to new institutions. Thus, the late-Victorian period saw the 
transformation of small local grammar schools into more expensive and ‘elite’ public 
schools. The Headmasters’ Conference was an important point of contact between the 
military and public schools, and in 1919, gave advice to the RAF on Cranwell’s 
curriculum.38 Haileybury itself highlights the diffusion of public school ideals. In 1874, 
Haileybury fostered an offshoot, the United Services College (USC), when a group of Army 
officers led by MajGen Sir Charles Daubeney founded a limited company to provide public 
school education at a low cost for sons of serving officers who sought to enter the military. 
Carmell Price, then Head of Haileybury’s Modern Side, noted for being fair and 
authoritative on the best way to enter the Army, was USC’s first Headmaster.39 USC 
eventually became part of Haileybury again; USC was absorbed by the Imperial Service 
College in 1906, which in turn merged with Haileybury in 1942. Furthermore, Haileybury 
produced several notable senior RAF officers. For example, besides Leigh-Mallory, 
Brooke-Popham, Dickson and Slessor all attended Haileybury. The latter two both served 
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as CAS, while Dickson was the first Chief of the Defence Staff in 1959. Slessor recalled 
that during Exercise PANDORA in 1948, six of the senior officers in attendance were 
products of Haileybury.40 
A reciprocal relationship existed between public schools and the Army. This 
formalised when ‘Army’ classes emerged in the late-Victorian period. ‘Army’ classes were a 
response to criticism from the Army’s Council of Military Education (CME), which sought 
to improve the educational standards of officers emerging from public schools. Formed on 
1 June 1857 after the Crimean War, the CME supported the Clarendon Commission’s 
views on public schools and placed great faith in its reforming zeal.41 The relationship was 
not always smooth, and the CME challenged the Clarendon Commission’s curriculum 
priorities. However, as the CME had a stake in ensuring that the Army recruited the ‘right’ 
type of officer, this criticism was never vocalised outside controlled environments like the 
Clarendon Commission and JRUSI.42 The Victorian Army, despite meritocratic aspirations 
through the abolition of purchase in 1871, maintained a socially restrictive officer class that 
remained in place throughout the Edwardian era, as upper class, and by default public 
school educated, recruits were perceived as having natural leadership abilities.43 The CME 
considered public schools as the best way of providing an effective general education for 
‘gentlemen’ before entering the Army; by 1900, 62 per cent of Army officers came from 
public schools.44 At the CME’s behest, the Army evened out marks awarded between 
                                                          
40 Slessor, The Central Blue, pp. 3-4. 
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mathematics and classical subjects for the entry exams for Sandhurst and Woolwich, which 
ensured a steady flow of successful public school cadets.45 
Continuity existed between the experience of the Army and that of the RAF; 
however, it diverged from the preferred route of early recruitment through Britannia for the 
RN. The key body affirming this continuity was Cecil’s 1919 committee, which examined 
pre-service education. In examining the officer recruitment and training systems of both 
the Army and RN, the committee concluded: 
boys educated at Osborne and Dartmouth became too specialised and lacked 
the general cultivation which is better obtained at an ordinary public school.46  
 
Instead, Cecil’s committee stressed that the Army’s methods offered opportunities to 
develop the mental faculties required of officers. This is an interesting conclusion given the 
technical context of the RAF, which suggests that the RN’s system was unbalanced; 
though, as Chapter Five notes, there was some continuity between curriculum elements. In 
rejecting technical, or ‘specialised’, education, the RAF sought a progressive solution to the 
provision of balanced and effective education for officer recruits. The recognition that 
public schools were the best source of officers suggests that these institutions remained a 
vital aspect of the educational, social and cultural ideology of the period. As McCulloch 
noted, in contrast to teleological and ideologically laden criticisms from authors like Peter 
Parker, the First World War was ‘in fact widely taken to be a triumphant vindication of the 
public schools’ contribution to society’.47 However, McCulloch recognised that the public 
school system played a role in preserving the social order of the time and those 
organisations, such as the OTC ‘provided a lasting reminder of this kind of public service’ 
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in that they helped ‘legitimise’ views of civic duty prevalent in curricula.48 This desire to 
‘preserve’ social boundaries can be seen in the RAF’s desire to integrate closely with public 
schools. Despite this criticism, Cecil’s committee recognised the importance of studying 
English, history and maths, while classics developed ‘suppleness, receptivity, and sense of 
proportion in the mind of the pupil’.49 This broad knowledge was important for those who 
rose to senior leadership positions, as it gave them a degree of mental agility to manage 
challenges confronting them. Citing a series of works like Edmund Burke’s 1790 book 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, Cecil’s committee recognised the importance of 
character alongside intelligence.50 The committee defined character as: 
a high standard of courage, self-control, and honourable conduct, and seemly 
and considerable manners and deportment.51 
 
This definition of character bears similarity to that found in various RAF publications.52 
While not dismissing grammar or secondary school education outright, Cecil’s committee 
noted that such institutions did not:  
usually furnish boys so good an opportunity of acquiring the sort of cultivation 
which [was] desired as [did] the public schools.53 
 
This preference for the Army’s model of officer recruitment is interesting for two reasons. 
First, 1918 and 1919 were the years when RAF culture and institutions emerged, which had 
a long lasting impact, like the preference for pilots as senior leaders. Second, in November 
1919, just as Trenchard submitted his ‘Permanent Organization’ paper to the Secretary of 
State for War and Air, former naval officers ran three out of the four directorates in CAS’s 
Department. AC John Steel was DCAS and Director of Operations and Intelligence 
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(DOI), Admiral Lambert was DoP, while AC C.L. Lambe was Director of Equipment. 
Apart from Trenchard, only AC Game, Director of Training and Organisation, was 
formerly an Army officer. For issues of balance, a committee like Cecil’s typically consisted 
of officers with RFC and RNAS backgrounds.  
While Cecil’s committee was a marker in the decision-making process, the RAF had 
already tacitly recognised the importance of public schools. In October 1918, the Director 
of Manning, Colonel K.G. Brooke, wrote to all area commands requesting that they make 
every effort to recruit prospective public school candidates.54 Brooke’s memorandum, 
prompted by concerns in the ‘Press and elsewhere’ that the Service was not recruiting 
enough personnel from public schools, stressed that these institutions were not receiving 
the necessary information about the RAF as a career.55 This was because the RAF did not 
have the familial links that were a key feature of Army and RN recruitment. It took until 
1925 for the RAF to implement a plan for liaising with public schools, when suggestions 
were made that ‘old boys’ deliver lectures besides developing links with the OTC.56 On 12 
January 1926, the Treasury approved the Air Council’s plans for public school liaison, and 
the RAF established ten positions at various institutions.57 The decision about which 
schools to liaise with was based on those who supplied the highest proportion of 
candidates to Sandhurst.58 Schools chosen were Charterhouse, Harrow, Marlborough, 
Haileybury, Winchester, Wellington, Eton, Bedford and Rugby.59 WgCrs Portal, Sutton, 
SLs Slessor, and J.V. Steel acted as liaison officers to Winchester, Haileybury, Eton and 
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Charterhouse respectively. Bedford declined the invitation and was replaced by Clifton 
College, while Trenchard insisted on Lancing College’s addition.60 The implementation of 
this scheme illustrates the importance the RAF placed on public schools. It also mirrored 
similar visits undertaken pre-First World War; for example, Slessor recalled a visit by Major 
Brooke-Popham to Haileybury in 1912, and, as Pugh noted, RFC officers visited public 
schools to ‘sell’ air power, reinforcing the former’s recollection.61 
The clearest indication that public schools were central to the RAF came in a 1931 
report authored by Cranwell’s Assistant Commandant, WgCr Evill. Titled, ‘An Analysis of 
the Cranwell Entry’, Evill classified various schools into the three grades illustrated in Table 
4.1. The aim of the report was twofold. First, the report examined changes in the 
composition of the ‘Cranwell Entry’, and second, it considered whether those emerging 
from ‘better known schools’ were more suited to being officers.62 
Table 4.1 – The Grading of Schools in ‘An Analysis of the Cranwell Entry’ 
Grade I Schools Grade II Schools Grade III Schools 
Charterhouse Aldenham Ampleforth The remainder 
Cheltenham Downside Bedford  
Clifton Berkhamsted Blundell’s  
Eton Bradfield Brighton College  
Haileybury Christ’s Hospital Canford  
Harrow Cranleigh Dover College  
Malvern Dulwich Dublin University  
Marlborough Edinburgh Academy Epsom College  
Rugby Felsted Fettes  
Stowe Imperial Service 
College 
Lancing  
Wellington Liverpool College Loretto  
Winchester Mill Hill Merchant Taylors  
 Oundle Pangbourne  
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 Radley Repton  
 Rossall St Bees  
 St Paul’s Sedburgh  
 Sherborne Shrewsbury  
 Stonyhurst Tonbridge  
 Trent College Uppingham  
 Westminster Wrekin  
(Source: RAFM, Evill Papers, AC 74/8/27, An Analysis of the Cranwell Entry, 16 November 1931, p. 1) 
 
Table 4.1 closely conforms to the aforementioned hierarchy of public schools, but it is 
interesting to note that several Clarendon schools – St Paul’s, Merchant Taylors and 
Shrewsbury – are not listed as Grade I institutions, while Haileybury is. Grades I and II 
included institutions readily identifiable as public schools. From Evill’s analysis, schools 
listed as Grade I and II dominated at Cranwell and constituted 59 per cent of the intake 
from 1920 to 1931.63 While not as high a figure as the report’s tone suggested, Evill 
preferred officers from these routes, which is interesting given his own educational 
background having attended Britannia. The figures suggest that RAF recruitment was 
broader than the Army’s was; however, as noted earlier, in 1900, 63 per cent of officer 
recruits for the Army came from public schools. This reinforces the view that the RAF 
mirrored Army practices concerning public schools. Furthermore, it must be remembered 
that both grammar and state secondary schools - who made up the balance of recruits - 
mimicked aspects of the public school ethos, such as the focus on sport. Evill’s report 
discussed three aspects of a cadet’s development: examinations, flying and ‘officer-like 
qualities’. Concerning examinations, those from Grade I schools performed worse due to 
weakness in ‘Mathematics and Mechanics’.64 Thus, Evill’s point mirrors many criticisms 
evident in the historiography concerning public schools. In terms of flying, it was found 
that those from better schools were more effective, while the final area of ‘officer-like 
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qualities’, something left undefined by Evill, showed that cadets from Grade I institutions 
had ‘outstanding characteristics’ that were graded based on an assessment of their character 
that ranged from ‘Of outstanding merit’ through to ‘Rather poor material’.65 The clearest 
indications of the importance of public schools to the RAF are delivered in Evill’s 
conclusion, which stated: 
Boys from the higher grade schools, whether due to hereditary or training, 
have in particular valuable qualities which the Service must still seek, and it 
seems the answer to the question at the end of para. (2) is that we must still 
seek to maintain a high proportion of these boys at Cranwell. (Emphasis 
added)66 
 
Evill’s report made clear that the RAF accepted and recognised the technical limitations of 
cadets emerging from public schools. This echoes the Army’s and CME’s willingness to 
accept the lack of scientific education prevalent in officers joining in the Victorian and 
Edwardian period in favour of the more balanced pre-service education provided by public 
schools. Valued by the RAF, which believed technical skills could be easily taught, public 
schools placed greater importance on character and leadership qualities that mirrored 
conceptions found in AP1300.  
 
4.3 The Public School Experience 
Clearly, the RAF viewed public schools as important; thus, it is useful to contextualise this 
shared experience to understand what officers might have taken from it. Recollections are 
replete with thoughts about the importance of public schools; for example, Willock recalled 
the advantages of his time at Marlborough:  
the good friends I made, the understanding of leadership and sportsmanship 
and the end product of becoming an O.M. (Old Marlburian), which in itself 
has been a magical password and an invaluable open sesame to me in my 
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career. There are some people who resent and ridicule the Old School Tie, but 
I am proud of it.67 
 
Willock’s recollection highlights three key aspects of the public school experience: an 
understanding of leadership through the curriculum and extra-curricular activities, the 
feeling of membership and socialisation, and team sports. Analysed below, it is worth 
noting here that the latter reinforced the former by amplifying lessons learnt in class. 
Placed into Melvill House under Housemaster Percy Latham at Haileybury, Leigh-Mallory 
began his public school experience in 1906.68 Dunn noted that during his time at 
Haileybury, Leigh-Mallory developed self-confidence, initiative and even a glimpse of 
leadership.69 This contrasts with Latham’s own final evaluation: 
He is a good straight fellow and could have a good influence but it is doubtful 
whether he has ‘guts’ to use it.  I should say spoilt at home.  He is too self-
centred. Too easy going. There is no doubt that he has a pleasing manner and 
presence which he might use to advance in life but he is self-centred and 
conceited and has little notion of making his life of value to others. Aim is 
having a good time and taking a good place in society.70 
 
Treated with care, neither recollection actually criticised Leigh-Mallory’s academic ability, 
which continued to develop with the award of a History Exhibition to go to Magdalene 
College, University of Cambridge. Furthermore, Latham’s view illustrates some positive 
aspects, his criticism actually focused on Leigh-Mallory’s home life, and given Dunn’s 
description of this and his parents role, it appears that little structure existed.71 However, 
while this analysis is open to question, it does appear that Leigh-Mallory made every 
attempt to take in the public school experience, and, while linked to personal development 
and maturity, Latham’s criticism should be read with this consideration in mind rather than 
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as an outright critique of his character. Leigh-Mallory’s subsequent rise to senior leadership 
in the RAF suggests that if Latham’s critique of being ‘too easy going’ was accurate in 1910, 
then, as subsequent chapters illustrate, Leigh-Mallory did at least apply himself to his 
chosen profession. Interestingly, according to Dunn, Leigh-Mallory’s family felt that he had 
exhibited signs of idleness.72 Additionally, the criticism of being ‘conceited’ might have 
some truth in it; for example, Douglas recorded in Years of Command that, Leigh-Mallory’s 
‘strong personality led him to be somewhat self-opinionated’, and, that, ‘[s]ome found him 
arrogant’73 Despite having determination, it seems that this character flaw was never fully 
managed, as his dealing with the Americans and some RAF officers during the planning 
and conduct of OVERLORD illustrates. However, as his operational diary from 1944 
recollected, Leigh-Mallory was aware of the challenges of his position and personality.74  
Returning to Willock’s assertion concerning ‘the understanding of leadership’, this 
statement raises the question of what pupils were taught. Imbued with Arnoldian values of 
the ‘Christian gentleman’, by the mid-nineteenth century, public schools stressed: 
personal endurance, self-reliance, an unquestioned devotion to ‘duty’, and the 
ability to administer justice, or punishment.75  
 
The ideal of the ‘Christian gentleman’ was underpinned by the concept of muscular 
Christianity, which linked piety to physical health through participation in sport, which was 
a key aspect of leader development. Muscular Christianity was a key theme in Thomas 
Hughes’ book Tom Brown’s Schooldays as well as Charles Kingsley’s Westward Ho!; these 
books popularised the importance of public schools and aspects of its curricula, like sports, 
which were deemed to be important in developing leaders. Furthermore, from a leadership 
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perspective, and with links to the evolution of ‘Great Man’ theory, William Winn noted 
that Carlyle’s work on heroes influenced Kingsley and wrote: 
Kingsley introduced into literature the huge British hero who always fought 
victoriously and who spread the doctrines of the English Church.76 
 
This idea of civic duty was important in a curriculum that stressed concepts like courage, 
which also found their way into RAF leadership thinking. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, these ideals fused with social Darwinism, which led public schools to stress the 
importance of self-confidence and leadership.77 While the term social Darwinism was only 
used in a limited sense at this point, it is clear that a series of Darwinian ideals, based 
around the concept of survival of the fittest, emerged in the late-nineteenth century and, as 
Mangan noted, merged in a ‘precarious fusion’ with the views espoused by the ethic of the 
Christian Gentleman. Primarily, Mangan defined these as ‘imperial Darwinism’, the view 
that the white man had a God given right to rule and civilise other races, and ‘institutional 
Darwinism’, which involved ‘physical and psychological cultivation’, through public 
schools, of men to lead the empire.78 These ideals linked education to leadership, 
reinforced by masculinity, and aimed to produce leaders who would take on key roles in the 
middle to higher echelons of public institutions including the military. These values were of 
particular importance to those seeking military careers, as they further fitted with ideas like 
paternalism, which was prominent both in the armed services and in wider Victorian and 
Edwardian society.79 Furthermore, paternalism fitted with the views espoused in Cecil’s 
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1919 report on the character required of officers.80 Embedded in the Army, as both 
Sheffield and Christopher Moore-Bick illustrated, the transposition of ideas like 
paternalism demonstrated the amorphous nature of shared cultural practices between 
organisations and wider society.81 As with public schools more broadly, the RAF took the 
Army as its reference point concerning what it sought from its officer class due to the 
perception that it had a more balanced outlook towards leadership; however, this 
preference also helped reinforce class structures through the character of personnel 
recruited into the GD Branch. 
During the Edwardian period, public schools consisted of three classes, ‘Classics’, 
‘Modern’ and ‘Army’, which sought to develop leaders in related ways. The late-nineteenth 
century saw the emergence of ‘Army’ and ‘Modern’ classes that offered broader curricula 
with a greater focus on the sciences and mathematics, which was a response to the greater 
number of middle class students entering public schools and seeking professional careers.82 
By 1902, to specialise for the entry examinations, which included the use of crammers, 
prospective candidates for the military transferred to ‘Army’ classes aged 14.83 Joubert 
recalled that while in the Army Class at Harrow, he required a crammer for Woolwich’s 
entry examination as he had not been ‘working very hard’, despite his father paying for 
extra tuition.84 This was because of Joubert’s weakness in mathematics, a key element of 
Woolwich’s entry exam, and his over-involvement in sport. Mathematics was one area 
where public school curricula could have been improved, though this did not compensate 
for Joubert’s weakness in the subject, which he might have been covering for in his 
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autobiography. Crammers were people, or institutions, who provided intense coaching to 
help pupils pass entry examinations. They became an essential link between public schools 
and the Army but were also prevalent in other areas like supporting people taking the Civil 
Service examination. Colonel H.J. Graves, late 20th Hussars, noted the importance of 
crammers when lamenting what he considered the failure of the general education provided 
by public schools in 1892.85 As Evill’s 1931 report demonstrated, the lack of technical 
knowledge derived from an effective grounding in mathematics remained an issue 
subsumed by character and other ‘gentlemanly’ qualities.86  
Despite evolving slowly, public school curricula focused on two key areas of leader 
development: first, the teaching of classics, and second, the role of sport. In defence of 
public schools, A.A. Somerville, a Master of Eton, noted in an 1899 memorandum:  
We see the imperious and imperial necessity of developing every faculty, 
mental and bodily, in our future officers, in the most healthy and thorough 
way. Is the new system likely to fulfil this need? Why should the public schools 
be thwarted in their hitherto successful endeavour to send into the Army men, 
healthily trained, in mind by preparation for a reasonable literary test, hardened 
physically by constant outdoor exercise and, above all practised in leadership 
and management of their fellows during the last two or three years of their 
time at school?87 
 
This memorandum was produced on behalf of the Headmasters’ Conference and 
condemned the new regulation changes for the Militia examination. It formed part of the 
Headmasters’ Conference’s evidence provided to the Akers-Douglas Committee, which 
was created in 1902 to examine questions surrounding the perceived deficiencies in the 
education and training of Army officers in light of problems identified during the Second 
Boer War. Somerville attempted to defend the status quo in a system, which, while 
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providing education to future leaders, did show a sluggishness to evolve in key areas that 
might have made it more effective. Nevertheless, classics remained a key curriculum area, 
with the Headmasters’ Conference’s position on its importance reiterating the Clarendon 
Commission’s view that the subject supplied:  
the most graceful […] poetry, the finest eloquence, the deepest philosophy, the 
wisest historical writing.88  
 
Classics was perceived to develop the intellectual capacity and understanding necessary for 
gentlemen who would become leaders in their respective fields; a link reiterated in Cecil’s 
report and a view that persisted until the 1960s. The weakening of classics was, as 
McCulloch noted, a post-Second World War reaction to the ‘elitism of the nineteenth-
century public schools’.89 It was a shift from education for the ‘elite’ to that for the 
‘masses’.  
Willock, while noting that he did not enjoy studying classics, was certain that the 
subject imbued him with an ‘understanding of leadership’.90 In terms of intellectual ability, 
which does not automatically translate into effective leadership, because, as Adair noted, 
intelligence is reliant on experience, Douglas recalled that only the ‘brightest boys were 
picked out for the ‘Classical’ side’.91 Furthermore, the relationship, as noted by Longmore 
in 1939, between effective command, education and experience was a point accepted by 
the military.92 Douglas excelled in classics and earned a Classical Scholarship at Lincoln 
College, University of Oxford.93 Leigh-Mallory entered the Classical Side at Haileybury in 
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1906, though in his last year, he moved over to the Modern Side.94 Dunn suggested that 
early on, Leigh-Mallory did well in various subjects including mathematics, but he peaked 
in 1908.95 However, in his move to the Modern Side in 1910, Leigh-Mallory apparently did 
well in history, which presumably led to his attendance at the University of Cambridge.96 
Nevertheless, despite any of Leigh-Mallory’s potential academic limitations identified by his 
move to the Modern Side, classics reinforced perceived leadership qualities and traits like 
‘deference’, ‘respect’, ‘heroism’, ‘duty’, ‘honour’ and ‘sacrifice’, which, it was believed, a 
man should have, and mapped onto characteristics apparent in RAF writings.97 It remained 
up to individuals to translate these concepts as they developed professional experience that 
allowed them to apply them in appropriate circumstances. However, writers like Fuller 
noted the need for a ‘creative mind’ to deal with the complexity and ambiguity of strategic 
leadership challenges.98 It was perceived that the development of this mental capacity 
emerged during an officer's formative school years but would be reinforced through Staff 
College attendance. Ideas were introduced through works like Homer’s The Iliad and 
Cicero’s De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (On the Ends of Good and Bad Things). In The Iliad, 
heroism meant standing up for values, which governed society, and translated into the 
paternalism prevalent in Victorian and Edwardian Britain. Cicero’s work stressed civic duty, 
pride and willingness to sacrifice. From a military history perspective, pupils were likely to 
have read not only Plato, but also the works of Xenophon and Thucydides, which provided 
useful imagery for developing leaders and inculcating them with character, and reinforced 
responsibilities in a stratified society. As Christopher Kolenda noted, ‘The ancients […] 
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provide us a wealth of ideas about leadership that transcend time and context’.99 Kolenda 
argued that these works introduced readers to modern concepts like vision, which was a 
notable skill for effective senior leaders.100 Despite an increasingly diverse provision in the 
‘Army’ and ‘Modern’ classes, grounding in the classics remained a core element of all public 
school curricula.  
The study of history in Victorian and Edwardian Britain, with its focus on 
positivism – in historical terms, the idea that logical laws governed events – and empiricism 
– a focus on experience and evidence – reinforced much of what classics taught.101 With a 
focus on events and peoples of the period, positivism worked in parallel with the ‘Whig’ 
interpretation of progression prevalent in the nineteenth century, which included authors 
such as Carlyle. The ‘Whig’ school saw a logical progression from ‘the inferior to the 
superior’ and sought to develop lessons from the past, though it underestimated the 
‘differences between past and present’.102 Positivism was a view that fitted with the belief in 
British national spirit and the spread of its values around the world. However, nineteenth 
century British historians such as Lord Acton viewed themselves empiricists rather than 
positivists due to the rejection of its theoretical underpinnings, though, as Phillipa Levine 
asserted, this was an artificial distinction, as the former was based around a theory of 
‘detailed reconstruction’.103 This was significant because the Clarendon Commission 
suggested that history, in combination with classics, formed a key curriculum element.104 
This was arguably because the focus on ‘Great’ men and events illustrated characteristics 
desired by society in future leaders. Nevertheless, T. Miller Maguire, a noted crammer and 
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military historian, argued in evidence to the Akers-Douglas Committee that the study of 
modern history was ‘scandalously’ absent from public schools; however, while not 
modified since 1888, by 1912, Harrow School did offer history as a stand-alone subject in 
its higher classes.105  
Apart from the themes developed in the curriculum itself, extra-curricular activities 
reinforced leader development. These included, for example, being a prefect, participating 
in debating societies and being a member of the OTC. Viewed as an important element of 
the system, prefects: 
were selected to maintain discipline, promote uniformity and help to foster a 
moral and spiritual esprit de corps.106  
 
This was an important consideration for leader development, as it gave those who 
undertook the role experience of what was, in the context of public schools, a senior role 
amongst peers. Made a dormitory prefect in 1910 and then a college prefect in March of 
that year, presumably Leigh-Mallory illustrated some ability to be appointed to these 
positions, though it might have been that he ingratiated himself into the system.107 
However, the lack of archival evidence makes it difficult to assess Leigh-Mallory’s 
effectiveness beyond the view that his appointment stands in contrast to views, noted 
above, that he was idle. As the 1944 Fleming Report on ‘The Public Schools and the 
General Educational System’ noted, the role of prefects introduced pupils to 
responsibilities such as the welfare of their fellow pupils and ensured discipline amongst 
their cohort. Viewed as a ‘valuable contribution to society’, the Fleming Report 
recommended that other secondary institutions imitate public schools, and, from a military 
perspective, these ideas mapped to notions of morale, motivation and vertical unit 
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cohesion.108 Thus, from a young age, officers like Leigh-Mallory, Portal, Tedder and 
Douglas undertook this much sought after duty, which fostered their leadership abilities in 
the key area of responsibility.109 While Parker suggested that prefects held a power that 
could be misused, some pupils recognised the influence their responsibilities wielded.110 For 
example, one aspect of the role of prefects, ‘fragging’, received scant respect from these 
men. Douglas described it as: 
one aspect of public school life […] which I felt at all strongly and to which I 
really took exception, and that was corporal punishment. When I became a 
prefect I firmly declined to have anything to do with it. I felt then, as I do now, 
that corporal punishment brutalises those who administer it, and that it stirs up 
in the person upon whom it is inflicted too strong a feeling of resentment.111 
 
This progressive attitude formed a firm basis for the leadership styles of these officers.  
Debating societies developed cognitive faculties as well as promoting self-
confidence. Specifically, they reinforced participants’ ability to discuss and consider 
opinions before coming to measured conclusions, an important generic skill for senior 
leaders who had to manage a wide variety of information when handling complex 
problems. This would, as Chapter Seven explores, be further reinforced by staff duties as a 
key job assignment. Dunn noted Leigh-Mallory’s participation in a debate on morality, 
while Harris’ obituary recorded that he took part in several debates concerning themes like 
compulsory military training and stag hunting. Probert noted that this played a role in his 
development as he displayed maturity and self-reliance beyond his years.112 Compared to 
Dudley Saward’s biography of Harris, Probert’s work is grounded in not only personal 
papers, but also operational files to provide context, and he was willing to be critical of his 
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subject.113 For example, in concluding his biography, Probert, who retired as an AC in the 
Educational Branch of the RAF and then served as Head of the AHB, noted that there was 
‘truth in such criticism’ related to Harris’ self-confident leadership style and the friction it 
created.114 Nevertheless, Harris’ self-confidence did aid him when holding operational 
command and in handling the Air Ministry at various points during his career.  
 
4.4 The Role of Team Sports  
A key element of the public school experience that developed leadership skills was 
participation in sport; in particular, team events. This emerged from the concept of 
muscular Christianity, and, despite Parker’s teleological overstatement that sport did not 
develop moral leadership or patriotism, contemporaries in both wider society and the 
military viewed it as doing so, and participation was part of this pedagogical process.115 
Both Mangan and Sheffield highlighted the importance that athleticism played in Victorian 
and Edwardian public schools in general and the impact it had on the development of 
Army leadership in particular.116 However, this thesis prefers the term ‘team sports’ rather 
than the more readily accepted adjective ‘athleticism’, which evokes imagery of athletics 
and individual events. This is inappropriate from a leadership perspective; it was 
participation in a team that mattered as suitable leadership skills emerged like working 
together, getting the best out of colleagues and decision-making. While examining the role 
of sport in the British military, Mason and Reidi suggested four key areas of analysis, 
including preparation for war, the development of esprit de corps, use as a recruitment tool, 
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and as an instrument for developing relations with broader society.117 Transplanted onto 
the RAF’s future officer class, the former two issues were important to the organisation, as 
officers regularly participated in sports in some form at public school. It is here that 
cultural osmosis existed between practices within and outside the military. Believed to build 
an ethos of patriotism, self-confidence, courage, obedience, fair play and leadership skills, 
sport was an aspect of public school life that also filtered into broader Victorian and 
Edwardian society.118 As Campbell showed concerning physical culture in the Army, sport 
was the means to foster, maintain and channel aggression and develop a feeling of team 
spirit that affected decision-making abilities.119 While a clear tension existed between the 
perception of sport being ‘mimic war’ and the reality of combat, which was not replicated 
on public school playing fields that stressed fair play, it was the ephemeral concept and 
belief in spirit, morale and identity that paralleled military considerations concerning the 
maintenance of cohesion.120 By understanding the significance of these concepts in a 
civilian sense, it was not a leap of faith to apply it to the martial arena because, as Sheffield 
noted, military leadership is not just about combat, but included aspects such as training 
where these ideas also had relevance.121 In addition, the codification of team sports, notably 
rugby and football, in the late-nineteenth century introduced future officers to rules and 
regulations that formed the basis of command cultures and processes.122 The predilection 
for sport in public schools might have produced traits deemed necessary for effective 
leadership, but participation could have potentially damaging effects. In his autobiography, 
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Joubert recalled his belief that he could have become a member of Harrow’s first Cricket 
XI, which almost damaged his chances of entering Woolwich as he lacked focus 
concerning his academic studies. As already noted, Joubert required a crammer order to 
pass the exam at his second attempt.123 Despite Joubert’s experience, the public school 
proclivity for sport diffused into the lower stratification of the education system, with 
grammar schools and state-funded institutions imitating them.124 Used as a training tool, 
more significant is the fact that this sporting ethos was prevalent in cadet establishments; 
for example, Evill excelled at games during his time at Britannia.125  
Sport remained central to the RAF as it developed. Transformed into the Royal Air 
Force Officers’ Sport Fund in 1918, as early as 1912, the RFC formed a Central Mess Fund 
for officers to coordinate and ‘promote all forms of sport and recreation’, with the stated 
aim of fostering espirit de corps.126 As Chapter One noted, spirit was a key element of RAF 
views on leadership, and, given the Service’s predilection for public school educated 
recruits, it is here that a relationship emerges among this concept, doctrine and sport. 
Underpinned by fostering competition, which occurred on public school playing fields, it is 
not straining verity to suggest that one origin for the RAF’s most basic belief, ‘Command 
of the Air’, in part, emerged from this source. In an undated paper relating to the RFC 
Athletic Association’s formation in 1917, the planned objectives were to foster the 
‘OFFESIVE SPIRIT & ESPIRIT DE CORPS’ (emphasis in original) necessary to create a 
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physical culture commensurate with the offensively minded RFC.127 Seen by the RAF to 
develop the faculties desired from officers, team sports fostered discipline, team spirit, 
efficiency and group cohesion through controlled competitive activities, with cricket 
singled out as creating the right ethos of ‘playing for the side’.128 Sport was deemed of such 
importance that, on the announcement of the formation in late 1917 of the RAF, GOC, 
Training Division RFC, MajGen Charles Longcroft, suggested that gymnastic staffs were 
required to provide effective physical training for future trainee officers; on 1 June 1918, 
the Physical Training Branch of the RAF formed.129 Furthermore, as Trenchard noted in a 
letter to Sir Charles Wakefield, who donated two trophies for boxing competitions between 
units, such activities helped build traditions, or culture, as well as fostering friendly rivalry 
that it was perceived would lead to greater efficiency.130  
Sport was also the shared experience for officers emanating from public schools. 
They all participated in some form of sporting activity, which developed necessary skills. 
Leigh-Mallory’s own experience consisted of playing in Melville House’s Rugby XV and 
Cricket XI. In addition, Leigh-Mallory, ‘very anxious to keep fit’, was a prominent gymnast 
and represented Haileybury in shooting in the College VIII.131 Given that Leigh-Mallory 
excelled in an individual sport, it is tempting to suggest that this influenced his subsequent 
leadership performance. This misses the point that, like so many of his peers, Leigh-
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Mallory took part in games, worked as a team player and developed a spirit, based on 
gentlemanly concepts, that permeated the social context from which he emerged. By 
excelling in individual events for his house, Leigh-Mallory was involved in the broader 
permeation of team spirit in this context by ‘playing the game’. Of Leigh-Mallory’s peers, 
Portal was a member of the first Cricket XI at Winchester, and Richards noted that he also 
held an interest in hawking and excelled at football and fencing.132 Tedder and Mitchell 
were keen rugby players, with the former playing two seasons in Whitgift School’s first 
Rugby XV, while the latter was a member of Wellington’s first XV.133 Orange noted that 
Tedder took part in cross-country activities, while Owen suggested that cricket was not a 
sport of choice.134 Other noted contemporaries of Leigh-Mallory also enjoyed taking part in 
sport. Not all excelled at sport; Probert noted that Harris played for both Allhallows’ 
Rugby XV and Hockey XI, though the teams themselves did not perform well, with the 
rugby team losing 156-0 to a team from Dartmouth.135 Douglas lamented in his 
autobiography that he had wanted to be good at cricket but was not able enough and took 
up rowing instead.136 It is significant that many officers recalled their enjoyment of sport 
and the sporting prowess of their peers, which had repercussions for leadership abilities. 
 
4.5 The Royal Air Force and the Officer Training Corps 
Another key shared experience was OTC participation. On 25 February 1907, in a debate 
over the Army estimates in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for War, 
Richard Haldane, announced the OTC’s formation to provide ‘a very substantial addition 
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to the number officers which we have got at the present time’.137 A War Office committee 
created the scheme under the chair of the Permanent Under Secretary of State for War, 
Colonel Sir Edward Ward, and formal notice of the OTC’s formation came in a Special 
Army Order on 16 March 1908 that stated: 
The object of this Corps is to provide students at schools and universities with 
a standardized measure of elementary military training, with a view to their 
eventually becoming Special Reserve or Territorial Officers.138   
 
While the OTC sought to provide a body of trained officers embedded with standardised 
training and military ethos, it failed to provide the numbers expected before the expansion 
of the Army during the First World War.139 The OTC consisted of Junior and Senior 
Divisions, with the former existing in public schools while the latter formed contingents at 
universities, which included artillery and cavalry sections besides infantry. Cadets who 
passed the Certificate ‘A’ and ‘B’ qualifications received exemption from four or eight 
months’ training respectively in the Special Reserve, while holders of the former received 
200 marks towards the Civil Service Examination for entry into Sandhurst or Woolwich.140 
By 1914, there were 23 OTC units at universities and 166 at schools. The formation of the 
OTC formalised an amateur tradition of volunteer rifle corps at public schools and 
universities that dated back to the 1860s. Haileybury’s own Rifle Corps formed in 1887 and 
included Clement Attlee, Prime Minster from 1945 to 1951, amongst its members.141 These 
units emerged after the French invasion scares of the 1850s, and, by 1899, there were 36 
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cadet corps and six cadet battalions.142 According to Sheffield, this figure increased to ‘eight 
cadet battalions, three Rifle Volunteer Battalions and 152 cadet corps or companies’ by 
1907.143 This formalisation, as well as other parts of the wider reforms enacted by Haldane, 
was driven by influences like debate over national efficiency and conscription to strengthen 
the Army after the Second Boer War. Haldane’s preference for the reform of the volunteer 
reserve rather than an expansion of the Army derived from Britain’s preference for a small 
standing military. Ian Beckett conceptualised this as part of an on-going amateur military 
tradition.144 In addition, underpinning these debates was the invasion scare literature, which 
was used to great effect by organisations like the National Service League.145 
Apart from its place in Haldane’s reforms, the historiography of the OTC focuses 
on two primary aspects. From the perspective of social and educational history, Best placed 
the OTC into the context of growing militarism in Victorian and Edwardian public schools 
by describing their relationship with the volunteer cadet corps and the OTC.146 In the 
military sphere, both sociologists and historians have examined the OTC’s significance by 
placing them in terms of military experience and socialisation. Otley stressed the OTC’s 
statistical importance for the Army concerning officers’ educational background, while Ian 
Worthington’s study into officer recruitment discussed the significance of socialisation as 
                                                          
142 Ian F.W. Beckett, Rifleman Form: A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement, 1859-1908 (Barnsley: Pen and 
Sword, 2007 [1982]), p. 109. 
143 Sheffield, ‘Officer-Man Relations’, p. 106. 
144 Ian F.W. Beckett, Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers: The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558-1945 (Barnsley: Pen and 
Sword, 2011 [1991]), pp. 197-224. This idea has gained limited credence in air power history, though for one 
exception, see: Michael Paris, ‘The Amateur Military Tradition: Further Considerations – the Air Volunteers, 
1909–1914’, The RUSI Journal, 138(1) (1993), pp. 53-4. 
145 R.J.Q. Adams, ‘The National Service League and Mandatory Service in Edwardian Britain’, AFS, 12(1) 
(1985), pp. 53-74; A. Michael Martin, ‘The Creativity of War Planners: Armed Forces Professionals and the 
Pre-1914 British Invasion-Scare Genre’, ELH, 78 (4) (2011), pp. 801-11. On the role of the media, see: Glenn 
Wilkinson, ‘‘The Blessings of War’: The Depiction of Military Force in Edwardian Newspapers, JCH, 33(1) 
(1998), pp. 97-115. Air power played an important role in much of this literature, see: Biddle, Rhetoric and 
Reality, pp. 11-20; Michael Paris, Winged Warfare: The Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain, 1859-1917 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 
146 Best, ‘Militarism and the Victorian Public School’, pp. 136-7. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Social Origins, Pre-Service Education and the Development of Leaders Page 181 
 
part of the officer recruitment process, which emerged after the Corps’ formation.147 More 
recently, Sheffield developed this understanding by examining the relationship between 
militarism, socialisation and public schools in the context of the Army’s understanding of 
leadership and the development of ideas like paternalism and deference.148 
Otley’s study into militarisation in public schools suggested that on the eve of the 
First World War, 79 per cent of all public schools had an OTC unit.149 While, as Sheffield 
concedes, the description used to link OTC units to ‘public schools’ was weak at best, in 
the First World War’s early phase, those with this form of experience were coveted by the 
expanding Army.150 Volunteers with OTC experience readily received commissions, though 
the Clarendon schools only accounted for 13 per cent of commissions.151 In 1914, officer 
recruitment stressed OTC experience, and Army Form B. 201, used for the appointment of 
officers to commissions in the Special Reserve, requested information on past military 
experience that included service in the Corps.152 From 1916 onwards, the formation of 
Officer Cadet Battalions to train wartime officers maintained the OTC’s ethos. Many 
Officer Cadet Battalions were located in universities, and, while a general broadening of the 
officer corps occurred, these units undertook social conditioning to raise the perceived 
quality of men promoted from the ranks.153 
The OTC was a source for RAF senior leaders. While aspects of training and 
motivation for joining are examined in subsequent chapters, 34 per cent of officers, 
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including Leigh-Mallory, from Appendix Four had some OTC experience.154 Reaffirmed in 
the reforms of the volunteer force that led to the Territorial Force’s formation in 1908, 
Leigh-Mallory’s housemaster, Latham, was a Captain in the OTC and would have been a 
key influence, in addition to peer pressure, in his decision to become a member.155 This 
experience developed some basic knowledge of military service that could be useful to 
future senior leaders who were exposed to it. The figure quoted above is distorted by two 
factors. First, it includes those who joined the RN and Army pre-First World War. Second, 
it also embraces those too old to have joined the OTC, as it only emerged in 1908. For 
example, born in 1882, Burnett was too old for OTC service.156 In addition, some future 
officers who had already chosen to volunteer for the military did not join the OTC. 
Separated out, with only volunteers who joined the military in 1914 and 1915 considered, 
this figure increases to 53 per cent.  
The OTC developed two aspects of military skills and leadership knowledge that 
were potentially useful to officers in their future careers. First, it introduced students to 
military training through skills development that produced the requisite knowledge and 
provided influence at an early age. While developing a sense of uniformity and obedience in 
subordinates, the early experience of drill in the OTC also reinforced the need for cohesion 
and commonality in small units that were outgrowths of effective leadership at this level. 
As Anthony King suggested, drill generated ritualised practices that developed group 
cohesion; however, he has been criticised for focusing too narrowly on functional 
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structures without taking account of broader social and cultural factors.157 Furthermore, as 
Kirke noted, some of King’s research derived generalised conclusions from the study of a 
specific organisation, the Royal Marines.158 Nevertheless, drill’s importance in instilling 
widely held leadership values like ‘discipline’, ‘resolution’, ‘comradeship’ and ‘esprit-de-corps’ 
mirrored those espoused in publications like AP1300 and military journals.159 Given this 
context, OTC experience gave some officers, based on the views of the time, some 
advantage over other volunteers in 1914/15. In Years of Combat, Douglas, who served in 
both the OTC’s Junior and Senior Divisions, recollected the utility of this experience when 
he noted: 
We who had learnt our drill at the University OTC’s were the only ones who 
were at all competent to handle the eighteen-pounder which we were going to 
use.160  
 
This passage related to his early service in 1914 with the Royal Field Artillery’s No. 1 
Depot in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Douglas continued that this experience led him to be 
involved in the instruction of both officers and gunners, including his Commanding 
Officer (CO); Douglas served in the artillery section of his OTC contingent. Exposed to 
the rigours of military life through annual summer camps, these men’s socialisation, 
acclimatisation and adaptation to military life became easier as they were further introduced 
to discipline and comradeship, which were part of the wider public school experience. In 
this respect, this was a complimentary element between these experiences. Exposure to 
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issues like cohesion, even in its basic sense, also allowed officers who served in the OTC to 
develop an understanding of leadership, which presumably remained with them and was 
seen as valuable when men, such as Leigh-Mallory, volunteered in 1914 and 1915. As a 
WgCr in 1925, Leigh-Mallory reflected on the importance of cohesion based on his service 
in the trenches in 1915 in his Staff College reflective essay.161  
Recognising that contingency played a role in this experience, many men did not 
join the OTC to pursue military careers or join the reserves as intended by Haldane; thus, 
the application of this knowledge during the First World War and in their subsequent 
careers was of secondary effect. Willock recalled that he joined Marlborough’s OTC 
contingent ‘just for the fun of it’, as he did not expect to join the Army.162 Conversely, 
Playfair did not join, as he was a member of the Army Class at Cheltenham College and 
had already chosen the Army as a career; therefore, he thought that he did not want to 
‘rush [his] fences, but wait until the time arrived’.163 From a leadership perspective, OTC 
service reinforced, complemented and paralleled key themes found in public school 
classrooms and the sport playing fields, which, it should be recognised, would have been 
applicable to the careers that these would have undertaken had the First World War not 
interfered with their career paths. Specifically, the OTC played a role in moulding the 
character of students by encouraging leadership concepts like duty and responsibility 
through active engagement with aspects of military life. Owen, in his 1952 biography of 
Tedder, makes much of the effect that OTC service had on the latter’s life, noting that, 
despite being an ‘introvert’, he was ‘unusually keen on the OTC’.164 In 1976, Hew Strachan, 
based on Owen’s biography, cited Tedder’s experience in his history of Cambridge’s OTC 
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contingent and noted that service in the Corps was an ‘inspiring addition to the formula of 
athletics for the body and education for the mind’.165 This supports the view that a complex 
interplay of a classical curriculum, sport and the mechanism of the OTC provided the 
ethos necessary to provide the British military with the raw material needed to lead it at the 
tactical level. Despite not actively seeking a military career, Tedder took his duty seriously, 
and this filtered into his later career; in the University of Cambridge’s OTC Senior 
Division, Tedder eventually rose to be a Scout Corporal and college commander for 
Magdalene College.166 However, as Bowman and Connelly noted, the quality of OTC 
contingents, and the military experience of the officers attached to them, varied greatly.167 
Thus, there was a lack of uniformity in the experience that future senior officers received, 
which makes it difficult to assess the overall influence that the OTC had on officers 
beyond the recognition that some, like Douglas, recalled their experience in positive terms. 
For the RAF, the importance of these themes coalesced after the First World War, 
as the OTC remained significant to the pre-service development of its future leaders. 
Furthermore, two schemes emerged with their antecedent in the OTC, and SL Leigh-
Mallory, SD3 in the Directorate of Organisation and Staff Duties, charted their importance 
in a letter to the University of Cambridge’s Vice-Chancellor on 6 September 1924.168 Key 
reasons included the need to increase the number of entrants into the RAF as well as 
building up a reserve of pilots. Related to this was the issue of the perception of the RAF at 
this time and the need to develop air-mindedness amongst the population, which 
underpinned the Service’s belief in ‘Command of the Air’. These processes sought to 
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strengthen the RAF’s association with educational establishments that provided recruits by 
encouraging this development. First, as noted above, the RAF fostered relations with 
public schools deemed to provide candidates with the right character for military service. It 
was with the OTC contingent that these liaison officers coordinated their relationship with 
selected schools. ‘Air platoons’ were originally envisioned; however, financial stringency led 
to the adoption of the liaison scheme.169 Under this scheme, the RAF exposed members of 
the OTC to service life through lectures and visits to bases during their summer camps.170 
By 1938, the OTC had formed Air Sections for those students who had completed their 
Certificate ‘A’ qualification.171 Second, despite challenges at an institutional level, the 
Universities of Oxford and Cambridge formed the first two University Air Squadrons in 
1925.172 In a 1929 RUSI lecture, WgCr Arthur Garrod, then Chief Flying Instructor at the 
Cambridge University Air Squadron, outlined the need for, and the success of, these units 
in fostering the ‘Air Force Spirit’. As the AHB narrative noted: 
All these needs were achieved, and graduates were encouraged, through the 
University Air Squadrons, to take up a career in the Royal Air Force.173 
 
Established for Sandhurst and Woolwich, the RAF maintained the pattern of awarding 
marks to members of the OTC when undertaking the Civil Service Examination for entry 
to Cranwell; those from the Senior Division were entitled to an additional 400 marks.174 
The Air Council considered a declaration of ‘efficiency’ from the OTC as part of the 
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nomination process to a Cadetship at Cranwell.175 For this purpose, Air Ministry Form 538 
established a series of qualitative metrics for measuring efficiency, which included whether 
a candidate had worked ‘hard’ while an OTC member.  
 
4.6 University Education and the Royal Air Force 
Despite its technical nature, the RAF held a definite view of what it wanted from its 
permanent officers. In general, the RAF sought candidates that it could mould to its culture 
through the mechanism of Cranwell; however, this did not mean that the Service ignored 
the value of having officers with a university background. Early editions of AP904, 
regulations covering university entrants for Permanent Commission, preferred nominated 
students to have a degree in engineering, general or aeronautical, or a qualification in 
physics or mathematics.176 This policy emerged as early as 1919 when the Deputy DoT, 
Colonel Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, stated in a section concerning training permanent officers 
in notes prepared for the Secretary of States for War and Air: 
It is proposed to open this door rather more widely than is the case in the 
Army, mainly with a view to the inclusion of engineering and science pupils 
whose education has throughout been directed towards these vocations.177  
 
Primarily, the RAF hoped to entice technical students from university with an interest in 
aviation to consider a career to reinforce entrants from Cranwell. This is where a key 
difference splits between those officers considered in this thesis with those recruited after 
1920. Specifically, officers like Leigh-Mallory, who attended Magdalene College, University 
of Cambridge between 1911 and 1914, undertook liberal arts degrees; Leigh-Mallory 
graduated with a Third in History and a Third in Law. As Chapter Three explored, 35 per 
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cent of officers from Appendix Four who reached Air Rank in 1939 had undertaken a 
university education. This compares well to the figure for 1929, when 16 per cent of 
officers with Permanent Commissions came from universities.178 However, there was a 
shift in RAF policy, as Permanent Under-Secretary to the Air Ministry, C.B. Bullock, 
outlined in a letter to the Vice-Chancellor of the University of London on 7 March 1933.179  
It stated that only three permanent commissions from an engineering background would 
be guaranteed to the 15 awarded to university candidates, thus recognising the need for 
officers with wider knowledge. This was driven by several factors, including the recognition 
that technical skills could be taught to those who chose to specialise in engineering after 
their first five years as well as a need to avoid limiting officers to their specialism and giving 
them a fair chance of reaching senior command. Nevertheless, despite this shift, and 
recognising the potential utility of other degrees, the number of two-star officers and above 
with a university background in 1939 stood at 17 per cent, which was still smaller than that 
which emerged into the post-First World War RAF.180 However, while the RAF showed a 
preference for engineering degrees, many officers with such qualifications would have 
emerged through an education system that would have introduced pupils to leadership 
concepts, through subjects such as classics, which the Service valued.   
In pedagogical terms, degrees that officers like Leigh-Mallory, Douglas, Portal and 
Tedder undertook had transferable skills that underpinned their development. In a modern 
sense, their courses introduced them to writing, research, analysis, self-management, 
teamwork and communication skills that were central to effective leadership. Given these 
officers later experience of military education, these skills should have stood them in good 
stead to excel in areas like staff duties, which had repercussions for succession planning 
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and their career trajectories. Tasked to produce reports and memoranda, staff officers 
required the ability to write, research and analyse various questions ranging from the 
development of doctrine to personnel issues. While easy to overstate, as academic ability 
does not automatically translate into operational competency, this sub-group certainly had 
the skills to support their development as leaders in the RAF. It was also perceived that 
university attendance also reinforced abilities developed in public schools. For example, 
despite showing a troubling and tiresome attitude towards his studies at Magdalene College 
at the University of Cambridge, Tedder had academic ability.181 Based on research 
undertaken in his fourth year and cited to this day, in 1916, Tedder published a history of 
the RN in the restoration era of Charles II.182 His key tutor at Magdalene, A.C. Benson, 
recalled that Tedder was ‘cautious in statement’ but had ‘independence of judgement’.183 
This judgement would work well for him as he rose through the ranks. Although he was 
senior by one year, Tedder was Leigh-Mallory’s contemporary at Magdalene, and their 
socialisation offers an insight into their respective abilities. In his wartime memoirs With 
Prejudice, Tedder made no link between his and Leigh-Mallory’s shared experience, and 
Orange claimed that ‘Tedder had disliked him since their undergraduate days at 
Cambridge’.184 This is a tendentious claim based on Orange’s teleological analysis of their 
Second World War relationship, and one for which he provides no evidence. Orange 
actually admitted that the prestigious Kingsley Club at Magdalene inducted both Leigh-
Mallory and Tedder into its ranks on the same day in October 1912; therefore, they knew 
                                                          
181 On Tedder’s time at Cambridge, see: Orange, Tedder, pp. 7-12. 
182 Arthur William Tedder, The Navy of the Restoration from the Death of Cromwell to the Treaty of Breda: Its Work, 
Growth and Influence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1916). Republished by CUP in 2010, Tedder’s 
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Restoration Navy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
183 Cited in Orange, Tedder, p. 9. 
184 Orange, Tedder, p. 15; Vincent Orange, ‘Arthur Tedder and the Transportation Plans’ in John Buckley 
(ed.), The Normandy Campaign, 1944: Sixty Years On (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 150. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Social Origins, Pre-Service Education and the Development of Leaders Page 190 
 
one another. However, there is little evidence regarding how this relationship developed at 
university.185 More tellingly, Orange noted that the Kingsley Club, founded by Benson in 
honour of Charles Kingsley, Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge and 
described as ‘an exciting teacher’, was the preserve of the college’s ‘intellectual elite’, thus 
suggesting that both Leigh-Mallory and Tedder were well regarded by their tutors.186 
Recorded in hyperbolic terms as having an influence that ‘helped to build the new society 
there of the 1920s and 30s’ due to ‘his presence, his generosity and his encouragement’, 
Benson undoubtedly had an influence on Tedder’s and Leigh-Mallory’s outlook and 
development.187 Additionally, the aim of attending university in this period was not 
specifically to gain an honours degree, but to socialise and network with key peers and 
emerge with a pass BA; thus, this key social activity was just as important as academic 
development. As Douglas recalled, university attendance ‘was the socially desirable thing to 
do’ because it was seen as finishing the process begun at public school.188 While only 
attending the University of Oxford for a year, Douglas, in Years of Combat, provided a useful 
overview of its importance beyond academic aspects. Douglas recalled the importance of 
the atmosphere at Oxford as being the key to the development of his political outlook; as a 
peer, he sat on the Labour benches in the House of Lords. Douglas stressed that the 
atmosphere generated in the ‘elite’ universities allowed him to mature in a convivial 
environment designed to foster moral leadership and stress concepts of duty and respect.189 
Despite challenges in the late-nineteenth century, the ‘elite’ universities allowed for the 
continued process of education for leadership established in public schools. The military 
                                                          
185 Dunn, Big Wing, p. 15; Orange, Tedder, p. 15. 
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(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 258. 
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University of Cambridge, 1993), p. 49. 
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The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Social Origins, Pre-Service Education and the Development of Leaders Page 191 
 
valued these due to the perceived relationship between the processes, noted elsewhere, that 
allowed for personal development, knowledge, and skills that supported officers abilities. 
 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted some of the key pre-service practices that emerged for the 
senior officer class of the RAF of the Second World War. Diverging from the experience 
of the Army and RN in terms of social origins, though Leigh-Mallory’s own background 
mapped closely to those of the other services, the RAF moved to more broadly represent 
the changing character of the British class system. However, the RAF followed the Army’s 
preference for officers with public school backgrounds, as the ethos that these institutions 
developed provided men with the right character that fitted with the Service’s heroic 
paradigm concerning leadership. By accepting that technical knowledge could be taught, as 
highlighted by Evill’s 1931 report, the RAF aimed to recruit officers who had developed 
‘natural’ leadership abilities through the interaction of a classical education, sports and 
OTC experience. These factors then found outgrowths in the RAF as it sought to define 
what it wanted from officers and the best methods to recruit them. While continuity 
between the Army and RAF existed, it is worth reiterating the contingent nature of these 
factors on the officers considered in this thesis. As noted, not all of these men sought 
military careers. Concerning university education as an example, with the exception of AM 
Sir Ernest Gossage, who attended the University of Cambridge and was commissioned into 
the Royal Artillery on 19 July 1912, each of these men either had, or were about to embark 
on, careers. As noted, Leigh-Mallory pondered entering the legal profession in 1914, while, 
post-war, some, as Douglas did, briefly left the RAF. 
Chapter Five 
Leadership and Officer Training in the Army and Royal Navy and their Air Arms 
 
In a thesis that examines an RAF officer’s leadership development, it might appear counter 
intuitive that this chapter focuses on training in the Army and RN. However, given that a 
third of the officers in Appendix Three served in the British military pre-First World War, 
clearly these men emerged from the training systems of the Army and RN; the rest, like 
Leigh-Mallory, were wartime volunteers in the Army. Examining Army and RN training 
methods highlights the disparate nature of the development of RAF officers who emerged 
as senior leaders by 1939. However, while training developed competencies required as the 
basis for leadership development, the diverse background of the prosopography population 
raises questions about the influence initial training had on these officers and the challenge 
of correlating patterns from the data in Appendix Three. Nevertheless, flying training was 
an important element of this experience, as it developed a shared identity, related to flying, 
in the RFC and RNAS that filtered into the professional ethos of the RAF and provided 
the operational context to Leigh-Mallory’s career. However, even this was a challenge, 
because, as Chart 2.1 illustrated, 30 per cent of officers were not classified as heavier-than-
air pilots in 1919, thus there was even some discord in this experience. Nonetheless, even 
this is problematic as these branch designations were representative of current duties rather 
than operational backgrounds. 
This chapter examines the training and promotions procedures of the Army and 
RN up to 1916, as by this point, all officers in Appendix Three were members of the 
British military. Leigh-Mallory’s own experience of training occurred as a Private in the 
10th (Territorial) Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regiment (The Liverpool Scottish) before 
transferring to the 4th (Special Reserve) Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers as an officer. It was 
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with the latter unit that Private Leigh-Mallory undertook basic training. Helen McCartney 
described this unit as a ‘Cuff and Collar’ battalion because the Liverpool Scottish recruited 
from the middle and upper classes before the First World War.1 The Liverpool Scottish 
maintained much of its social exclusivity during the First World War, which, in part, given 
his background, explains why Leigh-Mallory volunteered as a Private in this unit.2 This 
chapter then examines flying training in the RFC and RNAS up to 1916. Leigh-Mallory’s 
own experience began as an observer at No. 1 School of Aeronautics before graduating as 
a pilot through the Central Flying School (CFS). The experience of his various peers 
illustrates the discordant nature of training in the nascent air arms, though significant 
changes occurred after 1916.  
An enduring debate remains over the pedagogical purpose of training and 
education, which relates to the difference between leader and leadership development. As 
related to leadership development, training has largely been side-lined due to concerns that 
it relates, as Dennis Drew remarked, to a ‘checklist-dominated’ mentality that is drawn 
from the need to develop the skills-based competencies a professional requires.3 This is 
overly simplistic, and it ignores the importance of initial training and the influence it had in 
shaping officers outlook and professional identity. At institutions like Sandhurst, Woolwich 
and Britannia, education sits alongside training, though, arguably, the latter retains greater 
importance. Furthermore, as Jörg Muth suggested, initial training experiences inculcated 
officers with a ‘command culture’ that was derived from an organisation’s leadership 
                                                          
1 Helen McCartney, Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Soldiers, pp. 25-56. 
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preference.4 The tension between education and training in the military is represented by 
Harry Dickinson’s description of ‘Athens in Sparta’.5 Athens represents education, while 
Sparta characterises training, and the difference between the former and latter is based on 
these ancient societies philosophies related to youth development. As an organisation, 
training is, and remains, central to the RAF, as it promotes uniformity of purpose across 
new recruits while developing a sense of belonging; an important starting point for future 
leaders. However, due to the disparate sources of officer recruitment in the prosopography 
populations of Appendices Three and Four, this was missing amongst Leigh-Mallory and 
his peers. Thus, pilot ethos, which, from a training perspective, was developed during initial 
flying lessons, was of more importance to the group under examination, as it remained 
their shared experience throughout their careers. Nonetheless, effective training should be 
morally neutral and allow for the skills development necessary for military professionals to 
undertake their core missions while developing task competencies, decision-making and 
communication abilities at an early stage in their careers. Significantly, military professionals 
are not educated to kill, but rather trained to, and it is the one activity that militaries spend 
much of their time in peace performing as units constantly seek to perfect skills and 
knowledge as well as integrating new methods and equipment.6 Even during high tempo 
operations in 1918, RFC/RAF squadrons spent a third of their time training and 
acclimatising new members with their respective duties in the unit. Skills that are developed 
have to be maintained to deliver fighting power, and, as both Edgar Jones and Bourke 
recognised, military training is the process through which civilians are psychologically 
                                                          
4 Jörg Muth, Command Culture: Officer Education in the US Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the 
consequences for World War II (Denton, TX: University of North Texas, 2011). 
5 Harry Dickinson, ‘Athens in Sparta: Making the Case for Naval Education – I’, TNR, 90(3) (2002), pp. 243-
8; Harry Dickinson, ‘Athens in Sparta: Making the Case for Naval Education – II’, TNR, 90(4) (2002), pp. 
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conditioned to deal with the process of killing.7 This is an important consideration when 
conceptualising Leigh-Mallory’s experience, as he was a civilian volunteer who was given 
military training to kill. Clearly, despite any association with the OTC, whose training 
regime was of variable quality, previous military experience was not typical. Furthermore, 
training also inculcated civilians with unit cohesion through the implementation of 
standardised techniques; however, in the context of the First World War, it is difficult to 
ascertain the effectiveness of this due to various entry routes and the diversity of methods 
used.8 These divergent entry methods raised questions over leadership development, as 
training in this context leaned towards value for the individual rather than what it delivered 
to the organisation; the RAF.  
 
5.1 Cadet Training in the British Army and Royal Navy 
As Chart 3.3 illustrated, 58 per cent of officers from Appendix Four had some form of pre-
war military experience. This experience split between amateur routes, like the Militia and 
RNVR, and regular paths through the cadet training establishments of the Army and RN. 
Formed in 1720 and 1802 respectively, Woolwich and Sandhurst were the cadet training 
institutions of the Army, while, by the outbreak of the First World War, the key training 
establishment for the RN, Britannia, consisted of Osborne and Dartmouth.9 Osborne 
opened in 1903 to unify entry routes into the RN through the Selborne Scheme, which was 
announced by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Selborne, in 1902 and sought to create 
                                                          
7 Edgar Jones, ‘The Psychology of Killing: The Combat Experience of British Soldiers during the First World 
War’, JCH, 41(2) (2006), p. 19; Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, p. 60. 
8 A key proponent of cohesion through military training is King, see: Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: 
Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
pp. 266-337.  
9 Britannia is used as an overarching term unless specifically discussing Osborne or Dartmouth. 
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‘homogenous training of Executive, Engineer, and Marine Officers’.10 Through the 
Selborne Scheme, RN recruits joined Osborne aged 13 for two years and then progressed 
to Dartmouth for a further two.11 Before this, future members of the Executive Branch 
entered Britannia, which was a hulk based on the River Dart, while engineers passed 
through Keyham.12 The plurality of these entry routes raises concerns over the 
professionalism of the Army and RN, especially in the former when failure to pass entry 
examinations led officers to enter through the ‘back door’ of the Militia; a method followed 
by Trenchard.13 ‘Amateur’ officers accounted for 16 per cent of future RAF senior leaders 
from Appendix Four. For example, Bowhill failed Britannia’s entry exam before attending 
the Thames Nautical Training College and entering the Merchant Marine.14 Bowhill then 
joined the RNVR and, after gaining his Royal Aero Club Aviator Certificate, was gazetted a 
Lieutenant on the Supplementary List of the RN in 1912.15 To take another example, 
commissioned into the 4th Battalion the Devonshire Regiment in 1906, Mitchell 
subsequently transferred to a regular battalion of the Highland Light Infantry in 1909.16 As 
Bowman and Connelly noted, the variety of routes available to the Army provided ‘variable 
training’, and this plurality of experience makes it difficult to quantify the impact that such 
service had on leadership development of RAF officers.17 Furthermore, neither the Army’s 
nor the RN’s officer recruitment phase specifically identified leadership ability. This was 
because the military presumed those applicants social backgrounds produced effective 
                                                          
10 1902 [Cd. 1385] Memorandum dealing with the Entry, Training, and Employment of Officers and Mean of the Royal 
Navy and Royal Marines, p. 11 
11 Davison, The Challenges of Command, p. 104. 
12 For a history of Keyham, see: G. Penn, HMS Thunderer: The Story of the Royal Engineering Colleges, Keyham and 
Manadon (Emsworth: Kenneth Mason, 1984). 
13 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p. 21; Jordan, ‘The Battle for the Skies’, p. 69. 
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15 Ibid. 
16 Woolven, ‘Mitchell, Sir William Gore Sutherland (1888–1944)’. 
17 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p. 8. 
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leaders, and this filtered into RAF thinking in the 1920s. This, coupled with alternative 
entry routes, created challenges for the provision of effective leadership training.  
Cadet institutions curricula reflected distinct organisational choices and included a 
mix of practical provision for skills development and didactic classroom learning.18 These 
choices were grounded in the skills officers required for their chosen profession. At 
Osborne, engineering remained a key component, as did scientific subjects at Woolwich.19 
As the Director of Naval Education (DNE), J.A. Ewing, a civilian physicist and engineer 
who had been Professor of Mechanism and Applied Mechanics at the University of 
Cambridge, noted in his 1905 report about Osborne, ‘The large part taken by practical 
engineering is a novel element in the training of such young boys’.20 As Andrew Lambert 
noted, the RN’s system before 1902 at Britannia was ‘essentially mathematical’.21 
Furthermore, Dickinson argued that ‘the old Britannia system continued to exert an 
influence’ on initial training into the early-twentieth century.22 The RN made a powerful 
organisational statement in appointing a civilian to the newly established post of DNE; 
however, it also reinforced the service’s predilection for technical education, given Ewing’s 
scientific background. For this reason, as Chapter Four noted, the RAF rejected the 
recruitment and training system of the RN. Cecil’s committee on pre-service education 
dismissed Britannia’s curriculum as too ‘specialised’ due to the early age at which cadets 
                                                          
18 While several overviews of Sandhurst and Woolwich exist, they have been given scant attention by 
academics. Conversely, two useful PhDs exist that have considered Britannia, see: Mary Jones, ‘The Making of 
the Royal Navy Officer Corps, 1860-1914’ (PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 1999), pp. 79-111; Elinor 
Romans, ‘Selection and Early Career Education of Executive Officers in the Royal Navy, c. 1902-1939’ (PhD 
Thesis, University of Exeter, 2012), pp. 139-200. Both suggest a possible framework for looking at the initial 
experience of RAF officers and the importance of Cranwell.  
19 TNA, ADM 7/936, Appendix B – Royal Naval College, Osborne: Timetable of the First Term, Report of 
the Director of Naval Education for the Year 1904, January 1905, p. 18; Colonel K.W. Maurice-Jones, DSO 
(ret’d), The Shop Story, 1900-1939 (Woolwich: The Royal Artillery Institution, 1954), p. 11. 
20 TNA, ADM 7/936, Report of the Director of Naval Education for 1904, p. 1. 
21 Andrew Lambert ‘The Development of Education in the Royal Navy, 1854-1914’ in Geoffrey Till (ed.), The 
Development of British Naval Thinking: Essays in Memory of Bryan Ranft (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 41. 
22 Dickinson, Educating the Royal Navy, p. 210. Ewing went on to manage Room 40, the section of naval 
intelligence responsible for cryptanalysis, which deciphered the Zimmermann Telegram in 1917, see: 
Dickinson, Wisdom and War, pp. 114-5. 
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entered the system.23 However, given that technical subjects did appear on the curriculum 
at Cranwell, its formation can be seen, in part, as an attempt to merge the heroic leadership 
training extant in the Army with the technical preferences of the RN. Practical elements of 
curricula focused on subjects like drill, tactics and navigation that developed basic 
professional competence. At Sandhurst, this included annual training camps to apply 
classroom knowledge through experiential learning.24 These, like military manoeuvres, also 
occurred once commissioned, and the Military Wing of the RFC regularly participated in 
them before the First World War.25 Gradual changes in Army cadet training emerged in the 
aftermath of the Akers-Douglas Committee of 1902, which also considered broader issues 
related to entry from public schools and universities.26 In providing necessary professional 
skills, both the Army and RN began a process of leader development that continued during 
an officer’s early career. As Joubert recalled, after passing out of Woolwich, he attended 
specialist courses at the former and Shoeburyness, while Royal Engineers went to Chatham 
and infantry officers went to the School of Musketry at Hythe.27 RN officers typically 
continued training in preparation for their Lieutenants exam, which, as AC C.R. Samson’s 
example illustrates, was heavily technical in character and included subjects like ‘Boat 
Work’ and ‘Signals’.28  
While, from a leadership perspective, there were challenges over the oscillation 
between practical and general elements of cadet training, before the First World War, there 
were attempts to broaden curricula. The pre-First World War reports of the DNE on 
Britannia show that the RN attempted to introduce a more general education for cadets, 
                                                          
23 TNA, AIR 2/100, Preliminary Education of Candidates for the Royal Air Force Commissions, p. 3. 
24 Alan Shepherd, Sandhurst: The Royal Military Academy (London: County Life Books, 1980), p. 109. 
25 In general, see: Andrew Whitmarsh, ‘British Army Manoeuvres and the Development of Military Aviation, 
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26 1902 [Cd. 982] Akers-Douglas Report, p. iii. 
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which included increased provision in subjects like history. This sought to widen 
knowledge and understanding but also introduced cadets to RN culture as a form of 
indoctrination in nurturing shared identity. Reading on the history syllabus at Osborne 
included Hamilton Williams’ British Naval Power and Julian Corbett’s biography of Sir 
Francis Drake; both reinforced prevalent views of the RN as a great naval power.29 
Williams served as an Instructor in English Literature who also taught history at Britannia, 
while Corbett went on to be a key RN lecturer and naval theorist before the First World 
War. AM Sir Robert Clark-Hall described Williams’ teaching of history as being ‘about 
dates’ and little else of value.30 History also featured at Sandhurst and Woolwich, and while 
Bowman and Connelly criticised the lack of specific leadership training at these institutions, 
they were unfair in selectively citing recollections that ignore the pedagogical role the study 
of the past had in inculcating leadership lessons and nurturing a sense of identity.31 At this 
level, this was reinforced by the study of tactics and the use of camps for experiential 
learning. Before the Akers-Douglas report, the Professor of Tactics tried to increase 
military history provision in lieu of law and administration; however, even in 1902, it was 
noted that the former still mainly focused on the Napoleonic period.32 That the Professor 
of Tactics argued for the need for a balanced relationship between history and tactics 
shows that, from an Army perspective, a balanced curriculum was required to develop 
officers’ competencies. However, the inculcation of a service’s culture remains a key 
element of modern Initial Officer Training and underpins appropriate skills development. 
As Finlan correctly noted concerning Britannia in the late-twentieth century, ‘it is the place 
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where the cultural regeneration process occurs for newly joined officers’; this has always 
been the case and is why Cranwell was vital to RAF independence and the development of 
its officer class.33 This ‘cultural regeneration’, adjusting civilians to a military organisation, 
was one of the key challenges the RAF faced in 1919 as it began to shape its own military 
professionals focused on its requirements. 
One element of leadership education that pervaded the Army and RN systems, and 
mirrored that used in public schools, was the focus on team sport. As Mason and Reidi 
recognised, even at Keyham, which trained RN engineering recruits, rugby, football and 
cricket were key pedagogical tools.34 In general, this was because it was thought that sport 
developed leadership character, and, as Campbell noted concerning the Army, it improved 
the: 
wellbeing of the British soldier, enhance[d] unit morale and esprit de corps, and 
develop[ed] individual initiative and leadership qualities.35 
 
This illustrates the links between morale and cohesion that underpinned the British 
military’s understanding of leadership in both practical and conceptual terms. As Chapter 
Four noted, team sports were widely seen to engender leadership skills through ‘playing the 
game’, which included channelled aggression, team spirit, ‘unit’ cohesion, and 
understanding rules and regulations. In the Army, team sports were naturally subsumed 
under the rubric of physical training; though in 1914, the Manual of Physical Training 
recognised that: 
The value of active games and sports as adjuncts to physical training cannot be 
over-estimated.36  
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Here, the balance between physical training and sport reflects the debate of ‘Athens in 
Sparta’. Physical training reflects the need to generate basic standards required for military 
service, with sport seen as part of a more general leadership education. This balance is 
illustrated by GC Carmichael’s recollection of his time at Woolwich between 1907 and 
1908. Carmichael recalled: 
On Wednesday afternoons, games held sway. In winter; rugger, hockey, soccer 
and in later winter athletic sports, gym and swimming as side lines.37 
 
Carmichael’s recollection of individual events as ‘side lines’ is interesting and suggests that 
not much was learnt from these experiences, while team sports had a greater influence on 
his development. 
Leigh-Mallory’s experience, and that of 42 per cent of officers in Appendix Four 
and four-fifths of Squadron Commanders in Appendix Three, centred on the training 
regime of the Army in the early phase of the First World War, which attempted to cope 
with rapid expansion. Leigh-Mallory was representative of a group of public school 
educated officers that Peter Simkins described as having: 
Uncomplicated patriotic ideals and an innate sense of obligation to King and 
Country [through] public school codes of duty, self-sacrifice, and discipline 
which had permeated every level of society through the education system.38 
 
Public school educated officers provided what the Army perceived as natural leaders to fill 
its ranks. Leigh-Mallory’s first training experience occurred as a Private, which centred on a 
regime of route marches, parades and drill as well as providing work parties for the 
Liverpool docks.39 After commissioning, Leigh-Mallory’s experience relied on regimental 
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based training led by regular Non-Commissioned Officers, whom new officers expected to 
learn from while relying on their previous educational backgrounds. Officers also had 
access to manuals like Infantry Training that contained the organisational memory of the 
Army about the employment of various combats arms.40 Mirroring other manuals of the 
period, the 1912 Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training Manual stated ‘The object of training is 
to prepare leaders, men, and horses for war’.41 Infantry Training stressed the need to develop 
‘the soldierly spirit’ through efficient drill. It was recognised that this emerged from good 
leadership centred on concepts of morale and motivation through ideas like duty, 
paternalism, self-reliance and responsibility that had been inculcated at public schools.42 
While these basic precepts existed, regimental training lacked uniformity and provided a 
poor basis for effective leadership that was only overcome though operational learning. For 
example, in 1923, SL Hill recalled how in 1915, he felt inadequately trained on deployment 
to France with the Northumberland Fusiliers.43 While officers had access to manuals, it is 
open to question whether they would have read them and how much they would have 
understood had they done so. It was only through wartime experience that initial leadership 
experience emerged for future RAF officers. It is reasonable to presume that this was 
Leigh-Mallory’s view, given that he started his 1925 reflective essay in 1915 when he 
deployed on operations.44   
 
5.2 Promotion in the British Army and Royal Navy 
                                                          
40 Infantry Training (1914); War Office, Cavalry Training (London: HMSO, 1907). 
41 War Office, Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training (HMSO: London, 1912), p. 10. 
42 In general, see: Sheffield, ‘Officer-Man Relations’, passim. 
43 TNA, AIR 1/2387/228/11/37, War Experience, 1914-1918 by Squadron Leader Roderic Hill, September 
1923 p. 2. 
44 TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory, p. 1.  
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Before examining pilot training, it is worth considering the challenge of promotion in the 
Army and RN as it provided the career framework for an officer’s development before 
joining the RAF. Primarily, Army and RN promotion procedures have been criticised over 
the abuse of patronage and seniority. While promotion exams existed in both systems, the 
Army, as Bowman and Connelly noted, was: 
too tied to seniority and, arguably, patronage with the regimental system 
creating further problems for advancement of promising officers.45  
 
Seniority was a holdover from the abolition of purchase of commissions in 1871 as part of 
the reforms of the Secretary of State for War, Edward Cardwell.46 Concerning the RN, 
Davison argued that ‘the Navy was semi-aristocratic and yet professional’, and as the 
service professionalised in the late-nineteenth century, certain career routes, like the 
gunnery branch, led to senior leadership positions.47 Both services attempted reform, the 
RN most notably through the Selborne Scheme; however, out-dated attitudes remained up 
to 1914. In 1906, in the pages of JRUSI, Major Lord Douglas Compton of the 9th Lancers 
wrote that promotion by seniority ‘cannot be bettered’, which was a view arguably based 
on his social background and desire to maintain class barriers in the Army.48 Senior officers 
like the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir William Nicholson, supported promotion 
by seniority as it reinforced the regimental system of the Army, which they did not want to 
see diminished.49 Patronage also remained an issue for the RN; for example, the rise of 
Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas to command the 5th Battle Squadron of the Grand 
Fleet, as Andrew Gordon illustrated, was inherently linked to his service on the Royal 
                                                          
45 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p. 8. 
46 Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp. 16-19, 90-3. 
47 Davison, The Challenges of Command, p. 20; Jones, ‘The Making of the Royal Navy Officer Corps’, p.142. 
48 Major Lord Douglas J.C. Compton, 9th (Queen’s Royal) Lancers, ‘The Shortage of Officers in the Army’, 
JRUSI, 50 (1906), p. 796. 
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Yachts and his association with the Royal Family.50 Furthermore, the emergence of the so-
called ‘Rings’ in the 1890s centred on the control pervaded by both Field Marshals 
Viscount Wolseley and Earl Roberts over appointments during their respective terms as 
Commander-in-Chief.51 However, as Beckett suggested, the ‘Rings’ emerged to deal with 
problems in the promotion procedures of the Army, such as the provision of effective 
officers.52 While, in principle, Military and Naval Secretaries managed promotion and career 
planning, even these appointments received criticism, and French, with reference to 
postings from Woolwich and Sandhurst, noted: 
cadets who missed out on their preferred choices found themselves posted by 
the Military Secretary willy-nilly.53 
 
This lack of succession planning was abrogated by the regimental system’s influence, 
whereby COs had more influence over appointments than the War Office.54 Due to these 
issues, adventurous officers sought alternative options for employment that often included 
service in the British Empire. While undoubtedly underpinned by an interest in aviation, 
the problems of the promotion system led some officers to view the newly founded RFC 
as an opportunity for career advancement. Jordan noted of Trenchard:  
When he became Assistant Commandant of the CFS Trenchard was a forty-
five year old major, with no obvious prospects for advancement. Five years 
later, he was a major-general and regarded as Britain’s leading airman.55  
 
Other pre-war officers, like Joubert, benefitted from their decision to join the fledgling 
arm. Joubert, who attended the CFS as a Lieutenant in 1913, finished the First World War 
as an acting Colonel and was gazetted a WgCr in 1919 with a Permanent Commission. 
                                                          
50 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996), pp. 
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51 Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 1880-1918 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 155-6; 
Kochanski, Sir Garnet Wolseley, pp. 271-2; Spiers, Late Victorian Army, pp. 68-9. 
52 Ian F.W. Beckett, ‘The Annual Confidential Report and Promotion in the Late Victorian Army’, British 
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53 French, Military Identities, p. 55. 
54 Ibid, p. 151.  
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Officers like Brooke-Popham and Dowding illustrated abilities that might have seen them 
rise to senior Army positions. As Stephen Roskill noted in 1969, the loss of officers like 
Bowhill, Longmore and Courtney was an ‘irreparable loss’ to the RN but a gain to the 
RAF.56 Furthermore, Roskill claimed to have identified only one officer who returned to 
the RN post-war, which reinforces the view presented by Bigsworth in Chapter Three 
about being put back in his career if he returned to his original service.57 
This advancement was contingent on the expansion of the British military 
generally, and air arms specifically, during the First World War. Of all the arms of the First 
World War Army, the RFC expanded the most, from 1,244 officers and men in August 
1914 to 291,748 in October 1918; additionally, in August 1914, there were 600 officers and 
men in the RNAS.58 Dictated by the need to fill operational and staff appointments, 
promotion relied on the availability of suitable officers. Typically, this meant public school 
recruits with OTC experience, as exemplified by Leigh-Mallory. This growth led to the use 
of acting, temporary and brevet ranks to deal with operational situations. Temporary ranks 
predominated during the First World War and were utilised for those ‘appointed to 
command and extra regimental positions’ like staff positions or the RFC, whose expansion 
saw the transfer of permanent and volunteer officers to the Corps.59 Evidence of this 
system, albeit utilising a pre-war officer, comes through Major Bernard Vernon-Harcourt, 
who was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the 4th Battalion South Wales 
Borderers, a militia unit, on 4 September 1897, earned his Royal Aero Club Aviator 
Certificate on 10 August 1915, and was appointed a flight commander in the RFC on 19 
                                                          
56 ‘Introduction’ in Stephen Roskill (ed.), Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service: Volume I – 1908-1918 
(London: Spottiswoode printed for the Navy Records Society, 1969), p. xvii. 
57 Ibid; TNA, AIR 2/90, OC 10 (Operations) Group to GOC South Western Area, 2 October 1918. 
58 TNA, AIR 8/13, Synopsis of the British Air Effort during the War, 1 January 1919, p. 16. This paper was issued 
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October 1915.60 By March 1918, Vernon-Harcourt, through seniority, was a Captain in the 
Welsh Regiment, to which he had transferred in 1899, and a temporary Major in the RFC. 
However, the problem of expansion did not remove favouritism or nepotism, and, while 
Churchill chaired a committee that examined promotion from the Army perspective, it is 
clear that issues filtered into the RFC and the RAF in 1918.61 For example, in his 1923 Staff 
College essay, SL John Quinnell, OC 104 Squadron in 1918, claimed that promotion was 
less than fair to those officers who served in France. Quinnell suggested that on returning 
to Britain, reports were produced on their suitability for promotion, and if recommended, 
officers were automatically promoted without reference to other factors; a clear accusation 
of favouritism, which demonstrates that merit was not evaluated by any metric.62 Despite 
these problems, in general, during the First World War, the British military appointed 
appropriate officers to leadership positions; however, this success came more from 
personal ability rather than any identifiable and consistent succession planning process. 
These officers achieved promotion through what SL Forster Maynard, a flight commander 
in 1 Squadron RNAS in 1916, referred to as the ‘hard work and constant strain’ of 
leadership that required self-confidence and effective decision making abilities, without 
which morale and unit cohesion would be reduced.63 
 
5.3 Flying Training, Shared Identity and Pilot Ethos 
While divergent training experiences had limited impact on leadership development in the 
RAF, there was one aspect that coalesced and brought officers in Appendix Four together. 
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This was the shared identity of being pilots, which had its outgrowth in RAF ethos and was 
formalised in the GD Branch. This provided continuity between the wartime and post-First 
World War experience of officers through the professional competencies that formed the 
basis of future development. However, even here, problems existed. As Chapter Three 
noted, not all officers were fixed-wing pilots; for example, AVM Harries trained to fly 
airships in the RNAS.64 However, it was only through the experience of the First World 
War that aircraft were recognised as more versatile than airships.65 By 1924, airship pilots 
like Harries had retrained as fixed-wing pilots. Harries is unique amongst officers in 
Appendix Four, as the remainder had fixed-wing backgrounds. However, as already noted, 
30 per cent of the prosopography population in Appendix Three were not classified as  
heavier-than-air pilots in 1919; for example, there were three officers rated as members of 
the Kite Balloon Branch, including two former RNAS officers who would have trained at 
RNAS Calshot. Interestingly, these three officers had left the RAF by 1920. However, the 
same is not true of those graded as staff officers in 1919; for example, SL Geoffrey 
Bromet, a pre-1914 RN officer who trained at the CFS, retired as an AC in 1938. Bromet 
returned to service in September 1939 and rose to be an AVM, thus highlighting the 
difficulty of generalising on training, branch membership and subsequent career patterns.66 
Pilot training was further complicated by the system’s evolutionary nature.67 RFC training 
split into three phases. First, pre-First World War training centred on initial private tuition 
through the Royal Aero Club and then proceeding to the CFS, which was a joint 
establishment formed in 1912 between the Army and RN. Around thirty per cent of 
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Appendix Four were pre-First World War trained and consisted of some of the more 
adventurous members of the British military. Second, there was a phase up to late 1916, 
which saw the emergence of the RFC Training Brigade and a series of units focused on 
specific tasks, such as ab initio training. This was a period of experimentation, with variable 
results. Finally, from late 1916 onwards, and in reaction to the challenge of increased 
losses, the RFC introduced the so-called Gosport System, named after the Gosport 
Training School commanded by Major Robert Smith-Barry.68 
Leigh-Mallory’s own training experience occurred during the second phase, which 
Robert Morley characterised as ‘An Atmosphere of Haste’.69 Leigh-Mallory applied for 
observer duties in 1915 with the hope of becoming a pilot.70 Many, including Douglas, 
gained initial training as observers with operational squadrons before transferring back to 
the home establishment for conversion to flying. Douglas described his experience as being 
haphazard with a lack of rigour, and Leigh-Mallory mirrored these feelings, describing his 
training as ‘tedious’ due to the lack of effective instructors and flying time.71 This was 
perhaps understandable given the expansion of the RFC, which placed great strain on all 
aspects of its operations. SL John D’Albiac recalled in 1929 that the RNAS faced similar 
problems during the same period.72 On 4 January 1916, Leigh-Mallory reported to No. 1 
School of Military Aeronautics, where he received instruction in observation, passed with 
ease, and was identified as a potential pilot. After this point, Leigh-Mallory undertook basic 
flying training with 12 (Reserve) Squadron, which consisted of basic flying manoeuvres and 
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initial dual-control instruction, and graduated from the CFS on 6 June 1916.73 This skills 
development sought to achieve a level of professional competency to undertake flying 
duties. While Leigh-Mallory eventually graduated through the CFS, training in this early 
period of the war was still of variable quality; for example, at the end of 1915, Trenchard 
brought the example of Lieutenant A.G.R. Garrod to the attention of the Director-General 
of Military Aeronautics, MajGen David Henderson. Trenchard noted that Garrod was 
rated as ‘fair’ on the Royal Aircraft Factory BE2, despite the latter claiming that he had 
never flown this type.74 Despite challenges, many officers recalled the shared enjoyment of 
flying developed through training. AVM George Reid recalled his first solo flight as ‘a 
strange and vitalising experience’, while Willock recalled killing a sheep on his third flight 
‘but flew solo after 6 hours’ dual instruction’.75 
The adventurous spirit of officers filtered into their shared identity. SL Raymond 
Collishaw, a noted ‘ace’ of the First World War and future AVM, recalled three 
characteristics that contributed to successful pilots. These were: 
a) Confidence, self-reliance and love of responsibility. 
b) Wiliness, nonchalance and subterfuge. 
c) Ingenuity, foresight and alertness of mind.76 
 
These concepts mirrored characteristics taught in public schools and reinforced through 
training. As one suggested series of training ‘Maxims’ noted in 1916, ‘Everyone who takes 
up flying becomes converted from disbelief to enthusiasm’.77 This ‘enthusiasm’ 
underpinned many officers motivation for becoming pilots, with Nicholl recalling that as 
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soon as he decided to re-join the Army in 1914, he ‘immediately applied to join’ the RFC.78 
For some, like Leigh-Mallory, it was an opportunity for ‘freedom, breadth of vision, and 
possibility of personal initiative’.79 The RFC, despite technical elements related to training, 
appeared to offer leadership opportunities where officers applied their desire for 
adventurism in an aggressive context. This ‘spirit’ was apparent in doctrine, and, as Pugh 
suggested, the RFC mirrored the ‘moral’ tendencies of its parent organisation, the Army, 
which, during the First World War, pursued an aggressive culture with a ‘doctrine that 
placed significant weight on aggression, moral superiority, and the offensive’.80 This filtered 
into the RFC Training Manual, distributed amongst units, and codified early doctrinal 
conceptions related to the belief of ‘Command of the Air’.81 While the RNAS Training 
Manual was more technical in conception, it is possible to suggest that similar ‘moral’ 
aspects filtered into RN thinking as its own senior leadership shifted between what Gordon 
described as ‘ratcatchers’ and ‘regulators’, or the difference between proscriptive and 
mission command as the basis for operations.82 While centred on the personalities of 
Admirals of the Fleet Earl Beatty and Earl Jellicoe respectively, it is possible to argue that, 
while lacking clear conceptual doctrine, RNAS operations of the First World War 
suggested an aggressive outlook, as exemplified by the Cuxhaven Raid of Christmas Day 
1914, in which AVM Charles Edmonds participated.83 Thus, the perceived psychology 
required of a pilot fitted with the culture and ethos of the air arms parent organisations, 
which in themselves developed from moralism present in aspects of military thinking in the 
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late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. This psychology was underpinned by training, 
which began the process of forming the professional identity for future leaders of the RAF 
and provided the context for development, as it was among pilots of the GD Branch that 
the Service sought its leaders.  
 
5.4 Summary 
Conceptually, it is clear that, despite Drew’s concern over a tick box approach, training 
provides an important basis for further leadership development. Using the analogy of 
‘Athens in Sparta’, skills-based procedures provided the basis for leadership development 
by developing professional competencies. These competencies, and the choice of which 
were most appropriate, were shaped by the culture and ethos of the service, which 
generated a shared identity for officers. However, the challenge for those considered in this 
thesis is that the impact of the competencies developed through the Army and RN were 
not strictly those required in the RAF. This was further complicated by the variety of entry 
routes, which makes it difficult to ascertain whether skills developed had any real effect on 
further development. However, it is the role of flying training that was most significant 
here, as it not only developed a set of competencies that filtered into officers shared 
identity and ethos, but also became a nexus of RAF culture through the GD Branch. In 
being members of this group, officers like Leigh-Mallory who chose to make the RAF their 
profession ensured that they had the desired skills necessary to allow them to identify with 
the Service’s culture, which influenced inter-war leadership development despite their 
varied service training and backgrounds. 
Chapter Six 
Military Education and Leadership Development in the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 
 
On 18 January 1939, the outgoing Commandant of the IDC, Longmore, lectured to RUSI 
on the subject of ‘Training for Higher Command’, in which he outlined his view of the 
military education officers required to reach senior leadership positions.1 As previously 
noted, an enduring debate over the balance and meaning of training and education exists, 
and while Longmore used the former term, the institutions he identified fitted the latter.2 
Attendance at institutions Longmore identified – individual service staff colleges, the RN’s 
SOWC, the Army Senior Officers’ Schools and the IDC – emerged as characteristic in an 
RAF officer’s rise to senior leadership.3 Longmore also identified the role of RUSI in 
developing officers intellectual ability, but this did not fit the patterns identified in this 
chapter and was more fragmented in its use by the RAF.4 Broadly, this chapter prefers the 
phrase ‘military education’ to the more modern ‘Professional Military Education’ (PME) 
for the processes described here. This distinction is needed because military education in 
this period was not mandatory as PME is in the modern military.5 However, the continuity 
between military education in this period and PME today is that, as Cynthia Watson noted, 
it ‘targets the fields which are crucial to the officer’s specific rise to the upper ranks of 
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service’.6 Linked to this is the identification and nurturing of talent by senior officers who 
selected those who attended courses that developed such ‘fields’. Furthermore, military 
education is used, rather than staff education, to encapsulate the broader pedagogical 
purpose of institutions examined herein. If staff education had been their aim, then shorter 
courses, as occurred during the Second World War, could have been established.   
Concerning Andover, it was believed that attendance on such courses ‘broaden[ed] 
the mind’.7 This broadening of the ‘mind’ allowed the RAF to develop ‘fields’ such as 
leadership, command and staff abilities amongst nurtured officers while improving 
professional knowledge. Apart from service specific considerations, such as air operations, 
this development of professional knowledge focused on what today would be broadly 
considered as strategic studies and included imperial geography and ideas surrounding the 
principles and the conduct of war through historical study, which focused on both service 
specific operations and those in the combined, inter-service spheres. As Searle suggested, a 
general set of principles of war emerged amongst the services that helped foster a strategic 
culture in the inter-war British military.8 However, while tangentially noting the importance 
of Staff College lectures on the principles of war in propounding a unified strategic culture, 
Searle did not explore the importance of such institutions in developing the leaders who 
developed these views. Modern conceptions of socialisation though the staff colleges and 
the IDC ensured that a common language emerged amongst officers operating in the joint 
sphere in the Second World War. In addition to nurturing and socialisation, military 
education in the RAF promoted leadership development through modern ideas like job 
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assignments and action learning. Therefore, military education acted as the nexus of the 
nurturing process for an officer’s rise to senior leadership during this period, and it is the 
closest the RAF came to succession planning without the use of psychometric methods 
and career planning. While Longmore was adamant that the so-called ‘Great Captains of 
History’ were born and not made, he recognised that effective education refined and 
underpinned the leadership development of potential senior leaders.9 From Longmore’s 
lecture, it is possible to identify several themes key to an officer’s development, like 
responsibility, the ability to work outside one’s ‘silo’, and understanding the knowledge that 
underpinned professional identity.10 In essence, military education developed candidates’ 
intellectual agility to operate with ever-increasing responsibility at different levels by 
encouraging officers to think and reflect on their profession. This enabled officers to 
contextualise their development and deliver organisational capital to the RAF. This is 
particularly relevant concerning the award of the symbol psa and subsequent employment 
following Andover.  
Longmore recognised that education could not guarantee to develop an effective 
senior leader, but might just produce a ‘highly trained staff officer’, and it was the 
relationship amongst education, training and experience that acted as a ‘guide as to his 
potential executive ability’, and even this was no guarantor of success.11 Leigh-Mallory 
experienced each of the processes described above, and his experience generally mirrored 
that of his peers from Appendix Four. WgCr Leigh-Mallory successfully attended the 
Fourth Course at Andover in 1925/1926; however, he did pass the entrance examination 
for the Third Course, but was not nominated by the Air Ministry to attend the course. This 
was not, however, because of some form of nefarious motive, but rather concerned his 
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then job assignment in the Air Ministry, which precluded attending this course.12 Before 
attending Andover, SL Leigh-Mallory attended the Army Senior Officers’ School during his 
first posting to the School of Army Co-Operation in 1922. Leigh-Mallory did not attend 
Greenwich, nor Camberley or Quetta, but did serve as DS at the latter.13 It might have 
been viewed as cruel to send officers on two separate staff courses, though Portal did 
attend the SOWC in addition to Andover and the IDC; however, this was exceptional. GC 
Leigh-Mallory eventually attended the IDC’s Eighth Course in 1934. The time between 
attending Andover and the IDC is explained, in part, by his job assignments in the 
intervening years. Finally, from 1930 onwards, Leigh-Mallory engaged with wider 
professional education outside the confines of service institutions as he contributed articles 
to both JRUSI and RAFQ.14 Leigh-Mallory became a member of RUSI in 1931.15  
 
6.1 The Royal Air Force Staff College, Andover 
The Staff College stood up at RAF Andover in November 1921, co-located with its parent 
headquarters, 7 Group. Its formation marked an important step in the evolution of the 
RAF. In announcing the 1922/23 Air Estimates, the Secretary of State for Air, Guest, 
noted Andover’s significance when he remarked that it allowed the RAF to form the 
world’s first fully trained Air Staff embedded with an independent view of air power 
employment, which, in essence, encapsulated RAF culture. Guest noted that the problems 
confronting the RAF were ‘just as complicated, just as far-reaching, and quite different’ to 
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Army Staff Colleges, as they were widely considered mirrors of themselves. 
14 Wing-Commander T.L. Leigh-Mallory, DSO, ‘Co-operation between the Army and Royal Air Force during 
1929’, RAFQ, 1(1) (1930), pp. 37-44; Wing-Commander T.L. Leigh-Mallory, DSO, RAF, ‘Air Co-Operation 
with Mechanized Forces’, JRUSI, 75 (1931), pp. 565-77; Leigh-Mallory, ‘The Maintenance of Air Superiority 
in a Land Campaign’, pp. 245-52. 
15 ‘Secretary’s Notes’, JRUSI, 76 (1931), p. xxiv. 
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those faced by the Army and RN.16 As with Cranwell, questions concerning its location and 
independence remained a constant theme in debates over the Air Estimates. In 1934, the 
Under-Secretary of State for Air, Sir Philip Sassoon, reiterated that staff colleges existed to 
work out service specific problems and that Andover’s location was dictated by operational 
requirements; officers up to the rank of WgCr were required to maintain flying 
proficiency.17 Andover reinforced the assumption of independence, which linked effective 
military education to leadership development by the promotion of the ‘Air Force Spirit’. 
Andover was not the location of choice for the Staff College; in 1919, Trenchard 
suggested Halton, while in January 1918, the Director of Air Training suggested to the 
Admiral President of the Royal Naval College Greenwich that ‘a school for higher 
education’ for the RAF could be founded there.18 Andover’s Operations Record Book 
noted that the first official mention of a Staff College appeared in Trenchard’s 1919 
‘Permanent Organization’ memorandum in the section detailing training and the 
development of the ‘Air Force Spirit’.19 While Trenchard appreciated education’s 
importance, this was not the first mention of Andover. The idea did not develop in a 
vacuum, as Sykes discussed founding a Staff College in a draft memorandum on the RAF’s 
post-war organisation in October 1918.20 Sykes’ belief in the value of military education 
derived from his Quetta experience in 1908.21 Conversely, Trenchard’s views might have 
been due to his lack of military education.  
                                                          
16 Hansard, HC Deb, 21 March 1922, Vol. 152, Col. 293. 
17 Hansard, HC Deb, 8 March 1934, Vol. 286, Cols. 2150-2151. 
18 TNA, AIR 8/12, Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force, p. 6; Dickinson, Wisdom and War, p. 121. 
At this point, ‘RAF Greenwich’ was being used to train 450 2nd Lieutenants for the RFC, see: Dickinson, 
Wisdom and War, pp. 119-22. 
19 TNA, AIR 29/527, Operations Record Book, RAF Staff College, Andover, November 1921. 
20 TNA, AIR 2/71, Appendix F: Training after the War, Draft Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on 
Considerations affecting the Strength, Organisation and Constitution of the Royal Air Force after the War, 21 
October 1918. 
21 Sir Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles: An Autobiography (London: George G. Harrap, 1942), pp. 70-3. 
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Appointed in late 1921, DS attended the annual combined operations exercise at 
Camberley in preparation for teaching at Andover. Andover’s first Commandant was AC 
Brooke-Popham, a noted commander and staff officer of the First World War, who was a 
Camberley graduate; Brooke-Popham attended Camberley between 1910 and 1912 under 
the progressive tutelage of MajGen Sir William Robertson.22 C.G. Grey suggested that 
Brooke-Popham only took the appointment when shown the list of other candidates for 
the position of Commandant, and exclaimed that he had better take it, though the former 
provided no source for this claim.23 Except for GC Clark-Hall, the Assistant Commandant, 
DS were Camberley or Greenwich graduates. This was an important factor in their 
selection. Furthermore, two of the first four DS, GC Joubert and WgCr Freeman, would 
become Commandants themselves.24 Increasingly, DS emerged from officers who passed 
through Andover’s early courses and while it can be suggested that this ensured that 
‘internal ideologies’ were perpetuated, this, as noted below, ignores the wide character of 
the curriculum.25 Significantly, Joubert recorded his frustration when posted away from 
Andover in 1923, and, as noted below with specific reference to DS at the IDC, this job 
assignment was viewed as important for nurtured officers.26 
Distorted by a misunderstanding of its purpose, the historiography on Andover 
focuses on a narrow element of its curriculum; the development of air power doctrine.27 
AVM (ret’d) Tony Mason suggested that Andover ‘lamentably failed’ in providing a 
developed air power theory for the RAF, while Orange argued that it served: 
                                                          
22 David R. Woodward, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson: Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the Great War 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 4-5. 
23 Grey, Air Ministry, p. 188. 
24 TNA, AIR 29/527, Operations Record Book, RAF Staff College, Andover, November 1921; AIR 2/251, 
Minute from Director of Personnel to Director of Training, 16 September 1921. 
25 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, p. 92. 
26 Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté, Fun and Games (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p. 80. 
27 See: R.A. Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College, 1922-1972 (Bracknell: RAF Staff College, 1972); Hall, 
Strategy for Victory, p. 18; Parton, ‘Royal Air Force Doctrine, pp. 97-100; English, ‘The RAF Staff College’, pp. 
408-31. The latter is based on the author’s MA Thesis from The Royal Military College of Canada. 
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as a disseminating station for approved doctrine, seasoned by essays on riding, 
hunting and how to cope with the bazaars of Baghdad.28  
 
Mason’s view, while open to criticism, cannot be unduly ignored. GC Mason was the first 
DDefS at the RAF Staff College at Bracknell from 1977 to 1985, and remains a widely 
respected air power expert. This doctrinally based view of Andover, however, requires 
revision in light of a more developed understanding of the Staff College’s purpose. This 
doctrinal view emerged from a misinterpretation of a phrase in Andover’s opening address, 
which described officers attending Andover as ‘the cradle as I call it, of our brain’.29 Linked 
to the idea of a school of thought for the RAF, and while an aspect of military education, 
this was not Andover’s primary purpose. This phrase had much broader pedagogical 
connotations, which linked education and leadership development by creating leaders able 
to lead the RAF. The idea of a general staff being the ‘brain of the army’ was a popular 
euphemism. In 1890, Spenser Wilkinson published The Brain of the Army, which popularised 
the on-going debate in the Army concerning the adoption of a general staff, as advocated 
by officers including MajGen Henry Brackenbury.30 Recognising that general staff systems 
were required to manage the military and develop plans, the Army and RN adopted them 
in 1904 and 1912 respectively after much debate.31 As Brian Bond asserted, the concept of 
staff colleges as schools of thought was prominent at Camberley before the First World 
War, suggesting continuity between the Army and RAF.32 As leaders administered and 
                                                          
28 Tony Mason, ‘British Air Power’ in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), Global Air Power (Washington DC: Potomac 
Books, 2011), p. 26; Orange, Churchill and His Airmen, p. 87. 
29 TNA, AIR 5/881, Opening Address. 
30 Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff (Macmillan: London, 
1890); Hew Strachan, ‘The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment’ in French and 
Reid (eds.), The British General Staff, pp. 80-1; Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of 
Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 85-96. On 
Brackenbury, see: Christopher Brice, The Thinking Man's Soldier: The Life and Career of General Sir Henry 
Brackenbury 1837-1914 (Solihull: Helion and Company, 2012).  
31 On the British Army’s general staff, see: French and Reid (eds.), The British General Staff,. On the RN’s war 
staff, see: Nicholas Black, The British Naval Staff in the First World War (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2009). 
32 Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), p. 259. 
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organised the general staff, it was necessary to develop their abilities through the provision 
of suitable military education, which indicates the relationship between these two areas. 
The RAF readily identified this and had an Air Staff from its foundation.  
Andover’s purpose derived from the nature of the system it served. The Air Staff 
specifically, and the Air Ministry more broadly, managed information, developed strategy 
and doctrine, and produced directives and orders for operational commanders. 
Furthermore, staff officers in operational commands had to understand how to translate 
Air Ministry directives into physical outcomes as well as managing duties at that level. To 
work in a staff organisation, officers had to develop knowledge and professional 
understanding, which underpinned their leadership development. In addition, while Biddle 
suggested that Andover indoctrinated officers – and there was an element of this – 
indoctrination was important to ensure that students emerged able to speak the same 
language in order to operate as effective staff officers.33 Brooke-Popham recognised this 
developmental challenge when he noted:  
From the start, it was emphasised that our job must be, not only to produce 
good staff officers but also to lay the foundations for those who could become 
commanders in the future.34 (Emphasis added) 
 
In the First Course’s opening address, Brooke-Popham applied an orthodox classification 
to Andover’s purpose. Brooke-Popham stated that the Staff College’s aims were to: 
a) To train officers for work on the staff not only in war but also in peace. 
b) To give future commanders some instruction in the broader aspects of war, 
whether on sea, or land, or in the air. 
c) To found a school of thought and to assist in solving problems regarding 
the organisation, training or employment of the Air Force.35 
 
                                                          
33 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, pp. 92-3. 
34 LHCMA, Brooke-Popham Papers, 9/12/52, Draft article on the Formation of the RAF Staff College 
(N.D.) pp. 3-4. Subsequently published as Air Chief Marshal Sir R. Brooke-Popham, ‘The Formation of the 
Royal Air Force Staff College’, The Hawk, 12 (1950), pp. 18-20. 
35 LHCMA, Brooke-Popham Papers, 1/5/3, Address at the Opening of the RAF Staff College, 4 April 1922, 
pp. 1-2. 
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This taxonomy moved from a narrow focus on producing staff officers towards developing 
leaders grounded in the challenges and ambiguities that they might face as senior leaders, 
like combined operations, which accounted for much of the third term’s work at 
Andover.36 Derived from his experience of Camberley, Brooke-Popham admitted that anti-
intellectualism pervaded the British military and that a key element of Andover’s 
curriculum and ethos was to challenge this attitude. Brooke-Popham argued that Andover 
graduates should be able to ‘think and act quickly’ and ‘to change attitude of mind’.37 The 
idea of Andover as a driver in the doctrinal development of the RAF came last in Brooke-
Popham’s taxonomy, though doctrine and strategy did have a place in the pedagogical 
context of leadership development through action learning. The key challenge facing the 
Air Ministry, Brooke-Popham and his successors was in how they nurtured officers for 
senior positions while developing knowledge required for roles in their current ranks. The 
ability to balance these competing requirements remains a key aspect of effective senior 
leadership. Because of this leadership challenge, it is here that this thesis diverges from 
previous works on Andover and argues that leadership development, rather than doctrine, 
drove the curriculum. This allowed the RAF to develop its organisational capacity by 
producing officers who thought broadly about their profession. Doctrine was clearly an 
element of this, but not the only aspect required to develop capable officers, as illustrated 
by Brooke-Popham’s quote above. Throughout this period, the RAF recognised that Staff 
College education provided a foundation for nurturing identified officers. To support this, 
Andover’s curriculum was broad in conception, which helped develop officers who could 
lead the Service while developing coherent plans, strategy and doctrine. This protected 
RAF independence while furthering its culture through shared identity and encouraging a 
                                                          
36 RAFM, AIR 69/158, Books and Papers that may be Studies in Connection with 3rd Term’s Work, 7th 
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common language and experience. This allowed successful officers such as Leigh-Mallory, 
Douglas and Portal to be conversant in the ideas and thinking that underpinned RAF 
culture, but also acquainted with broader military matters, which allowed them to work 
with the other services. For some officers, including Leigh-Mallory, IDC attendance 
reinforced this broader understanding.  
Apart from Andover’s first two courses, for which Trenchard and Brooke-Popham 
handpicked students, selection was by OC’s recommendation, entrance examination, and 
final nomination by the Air Ministry and the Commandant.38 The Air Ministry was the 
arbiter in the selection process and ensured only those deemed capable attended after they 
passed the initial examination. In some respects, this went beyond nurturing by moving 
from a passive to an active state of selection whereby the Air Ministry, took an interest in 
guaranteeing a steady flow of suitable graduates. Thus, entry in itself acted as a gateway to 
success, as the Air Ministry believed these officers would form the core of the RAF’s future 
senior leadership. The award of psa was a significant cultural marker for this very reason. 
Nevertheless, by the early 1930s, concerns arose over the quality of officers recommended, 
and crammers, a holdover from the Army, were increasingly advertised in RAFQ. The First 
Course brought together many emerging leaders, including Portal, Douglas, Peirse and 
Park, and, on Brooke-Popham’s advice, no students from either the Army or RN attended; 
though, as with their respective staff colleges, this aspect of inter-service socialisation soon 
became a feature at Andover.39 In 1930, a series of articles appeared in RAFQ’s first 
volume, which advised prospective candidates how best to prepare for entry exams, 
described the Andover experience, and reinforced advice provided through AMWO and 
                                                          
38 LHCMA, Brooke-Popham Papers, 9/12/52, Formation of the RAF Staff College, p. 8; TNA, AIR 72/5, 
AMWO No. 321 – Entrance of Students to RAF Staff College – Examination, 31 May 1923. 
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AP reports on the qualifying exams from the Third Course onwards.40 In addition to RAF 
doctrine, compulsory pre-course reading included titles such as Corbett’s Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy, G.F.R. Henderson’s Science of War and C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars.41 Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s Naval Strategy was an alternative to Corbett, while neither Clausewitz nor 
Henri Jomini appeared on the list.42 Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power upon History also appeared 
on the suggested reading list. Alongside various periodicals like JRUSI, Spaight’s Air Power 
and War Rights and the various official histories of the First World War appeared as 
suggested reading as they were published.43 No compulsory air power titles appeared. Thus, 
even before attendance, the RAF sought to develop officers’ broad understanding of the 
principles of war that underpinned their development. 
Andover’s curriculum was broad in conception and split into five areas: 
administration and organisation, staff duties, history of military operations, strategy and 
leadership, and included aspects related to the RAF’s sister services. Andover’s schemes of 
work show that only about 20 per cent of the initial curriculum dealt explicitly with aspects 
directly related to the RAF as an organisation, though, naturally, discussions on air power 
emerged in lectures on subjects such as the First World War.44 While this proportion grew, 
it only ever accounted for a third of the lectures delivered by DS. Where air power featured 
more prominently was in student delivered sessions that drew on their operational 
                                                          
40 TNA, AIR 10/1123, AP1118 - Report on the Qualifying Examination for RAF Staff College Andover, held on 24th, 
25th and 26th September 1924, with copies of the examination papers and remarks thereon, March 1925; AIR 72/5, 
AMWO No. 136 – Entrance of Students to the RAF Staff College, 26 February 1925; Squadron-Leader R. 
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65. 
41 TNA, AIR 72/7, AMWO No. 136 – Entrance of Students to the RAF Staff College, 26 February 1926 
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Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (New York: Little Brown, 1911). 
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experience. Staff work, including the ability to produce clear and concise orders, remained 
part of the curriculum but included broader leadership too. The first lecture of the course 
was on this very subject, and Brooke-Popham reiterated that a staff officer’s role was to act 
as ‘agents employed by a Commander to do details’ and the ‘medium through which the 
commander transmits his orders’.45 While Slessor was critical of the administrative 
education present at Andover, the above was a leadership lesson that stressed that staff 
officers had to be accurate, truthful and definite.46 However, as suggested elsewhere, there 
was a pervading opinion that administration was not something that GD Branch officers 
should undertake. Students also attended lectures in English Language to stop perennial 
complaints of a poor standard of English amongst RAF officers.47 Brooke-Popham’s, and 
later Commandants, lectures on the ‘Principles of War’ stressed the need for co-operation 
amongst the services that reinforced the nurturing of selected officers.48 Rather than 
producing narrow-minded officers, and despite challenges like training in administration, 
Andover’s curriculum contributed to the intellectual development of nurtured officers and 
equipped them with a broad conception of war and their profession. Many, such as Leigh-
Mallory, emerged as recognised subject matter experts.  
Teaching at Andover consisted of lectures, conferences and exercises based on 
experiential and didactic methods. Typically, teaching took place in the morning, with the 
afternoons free for preparation, reflection and assignments. AM Sir Thomas Elmhirst 
described the academic environment in the following terms: 
Lectures and seminars every morning. One had to do a great deal of exercise 
every week. You had writing on some such subject as had been lectured on and 
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we were kept very hard on it in our writing. Occasionally in our seminars, 
committees of three and four would spend a week on producing an answer on 
some set question.49 
 
Considered an element of the pedagogical process that differentiated higher education 
from training, this mix of methods closely mirrored modern practices where so-called 
timetabled ‘white space’ occurs. Reflection also appeared in assignments, with students 
producing essays on recent service experience. This form of action learning allowed 
officers to contextualise and distil appropriate lessons that had value for both their 
leadership development and the RAF. SL Portal lamented the lack of his administrative 
experience during the First World War, while Leigh-Mallory’s essay primarily examined the 
issue of inter-service co-operation through his work with the Tank Corps in 1918.50 Placed 
in Andover’s library, these pieces represented an aspect of encouraging officers to engage 
with problems that they would experience in both staff and leadership positions.51 These 
recollections also generated cultural ‘stories’ for the RAF as they appeared in APs and The 
Hawk, Andover own journal.52 The Hawk existed to ensure that material produced at 
Andover could be circulated around the RAF as a whole and was a good example of the 
Service sharing what was perceived as best practice.53 Conferences closely related to the 
modern conception of seminars, while exercises included syndicate work. It was here that 
specific problems were examined and solutions determined. They also encouraged 
socialisation amongst students, and Leigh-Mallory’s course included the future ACMs Sir 
Ralph Cochrane, Hugh Lloyd and AVM Thomas Medhurst. Students also delivered 
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lectures on selected subjects to develop their powers of communication; Leigh-Mallory 
surveyed ‘Army Co-Operation’ on 23 June 1925.54 By the 1930s, officers were also 
encouraged to use term breaks to travel abroad, and produced reports on foreign air forces 
and their activities, which were then disseminated amongst the Air Staff.55 War games were 
increasingly used to explore various strategic and operational problems confronting the 
RAF. Two readily identifiable campaigns concerned Mosul and Hong Kong and closely 
resembled German Kreigsspiele with the production of staff appreciations and operational 
orders, which were mapped to team responses.56 These differentiated pedagogical 
methodologies gave broad scope for officers learning and encouraged them to engage with 
material in a variety of ways while developing personal abilities.  
While Chapter One noted broad factors of leadership education at Andover, it is 
worth reiterating its importance as an element of the curriculum. The methods utilised 
illustrate the process of pedagogical engagement already noted, with lectures delivered by 
the Commandants and student conferences on leadership and morale.57 Both drew on 
historical examples and personal experience, with students engaging in reflective processes 
when writing assignments and in conference. As with reflective essays, the advantage of 
this methodological mix was that it developed a cognitive link between theory and practice 
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so officers could apply lessons to future scenarios. In an essay on morale by SL Douglas in 
1922, Brooke-Popham remarked that it was a ‘good bit of work’, whose deductions he 
agreed with.58 Those deductions were that leaders should be able to motivate people and 
have aim of purpose, resolution and authority.59 Motivation would be increasingly vital to 
understand as officers emerged into senior positions in an organisation that devolved 
execution as low as possible. Motivation would also be needed to influence and empower 
subordinates to achieve objectives. This represented what the RAF understood by 
leadership as it sought to apply it to maintain morale and drive fighting power. External 
experts also lectured on specific subjects, thus highlighting a willingness to move beyond 
narrow service conceptions on subjects. For example, J.L. Birley, the Consulting Physician 
to the RAF, though a civilian, delivered lectures on the ‘Psychology of Courage’, which was 
a key leadership value for the Service.60 Much of what was taught paralleled the 
contemporary view of heroic leadership grounded in ‘Great Man’ theory and utilised 
historical examples like Garibaldi, Nelson, General Robert E. Lee, Napoleon I and Field 
Marshal the Duke of Wellington. 
Combined operations were a key aspect of the curriculum and undertaken in the 
course’s third term. It was here that lectures on air power’s employment took place, with 
strategy and doctrine widely discussed and debated. It was an area where modern 
conceptions of action learning related to doctrinal development. It is accepted that the First 
Course edited the RAF’s first capstone doctrine, CD22.61 Students on subsequent courses 
were encouraged to read and discuss this, and its replacement, AP1300, as the basis for 
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classroom discussions and as pre-course reading for the entry examination.62 Parton 
pointed out that clear similarities existed between lectures and capstone RAF doctrine 
throughout the period, and Commandants delivered the classes on the principles of war 
and air strategy.63 Lectures covered aspects of air power employment and the working of 
various key departments in the Air Ministry. Here, education reinforced RAF culture. As 
Philip Meilinger reflected, Andover was, perhaps, guilty of institutionalising a specific view 
of air power employment.64 However, a deeper exploration of the character and variety of 
air power writing of the period shows that, while linked by the belief in ‘Command of the 
Air’ through the necessity of air superiority, there was recognition that this could be applied 
to a variety of environments, as exemplified by Leigh-Mallory himself. From a leadership 
perspective, this infers that officers emanated from Andover immersed in RAF culture but 
able to think about their place in the defence establishment. This was, in part, because of 
the value placed on education through the ‘Air Force Spirit’. As the RAF evolved, officers 
were able to employ this doctrinal knowledge in job assignments, where they advocated the 
most appropriate methods of air power employment in both joint and combined 
environments. As Sir Michael Howard noted in 1974: 
I am tempted to declare that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working 
on, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter 
that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right 
quickly when the moment arrives.65 
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This has become a hackneyed quote, and it is worth reflecting that the ability to ‘get it right’ 
was based, at least in part, on the opportunity afforded by attendance at institutions like 
Andover for study and reflection. It also mirrored writings on leadership development, 
which suggested that the key to managing change was to develop leaders able to respond to 
new challenges. Given that, during the Second World War, the RAF adapted to shifting 
operational and strategic circumstances, it is possible to suggest that, through Andover, the 
Service generated flexible and capable leaders able to adapt and ‘get it right’ when it 
mattered. Thus, Andover generated organisational capacity at the senior level through 
leadership development. The impact of this form of action learning in this period was 
limited by exogenous factors like economic and strategic imperatives, which restricted the 
apportionment of resources and created tension at senior service levels. Nevertheless, as 
Chapter Seven suggests, there was limited success in bridging conceptual gaps between the 
services, and Leigh-Mallory was involved in this due to his service at the School of Army 
Co-Operation and as DS at Camberley. Concerning appointments as Staff College DS, only 
26 per cent of Appendix Four served in such a position, thus illustrating the trust placed in 
officers like Leigh-Mallory to educate other officers. This can be taken further for Leigh-
Mallory as he was appointed as DS at Camberley, thus not educating his own service, but 
officers of the Army. Therefore, the RAF vested a degree of trust in Leigh-Mallory’s ability 
to help shape and inform Army colleagues on the character of air warfare. 
Early lectures had a Clausewitzian feel, and while On War itself never found its way 
onto the reading list at Andover, they highlight the influence that Camberley had on 
Brooke-Popham’s teachings where the work of Henderson remained prominent.66 
Henderson served as Professor of Military Art and History at Camberley between 1892 and 
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1899, during which time he published a major operational military biography, his 1898 
study of Lieutenant General ‘Stonewall’ Jackson during the American Civil War.67 Writers 
influenced by Clausewitz, like Corbett and Henderson, were present on Andover’s reading 
list. However, it is difficult to quantify Clausewitz’s influence on air power theory in the 
RAF, as he is never explicitly mentioned in Andover’s lectures. Nonetheless, in a 1921 
JRUSI article, GC John Chamier paraphrased Clausewitz’s often quoted dictum as, ‘War is 
a continuation of national policy’, showing at least some familiarity with his writings.68 It 
also illustrates that Clausewitz codified a dictum that was an immutable belief about the 
nature and purpose of war that remains relevant today despite continuing debate on the 
subject. This phrase not only made its way into Andover’s lectures, but also those delivered 
at other RAF units, such as Flying Training Schools.69 While Michel Foucault reversed 
Clausewitz’s view and suggested that politics is a continuation of war by other means, the 
views of the latter mirrored those of his contemporaries and drew on works like Nicolò 
Machiavelli when composing his views on the nature of war.70 Furthermore, as Christopher 
Bassford noted, Clausewitz, in his dialectic in Book One of On War, superseded this phrase 
when he constructed his trinity of violence, chance and reason.71 The nature of this has 
been much debated as it has commonly been simplified as government, army and people.72 
Nonetheless, the character and evolution of Clausewitz’s writings illustrate the 
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development of his own thinking on the complex and potentially contradictory nature of 
war. Ultimately, both Clausewitz and Foucault, through the lens of power relationships, 
identified the ‘connectivity of war to politics’, but from opposite ends of the viewfinder.73 
This connectivity is an unstable relationship, which requires capable leaders to manage the 
ambiguities that emerge between elements of the trinity. Therefore, an awareness of such 
complex concepts through the study of texts derived from military thinkers like Clausewitz 
helped nurtured officers to mature intellectually in preparation for challenges they faced as 
senior leaders, like managing relationships with politicians and civil servants. For selected 
officers, this was further developed at the IDC, where they worked in syndicates with civil 
servants. Thus, while the advent of air power affected the character of war and the 
perceived means of achieving victory, it did not change its nature or principles. This was 
because, as Antulio Echevarria related about the trinity and policy, ‘technological advances 
will not alter the framework of war since they affect the grammar of war, not its logic’.74 
This, in part, helps explain the similarities between the capstone doctrines of the British 
military; for example, as Searle noted, Brooke-Popham recognised the importance of 
Fuller’s 1916 JRUSI article on the ‘Principles of War’ in an Andover lecture of the same 
name. Searle also acknowledged the influence that Clausewitz had on Fuller as well as the 
varied nature of the development of strategic thought.75 This illustrates that the 
development of strategic thought derived heavily from historical experience, which was 
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used as an analytical prism to codify thinking; for example, Fuller’s own writings derived 
from his First World War experience. Therefore, while the teaching of key principles of 
war remained consistent among the services during this period, their origins remain 
complex. Additionally, a thorough understanding of these shared principles also 
contributed to the British military’s burgeoning strategic culture as they influenced the 
leaders the services nurtured and allowed them to converse in a common language. 
Conversely, the inclusion of writers like Mahan on Andover’s reading lists suggests an 
attempt to draw lessons from a variety of sources and give officers a broad conception of 
strategic thought, and not the rejection of the past as discussed below.  
While, as Gray noted, it is easy to overemphasise the significance and influence that 
a Staff College education had on officers’ development, there is one aspect of Andover that 
has largely been ignored. This is the value placed on the post-nominal psa and its role in 
succession planning.76 This is explained, in part, by the aforementioned narrow view of 
Andover’s purpose concerning doctrinal development. By ignoring leadership 
development, historians have only partially considered Andover’s broader implications. 
English’s focus on strategic bombing led him to assert, correctly, that by the 1930s, an 
ever-increasing proportion of officers undertaking staff duties in the Air Ministry passed 
through Andover; however, he failed to place this into the context of the career 
development of these men, and he stopped at the implications it had on RAF policy.77 The 
Air Ministry actively nurtured capable officers, and the award of psa became a symbol of 
prestige amongst officers who typically moved into key positions. For example, officers 
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regularly recalled that the course was ‘much-prized’ and that, as a FL, it was ‘something that 
one ought to do’.78 This paralleled the Army’s experience, as French stated: 
After 1918 increasing numbers of officers recognised that the initials “p.s.c.” 
were becoming an indispensable passport to the higher ranks.79  
 
The prestige of psa is illustrated by the example of Andover’s initial DS who attended 
Camberley, Quetta or Greenwich. They were awarded the post-nominal qs, which denoted 
the successful completion of a course at one of these institutions; however, psa replaced qs 
in the AFL once a tour of duty as DS at Andover was completed. This reinforced the pre-
eminence the RAF placed on the former symbol as Andover reinforced Service culture. By 
awarding qs rather than psc to those officers selected to attend Camberley or Greenwich, 
the RAF made a statement concerning its preference for Andover, though, as illustrated 
below, this was not as monolithic as it appears, as officers regularly attended the former 
institutions. Key was that officers attending Camberley or Greenwich, like Tedder, often 
returned to Andover as DS. However, it is worth reflecting here on the ‘elite’ character of 
Staff College attendance in Appendix Three. Focussing on just Andover, seven per cent of 
the prosopography population in general enjoyed this experience, and only one officer, 
Bromet, had retired before 1939, though this figure does increase to 35 per cent when 
correlated to those 71 still serving. However, as noted in Chapter Five, Bromet returned to 
service and became an AVM. More broadly, taking into account attendance at Camberley 
or Greenwich, this figure only increases to 13 per cent, and of those 54 officers, 46, or 85 
per cent, remained in service, thus highlighting the Service’s desire to keep well qualified 
people in service. Of 71 officers from Appendix Three still serving in 1939, 76 per cent 
experienced Staff College education in general. More specifically, as Chart 3.4 highlighted, 
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75 per cent of officers from Appendix Four had Staff College education, which included 
those who eventually became DS. This reinforces the power of symbols such as psa and qs, 
and the reason Staff College was viewed as something officers should do. 
The power to award psa rested with the Commandant and his confidential reports 
on students’ performance during the course. In 1924, the Air Ministry informed Brooke-
Popham that students deemed not ‘likely to succeed’ as staff officers were not to be 
entitled to use psa in the AFL despite finishing the course.80 This was reiterated in 1927 
when the DOSD, AVM Ivo Vesey, informed the Commandant, AVM Edgar Ludlow-
Hewitt, of several key considerations related to the award of psa.81 First, an officer 
completing the staff course might not necessarily be able to fill all types of staff positions. 
Second, consideration should be given to officers likely to develop their skills and 
experience further. Third, the granting of psa should be withheld if the officer was deemed 
deficient for staff work. Finally, the failure to gain psa was not to be a bar on an officer’s 
future ‘regimental’ employment and promotion.82 Regarding the first two points, the Air 
Ministry noted that Andover could only lay the foundation for an effective staff officer and 
that students were judged on their status and suitability for future staff duties. There was 
little fear of withholding psa, with Brooke-Popham’s confidential report on Leigh-Mallory’s 
course noting that at least one candidate was not deemed sufficiently capable of being 
awarded it.83 Interestingly, Vesey was an Army officer with significant staff experience who 
was loaned to the RAF in this period while its staff system developed and until suitably 
qualified officers emerged. The significance of psa for promotion and leadership 
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development was made explicit in 1931 when DOSD wrote to the Commandant, now AC 
Joubert: 
It is from among officers awarded p.s.a. that the Air Council will, eventually, 
look to find their higher commanders, and it is improbable that an officer will 
ever reach a position of high command who is incapable of carrying out 
normal staff work.84 
 
Therefore, there was a clear relationship amongst leadership development, Andover and 
staff duties, and while concerns existed, they related to the quality of officers being 
recommended for Andover. The Air Ministry’s position concerning psa, outlined to the 
Commandant throughout the 1920s, could be found in The King’s Regulations and was 
publically noted in Flight, which stated: 
The College does not exist only to turn out efficient staff officers, but it is to 
the graduates that the Service naturally looks for its future leaders.85  
 
The wider implication of DOSD’s 1927 memorandum and its continuous reiteration both 
publically and in regulations was that officers were not penalised for their lack of Staff 
College experience, as the RAF recognised that they could provide useful service in 
operational roles.86 Access, however, to the most senior ranks was closed to those who did 
not successfully complete Staff College, as it typically cut an officer off from service in the 
Air Ministry. For example, Tyssen, who temporarily commanded 12 Group as an AC 
before Leigh-Mallory, had air staff experience in operational commands but never served in 
the Air Staff due to his lack of Staff College experience. Tyssen finished his career as an 
AVM.  
 
6.2 Military Education with the British Army and Royal Navy 
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The Air Ministry regularly selected officers to attend military education courses run by the 
Army and RN, and while it is not necessary to delve into the minutiae of these institutions 
development, it is worth considering their significance to the RAF and its implications for 
succession planning. Concerning the role of the staff colleges, the First Sea Lord, Admiral 
of the Fleet Sir Charles Madden, reflected in the discussion session of a 1928 RUSI lecture 
on ‘The Modern Staff Officer’ by MajGen Edmund Ironside, a former Commandant of 
Camberley: 
We appreciate that it is a great benefit to be allowed to send two officers a year 
to the Staff College at Camberley and one to the RAF College at Andover to 
widen our views on staff work.87 
 
While Madden did not expand on the idea of this ‘great benefit’, understanding how staff 
systems and colleges of sister services worked through action learning and socialisation was 
important. The RAF readily accepted this view.88 By adopting a policy of selecting officers 
to attend the other services staff colleges, the RAF encouraged this ‘great benefit’. It was 
also a reciprocal process, as Army and RN officers regularly attended Andover from the 
Second Course onwards. A third of officers from Appendix Four attended Camberley, 
Quetta or Greenwich, with eight attending both these institutions and Andover in various 
guises. There was no correlation between officers’ previous service in the RFC or RNAS 
and the institutions they attended; for example, Tedder, originally an RFC officer, attended 
Greenwich, while Longmore, an RNAS officer, attended Camberley. Thus, sending officers 
to the opposite Staff College from their original service appeared to have been a 
progressive and sensible practice to develop individual and organisational knowledge, 
though, admittedly, this might not have been a factor considered in their selection.   
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The above institutions foundation is marked by their service’s recognition that 
officers’ intellectual capabilities needed development if they were to lead the modern 
militaries that emerged in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Leadership 
challenges like the shifting pace of technological change, the military’s social composition, 
and the need to professionalise in the face of external competition from industry all 
contributed to changes in the character of command, and officers required education in 
how to cope with this. This challenge was characterised by the establishment of staff 
systems to manage these changes. The development of these systems was not always 
smooth, as illustrated by the Army’s rejection of key elements of the second report of the 
1890 Hartington Commission, which examined administration in both services.89 
Camberley, founded in 1858 by converting Sandhurst’s Senior Department into the Staff 
College, emerged on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge.90 
This was part of wider reforms to Army education introduced by the CME in the late 
1850s and 1860s.91 Before the First World War, Camberley’s status was culturally 
constrained by the regimental system, which disdained professionalism and staff officers; 
however, it increasingly became, as with Andover, the typical route for officers seeking to 
become senior leaders. The number of applicants for Camberley reached a ratio of four 
candidates for every position by 1904.92 Quetta, founded at Deolali in 1905, moved to its 
permanent home in 1907, and it was widely considered a mirror of Camberley with some 
regional variations.93 Unlike the Army, the RN did not formally institute a Staff College 
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until 1919 when it stood up at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.94 Recognised during 
the First World War after the institution of a War Staff Course, the importance of 
Greenwich emerged after an initial two courses ran as an adjunct to the SOWC in 1913 and 
1914. These courses began after the Naval Staff’s foundation in 1912 and represented what 
Davison described as the change in the ‘culture of command’ that confronted the 
Executive Branch of the RN as it coped with the service’s technological change in the late-
nineteenth century.95 The staff colleges shared a common purpose, which recognised the 
need for effective military education and an introduction to the professional knowledge 
that underpinned an officer’s profession. Each acted as part of a leadership development 
process for future senior leaders that was present in the services, and by 1919, were 
accepted elements of an officer’s career progression.96 They also, as Searle recognised, 
shared common views on the principles of war, which suggested more continuity amongst 
the services rather than the focus on their differences.97 
The key difference amongst the staff colleges lay in course length. Camberley was a 
two-year course split between Junior and Senior Divisions, while Greenwich was ostensibly 
only for a year; however, the latter formed part of an educational process that led some 
officers to undertake the SOWC. Continuation to the Senior Division of Camberley was 
dependent on successful completion of the Junior Division. Attendance on the SOWC was 
not dependent on the completion of the RN Staff College course because the latter only 
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began in 1919, though there was symbiosis due to their co-location at Greenwich after 
1920. Rear-Admiral H.H. Smith suggested that to rise to the rank of Captain, an officer had 
to pass through both the Staff College and SOWC, and Ironside, in considering the grander 
purposes of Camberley, labelled it a War College due to the focus on the ‘higher art of war’ 
in the Senior Division.98 This differed from Andover, whose course lasted a year, and while 
discussions took place concerning a refresher course for senior officers, this failed to 
emerge before the Second World War.99 A view held was that too much was crammed into 
Andover’s curriculum; for example, the Commandant, Ludlow-Hewitt, noted in 1930 that 
when the Fifth and Sixth Courses were lengthened to 15 months, it gave them a better 
feel.100 Andover quickly reverted to a year once the course start dates moved into alignment 
with Camberley and Greenwich. While curriculums at Camberley and Greenwich examined 
naval or land operations, as with Andover, they did not predominate. Aspects of the other 
services were discussed to broaden officers’ conceptual knowledge that would give them 
the necessary grounding to operate both as staff officers and as senior leaders in the 
future.101 
Pre-dating its Staff College, the RN established the Naval War Course at 
Greenwich in 1900, which from 1907, became the Royal Naval War College at Portsmouth 
until it moved back in 1914 as a wartime exigency. Re-established in 1920 as a constituent 
part of Greenwich’s establishment, the SOWC, broadly conceived, sought to introduce 
senior Captains to issues of strategy and move naval education away from its technological 
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focus.102 Before the First World War, the SOWC codified British naval thinking, with 
Corbett being a noted lecturer on the course.103 The SOWC was in marked contrast to the 
education systems of the both the RAF and Army, which both lacked a course specifically 
designed to examine only strategic issues. Thus, sending officers to the SOWC was a means 
of bridging an educational gap and delivering value to the RAF. Conversely, the Army 
Senior Officers’ School, set up at Woking in 1920-21, had its antecedents in ad-hoc 
attempts by the Army to establish appropriate training and education regimes before the 
First World War. In 1908, GOC 3rd Division, MajGen W.E. Franklyn, established a ‘War 
School’ where 40 regimental officers undertook a regime of lectures and practical 
problems.104 The course lasted two months, and, while viewed as an affront to the abilities 
of regimental officers, it was an essential educational experience for Majors seeking 
battalion command at the tactical level rather than the strategic thinking encouraged at 
SOWC.105 It was also an attempt to create a uniform and common tactical doctrine, and 
was a necessary step in promotion to LtCol. The course covered a variety of subjects 
ranging from logistics to barrack services, included lectures on both naval, and air warfare. 
It also made thorough use of war games to examine tactical problems.106 Leigh-Mallory’s 
selection for this course reinforces the argument that the Air Ministry actively nurtured 
officers at appropriate points in their careers; in 1922, SL Leigh-Mallory was serving at the 
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School of Army Co-Operation, which worked closely with the Army. The Senior Officers’ 
School had only recently re-opened; therefore, Leigh-Mallory’s selection at such a point 
was important in a career trajectory that continued to see him specialise in army co-
operation in the 1920s. 
The value placed on education by the RAF saw the Service learn from the 
challenges that confronted its predecessors, and, while Andover was not immediately 
established, the Service appointed officers to attend courses at both Camberley and 
Greenwich from 1919 onwards. Camberley’s regulations made clear that RAF officers 
entered ‘by selection by the Air Ministry’.107 The Air Ministry specifically selected officers 
to attend these institutions, and Orange suggested that Trenchard himself sent Tedder to 
Greenwich.108 Trenchard certainly played a role in this process; however, Orange’s reliance 
on Derek Waldie’s 1980 PhD decontextualised this process, as the latter implied that the 
appointment of officers to the staff colleges started in 1923.109 Before 1923, RAF officers 
were attending Camberley or Greenwich, with both WgCr Joubert and SL Evill attending 
Camberley in 1920 and 1921 respectively.110 Air Ministry selection illustrates that marked 
out officers were the most appropriate to gain experience from the other services, which 
allowed for the development of knowledge that would support the RAF’s improvement. It 
indicates a reciprocal relationship between nurturing and action learning where the Air 
Ministry vested trust in selected officers. As RAF representatives, these officers were 
required to deliver lectures on air power. Through what is now considered action learning, 
nurtured officers educated both the Army and RN as trusted Service representatives as they 
‘sold’ RAF culture by illustrating how the Service could co-operate with the Army and RN 
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to make their operations more efficient. Tedder, while attending Greenwich in 1923, 
delivered a lecture on ‘The Bomb as a Weapon against Ships’ that no doubt caused much 
debate.111  
Attendance was a development of an ad-hoc process established between the 
SOWC and Camberley when Corbett began lecturing at the latter in 1905 on the subject of 
combined operations.112 No RN officer attended Camberley as a student, though Royal 
Marine officers like MajGen Sir George Aston did.113 Aston attended as student and DS 
between 1904 and 1908, though his influence in the latter position was dependent on the 
patronage of the Commandant. During Aston’s time, Camberley held a series of combined 
operations exercises that led to the development of the Manual of Combined Naval and 
Military Operations, published in 1911 and 1913, which set a precedent for those held 
amongst the three staff colleges in the inter-war years.114 As Jim Beach noted, apart from 
developing some knowledge of amphibious operations, the key advantage of the exercise 
was ‘the interaction between the two sides, both socially as well as professionally’.115 This 
became prominent in post-war years when in 1919, Camberley’s Commandant, MajGen 
Hastings Anderson, recognised that the RAF needed to be included in the combined 
operations exercises to develop a holistic view that incorporated observations concerning 
the employment of air power.116 That the first two RAF officers, including Joubert, 
attended Camberley in 1920 cannot be viewed in isolation from this recognition.  
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Joubert described his time at Camberley as composed of heated debates over the 
respective roles of the Army and RAF, but noted that all disagreements were solved ‘over a 
round of pink gin in the Mess’.117 Longmore also noted the role of social activities when 
attending Camberley in 1922: 
Golf and hockey matches were arranged and both sailors and airmen went with 
the famous Staff College drag-hunt.118  
 
Several RAF officers, including Harris and Slessor, recalled having horses and being able to 
partake of the drag hunt; the former was suitably impressed with a certain LtCol 
Montgomery who was DS in 1928.119 While neither Owen nor Orange identified any overt 
socialisation for Tedder’s time at Greenwich in 1923, he attended the course with future 
senior officers like Vice-Admiral Frank Pegram, who served as the Fourth Sea Lord during 
the Second World War; therefore, it is reasonable to presume that it occurred.120 Similar 
advantages were present at the Army Senior Officers’ School and the SOWC. This 
flexibility and pragmatism in the socialisation amongst the services suggests that in the First 
World War’s aftermath, each service sought to learn from their joint experiences. For 
example, while Gray suggested that Portal might have preferred it if Harris had attended 
Andover, this perhaps ignores the broader value the RAF placed on attendance to the 
other service’s staff colleges and was more to do with the latter’s personality than his 
education; though as noted below, Harris’ lack of IDC attendance perhaps reinforces 
Gray’s criticism.121 However, a key senior leadership challenge remains the necessity to 
break down cultural barriers to effect the application of aim and vision, which is 
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particularly noticeable in the joint environment.122 As officers attending Staff College were 
marked for future senior command as part of succession planning, the process of 
socialisation was of inestimable value, as it allowed them to understand the culture and 
viewpoints of the other services, thus preparing them for these challenges. Reinforced 
annually through combined operations exercises, these activities had a twofold impact: first, 
they introduced officers to ideas and doctrines of the other services; and second, they 
began to breed a degree of understanding amongst them that influenced the evolution of a 
common strategic culture in the British military. The existence and acceptance of this 
socialisation process compared well to the French military education system. Joubert, who 
visited the French Écoles Supérieures de Guerre in Paris with Brooke-Popham in 1921, was 
critical of the lack of cooperation with the French Navy and their equivalent school.123  
 
6.3 The Imperial Defence College 
Established in 1927, the IDC was the final element in developing the future senior 
leadership of the British military. Its foundation represented a step change in military 
education provision for the British that also had implications for the evolution of inter-
service strategic culture. In any organisation, leaders drive strategic culture, and the 
provision of effective education for nurtured future senior leaders allowed the British 
military to engage in a process of leadership development that was of value to the 
individual services. It also created a cadre of officers well versed in concepts and 
relationships that ultimately contributed to victory in the Second World War. Before the 
opening of the IDC, there was no joint institution to educate officers in the strategic 
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challenges faced by Britain, the Dominions and the Empire. Thus, one of the IDC’s key 
roles was in furthering individual officers ‘vision’ and ability to see the broader strategic 
picture by translating strategy into manageable operational objectives. This remains a key 
element of effective organisational leadership at senior levels.124 In the words of Prime 
Minister Stanley Baldwin, the central purpose of the IDC was to produce senior leaders 
versed in the ‘broadest sense of grand strategy’, while Maurice Hankey, in his 1945 Sir Lees 
Knowles Lectures, described it as a ‘veritable nursery for leaders’.125 The IDC’s mission 
statement was: 
The training of a body of officers and civilian officials in the broadest aspects 
of imperial strategy.  
 
At the senior level, officers needed to be able to manage relationships with key civilian 
partners, from Civil Servants to ministers, thus socialisation at the IDC provided a 
necessary foundation for understanding these relationships and balances of power. The 
IDC’s curriculum focused on the higher direction of war, the organisation of the services 
and civil defence in their domestic and imperial contexts, the influence of politics on war, 
foreign relations, and economic and industrial policy as it related to imperial defence.126 To 
use a phrase from modern leadership theory, selected officers were schooled to deal with 
‘wicked’ problems at the strategic level where ambiguity existed.127 This was achieved 
through a common educational framework, which was heavily reliant on experiential 
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learning techniques and fostered effective working relationships between key stakeholders. 
The term ‘wicked problems’ relates to those that generate the most resistance and are based 
on relationships with a number of interdependencies where stakeholders meet. Thus, they 
require a degree of vision to find solutions to often-contradictory views that emerge from 
stakeholders holding different values. This is particularly noticeable when the different 
services, who often have divergent cultures and values, work together. Vision remains a key 
leadership ability, though, as noted earlier in this thesis, demarcating such attributes 
between command, leadership and management in potentially unhelpful as each process 
relies on being good at the other. 
During the First World War, the British military lacked sufficient senior officers 
who could operate at the strategic level, where they had to communicate with other 
services, the government, the civil service and coalition partners. Those who could, did so 
more by luck than education. While on the DS at Camberley in 1919, LtCol John Dill 
produced a paper outlining the need for a higher war college set apart from staff colleges, 
which mirrored Haig’s feelings in 1920.128 In 1923, the Committee of Imperial Defence 
(CID) accepted the need for the provision of education concerning strategic aspects of the 
conduct of war for middle ranking officers who would go on to senior leadership and staff 
roles.129 This decision was based on a report authored by the Sub-Committee on the 
Institution of a Joint Staff College, which consisted of Churchill, Vice-Admiral Herbert 
Richmond (Director of the SOWC), MajGen Cecil Romer (Director of Staff Duties at the 
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War Office) and John Salmond (AOC Iraq Command).130 Richmond went on to become 
the first Commandant of the IDC.131 However, the failure to set up the IDC until 1927, as 
William Philpott suggested, must be understood in the context of the internecine service 
debates of the period that failed to establish a unified Ministry of Defence (MoD).132 These 
debates were framed over issues like the apportionment of resources and RAF 
independence. Throughout these discussions, Trenchard supported the idea of a MoD and 
the formation of the IDC, though this position derived from his pragmatism in the face of 
the organisational challenge that threatened RAF independence. As Powers noted, the 
inherent advantage of a joint IDC was that it would give the RAF the appearance of the 
same status as the other services.133 While Lord Salisbury’s Committee on National and 
Imperial Defence eventually led to the establishment of the CoS Sub-Committee of the 
CID as well as acceptance of the need for the IDC, it did not lead to a unified MoD. This 
was, in part, because of Hankey, who supported the idea of the IDC, but did not support 
the MoD’s formation for fear that it ‘would usurp the functions of his cherished CID’.134 
Changes in government in 1923 and 1924 also held up the IDC’s formation until a new 
sub-committee under Lord Irwin in 1926 re-examined the question of its formation, which 
the CID accepted on 29 March 1926.135  
Unlike the staff colleges, those selected for the IDC were specifically identified by 
their representative administrative body and did not go through the process of nomination 
by OC and entry examination. Simply, the War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry selected 
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officers deemed suitable for the course.136 Here, the services nurtured an officer’s career at 
a point where they were experienced commanders, had staff experience and had attended 
Staff College. By sending officers to the IDC, the British military accepted that these 
leaders were being prepared for future strategic challenges in an ever-changing defence 
landscape. Willock, who attended the IDC in 1937 as a GC, recalled that it ‘was a mecca 
for future senior officers’.137 The Air Ministry recognised this and advised Andover’s 
Commandant that students successfully awarded psa were potentially being marked out for 
attendance at the IDC.138 Confidential reports produced at Andover specifically noted 
whether a student was suitable for this next step.139 Of 57 officers who reached Air Rank 
from Andover’s first four courses, 21 attended the IDC. In general, prior Staff College 
experience was essential, despite Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham’s recollections 
that he never attended Greenwich; however, he is slightly disingenuous, as he had 
undertaken the SOWC.140 Typically, for the RAF, officers were WgCrs or GCs and 
equivalents in the Army and RN. On average, WgCrs were six years away from Air Rank or 
the point at which the knowledge gained at the IDC could begin to have real meaning, and 
attendance attracted a return of service for five years, which meant the knowledge 
developed fed back into the organisation, unlike the staff colleges.141 Selection at this level 
also provided adequate distance between an officer’s previous educational experiences at 
Staff College. This space allowed officers to continue to build on their operational 
experience in staff, training and command positions before being identified to take the 
necessary next step in their leadership development. While Leigh-Mallory waited eight years 
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to attend the IDC, this was not unusual, as Park, who attended Andover in 1922, did not 
go until 1937. These differences are principally explained by job assignments like Leigh-
Mallory’s appointment as DDSD between 1932 and 1934, which was part of his career 
rhythm and the nurturing processes in the RAF. The RAF consistently filled its quota of 
officers for the IDC, but often identified future talent at a lower level than its sister 
services, as occasionally, officers at the rank of SL attended the course, which suggests that 
the Service had a progressive attitude to nurturing able individuals. 
The clearest indication that these officers were identified and developed for senior 
leadership roles stems from the work undertaken at the IDC. Here, officers examined and 
analysed issues at the strategic level as well as the future character of war, with particular 
reference to the experience of Britain and the Empire. This examination was based on a 
syndicate teaching system that relied on a mix of experiential and didactic pedagogical 
methods, where officers scrutinised contemporary and future strategic threats that they 
could expect to face. At service staff colleges, officers had already been inculcated with 
common knowledge on subjects like the principles of war, which underpinned further 
study at the IDC. This effective mix of pedagogical methods owed their use to the IDC’s 
first Commandant, Richmond, who, as described by his biographer, Barry Hunt, hoped to 
create an open atmosphere for learning with no relevant subjects off limits.142 Both 
students and DS had ready access to information from the CID to prepare reports and 
staff solutions and run exercises that found their way into the formulation of policy or 
doctrine; thus, the IDC fulfilled a role as a learning organisation that influenced British 
strategic thinking and culture. The DS, whom Reid described as the ‘super-stars’ of the 
services, included notable rising officers like the future Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Admiral 
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Sir Bertram Ramsey, Field Marshal Alanbrooke, and, from the RAF, Portal, Joubert and 
Douglas.143 While it is easy to overstate the impact of staff exercises, students were being 
prepared for senior leadership roles. Both Capel, a student in 1939, and Douglas, both a 
student and DS, recalled this process of strategic planning by ‘fighting on paper’ as the key 
element of their IDC experience.144  
As significant as the DS were, the Commandant’s selection was vital to the IDC’s 
success, as they needed to be rigorous in the application of the standards sought. 
Richmond was the most appropriate choice for the first Commandant given his close 
association with academic study in the RN, with Tedder describing him as ‘that rare 
phenomenon, […] a sailor who is really well educated’.145 Richmond did not hold RAF 
officers in high regard, and this showed in his ‘constant carping’ at the service in some of 
his lectures. Richmond was reminded of this point by a former student in 1942, the Vice-
Chief of the Air Staff, AM Freeman, who noted that his views on air power had shifted 
since his time as Commandant.146 This bias is interesting given that Tedder, Portal, Douglas 
and Leigh-Mallory all attended university, suggesting that this experience was not as widely 
valued in the other services as it perhaps should have been. The two pre-Second World 
War RAF Commandants, Brooke-Popham and Longmore, were excellent choices. By the 
time he became Commandant in 1931, Brooke-Popham had expansive staff and 
educational experience, and as Andover’s first Commandant, he was ideal for the position 
as he had experience of working with the other service’s staff colleges. Longmore also had 
staff and education experience, having served as Cranwell’s Commandant between 1929 
and 1933. 
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As Greg Kennedy illustrated, the CoS Committee used reports and assessments 
produced by students, and the Commandant, for planning British military strategy in the 
Far East during the 1930s.147 These formed part of the CoS’ discussions about imperial 
strategy. The IDC examined numerous scenarios and covered a wide range of situations, 
including war with all the major powers, on their own or in a coalition; Leigh-Mallory’s 
course in 1934 considered the possibility of war in the Far East and defence of the 
Empire.148 Through their syndicates, students integrated service specific knowledge with 
that of other members to create solutions that considered all aspects of national strategy; 
syndicates included members of the Civil Service and Dominion representatives, thus 
broadening officers’ perspectives.149 In the area of doctrine, the CoS Committee took 
account of the Commandant’s recommendation in 1935 that the Manual of Combined 
Operations be updated to consider the process of producing appreciations and planning for 
combined operations more fully.150 This was based on the use of the Manual of Combined 
Operations in syndicated exercises. This began a process whereby the British military 
accepted combined operations in their broader sense as the RAF had advocated as early as 
1922.151 At a practical level, students used staff rides and experiential learning to explore 
imperial strategy; introduced by Richmond’s successor, MajGen W.H. Bartholomew, who, 
based on his Camberley experience, saw them as useful pedagogical methods.152 While John 
McCarthy criticised these pedagogical methods, Peter Caddick-Adams argued that they 
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were an important tool and not just an examination of the past with the benefit of 
hindsight.153 The CoS Committee renewed the allowance needed for the tours each 
academic year, thus sharing the view that this was a useful method of preparing future 
senior leaders. 
During the first course, students undertook lectures, produced appreciations and 
conducted staff exercises on a variety of topics including: the strength and dispositions of 
the Armed Forces of the Crown relative to Imperial commitments; France, the British 
Empire and Japan; the principles of war; the British Empire, France and Belgium versus 
Germany; and the general policy governing the distribution and development of each of 
the fighting services of the empire during the next decade.154 These themes remained 
largely consistent up to 1939, and any changes reflected the geo-political situation in 
Europe and the Far East.155 Noted senior government civil servants and experts, such as 
Fuller, Hankey and Lord Ismay, delivered lectures. In 1939, Ismay gave a lecture on the 
subject of the CID, which was based on his JRUSI article of the same theme.156 Use of 
these subject matter experts ensured students received up to date information for the 
problems they examined while reinforcing the importance and prestige of the course. 
Other subjects varied from ‘Economics in Modern War’ to the ‘Food Supply of London’.157 
Concerning leadership, of particular interest was the lecture delivered by the Commandant, 
Brooke-Popham, to Leigh-Mallory’s cohort in 1934 on the subject of the ‘Higher Direction 
                                                          
153 John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 1918-1939: A Study in Air and Sea Power (St Lucia: University 
of Queensland Press, 1976), p. 66; Caddick-Adams, ‘Footsteps Across Time’, pp. 326-8. 
154 TNA, CAB 53/14, Report by the Commandant on the First Session of the Imperial Defence College, 
January to December 1927, 22 December 1927. 
155 Longmore, From Sea to Sky, p. 176. 
156 TNA, CAB 21/1197, ‘The Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence’, Lecture by Major-General 
Hastings Ismay, 1 March 1939; Major-General H. L. Ismay, ‘The Machinery of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence’, JRUSI, 84 (1939), pp. 241-57. 
157 TNA, CAB 21/1197, ‘Economics in Modern War’, Lecture by Major Desmond Morton, Director of the 
Industrial Intelligence Centre, February 1939; TNA, MAF 60/447, ‘Food Supply of London’, Lecture by Mr 
R.J. Foley, Mercantile Marine Department, 28 January 1928. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Military Education and Leadership Development in the Royal Air Force Page 252 
 
of War’. This leadership-based lecture developed many of the themes that Leigh-Mallory 
would have been familiar with from his lectures by Brooke-Popham at Andover. It built on 
these by introducing students to values relating to the direction of war at the strategic level 
that corresponded to principles of war.158 It examined both the positive and negative 
aspects of the war cabinet system and the role of responsibility, and, as with his lectures at 
Andover, Brooke-Popham utilised historical analysis to illustrate his argument. Inherent in 
this lecture was the difficulty of defining the strategic level. Brooke-Popham used the 
explanation provided by the Naval War Manual of 1925, which defined strategy in terms of 
the management of war and its resources, principally its human element.159 Brooke-
Popham was clear that leadership was required at the highest level through the 
management of relationships and resources, which emerged from the provision of strategic 
‘vision’, and he reinforced the idea of being able to talk the same language as officers from 
other services and cultures, a theme stressed throughout the IDC’s course.160  
Modern conceptions of socialisation were present in all that the students and DS 
did at the IDC. Both Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, a student on the first course in 
1927, and Joubert, who was DS between 1927 and 1929, recalled that during the Second 
World War, those officers who attended the IDC all spoke a common language, which, 
while based on hindsight, was a reasonable deduction based on experience.161 The 
integration of service cultures allowed officers to work with a degree of flexibility during 
the Second World War. For example, the key wartime CoS exhibited the ability to look up 
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and outside their service ‘silos’ when working with one another and in coalition settings.162 
However, while adhering to common strategic principals, there were times when specific 
services differing perspectives on the means of enacting them challenged key senior 
leaders. For example, the issue of air support for the Army stretched relations between 
Portal and Alanbrooke and highlighted challenges related to both the apportionment of 
resources and differing conceptions related to air power’s employment.163 Differences often 
represented alternative views over the means, rather than the ways, of achieving common 
strategic principles shared amongst the services and highlighted continuing tensions that 
characterised leadership at the senior level. This did not, overall, damage the conduct of the 
Second World War, as problems tended to be solved by the CoS system. The wartime 
success of CoS was, in part, due to all, except for Ironside and Pound, attending the IDC 
as either students or DS, or, for Portal and Alanbrooke, as both. However, Higham 
suggested that few who went to the IDC achieved positions of influence and that the 
College was an attempt to overcome the ‘parochial training’ of the service staff colleges.164 
On the latter issue, it is possible to suggest that the IDC was actually a progressive attempt 
to build on the foundations provided by institutions like Andover, and one that did not go 
un-noticed by other countries. As James Corum noted, the IDC’s success at preparing 
senior leaders was copied in Germany when, in 1935, the Wehrmacht established the 
Wehrmachtakademie, which aimed to provide education to selected staff officers in higher 
                                                          
162 For Portal’s time as a student, see: Richards, Portal, p. 99. On Alanbrooke’s and Cunningham’s 
experiences, see: David Fraser, Alanbrooke (London: Hamlyn, 1983 [1982]), pp. 93-4; Cunningham; A Sailor’s 
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forms of warfare in the joint environment.165 On the issue of influence, French remarked 
concerning the Army that attendance was an indication that you had been: 
earmarked as likely to become full generals and to serve as either commanders-
in-chief or chiefs of staff.166  
 
The IDC’s influence is clear when its register is examined and the names of those who 
attended are analysed. For example, Appendix Five illustrates that 85 per cent of RAF 
officers who attended the first ten courses at the IDC reached Air Rank, and many reached 
influential positions at the strategic and operational levels.167 Figures of 68 and 75 per cent 
respectively existed for the Army and RN. However, attendance was clearly ‘elite’ in 
character as only four per cent of officers from Appendix Three attended the IDC; of 
these, only Capel, who actually attended in 1939 as a GC, did not hold Air Rank in 1939, 
though he would go on to become an AVM. This increases to 15 per cent when focused on 
those in Appendix Three who still served in 1939, and, clearly, this ‘elite’ education was 
part of preparation for senior positions, and these officers all had some prior Staff College 
experience. Additionally, attendance had imperial influence, with representatives from the 
Indian Army and the services of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Besides 
the names readily identifiable in Appendix Five, other notable attendees included: 
Auchinleck (1927) and Slim (1937) from the Indian Army; Generals Andrew McNaughton 
(1927) and Henry Crerar (1934) and Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns (1939) from the 
Canadian Army; ACM Lloyd Breadner (1935) from the Royal Canadian Air Force; and AM 
Sir Richard Williams (1933) of the Royal Australian Air Force.168 Through a symbiosis of 
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nurturing, action learning and socialisation, the IDC encouraged an ability to understand 
differing views at all levels.169 These men led the British Imperial military to victory in the 
Second World War. However, there were two notable exceptions to this career rhythm, 
Harris and Montgomery, who might have benefitted from attending the course. 
 
6.4 Knowledge Transfer and Writing for Military Journals 
In his 1938 RUSI lecture, Longmore advocated the use of the Institution as part of an 
officer’s rise to senior leadership and noted that it ‘ha[d] done so much […] to further the 
scientific study of war’.170 RUSI’s perceived importance raises questions about RAF 
officers’ professionalism and ownership of leadership development through informal 
socialisation and action learning to further their career aspirations. Engagement with 
theory, knowledge and skills related to an officer’s chosen profession illustrates a desire 
from both the individual and the organisation to engage with constructs underpinning 
development and reinforcing institutional professionalism. For the RAF, this meant the 
nascent air power theory that emerged in this period, exploring its uses as well as explaining 
the Service’s purpose while developing a culture based on the efficient use of military 
aviation. Officers writing in journals were the RAF’s military intellectuals, defined simply as 
those who wrote articles, contributed to, and engaged with professional knowledge, rather 
than just a specific consideration of the merit of their works.171 The emergence of such 
officers highlights a tension between the RAF’s heroic view of leadership and those 
                                                                                                                                                                          
McNaughton and the Canadian Army, 1939-1943 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2010), p. 26. Both 
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169 French has identified 19 British Army divisional commanders of the Second World War that attended the 
IDC, see: David French, ‘Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisional Commanders in the War 
against Germany, 1939-1945’, The English Historical Review, 111(444) (1996), p. 1188. 
170 Longmore, ‘Training for Higher Command’, p. 474. 
171 This definition comes from Linn’s work on the US Army’s way of war, see: Linn, The Echo of Battle, p. 247, 
fn. 3. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Military Education and Leadership Development in the Royal Air Force Page 256 
 
pushing knowledge in a new sphere of military art and science. The small number of RAF 
officers writing for and partaking in the opportunities presented by organisations and 
journals like RUSI and RAFQ suggests that the Service was not effectively able to relax this 
tension. The historiography concerning RAF officers writing in military journals has been 
limited to its relationship to the development of doctrine. Powers recognised that through 
military journals, the RAF managed to evolve ‘a generalised concept about the future 
impact of air warfare’, while Parton noted that between 1918 and 1923, RAF officers wrote 
roughly six per cent of articles in JRUSI.172 However, neither Powers nor Parton recognised 
the relationship amongst writing for military journals, officers’ career progression and 
leadership development. Moving beyond simple statistics and considering career 
trajectories indicates a more nuanced picture that suggests that the RAF recognised the 
value of writing, as many of those who wrote emerged as senior leaders. Nevertheless, 
more broadly, anti-intellectualism did remain amongst the officer class as a whole.  
Concerning writing in the RAF during the 1920s, the historiography has focused on 
Trenchard’s role and his concern over the publication of SL C.G. Burge’s book The Basic 
Principles of Air Warfare, as the latter was the former’s Personal Assistant.173 Higham claimed 
this book was Trenchard’s ‘Clausewitz’, while Parton contradicted this, arguing that he did 
what he could to stop its publication.174 Burge claimed that the key reason that the Air 
Ministry initially banned the book was because of Trenchard’s concern that it might 
generate criticism. Specifically, both Boyle and Liddell Hart claimed that Trenchard was 
concerned about criticism from Sykes and his potential influence on his father-in-law, the 
Prime Minister, Sir Andrew Bonar Law; Sykes, who served as CAS in 1918, retired as 
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Controller-General of Civil Aviation in 1922 and entered the House of Commons as MP 
for Sheffield Hallam.175 Liddell Hart noted: 
Trenchard had said he did not wish any officer to write books – as writing, the 
means to clarity of ideas, was the RAF’s weak point in my opinion. (Emphasis 
in original)176  
 
Tellingly, Sykes made no mention of this episode in his autobiography From Many Angles. 
Burge’s book was eventually published under the pseudonym of ‘Squadron-Leader’, and 
Parton suggested that it effectively curtailed his career in the RAF, though he went on to 
edit RAFQ, which became a key output for writing about air power in the 1930s.177 Despite 
Burge having served as Trenchard’s Personal Staff Officer, it fell to an Army officer, 
Ironside, to supply the book’s foreword, which runs counter to Higham’s view of 
Trenchard’s support. However, understanding that Trenchard’s concern related to books, 
which were publically available, rather than journal articles, whose primary audience was 
the military and interested parties, should frame Liddell Hart’s caution. Concerning journal 
articles, the RAF and Trenchard encouraged qualified engagement with this process to 
shape air power debates and to promulgate Air Ministry thinking on topical issues. 
Despite Trenchard’s concern and his attempts at control, the Air Council was 
aware of the potential advantages that engagement with service audiences through writing 
delivered, primarily the ownership of ideas concerning air power’s employment. On 22 
April 1920, AMWO No. 354 outlined regulations governing the publication of articles 
written by serving officers.178 The Air Council encouraged officers to write where 
applicable and provided the necessary guidance for this process. This encouragement 
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allowed the RAF to develop its intellectuals, which allowed the Service to overcome what 
Trenchard decried as the lack of a ‘Royal Air Force Clausewitz or Hamley or Mahan’.179 
Trenchard hoped to develop key principles related to air power employment as they 
concerned the most efficient way of war. However, by 1923, Trenchard illustrated some 
concern over the writing of articles as evidenced by the advice received by Andover’s 
Commandant, Brooke-Popham, from CAS’s Private Secretary, Captain T.B. Marson, which 
suggested that publishing would cause controversy.180 This statement is contextualised, 
however, by the RAF’s lack of critical mass at this point concerning the number of officers 
who had passed through Andover. Trenchard’s seemingly ambivalent position highlights 
the axiomatic view that attendance at Andover was increasingly important for those 
wishing to write on air power. Not until enough officers had passed through Andover 
would Trenchard feel at ease about them writing on air power. While this suggests an 
attempt to produce an indoctrinated view of air power employment, this ignores the broad 
character of Andover’s curriculum noted above and the variety of material written by 
officers. This critical mass arguably was not reached until Trenchard stood down as CAS in 
1929. Additionally, RAFQ’s foundation in 1930 suggests that it was at about this point that 
the RAF felt safe to make its own statements on air power through its own journal, and 
until that point, writing in other spheres fell to selected officers, which included members 
of Andover’s DS. Nevertheless, by issuing the aforementioned AMWO, the Air Ministry 
encouraged officers to engage in informal action learning through a discussion of their 
profession and its conceptual knowledge. This development process encompassed writing 
for military journals like RAFQ and The Army Quarterly, and membership of RUSI. TNR 
was closed to RAF officers, as membership was only open to officers of the RN and 
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commonwealth navies, and certain other individuals in the Admiralty.181 This closed off this 
avenue of debate concerning air power’s employment except for articles by Fuller on the 
supremacy of air power, which were similar to those lectures he delivered at Andover.182  
Ostensibly independent, RUSI was the key body for officers and existed for 
‘promoting and advancing naval and military science and literature’ in an environment 
conducive to its discussion; though, as Damien O’Connor illustrated, it received official 
support when appropriate.183 RUSI membership came from serving and retired officers of 
all three services and was the closest that the military came to having a learned society to 
promote the study of their profession. A marker in the evolution of professionalism of the 
British military, similar parallel organisations existed for other established professions, 
which promoted and supported members’ development. From 1920 onwards, the Air 
Council encouraged RUSI membership and regularly noted its ‘real value […] for the 
advancement of professional education’ of officers.184 The RAF also attempted to get its 
emblem placed on the RUSI crest, while Trenchard joined RUSI in 1925 and became the 
first RAF officer to hold the position of Vice-President.185 In valuing RUSI, the Air 
Council understood that, besides owning and shaping air power debates, it had a stake in 
encouraging personal development through the advantages of socialisation that integration 
into the intellectual activities of the Institution sought to deliver. RUSI reinforced this by 
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deciding in 1928 to make CAS, CIGS, the First Sea Lord and the Staff College’s 
Commandants ex officio council members.186  
Despite the value placed on RUSI by the RAF, Chart 6.1 suggests that the Service 
struggled to recruit members.187 Only in 1935/1936 did the number of officers joining 
RUSI reach greater than 50. However, RAF membership maintained a steady rate during 
this period, being broadly comparable with that of the RN. In 1928/1929, 14 RAF officers 
joined RUSI, compared to 24 from the RN. In 1929, the GD Branch contained 2,512 
officers, compared to 8,363 in the Army, excluding those on the Indian establishment, and 
6,276 in the RN.188 Nonetheless, key is the question of who joined RUSI, and Leigh-
Mallory was in a large minority, with 40 per cent of officers in Appendix Four being 
members.189 Joining dates highlight a difference in officers’ motivation for becoming RUSI 
members, with two key reasons identifiable. First, officers joined when they were due to 
attend Staff College; Douglas and Portal joined in 1922 when they attended Andover as 
SLs, which was no coincidence, as Staff College candidates were encouraged to read 
journals, especially JRUSI.190 Another reason linked to personal professional development, 
for which there is no clear pattern. Leigh-Mallory, who joined RUSI in 1931 after giving his 
lecture on the subject of ‘Air Co-Operation with Mechanized Forces’ on 5 March 1930 
while he was serving on the DS at Camberley, is part of this latter group. This experience 
probably encouraged him to experience RUSI’s benefits. Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald 
Montgomery-Massingberd, who in 1918 was Chief of Staff to the Fourth Army, which 
Major Leigh-Mallory’s 8 Squadron operated with, chaired his lecture. Both reasons suggest 
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a desire on the part of these officers to take ownership of their education and development 
while improving their career opportunities by making themselves more ‘visible’ for 
promotion. 
Apart from the advantage of being a RUSI member, with the attendant benefits of 
use of its library and admittance to lectures, another aspect of engaging with this form of 
personal leadership development was the opportunity to contribute to the development of 
informal doctrine. While this thesis does not focus on the development of doctrine, it was 
an element of an officer’s leadership development through the modern process of action 
learning. As Parton argued, articles in JRUSI and other publications represented a source of 
informal doctrine that was indicative of the RAF’s broad thinking, which was owned by a 
small number of appropriately qualified subject matter experts.191 This was furthered when 
RAFQ appeared in 1930. As Flight noted in 1930, ‘It was quite time that the Royal Air 
Force should possess a quarterly review of its own’.192 RAFQ paralleled The Army Quarterly 
rather than TNR, as it was publically available through its publisher, Gale and Polden. 
Officers writing for RAFQ not only informed service discussions over air power 
employment, but also ‘sold’ air-mindedness, a distinct element in the belief in ‘Command 
of the Air’. RAFQ was supported by the Air Ministry, which encouraged officers to write 
for the journal as well as providing it with an advisory committee.193 RAFQ acted as the 
RAF’s semi-official outlet concerning its evolving thinking on air power employment. It is 
significant that an article by Leigh-Mallory, an army co-operation specialist, appeared in its 
first edition, albeit a summary of his final army co-operation report that he produced as 
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OC, School of Army Co-Operation at RAF Old Sarum.194 This illustrates the diverse 
character of RAF air power thinking that moved beyond the subject of bombing as 
presumed by some historians.  
Articles in publications can be split into three categories: theory and strategy, 
operations, and personnel. Parton’s figure of six per cent concerning articles written by 
RAF officers in JRUSI in the period 1918 to 1923 remained relatively constant throughout 
this period.195 Out of 1,052 articles published in JRUSI between 1919 and 1939, 15 per cent 
focused on air power broadly defined, with about seven per cent written by RAF officers.196 
This figure is distorted by the inclusions of air power advocates like Oliver Stewart, a 
retired RFC ‘ace’, who contributed to on-going debates. Many officers in this period also 
wrote under pseudonyms for reasons of anonymity, which makes identifying their service 
background problematic. Anonymity raises the question of these officers’ subsequent 
career trajectories and of whether they wrote under a pseudonym to protect their career 
prospects, though this was not a significant issue for those deemed capable. However, 
unlike land or naval matters, and due to its infancy, there existed a feeling amongst the 
services that air power was a subject on which everybody could write. Except for Liddell 
Hart or Fuller, it was rare to find commentators from the other services writing on naval or 
military subjects. The perception of air power as a free subject mirrored aspects of the 
inter-service debates of the period and RAF culture. An analysis of the inter-war The Army 
Quarterly supports this contention. From 1919 to 1939, The Army Quarterly published 24 air 
power articles. Of these, RAF officers contributed six, including one article under 
Trenchard’s name and three by Chamier. Army officers wrote a further four articles, while 
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two retired RAF/RFC officers, Stewart and Rothesay Wortley, wrote nine. This division 
amongst the services is best represented by the RAF’s belief in ‘Command of the Air’. For 
the RAF, the doctrinal element of ‘Command of the Air’ was a conceptual state that 
allowed freedom of action for all services. Conversely, ‘Command of the Air’ for the other 
services was a physical state and related to their desire to recover what they perceived as 
their lost air arms.  
A broader examination of contributions illustrates the importance of those who 
wrote as well as what was written. Higham identified Slessor and Kingston-McCloughry as 
high order contributors to journals. While these men were unique in the RAF concerning 
their volume of output, it is illustrative that Leigh-Mallory produced three articles in the 
early 1930s, which was notable when compared to other future senior leaders.197 Like both 
Slessor and Kingston-McCloughry, Leigh-Mallory took part in essay writing competitions 
such as the Gordon-Shepherd Memorial Prize, which was founded in 1919 to promote 
study on ‘reconnaissance and kindred subjects’ after Sir Horatio Shepherd bequeathed 
money to support its foundation in memory of his son, Brigadier-General Gordon 
Shepherd.198 In 1932 and 1934, the same time as he was writing in journals, Leigh-Mallory 
came second in the Gordon-Shepherd Prize, while Douglas came first in 1922 and 1923 
while at Andover.199 This engagement illustrates that officers like Leigh-Mallory viewed 
extra-curricular activity as beneficial to both their personal and professional development, 
and it is clear that they were encouraged and valued by the Air Ministry, as evidenced by 
such officers’ career trajectories. Furthermore, as Parton noted concerning contributions to 
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RAFQ, a high proportion of officers writing in military journals held either psa or qs.200 
While not explicit in AMWO No. 354, by the late 1920s, the authorisation process took 
account of an officer’s status concerning their military education; thus, a relationship 
existed between key elements of an officer’s leadership development and Staff College 
attendance and the ability to comment on air power issues. Leigh-Mallory represented this 
relationship. By the time of RAFQ’s foundation in 1930, a critical mass of appropriately 
qualified officers, which was Trenchard’s concern in 1923, was reached. This contributed 
to the desire to both found and support such a professional publication. It also 
demonstrates that these officers were trusted to produce informal doctrine for broader 
dissemination, and, as Parton noted, actually allowed for ‘a considerable divergence of 
opinions within the service on what air power both could, and should, do’.201 However, 
despite encouraging divergent views, the reality is that of those officers in Appendix Four, 
only a quarter contributed to journals. While some accepted the benefits of RUSI, generally 
as a group, RAF officers failed to contribute to the advancement of their professional 
knowledge, thus highlighting the tension between intellectualism and heroic leadership in 
the RAF that had been Brooke-Popham’s concern. Nevertheless, Leigh-Mallory, and other 
officers like Douglas, Portal, Courtney, Peck and Gossage, aligned intellectualism with 
professional development and still rose to senior command.202 This runs counter to Liddell 
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Hart’s argument concerning Trenchard’s aforementioned view of writing. The RAF 
encouraged officers educated at Andover to contribute to service knowledge; however, it 
realistically took time to build up a cohort of officers capable of this. 
The articles written by these officers ran the full spectrum of themes identified and 
illustrate the wealth of experience that they collectively held in the areas of education, 
training and operations. Articles reached forward towards a nascent air power theory in an 
attempt to codify its planned employment and were not a rejection of history in the 
production of doctrine as Murray contended.203 As Parton noted, doctrine is not only based 
on an analysis of past lessons, but also indicative of deeper beliefs that the organisation 
holds to be true.204 Thus, they were a complex attempt to innovate in a field with little 
empirical data to support the assertions formed, as well as being influenced by RAF 
culture. Any criticism of the development of theory and doctrine in the RAF must be 
placed into the context that writers like Leigh-Mallory examined the implementation of a 
new dissonant technology that revolutionised the character of warfare. Even up to 1939, it 
is not straining verity to describe the whole process of air power employment as 
experimental. Murray failed to heed his own advice concerning the need to understand 
culture in analysing military change, as in trying to develop a coherent air power doctrine, 
the RAF did not ignore the past; though, as Biddle suggested, they might have 
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conclusions that fit specific cultural paradigms that seek a simple and out-dated explanation for organisational 
change.  
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misinterpreted it at times.205 Murray cited ASM No. 11A as evidence of the RAF’s rejection 
of history. Concerning discussions relating to the strategic objectives of an air force, this 
memorandum stated: 
The latter alternative is the method which the lessons of military history seem 
to recommend, but the Air Staff are convinced that the former is the correct 
one.206 
 
While this appears to validate Murray’s argument, it ignores the wider context of both the 
memorandum itself and broader RAF doctrine as a whole. The memorandum did not 
reject history so much as it sought to extrapolate an alternative strategy that stressed 
efficiency and speed in the face of what the officers writing it understood of military and 
naval theory. The memorandum was based on modern conceptions of action learning 
present at Andover, where historical lessons in aspects of strategy were taught with shared 
concepts on the principles of war. These derived from the study of history. The role of 
history is highlighted by Chamier’s 1921 JRUSI article on ‘Strategy and Air Strategy’, in 
which he stated: 
some would say no air strategy can exist. […] But without necessarily denying 
the […] existence of air strategy, it may be asserted that the time is not yet ripe 
for a definition of its principles. Strategic principles are derived from the study 
of history, and aerial warfare has the shortest of histories. […] History has 
therefore a great deal to teach us and we may confidently expect to throw light 
on the possibilities of air strategy.207 
 
Chamier, highly regarded by Trenchard, served as Deputy DOI on the Air Staff before 
retiring in 1929 at his own request. Based on a historical analysis of the perceived 
advantages of air power as it stood compared to the conduct of traditional naval and 
                                                          
205 Murray, ‘Military Culture Does Matter’ in War, Strategy and Military Effectiveness, pp. 83-97. Biddle, Rhetoric 
and Reality, pp. 69-81. 
206 TNA, AIR 8/71, ASM No. 11A – Air Strategy in Home Defence, March 1924, p. 1. 
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military strategies, Chamier concluded that  an air force’s ability to react quicker at the 
decisive point meant that it could force a decision in war more quickly.208 
Rather than rejecting the past, these articles were grounded in the RAF’s recent 
experience of both the First World War and colonial campaigns. Used as a didactic tool, 
history allowed officers to draw out appropriate lessons and develop ideas. Given Leigh-
Mallory’s higher education background, a rejection of history as a cognitive tool would 
have been out of character. Officers like Leigh-Mallory also regularly requested information 
from AHB to support their writings, thus making use of the RAF’s corporate repository of 
historical knowledge.209 Formed as the Air History Section of the Historical Section of the 
CID under the directorship of Captain Charles Fairburn in July 1918, the AHB’s purpose 
was to collate historical records and supply: 
historical information […] as required by the Air Ministry, Committee of 
Imperial Defence, and other Government Departments, and the official 
historians.210 
 
More broadly, this included supporting officers writing for both lectures and publications 
that used history to develop air power’s language and conceptual base. Nevertheless, 
returning to writing on air power, as both Buckley and Pugh noted, the very vernacular 
used to describe the RAF’s key doctrinal belief in air superiority, or control of the air, was 
used both inconsistently and interchangeably.211 Pugh’s critique of Overy’s lack of definite 
terminology concerning the concept of air superiority also mapped the debate of methods 
used to achieve that conceptual state as it shifted during this period and was dependent on 
                                                          
208 Ibid, p. 661. 
209 For evidence of Leigh-Mallory using the AHB, see: TNA, AIR 2/1228, Compilations of Work undertaken 
by the Air Historical Branch, 1928, p. 8; TNA, AIR 2/1228, Compilation of Work undertaken by the Air 
Historical Branch, 1929, p. 8, 12. I am grateful to Julia Dawson, a PhD student in the Defence Studies 
Department at King’s College London, for this reference. 
210 TNA, AIR 20/12276, The Record Holders (Air Historical Branch (RAF) 1918-1977) by Dennis Bateman 
(Air Historical Branch (RAF)), December 1977, pp. 1-2 
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operational conditions.212 As this author has illustrated concerning the development of the 
Manual of Combined Operations, methods both changed and shifted in scope as technology 
and conceptual ideas developed.213 Thus, it should be recognised that the use of history 
provided a conceptual basis for the development of doctrine, but that it was further 
advanced as experience emerged. 
In his 1931 RAFQ article on ‘The Maintenance of Air Superiority in the Land 
Campaign’, Leigh-Mallory defined air superiority as ‘the attainment of operational freedom 
by our own aircraft, and denying it to the enemy’.214 This paralleled the definition provided 
in AP1300 but lacked an explicit statement concerning its effect on morale and illustrated 
the contingent nature of the use of conceptual ideas. This article also illustrated Leigh-
Mallory’s ability to apply capstone doctrine to the operational level when the RAF lacked 
any formal ideas in this area. Furthermore, each of Leigh-Mallory’s articles drew on 
historical analysis of his own experience of combined arms warfare in 1918 and trials with 
the Experimental Mechanized Force (EMF) on Salisbury Plain in 1928, which allowed him 
to extrapolate what he viewed as the most appropriate lessons for air power’s employment 
in support of ground forces. In a modern sense, Leigh-Mallory’s RAFQ article on air 
superiority advocated the use of an offensive counter-air strategy at the operational level 
long before Slessor published Air Power and Armies in 1936. Leigh-Mallory’s conclusion also 
mentioned concepts that still have relevance today, such as the concentration of force at 
the decisive spot, decentralised execution and centralised control. Concentration of force 
was to be achieved by focusing on whichever target set was identified as the enemy’s ‘weak 
spot’.215 These remain enduring principles of air power doctrine, with the former idea 
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analogous to the idea of targeting for effect that emerged in RAF thinking, with a focus on 
morale as a target-set as well as industrial-web theory, which emerged at the United States 
Army Air Corps’ Air Corps Tactical School.216 This idea was revitalised in 1988 by Warden 
in his work The Air Campaign and his Five Rings Model.217 Debates over command and 
control also remained a perennial concern throughout the Second World War, and AM Sir 
Arthur Coningham, in his 1946 RUSI lecture on the ‘Development of Tactical Air Forces’, 
reinforced the importance of air superiority as the prerequisite for the effective air power 
employment in support of ground forces.218 The continuing legacy of the ideas 
encapsulated in Leigh-Mallory’s 1931 RAFQ article lies in the fact that it was republished in 
a 2003 edition of the modern RAF’s academic journal RAF Air Power Review.219 
A final aspect of knowledge transfer and socialisation that needs to be recognised is 
work undertaken by officers outside the confines of a service setting. Slessor remains the 
commonly cited example of an RAF officer engaged in producing publically available 
material; however, there is evidence that Leigh-Mallory and several of his peers engaged in 
informal socialisation outside their own service. For example, Tedder, while serving in the 
First World War, had his study of the RN in the Restoration era published by Cambridge 
University Press, which was recently reprinted in 2010.220 Gossage was invited by the Board 
of Military Studies at the University of London to deliver lectures on the RAF in 1936 as 
part of a series on the subject of national defence. Published in 1937, these lectures focused 
                                                          
216 For the best overview of the development of thinking on strategic bombing in both Britain and America, 
see: Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, pp. 69-175. On the evolution of American ideas, and especially the role of the 
Air Corps Tactical School, in general, see: Clodfelter, Beneficial Bombing, pp. 35-66. 
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on air power’s development, RAF co-operation with the other services, and imperial and 
home defence. While delivering a Service based view, they provided a useful sketch of the 
perceived place of the RAF in national defence in co-operation with the other services.221 
Of interest is that no serving RAF officer gave the Sir Lees Knowles Lectures on military 
science at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, during this period, though Sykes and 
Charlton did in 1921 and 1934 respectively after their retirements.222 It would not be until 
1947 that Tedder, as CAS, delivered his lectures on ‘Air Power in War’.223 Of greater 
significance were links with key military thinkers of the period, and Leigh-Mallory knew 
both Fuller and Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart, appointed the Military Advisor for the 
fourteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1927, recalled in his memoirs that he 
selected both Leigh-Mallory and Douglas to produce articles.224 Leigh-Mallory’s article 
examined the subject of ‘Co-Operation of Aircraft with the Army’, a subject on which he 
was eminently qualified to write, and it was probably through his involvement with the 
Army’s 1925 manoeuvres that he came to Liddell Hart’s attention.225 These manoeuvres are 
discussed in Chapter Seven. However, Leigh-Mallory was not Liddell Hart’s major 
correspondent in air power matters. From 1936 onwards, that role fell to Peck, who 
commented on the air power aspects for Liddell Hart’s 1939 book The Defence of Britain as 
well as supplying him notes on subjects like substitution and imperial defence.226 Fuller 
devoted a chapter in his 1920 work Tanks in the Great War to the subject of army-air force 
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co-operation, and careful reading shows that it was heavily based on Leigh-Mallory’s 
‘History of Tank and Aeroplane Co-Operation’ report produced in January 1919.227 Fuller 
wrote that ‘The first essential of successful co-operation [is] comradeship’, while Leigh-
Mallory’s report stated: 
the first essential of really successful co-operation, a thoroughly good liaison 
was established between the Flights and units with whom they were working.228  
 
This influence was not unattributed, with Fuller thanking Leigh-Mallory in the book’s 
introduction and noting that the latter’s: 
energy resulted not only in the cementing of a close comradeship between the 
two supreme mechanical weapons of the age but of a close co-operation which 
saved many lives in battle.229 
 
As Chapter Seven illustrates, this recognition was not unwarranted given the co-operation 
and socialisation between 8 Squadron and the Tank Corps from June 1918 onwards. 
Unfortunately, this form of socialisation was, as with writing, limited to but a few officers. 
They undertook this on their own initiative and received approval from the Air Ministry, 
and, while it was besides their normal duties, it did not affect their career prospects. 
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has explored the institutions that were central to leadership development in 
the RAF. These institutions were vital as the RAF nurtured officers for senior leadership, 
and while, in general, the Air Ministry was successful in nurturing, there were issues, such 
as the lack of academic register that is now commonplace in modern PME. Many thought 
                                                          
227 The Liddle Collection (LC), University of Leeds, AIR 189, Trafford Leigh-Mallory, ‘History of Tank and 
Aeroplane Co-Operation’, 31 January 1919; J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War (London: John Murray, 
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that the course at Andover was not long enough for its broader purpose of developing 
leaders’ knowledge of war rather than just a narrow conception of staff work, and it was an 
area that could have been improved. There was also the question of what type of future 
conflict officers were being prepared for. Unlike modern PME, which examines a whole 
spectrum of military operations from traditional war fighting to peace support operations, 
the inter-war staff colleges focused on their service’s primary role. For the RAF, this 
tended towards broad discussion of how to use air power to achieve a decision in war. 
Even discussions on how to use air power in colonial operations mirrored this conception. 
However, an examination of the various curricula illustrates an attempt to grapple with 
many challenges officers would encounter. This was especially the case for those officers 
who attended the IDC, where they were introduced to scenarios that they would have to 
cope with at the senior level. Overall, leadership development through military education 
was an ‘elite’ experience for future senior leaders, and socialisation was vital as officers 
began to feel their way towards a shared vernacular and grammar of war that was of 
inestimable value during the Second World War. Suitable military education also influenced 
the RAF’s attempt to shape the debate over air power’s employment. Officers attending 
Staff College became the trusted experts in this respect, while the RAF as a whole remained 
largely anti-intellectual. Staff College attendance was the nexus of an officer’s rise to senior 
leadership, and without it, and unless illustrating operational excellence, access to the 
military elite was limited, as officers would not be visible enough for further development 
and promotion. 
Chapter Seven 
Operational Job Assignments and Leadership Development in the Royal Air Force 
 
This chapter examines Leigh-Mallory’s development related to specific operational job 
assignments. Unlike training and education, Leigh-Mallory’s operational experience, 
especially that related to the First World War, is easier to examine due to greater source 
availability, such as War Diaries and Squadron and Operational Record Books as well as 
several pieces that he wrote. Notably, in early 1919, Major Leigh-Mallory authored a paper 
on the ‘History of Tank and Aeroplane Co-Operation’, which the AHB preserved, while in 
1925, he produced a reflective essay on his war experience while attending Andover.1 As 
already evidenced in Chapter Six, Fuller used Leigh-Mallory’s 1919 tank co-operation paper 
in his history of the Tank Corps published in 1920.2 Leigh-Mallory’s history was also 
utilised in the RAF’s official history The War in the Air when Jones cited the work of 8 
Squadron in volume six.3 Furthermore, a deeper examination of archival sources highlights 
the organisational value of the posts held by Leigh-Mallory in this period. Due to source 
availability, this chapter focuses more on Leigh-Mallory’s specific experience while still 
relating his career patterns to nurturing in the RAF and, where relevant, the development 
of his peers in Appendix Four. By furthering our understanding of the nature and 
significance of Leigh-Mallory’s job assignments in their organisational context and of their 
importance to leadership development, this chapter, in part, helps reconceptualise his rise 
to senior positions by suggesting that he was little different to other RAF leaders of the 
                                                          
1 TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory; TNA, AIR 1/725/97/10, 
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Second World War who had been earmarked for advancement. This stands in contrast to 
the ‘ambitious’ officer that Leigh-Mallory has been characterised as by some historians.4 
While this thesis makes clear that Leigh-Mallory was a careerist, this must be placed within 
the context of the leadership development opportunities afforded him. From this chapter’s 
perspective, this is because Leigh-Mallory held job assignments, like staff positions and 
operational commands, that were, despite the generalised character of the analysis of the 
prosopography population, largely characteristic of the rhythms present in the careers of 
his peers. 
From a leadership development perspective, the idea of patterns in the modern 
conception of job assignments remains a constant. In discussing professionalism, Janowtiz 
suggested that effective careers are ‘interspersed with operational military assignments’, 
while Donald Campbell et al stated: 
appropriately timed job experiences and work events represent another major 
method used by organizations to develop leadership.5 
 
Thus, timely job assignments were a vital aspect of rhythms inherent in a leader’s rise to 
senior positions, as they allowed nurtured officers to ‘acquire leadership capacity as a result 
of the roles, responsibilities, and tasks encountered in their jobs’.6 While examining an 
officer who reached the pre-eminent operational position in the Army of the First World 
War, Sheffield, in his recent study of Haig, wrote: 
Douglas Haig barely put a foot wrong. He acquired a balanced ticket of 
regimental soldiering, operational experience that included both command and 
staff work; had attended Staff College; and done some formidably demanding 
staff jobs that put him at the centre of army reform.7 (Emphasis added) 
 
                                                          
4 For example, see: Murray, Military Adaptation in War, p. 175. 
5 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 126; Donald J. Campbell, Gregory Dardis and Kathleen M. Campbell, 
‘Enhancing Incremental Influence: A Focused Approach to Leadership Development’, Journal of Leadership & 
Organizational Studies, 10(1) (2003), p. 36. 
6 Day, ‘Leadership Development’, p. 598. 
7 Sheffield, The Chief, p. 368. 
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Sheffield correctly adduced that there were certain patterns that Haig engaged with in his 
rise to senior leadership. This can be applied to most successful officers. As already noted 
in Chapter Three, Orange recognised that Park’s failure to undertake specific postings 
limited his post-Second World War employment.8 Orange also made a similar point 
concerning Coningham. Coningham was reputed to be proud of his lack of Staff College 
and staff experience before 1939, and requested that the announcement of his retirement 
due to the lack of aforementioned experience be noted as being by his own request, which 
was, unusually, granted, though probably due to his wartime successes.9 Significantly, 
appropriate job assignments gave officers experience of transitioning to positions with 
unfamiliar responsibilities, helping create change, and managing internal and external 
relationships. Success in these areas helped mark officers out for further advancement.10 In 
the RAF, key operational job assignments consisted of command experience, staff duties, 
and training and education positions. These are further separated between command at 
lower and senior levels, staff duties in either the Air Ministry or operational commands, 
and training and education, which included positions at Flying Training Schools, Cranwell 
or Staff College DS. While explicit career planning was absent from the RAF, in part due to 
the lack of an Air Secretary from 1923 onwards, the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that there was tacit understanding of appropriate job assignments being used to 
nurture officers. These assignments allowed officers to display their leadership abilities; an 
approach recognised as best practice in modern environments.11 These experiences allowed 
the RAF to develop its collective leadership capacity by giving officers the opportunity to 
                                                          
8 Orange, Park, pp. 264-5. 
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succeed or fail, which then allowed successful individuals to emerge into the military elite 
by 1939. 
 
7.1 The ‘Grammar’ of Command 
In his biography of Tedder, Orange used the phrase ‘Learning the Grammar of Command’ 
to describe the former’s early experience of military operations in 1915/16. Orange 
observed that during this formative period as a junior officer, Tedder learnt how to manage 
and motivate those personnel under his command.12 This learning experience held Tedder 
in good stead as he rose to senior positions. However, this was not a unique experience. As 
Chart 7.1 illustrates, before service in the RFC, officers in Appendix Three, except for 10 
per cent unknown and two in the Army Service Corps (ASC), all served in combat arms.13 
Even those members of the Engineering Branch of the RN would have been exposed to 
combat conditions when serving aboard ship. The same would have been the case for 
AVM Richard Saul, who joined the ASC in 1914 and transferred to the RFC as an observer 
on 14 August 1916.14 While the First World War was the primary experience, pre-war 
regulars also had combat experience; for example, Burnett served as a Private in the 
Imperial Yeomanry during the Second Boer War and subsequently saw action with the 
West African Frontier Force in Nigeria as an officer before relinquishing his commission in 
1909.15 Leigh-Mallory’s key ground combat experience came in 1915 while serving as a 2nd 
Lieutenant with the 2nd Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment, 7 Brigade, 3rd Division 
around Hill 60 and Hooge.16 Early work with the battalion included time served as 
                                                          
12 Orange, Tedder, pp. 29-30. 
13 Charts for this chapter can be found in Appendix Two. 
14 TNA, WO 339/20122, Application for Appointment to a Temporary Commission in the Regular Army for 
the Period of the War signed by Richard Ernest Saul, 10 September 1914. 
15 Jordan, ‘Burnett, Sir Charles Stuart (1882–1945)’. 
16 TNA, WO 95/1414, War Diary of the 2nd Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment, 6 April 1915. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Operational Job Assignments and Leadership Development in the Royal Air Force  Page 277 
 
pioneers, which in 1925 Leigh-Mallory described as ‘rather irksome’, though GOC 3rd 
Division, MajGen Sir James Aylmer Haldane, praised them for their work in this role.17 
Under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Edmund Allenby’s V Corps, 3rd Division 
attacked Bellewaerde Ridge on the night of 16/17 June 1915 to remove a salient protruding 
into the BEF’s lines at the end of the Second Battle of Ypres. Leigh-Mallory was wounded 
during this attack while the battalion served in a reserve role to construct assembly trenches 
and consolidate gains made by the attacking units.18 After this experience, Leigh-Mallory 
joined the RFC. 
Officers drew relevant leadership lessons from these combat experiences. For 
example, in his 1925 essay at Andover, Leigh-Mallory reflected on the need to understand 
soldiers’ backgrounds and motivations.19 This acknowledged the existence of paternalism as 
Leigh-Mallory recognised that, as an officer and gentleman, he had responsibility for 
ensuring his men were looked after and motivated.20 Leigh-Mallory also noted that 
motivation had ramifications for the maintenance of morale, the lack of which damaged 
unit cohesion and military effectiveness.21 Linked to the issue of morale was the frustration 
at the lack of information available to commanders at the tactical level, and while Leigh-
Mallory sympathised with his superiors need to send soldiers out on raiding operations for 
                                                          
17 IWM, Personal Papers of Major-General F.A. Dudgeon, 86/51/1, Major-General Haldane to Commanding 
Officer, 2nd Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment, 22 June 1915; TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, 
Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory, p. 2. 
18 Brigadier James Edmonds, Military Operations – France and Belgium, 1915, Volume II: Battles of Aubers Ridge, 
Festubert, and Loos (London: HMSO, 1928), pp.97-101. Edmonds’ description of the attack on Bellewaarde 
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19 TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory, p. 2. 
20 Sheffield, ‘Officer-Man Relations’, pp. 8-14. 
21 TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory, p. 2 
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no apparent gain, he was concerned at the effect this had on cohesion.22 Additionally, 
Leigh-Mallory assiduously picked up the difference between relations among officers and 
men in the RFC/RAF of the First World War and those in the trenches.23 These 
recollections show that WgCr Leigh-Mallory, as a rising mid-ranking officer in 1925, was 
able to conceptualise and translate key leadership issues from his recent past and recognise 
their implications for his current career, thus highlighting his ability to develop professional 
knowledge through reflection on successes and failures. 
Axiomatically, in a population that reached senior leadership positions, command 
experience was a necessary pre-requisite. Appendix Four makes clear that of all processes 
described in this thesis, squadron command experience was, axiomatically, the prescriptive 
element of an officer’s leadership development. However, for those rising to senior 
positions in Appendix Four there was a balanced ticket of command, education and staff 
duties that had to be experienced. As with flying, the ability to command was noted in 
ACRs, and specific qualitative metrics were applied, as Chapter Three discussed.24 
Command was the job assignment where officers translated their understanding of 
leadership while illustrating their suitability for further development and promotion. This 
job assignment had a tangible and quantifiable impact on an officer’s prospects. Failure 
would stop an officer’s career from progressing. As Chapter Three noted, in June 1924, SL 
Wright, later an AC, was passed over for promotion when it was noted that he ‘should be 
given a command’ to further his development.25 Command experience came in three 
forms: first, operational command of a front-line unit either deployed with the 
metropolitan air force or overseas on operations; second, command of a flying or non-
                                                          
22 TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory, p. 2 
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flying training unit; or finally, command of a non-operational administrative unit, such as 
the RAF Depot at RAF Uxbridge. Of five officers from Appendix Three who commanded 
the RAF Depot in either Britain or the Middle East during this period, only two still served 
in 1939; both GC Frederick Sowrey and GC A.H. Jackson remained in that rank for the 
rest of their careers. This job assignment did not aid an officer’s development due to the 
RAF’s view of administration and stores positions, which were not deemed the key roles 
for GD Branch officers even though many still occupied such commands. Leigh-Mallory’s 
own command experience encapsulated the former two aspects but not the latter. Leigh-
Mallory commanded 12 (Training) Squadron, the School of Army Co-Operation twice 
(including its operational element), No. 2 Flying Training School, and, most significantly, 8 
Squadron in 1918. While Major Leigh-Mallory’s command of 8 Squadron occurred just as 
the RAF formed in 1918, as illustrated below, his specialisation, which evolved out of his 
successful leadership of this unit, influenced further job assignments in the 1920s.  
As Chapter One noted, command has a legal status. While leadership is central in 
influencing the direction and drive of subordinates, particularly in the maintenance of 
morale, command and the associated organisation of resources, both human and physical, 
encompassed much of an officer’s responsibilities at squadron level. Codified in The King’s 
Regulations and the Manual of Air Force Law, command was viewed as a physical transaction 
with responsibilities for the discipline of officers and men through training, maintenance 
and administration.26 AP1300 defined commanders as having ‘a strong and resolute will 
and a ready acceptance of responsibility’.27 Command at squadron, wing, group and 
command levels was a complex interplay of the factors noted above and represented a key 
                                                          
26 TNA, AIR 10/822, AP804; TNA, AIR 10/974, AP958, pp. 6-19. 
27 TNA, AIR 10/1910, AP1300, Chap. III, Para. 4. 
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leadership challenge due to the lines of responsibility and accountability in organisations.28 
At squadron level, lines of responsibility went downwards to flight commanders and 
officers in charge of stores, which, amongst other aspects, included logistics and 
engineering elements, and the unit adjutant in charge of administration. Up the chain of 
command, squadron commanders were, during the First World War, responsible to their 
wing commander, who in turn reported to brigade and the RFC/RAF in the Field. In 1918, 
for Leigh-Mallory, 8 Squadron was responsible to V Brigade through 15th (Corps) Wing, 
though, due to the unit’s dispersed character during the latter part of the war, it was also 
accountable to III Brigade when in its area of operation.29 This latter challenge allowed 
Leigh-Mallory to manage a number of different relationships. The RFC/RAF in the Field 
was ultimately responsible to the War Office, and then from 1918, the Air Ministry. 
Squadron commanders also managed other unit elements, such as medical officers, who 
were also accountable to group level. This complex maze required effective leadership to 
ensure the efficient operation of the squadron. The fact that the ability to do so was 
recorded on ACRs illustrates that the RAF placed great value on this experience. 
Additionally, the ability to manage these structures was important, as it involved the 
empowerment of subordinates to achieve aims and objectives. In his autobiography, 
Collishaw outlined his command experience and functions based on his time as OC 203 
Squadron in 1918. Tellingly, Collishaw’s description paralleled leadership precepts like 
maintaining morale and acclimatising new pilots to the unit, though he noted 
                                                          
28 This is a theme picked up in: T.T. Paterson, Morale in War and Work: An Experiment in the Management of Men 
(London: Max Parrish, 1955), pp. 17-25. During the Second World War, Peterson worked in operational 
research for the RAF and was involved in studies into how to improve operations rooms in Fighter 
Command, see: Anon, AP3368 – The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force 
(London: HMSO, 1963), p. 19. Subsequently, Paterson, who held a PhD, went on to work at the University 
of Glasgow and as Professor at the University of Strathclyde, where he specialised, based, in part, on his 
Second World War experience, on industrial relations and administration. 
29 ‘Appendix XXVI – Strength of Royal Air Force, Western Front (including Independent Force and 5th 
Group), 11 November 1918’ in H.A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part played in the Great War 
by the Royal Air Force, Appendices (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1937), p. 127. 
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administration’s importance.30 Collishaw drew out one command lesson that never left him; 
the responsibility of writing letters to parents of dead officers and men. As Collishaw 
recalled: 
These letters were extremely painful to compose and yet they had to be done 
and it was a job that I could not foist off on anyone else.31  
 
This was a painful recognition of a commander’s responsibility and was replicated by other 
officers, as evidenced by the letters that Major Philip Babington, OC 46 Squadron, sent to 
the mother and aunt of Captain George Pollard Kay, a Flight Commander in his unit, in 
June 1917.32 
The issue of responsibility became increasingly complex as officers moved up the 
command chain. When Leigh-Mallory reached Air Rank in 1937, the point at which this 
thesis ends, he dealt with a growing number of different responsibilities, like operations, 
training and personnel issues, relationships with superiors, subordinates and members of 
other services, and, in some areas, relations with politicians and civilians in an imperial 
context.33 Thus, from a leadership perspective, senior officers at Air Rank acted as cross-
cultural leaders who operated across several interfaces. They required the right attitude, 
interpersonal skills and knowledge of the organisation, and, as Mary Teagarden suggested, a 
cumulative process of leadership development led officers to the point at which they were 
                                                          
30 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command, pp. 163-4. For a useful overview of modern squadron command, 
albeit from the perspective of the United States Air Force, see: Jeffrey F. Smith, Commanding an Air Force 
Squadron in the Twenty-First Century: A Practical Guide of Tips and Techniques for Today’s Squadron Commander 
(Maxwell, AL: Air University Press, 2003). 
31 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command, pp. 163-4. 
32 Captain George Pollard Kay, “Letters from Bob”: Flight Commander, 46th Squadron, Royal Flying Corps 
(Melbourne: Melville and Mullen, 1917), pp. 139-42. This collection of letters was published posthumously 
with an introduction by Kay’s former Headmaster, Reverend F.E. Brown of the Geelong Church of England 
Grammar School in Corio, Victoria.  
33 RAFM, AP1301, Chap., II, Para. 7. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Operational Job Assignments and Leadership Development in the Royal Air Force  Page 282 
 
equipped to undertake this role.34 This cumulative development is underpinned by 
appropriate job assignments and military education, which provided officers with a 
balanced ticket of experience; for example, as Chapter Six made clear, officers with psa had 
been identified and nurtured for senior command.35 The ability to work across cultures was 
an important development process for those rising to senior rank, and one that relied 
heavily on an AOC’s relationship with his staff. Thus, experience of staff duties was vital to 
foster a spirit of understanding and smooth running of leadership and administration at 
this level. Statistically, senior command experience as an AOC was important, as around 70 
per cent of officers in Appendix Four undertook this role before 1939. However, there 
were exceptions, like Douglas, Peck, Evill, Barratt, Freeman and Philip Babington, though 
these all experienced senior staff appointments in the Air Ministry, which introduced them 
to certain aspects of responsibilities and relationship management.  
 
7.2 Major Leigh-Mallory and Leading 8 Squadron, 1918 
Leigh-Mallory’s key operational command experience came in late 1917 when he was 
appointed OC 8 Squadron as a Major with the RFC/RAF in the Field in France. During 
this period, Leigh-Mallory grappled with the importance of effective leadership in the 
production of fighting power at the cusp of the tactical and operational levels. Leigh-
Mallory’s leadership of 8 Squadron illustrates several aspects, like responsibility, courage 
and vision, which were widely valued. In many respects, Leigh-Mallory understood what 
would now be referred to as action centred leadership by identifying the unit’s ‘task’ as he 
managed and developed his ‘team’ while challenging it’s ‘individuals’ by having them work 
                                                          
34 Teagarden, ‘Best Practises in Cross-Cultural Leadership’, pp. 300-30. On applying this concept in the 
military sphere, see: Kerry E. Irish, ‘Cross-Cultural Leadership: Dwight D. Eisenhower’ in Laver and 
Matthews (eds.), The Art of Command, pp. 93-124. 
35 For example, see: TNA, AIR 2/355, Director of Organisation and Staff Duties to Commandant, RAF Staff 
College, 4 June 1931. 
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together and with other units.36 Leigh-Mallory’s importance in 1918 has been widely 
recognised by historians, unlike other areas of his career.37 Bryn Hammond, in his analysis 
of tank co-operation with other combat arms between 1916 and 1918, recorded: 
Between July and November 1918, this relatively junior officer [Leigh-Mallory] 
played a vital role in an important area of tactical development - a situation 
incongruous with the BEF’s supposed centralised attitude to command and 
inflexible approach to military operations.38 
 
Given the historiography surrounding Leigh-Mallory’s later career, if taken prima facie, this 
quote suggests that something must have gone wrong in the intervening years. However, as 
shown elsewhere in this thesis, the picture concerning Leigh-Mallory’s nurturing and rise to 
senior leadership is more complex than previously presumed. Such a simplistic view is 
more indicative of the myopia found in the historiography surrounding the Battle of Britain 
and the Normandy Campaign of 1944, rather than a rigorous analysis of leadership 
development in the RAF.  
From the point of taking command of 8 Squadron in November 1917 through to 
July 1918, Leigh-Mallory faced the challenge of organising his unit and its resources in the 
face of changing operational conditions. Nineteen-eighteen saw the land war on the 
Western Front shift from static to mobile warfare after the launch of the German Spring 
Offensive on 21 March.39 This shift saw Leigh-Mallory manage 8 Squadron as it moved 
amongst new airbases and maintained lines of communication with wing and brigade 
                                                          
36 John Adair, Leadership and Motivation: The Fifty-Fifty Rule and Eight Key Principles of Motivating Others (London: 
Kogan Page, 2009), pp. 19-36. 
37 Jones, OH Vol. 6, pp. 464-7; Tim Travers, How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army 
on the Western Front, 1917-1918 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2005 [1992]), pp. 129-30; Paul Kennedy, ‘Britain 
and the First World War’ in Millett and Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, Volume 1, p. 70; Peter Hart, Aces 
Falling: War above the Trenches, 1918 (London: Phoenix, 2008), p. 97, pp. 285-6; John Sweetman, Cavalry of the 
Clouds: Air War over Europe, 1914-1918 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2010), p. 178; James McWilliams and R. James 
Steel, Amiens, 1918 (Stroud: Tempus, 2004), pp. 38-9; Edward Hooton, War Over the Trenches: Air Power and the 
Western Front Campaigns, 1916-1918 (Hersham: Ian Allen, 2010), p. 270. 
38 Bryn Hammond, ‘The Theory and Practice of Tank Co-Operation with Other Arms on the Western Front 
during the First World War’, (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2005), p. 275. 
39 On this period from a German perspective, see: David Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in 
The Operational Level of War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
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headquarters; from February to November 1918, 8 Squadron moved 12 times.40 Leigh-
Mallory was aided in this by the well-developed logistical system of the RFC/RAF, which, 
as Peter Dye noted, was able to cope with the multifarious needs of a high-technology 
combat arm/service by 1918 due to in-built resilience in sustaining operations.41 
Underpinning this logistical challenge was the delivery of fighting power through the 
maintenance of operational tempo. Chart 7.2 illustrates the numbers of sorties flown by 8 
Squadron between February and November 1918 and highlights the unit’s operational 
tempo in this crucial year of the First World War, with clear spikes that cover the periods 
of the German Spring Offensive and the Hundred Days Campaign. It is worth noting that 
a large proportion of sorties were ‘Test’ and ‘Practice’ flights, which covered training of 
new pilots, testing replacement airframes and work undertaken to test operational methods 
employed by 8 Squadron in its army co-operation role. Practice flights spiked in July 1918 
while conducting tank co-operation experiments with the Tank Corps, with 309 sorties 
undertaken. Eight Squadron’s roles covered the panoply of operations undertaken by army 
co-operation units, including reconnaissance, bombing and contact patrol work. 
In late 1917, Leigh-Mallory faced a more crucial leadership challenge; the 
replacement of exhausted officers in 8 Squadron, as the unit had been heavily involved in 
fighting on the Western Front, including the Battles of Arras and Cambrai. It is clear from 
Leigh-Mallory’s 1925 essay that this period of operations meant he needed to inject fresh 
personnel into the unit to maintain effectiveness; a view supported by the squadron’s own 
                                                          
40 TNA, AIR 1/1669/204/109/8-9, 8 Squadron Record Books, February to May 1918; TNA, AIR 
1/1670/204/109/10-13, 8 Squadron Record Books, June to December 1918. For the most recent overview 
of the RAF in 1918, see: David Jordan, ‘The Genesis of Modern Air Power: The RAF in 1918’ in Sheffield 
and Gray (eds.), Changing War, pp. 191-206. 
41 TNA, AIR 1/8/15/1/7, Notes on System of Supply for the Royal Air Force in France during the War by 
Air Commodore Robert Brooke-Popham, 20 September 1920. The study of logistics that support air power 
operations remains a limited area of study. The most useful brief overview is Peter Dye, ‘The Genesis of 
Modern Warfare: The Contribution of Aviation Logistics’ in Sheffield and Gray (eds.), Changing War, pp. 171-
90. For a fuller examination, see: Peter Dye, ‘Air Power’s Midwife: Logistics Support for Royal Flying Corps 
Operations on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2013). 
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history.42 One of those replacement officers was Flying Officer Ferdinand West, later an 
AC, who trained as a pilot under Leigh-Mallory in Britain and recalled the paternalism that 
the latter had for the officers and men under his command.43 Having commanded a 
training squadron, Leigh-Mallory was able to select fresh pilots whom he identified as 
effective. West eventually won the Victoria Cross while serving as a Flight Commander 
under Leigh-Mallory, who would have provided the initial recommendation that led to the 
former’s citation. Despite this relationship, West’s later career did not appear to have been 
influenced by Leigh-Mallory’s rise to senior leadership. It appears that after 1918, Leigh-
Mallory’s and West’s careers diverged, which strengthens the importance of the 
recollections of the latter. Returning to the redeployment of personnel, the reasons given 
do not appear to have been nefarious, but born out of concern for the morale and 
motivation of the officers and men of 8 Squadron. Reasons ranged from rest and 
recuperation to poor service as well as posting back to Britain for pilot training. For 
example, in November 1917, just after taking command, Leigh-Mallory posted Lieutenant 
C.A. Hyde back to the Home Establishment for rest after nine months service and 
recorded that he had performed ‘good service’. Conversely, on 6 December 1917, Leigh-
Mallory recommended that 2nd Lieutenant A.W. Newham ‘be returned to his unit’; the 
ultimate restriction applied to an officer deemed unfit for operational flying duties.44 These 
two examples illustrate that Leigh-Mallory was able to deal with the difficult process of 
managing personnel to maintain unit efficiency. It also highlights Leigh-Mallory’s ability to 
manage the ‘leader-follower’ relationship and meet both individual and group needs while 
                                                          
42 TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory; TNA, AIR 
1/688/21/20/8, Short History of 8 Bombing Squadron Royal Air Force, January 1915 to 1921 (N.D.), pp. 
15-7. 
43 P.R. Reid, Winged Diplomat: The Life Story of Air Commodore ‘Freddie’ West, VC (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1962), p. 76. 
44 TNA, AIR 1/1671/204/109/20, Transfer Report for Lieutenant C.A. Hyde, November 1917; TNA, AIR 
1/1671/204/109/20, Report on Inefficient Officer – 2nd Lieutenant A.W. Newham, 6 December 1917. 
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ensuring vertical unit cohesion through trust.45 J.A.G Haslam, an officer who served with 8 
Squadron, recalled how, when he joined the squadron, he was ‘Quickly made to feel at 
home’, which suggests that Leigh-Mallory, from both an individual and group perspective, 
was able to generate an atmosphere conducive to efficiency while strengthening his 
‘team’.46  
Shared experience of flying duties influenced leadership and unit cohesion and 
generated an identity central to RFC/RAF culture. Leigh-Mallory recognised the 
importance of flying when experimenting with the Tank Corps during the Battles of Hamel 
and Amiens in July and August 1918 respectively. Leigh-Mallory flew the first missions for 
both operations and took responsibility by translating his vision into reality. This helped 
prove Leigh-Mallory’s concept of operations to his ‘team’ as well as reinforcing confidence 
in 8 Squadron concerning their experimental role. Understanding responsibility by linking 
flying to command was not new territory for Leigh-Mallory, who, on 24 April 1918, 
undertook a special reconnaissance mission rather than delegate to a subordinate.47 Leigh-
Mallory also identified talented officers in 8 Squadron; West was one of those and recalled 
that Leigh-Mallory made sure that new personnel understood their mission and role.48 
Leigh-Mallory emerged as an effective OC with an understanding of both unit cohesion 
and the organisation of resources, and West held him in high regard and noted of the 
formation of the RAF: 
There was a tremendous esprit de corps developing, comparable to that in some 
of the very oldest regiments. It was a joy and inspiration to us. Men like Leigh-
Mallory were at the roots of it.49 
 
                                                          
45 Grint, ‘Followership’, pp. 135-150; Bass, ‘Leading in the Army after Next’, p. 288.  
46 LC, AIR 150, Transcript of an Interview with Reverend Group Captain J.A.G. Haslam, October 1976, p. 7. 
47 TNA, AIR 1/1669/204/109/9, 8 Squadron Record Books, 24 April 1918. 
48 Reid, Winged Diplomat, p. 76. 
49 Ibid, p. 88 
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Eight Squadron’s attachment came from a request from GOC Tank Corps, 
MajGen Hugh Elles.50 Elles sought to formalise the ad-hoc relationship between the 
RFC/RAF and the Tank Corps, which had primarily focused on attempts to solve 
communication between aircraft and tanks. While identifying a specific reason for 8 
Squadron’s secondment to the Tank Corps remains difficult, by mid-June 1918, Leigh-
Mallory’s unit had been earmarked for this role.51 Leigh-Mallory’s own 1919 analysis of co-
operation with the Tank Corps is split into three phases: first, a period of preparation from 
1 July to 8 August; second, the Battle of Amiens; and finally, Third Army battles from 21 
August to 11 November.52 Eight Squadron’s role in late 1918 saw it operate in a transient 
state as individual flights co-operated with specific Tank Corps brigades, which illustrates 
Leigh-Mallory’s ability to lead the unit over wide distances and maintain relationships with 
other constituents. ‘A’ Flight co-operated with 3rd Tank Brigade, ‘B’ Flight with 1st Tank 
Brigade and ‘C’ Flight with 5th Tank Brigade, while Leigh-Mallory co-located himself with 
HQ Tank Corps.53 Key developments between the RAF and Tank Corps involved the 
refinement of Tank Contact and Counter Attack Contact Patrols, and offensive work. 
Methods for co-operation evolved during July and were used at the Battle of Amiens, with 
Leigh-Mallory recording that 8 Squadron’s perceived success led to an expanded role with 
reinforcement from 73 Squadron.  
A vital element of these developments was Leigh-Mallory’s relationship with several 
different constituencies. At an organisational level, this included relationships between the 
RAF and the Tank Corps as well as with senior officers like Elles, GOC RAF in the Field, 
                                                          
50 TNA, AIR 1/1074/204/5/1665, Major-General Hugh Elles to Major-General John Salmond, 17 June 
1918. 
51 TNA, AIR 1/1511/204/58/17, HQ RAF in the Field to 1st, 3rd, 5th Brigades RAF, 22 June 1918. 
52 TNA, AIR 1/725/97/10, History of Tank and Aeroplane Co-Operation. For the most comprehensive 
treatment of Third Army operations, see: Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British 
Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
53 TNA, WO 95/94, HQ Tank Corps War Diary, 1 July 1918; TNA, AIR 1/1511/204/58/17, HQ RAF in 
the Field to 1st, 3rd, 5th Brigade RAF, 1st, 3rd, 4th Armies and HQ Tank Corps, 28 June 1918. 
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MajGen John Salmond and his Senior Staff Officer, Brigadier-General Game. At the 
tactical level, Leigh-Mallory’s key organisational relationship was amongst those brigades to 
which his flights were attached. Leigh-Mallory recognised the need to develop a connection 
with officers with whom 8 Squadron would be operating. At all levels, Leigh-Mallory was 
successful. Socialisation with senior officers was achieved through regular reports detailing 
developments amongst the various flights and tank brigades as well as attending 
conferences on subjects like communication. This allowed Leigh-Mallory to build 
relationships while acting as a conduit between various constituencies. In late July, Leigh-
Mallory authored a detailed, six page plan for co-operation with the Tank Corps that Game 
described as going ‘too far’ beyond the capability of the RAF based on current experience; 
however, it illustrates a leader developing solutions to complex problems.54 Even if it went 
‘too far’, it triggered further conversations between the RAF and Tank Corps to solve 
common challenges, such as communications.55  
At the lower level, Leigh-Mallory advocated socialisation amongst units to improve 
relations, morale and operational understanding for ‘individuals’ as his ‘team’ operated in a 
dispersed manner. This ranged from the co-location of flights with brigades to officers 
being introduced to their Tank Corps counterparts; Army officers were taken for flights, 
while those of 8 Squadron enjoyed tank rides.56 The Chief Signals Officer of 1st Tank 
Brigade, Major E.F. Churchill, recalled this socialisation process: 
I went over to Enguingatte from time to time and had a very jolly time in the 
R.A.F. Mess. […] Working with us at this time were the 8th Squadron R.A.F. 
under Leigh Mallory, an awfully nice fellow who often used to come into the 
Mess.57 
                                                          
54 TNA, AIR 1/1074/204/5/1665, Brigadier-General Philip Game to Major-General John Salmond with 
attached paper on Co-Operation of Aeroplanes with Tanks, 27 July 1918. 
55 TNA, AIR 1/1074/204/5/1665, Major-General John Salmond to Major-General Hugh Elles, 28 July 1918. 
56 TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory, p. 11. 
57 IWM, Personal Papers of Major E.F. Churchill, Memories, 1914-1919 by a Signals Officer, Unpublished 
Memoir, pp. 33-4. 
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The leadership lessons provided through his work with the Tank Corps did not leave 
Leigh-Mallory. As evidenced in Leigh-Mallory’s 1925 essay, socialisation was a key method 
of leadership development that inculcated officers with a broader understanding of 
organisations and their inner workings.58 Leigh-Mallory developed an understanding of the 
Army that led to him being a recognised expert on army co-operation in the 1920s.  
It is not necessary to detail 8 Squadron’s operations with both Fourth and Third 
Armies apart from highlighting some of the conditions and challenges under which co-
operation occurred.59 An undated report on the Battle of Amiens by HQ Tank Corps noted 
that 8 Squadron carried out ‘their duties with great skill, pertinacity and courage’.60 Despite 
8 Squadron’s co-operation with the Tank Corps, it is also illustrative, as Chart 7.2 shows, 
that late August and September saw a spike in other roles like Artillery Patrols. This was 
because both the Tank Corps and 8 Squadron struggled to overcome communication 
issues that would allow for greater co-ordination during the breakout phases of operations. 
Specifically, after the breaking of the Hindenburg Line on 29 September 1918, co-
operation with the Tank Corps decreased as assets dispersed during the mobile operations 
of the Hundred Day Campaign. However, on 5 September 1918, each British army was 
reminded of the need to co-ordinate their plans with 8 Squadron when tanks were used in 
any numbers.61 Experiments in communications did occur and ranged from wireless to the 
use of identification discs to support advancing tanks.62 Communication was the key theme 
of a conference at HQ Tank Corps on 1 September 1918, which Leigh-Mallory and Game 
                                                          
58 TNA, AIR 1/2388/228/11/80, Experience on Active Service by Leigh-Mallory, p. 11. 
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attended; however, problems over wireless were ultimately devolved onto the Home 
Establishment. A more prosaic solution was developed to cope with this command and 
control conundrum at the front. Information sent to a Central Information Bureau via 
wireless was distributed to the appropriate tank unit through message dropping stations 
linked to each tank brigade; Leigh-Mallory ended his 1919 history of tank and aircraft co-
operation noting the effectiveness of message dropping and hypothesising the advantages 
of wireless communication.63 During 8 Squadron’s work with Third Army, weather was a 
constant factor that limited its work. Leigh-Mallory recognised this when he recalled that 
‘August 21st was quite the most disappointing day’s work the Squadron had with the 
Tanks’.64 Fog meant that 8 Squadron was unable to support Third Army operations until 
six hours after H-Hour, 4.55am. As Jonathan Boff noted in his examination of Third Army 
in 1918, both weather and length of daylight influenced operations in this period, with a 
particularly pronounced impact on the techno-centric actions of the RAF.65 While Leigh-
Mallory’s unit had been tasked with a specialist function, it remained a multi-role squadron 
and regularly returned to standard operating roles, either when the Tank Corps was not 
involved in major operations or when co-operation broke down during the breakout phase. 
Such close air support for land operations remained challenging during the inter-war years, 
and, despite various experiments with the EMF, in which Leigh-Mallory was involved, the 
RAF continued to prefer interdiction as the most meaningful mode of support to the 
Army, as direct support during mobile operations was found to be problematic even during 
the Second World War. Even Leigh-Mallory, as a WgCr, in his 1931 RAFQ article, 
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espoused a preference for interdiction and the paralysis of enemy rear areas rather than 
direct support.66 
Leigh-Mallory’s work with the Tank Corps influenced the production of doctrine 
and knowledge transfer amongst RAF commands.67 Concerning the latter, on 27 August 
1918, the Director of Flying Operations at the Air Ministry, Brigadier-General P.R.C. 
Groves, wrote to GOC Middle East Area, MajGen Geoffrey Salmond, regarding various 
developments emanating from the Western Front.68 While Groves did not directly name 
Leigh-Mallory, it was 8 Squadron’s experience to which he referred when noting that 
reports from the RAF in France had already been sent to Salmond that stressed the success 
of close co-operation between the RAF and Tank Corps during August. Groves wrote, 
‘that the recent show has had a terrific effect upon the Boche morale’.69 While Groves was 
able to think about air power at the operational level, in the post-First World War period, 
he became a proponent of the concept of the knockout blow that sought to avoid attrition 
as the main strategy in any future conflict.70 At the tactical level, by early-September 1918, 8 
Squadron’s experience was being codified for inclusion in the future edition of S.S. 135 The 
Training and Employment of the Divisions, which was to include an appendix detailing co-
operation between tanks and aircraft that was drawn up by GHQ Tank Corps and HQ 
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Missions’. For an examination of the production of formal doctrine in the Army during the First World War, 
see: Jim Beach, ‘Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 1917-1918’, WiH, 19(4) 
(2012), pp. 464-91. 
68 IWM, Personal Papers of Brigadier-General P.R.C. Groves, 69/34/1, Letter from Brigadier-General P.R.C. 
Groves to Major-General Geoffrey Salmond, 27 August 1918. 
69 Ibid. 
70 On Groves, see: Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, pp. 170–6. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Operational Job Assignments and Leadership Development in the Royal Air Force  Page 292 
 
RAF in the Field.71 This minor involvement illustrated several key issues for an emerging 
leader. First, Leigh-Mallory was involved in the British military’s learning process on the 
Western Front that, with specific reference to the production of formal doctrine, as Beach 
noted, did not ‘mature until mid-1918’.72 This saw Leigh-Mallory intimately involved in the 
problems confronting his profession, a necessary skill to master in order to foster one’s 
career development. Second, in his specific context, Leigh-Mallory was the key personality 
in adaptations that emerged once appointed to work with the Tank Corps. As related 
above, several constituencies and relationships had to be managed to drive adaptation, 
defined here as ‘change to tactics, techniques or existing technologies to improve 
operational performance’, between the RAF and Tank Corps.73 This process was not 
simple and required vision on Leigh-Mallory’s part to create change. Third, this was both a 
top-down and bottom-up process that relied on Leigh-Mallory’s appointment to work with 
the Tank Corps on the orders of HQ RAF in the Field. Without HQ RAF in the Field 
being willing to order work with the Tank Corps, the bottom-up adaptations developed by 
8 Squadron would not have evolved, as local initiatives would have lacked control and 
codification as they had before July 1918. Fourth, the adaptation was also horizontal in 
character, as it involved the co-ordination of two separate organisations, though the fact 
that the RAF in the Field on the Western Front continued to act as a part of the Army 
aided this relationship. Finally, the management of these aspects showed Leigh-Mallory’s 
ability as an effective leader, as he was able to balance ‘task’, ‘team’ and ‘individual’ by 
                                                          
71 TNA, AIR 1/1074/204/5/1665, Major-General John Salmond, GOC RAF in the Field, to Major-General 
Hugh Elles, GOC Tank Corps, 10 September 1918; AIR 1/1074/204/5/1665, Brigadier-General Philip 
Game, Senior Staff Officer, HQ RAF in the Field to Major Trafford Leigh-Mallory, OC 8 Squadron, 10 
September 1918. For Leigh-Mallory’s comments on the draft produced by GHQ Tank Corps and HQ RAF 
in the Field, see: TNA, AIR 1/1074/204/5/1665, Notes on Co-Operation between Tanks and Aeroplanes by 
Major Trafford Leigh-Mallory, 12 September 1918. 
72 Beach, ‘Issued by the General Staff’, p. 491. 
73 Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 
2006–2009’, JSS, 33(4) (2010), p. 569. 
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providing vision to the group’s actions while communicating and developing the necessary 
elements, and influencing behaviour between different organisations. Therefore, Leigh-
Mallory, with the underlying support of his superiors, set the pace for this important 
wartime adaptation. Furthermore, Leigh-Mallory developed and engendered team working, 
cooperation and morale while also managing 8 Squadron’s requirements during a period of 
high-tempo operations. In this latter respect, Leigh-Mallory also possessed good 
management skills, which reinforces the challenge of separating the latter concept from 
leadership as they clearly overlapped.  
It would be easy to describe Leigh-Mallory’s service with 8 Squadron in hyperbolic 
terms; however, his peers, axiomatically, also developed command experience. Eight 
Squadron’s role was not unique. While the development work emerged under Leigh-
Mallory, 73 Squadron subsequently supported 8 Squadron in operations; in part, because of 
workload and airframe suitability.74 Furthermore, from 1915 onwards, various squadrons 
had undertaken development work related to Contact Patrols; 6 Squadron, under Major 
George Pirie, later ACM, worked with the Cavalry Corps in 1918. Pirie’s example illustrates 
that other mid-ranking officers were also able to affect adaptations that influenced the 
conduct of operations. 
During the inter-war years, squadron command remained a marker in an officer’s 
rise to senior command; for example, WgCr Portal, while commanding 7 Squadron at RAF 
Worthy Down, lead the unit efficiently and gained the respect of his subordinates.75 In 
1927 and 1928, Portal’s squadron won the Laurence Minot Bombing Trophy with him 
personally acting as the bomb aimer in 1927. This was an example of action centred 
                                                          
74 TNA, WO 95/94, Report on the Battle of Amiens, HQ Tank Corps War Diary, N.D., p. 4 
75 Richards, Portal, pp. 93-8. Earlier in July 1927, WgCr Portal won the seven-hour reliability race that formed 
part of the Hendon Air Display; the previous holder was Harris’ 58 Squadron, and, as Probert noted, the 
latter’s reaction is not recorded, see: Probert, Bomber Harris, p. 58; ‘The Eight RAF Display’, Flight, 7 July, p. 
459. 
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leadership that engendered respect and maintained morale in the unit as Portal merged  
‘task’, ‘team’ and ‘individual’ by identifying the squadron’s mission, taking an interest in 
how its personnel performed and led by example while challenging personnel to excel in 
their role. Given that 7 Squadron was a bomber unit, it was Portal’s responsibility to ensure 
it was efficient at this core capability. Furthermore, while it was in Portal’s interest to 
maintain this capability, he did not have to, as Richards’ biography recalled, polish and 
burnish the practice bombs used for the exercise.76 While Richards’ biography was 
sympathetic to its subject, clearly, Portal as a professional, much like his peers in Appendix 
Four, took his job seriously and sought to progress his career by ensuring he was as 
successful as possible. Richards recorded in his autobiography that he had ‘great admiration 
for Portal’, and, having met him twice during the Second World War, he was impressed by 
his ‘quiet air of authority’.77 Nevertheless, while sympathetic of his subject, Richards was an 
established scholar whose work was not only grounded in Portal’s personal papers, which 
could have led to hagiography, but also contemporary operational files to reinforce 
subjectivity.78  It is also worth remembering that RAF ACRs recorded an officer’s ability to 
set an example, which was explicitly noted as being significant for officers above the rank 
of SL. Additionally, it also covered an officer’s conduct concerning ‘the handling of men’ 
and ‘performance of his duties’. These were clearly important metrics for the RAF in its 
consideration of an officer’s leadership ability.79 As a group, these men were on the 
frontline of developing new ideas and tactics regarding air power’s employment, which 
                                                          
76 Ibid, p. 95. 
77 Denis Richards, It Might Have Been Worse: Recollections, 1941-1996 (London: Smithson Albright, 1998), p. 226. 
78 Richards served as a Historian at the RAF’s AHB and was a co-author of the Service’s authorised history of 
the Second World War. In 1931, Richards graduated with a Double First in History from Trinity Hall, 
University of Cambridge. He served as Principal of Morley College during the 1950s and between 1965 and 
1968 held the Longman Fellowship in History at the newly established University of Sussex. In general, see: 
Ibid. 
79 TNA, AIR 2/506, Copy of Form 367, Annual Confidential Report (Officers) for 193(). 
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required leadership traits, such as vision to implement change. They were also committed 
military professionals with command experience. Finally, as Omissi correctly asserted: 
Whatever the training value of policing operations, there is no doubt that the 
men who guided the RAF into and during the 1939-45 war had spent many of 
their formative air force years in the Empire.80    
 
Clearly, command experience in this period was often imperial in character and related to 
air policing, which not only helped maintain the Service’s independence but also, as Brad 
Gladman suggested, ensured, at the middle level, that relations with the Army remained 
cordial.81 For example, GC Peregrine Fellowes, as OC of the hastily formed Constantinople 
Wing, SL Charles Blount, as OC 4 Squadron, and SL Tedder, as OC 207 Squadron, all 
deployed during the Chanak Crisis of 1922 and 1923.82 However, Leigh-Mallory never 
experienced this as a commander; though, as noted below, he did serve in Iraq as SASO. 
 
7.3 The Importance of Staff Duties 
Despite staff duties importance, and the associated emergence of staff systems, it remains 
an under researched aspect of military history from both an operational and leadership 
perspective. This is despite Dennis Showalter identifying the emergence of staff systems as 
‘Arguably the distinguishing feature of modern war making’.83 While several studies have 
examined the emergence of Army and RN staff systems, as Aimee Fox-Godden noted in 
her work on brigade staff in the First World War, there has been limited scholarship on the 
subject of staff duties themselves. This has led staff duties to be viewed as ‘a single, 
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81 Brad Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 
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homogeneous entity with very little attempt to differentiate their respective roles’.84 If 
studies into staff duties in the Army remain limited, though Harris’ recent PhD on staff 
officers in the Army on the Western Front is a welcome addition to the literature, then 
those on the RAF are non-existent. There is little understanding of staff functions at 
command level and in the Air Ministry despite the Air Staff featuring highly in most works 
on the RAF.85 However, staff duties, as an element of leadership development through 
timely job assignments, which often followed attendance at Andover, played a vital 
function in both the administration and the command and control of the RAF at all levels. 
The omission of staff duties from the history of the RAF is explained by two factors. First, 
the historiography of the RAF has focused on either policy debates related to issues 
surrounding independence or its doctrinal development. Second, staff duties tend to be 
uninteresting; therefore, apart from noting the significance of socialisation, this job 
assignment remained an inferred element of many RAF officers’ recollections. Joubert, in 
his autobiography The Fated Sky, drew the following analogy on the role of staff duties in 
the RAF that could be applied to officers of all services: 
When they go shopping our wives “make an appreciation of the situation” and 
then, in the form of a shopping list, they write their operation orders which 
they hand to the shopkeepers for execution.86 
 
This draws out staff duties central purpose, which AP1301 noted was the co-ordination of 
the ‘machinery of command’ through the ‘smooth co-ordination of the work of a 
                                                          
84 Aimee Fox-Godden, ‘“Hopeless inefficiency”?: The Transformation and Operational Performance of 
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85 See: Harris, ‘The Men who Planned the War’. 
86 Joubert, The Fated Sky, pp. 82-3. 
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headquarters’, which included the production of appreciations and ensuring the execution 
of orders.87  
The staff system of the RAF was influenced by the organisation used by the Army, 
which it inherited from the RFC.88 The system consisted of three branches, first, the Air, or 
operations, Staff managed operational aspects in commands, which included planning 
operations, intelligence and organisation. Second, there was a Personnel Staff, which 
administered manpower policy. Finally, the Equipment Staff, latterly engineering, 
administered maintenance policy. By 1939, the latter two aspects had merged into an 
administrative staff and associated services. RAF views on staff duties were codified in 
AP1301, which marked out a clear hierarchy of staff positions with the Air Staff pre-
eminent over other branches at all levels of the RAF.89 The head of the Air Staff, the Chief 
Staff Officer or eventually SASO, typically held a rank one level higher than the equivalent 
head of the Personnel or Equipment Staffs; Leigh-Mallory was an AC while SASO at HQ 
British Forces in Iraq, while the equivalent SPSO and Senior Equipment Staff Officers 
were GCs. As Chapter Three noted, only 23 officers active in March 1939 had experience 
as SASO, while 43 had served in the Air Ministry. AP1301 noted, concerning co-ordination 
of staff branches: 
The commander may, therefore, delegate much of this responsibility to the 
Senior Air Staff Officer. […] In the temporary absence of the commander the 
SASO will represent him.90 
 
AP1301 stressed that SASOs acted as the key conduit for presenting a consistent view to 
commanders.91 This delegation was based on the principle of centralised control and 
                                                          
87 TNA, AIR 10/2313, AP1301, Chap. II, Para. 23-24. 
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89 TNA, AIR 10/2312, AP1301. 
90 RAFM, AP1301, Chap. II, Paras. 27-28. 
The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Operational Job Assignments and Leadership Development in the Royal Air Force  Page 298 
 
decentralised execution, or, in a modern sense, mission command. As SASO in Iraq, Leigh-
Mallory provided much needed support to his AOC, AVM Mitchell, in a period of regional 
instability, as exemplified by the assassination of the Iraqi Army’s Chief of the General 
Staff, General Bekir Sidki. Sidki had been instrumental in the 1936 coup d’état against the 
government of Yasin al-Hashimi; Leigh-Mallory attended Sidki’s funeral as the British 
government’s representative.92  
This division of responsibilities was mirrored in the Air Ministry.93 The three key 
Air Ministry departments for much of this period were that of CAS, AMP, and AMSR. 
Broadly speaking, CAS held responsibility for providing advice to the government on air 
operations, policy, intelligence and organisation while maintaining RAF efficiency.94 AMP 
administered personnel policy and training, while AMSR organised the provision of 
aircraft, administration of supply and experimental work.95 Each held a seat on the Air 
Council alongside the Secretary of State for Air and, with the exception of AMP, until 
1922, the Controller-General of Civil Aviation. A key change occurred in January 1935 
when AMSR split into the positions of Air Member for Supply and Organisation and Air 
Member for Research and Development. In July 1940, responsibility for training moved 
from AMP’s department and rose to a position on the Air Council as Air Member for 
Training. Each department consisted of various directorates that administered specific 
aspects of RAF policy, and, as with the evolving structure of the Air Ministry, these also 
moved; the period of 1919 to 1924 can be considered one of experimentation in the 
evolution of the Air Ministry. For example, the removal of the position of the Master-
                                                                                                                                                                          
91 Ibid. 
92 ‘Iraqi General Murdered’, The Manchester Guardian, 13 August 1937, p. 9. In 1932, power in Iraq transferred 
to the Hashemite dynasty under the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which allowed British forces to 
remain in the country to protect British interests in the region. 
93 This section is derived from an analysis of the AFL. 
94 TNA, AIR 20/7502, Air Ministry – List of Staff and Distribution of Duties, July 1924,  p. 23 
95 Ibid, p. 31, 36. 
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General of Personnel in 1919 led to all directorates being placed within CAS’s department. 
However, the establishment of AMP’s department in 1923 saw various directorates moved 
around the Air Ministry as Trenchard sought to evolve an organisation that was fit for 
purpose. Initially, the Directorate of Organisation, in 1923, became part of AMP’s 
department, while training remained part of the Directorate of Training and Staff Duties. 
However, by 1924, training became a directorate in its own right in AMP’s department, 
while organisation, as a deputy directorate within the newly formed Directorate of 
Organisation and Staff Dutiess, returned to CAS’s remit. Similarly, staff duties formed the 
other deputy directorate in the Directorate of Organisation and Staff Duties. The key 
directorate in CAS’s department was the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, which 
was referred to as the Air Staff in the AFL. Its Director also served as DCAS until 1938. 
DCAS’s position split from this function as the RAF expanded and various additional 
Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff for plans and intelligence emerged; Douglas, as an AVM, 
served as DCAS in 1940. This made the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence primes 
inter pares amongst Air Ministry directorates, though service at Adastral House in general 
brought officers into direct contact with senior officers capable of shaping and nurturing 
careers. As with other changes in the 1930s, the AFL began to classify the whole of CAS’s 
department as the Air Staff from 1935 onwards. The importance of this discussion is to 
highlight the degree of change on-going in the RAF as it sought to develop its structures. It 
helps to contextualise the challenge of career management mentioned earlier because these 
changes in directorates provide the background to the bureaucracy that managed that 
process. 
In a March 1926 lecture by WgCr Sutton to Leigh-Mallory’s course at Andover, it 
was noted that a staff officer’s key function was to eliminate friction and engender shared 
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responsibility amongst commanders, units and staffs.96 Further leadership knowledge 
developed by this job assignment included the ability to change outlooks by creating wider 
unit cohesion in larger organisations like groups and commands by solving problems 
amongst stakeholders. This was because staff officers acted as a conduit through which 
control and smooth operations were conducted in co-operation with other staff branches. 
This job assignment allowed mid-ranking officers to gather an insight into the higher 
mechanics of the military bureaucracy, which, as potential senior leaders, they would lead. 
This knowledge allowed officers to navigate the internal politics of the RAF, which 
included negotiating relationships with those who did not form the core military 
professionals of the Service, like members of the Stores Branch. Effective staff officers 
generated space to allow their commander to lead by undertaking responsibilities that freed 
senior officers to ensure the efficiency of their command. This space emerged through 
influence on other members of the policy staff and OCs. The ability to influence and 
coerce subordinates remains a central aspect of effective leadership. Even at squadron 
level, the RAF recognised that an adjutant:  
should attend to all purely routine matters with a view of giving his 
Commanding Officer more time to study the general efficiency of the Unit and 
Station.97  
 
Concerning Air Ministry service, officers in Appendix Four who rose to four- or 
five-star rank typically served, on average, four years in the Air Ministry. Some, like 
Douglas and Portal, with seven years each, served longer, while Evill and Barratt served 
slightly less at three years. They also served in senior positions as either directors or deputy 
directors of various Air Ministry directorates. Leigh-Mallory, for example, served as DDSD 
between 1932 and 1934, while Douglas served as Director of Staff Duties from 1936 to 
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1938. Leigh-Mallory’s appointment followed an established pattern of appropriate job 
assignments whereby former DS at Camberley moved on to become DDSD in their next 
posting. DDSD’s responsibility encompassed aspects like RAF mobilisation arrangements, 
the preparation of training and operational manuals, including the War Manual, liaison with 
all staff colleges, promotion examinations, and liaison with the Dominions and the Army.98 
Given his experience to date, this was an appropriate appointment for Leigh-Mallory.  
Leigh-Mallory served as DDSD twice. First, after his predecessor GC Owen Boyd 
was posted as OC Aden Command in August 1931, Leigh-Mallory’s period as DS at 
Camberley finished early to replace Boyd as DDSD. Then, in late 1931, Leigh-Mallory’s 
service was again broken while appointed a supernumerary attached to 1 Air Defence 
Group when he attended the Geneva Disarmament Conference as a GC. Leigh-Mallory 
then returned as DDSD in late 1932 before attending the IDC in 1934. Supernumeraries 
were used to keep officers performing alternative duties on the active list rather than 
placing them on half-pay. Up to late 1931, the RAF’s representative to the League of 
Nations, as well as serving as air advisor to the British delegation at the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference, was GC John Babington, a staff officer in the Directorate of 
Operations and Intelligence. Babington sat on the Air Commission, but as the conference 
grew in scope, additional service members were appointed to help.99 Initial service 
representatives included Babington, Vice-Admiral F.C. Dreyer and Brigadier A.C. 
Temperley.100 Leigh-Mallory acted as the RAF’s representative on the Air and Chemical 
Warfare Commissions.101 It is not necessary here to detail the negotiations at Geneva other 
than to note that while Babington and Leigh-Mallory provided expert advice, the failures at 
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Geneva must be attributed to the politicians who could not agree solutions to the 
challenges that confronted them. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of the advice that service representatives like Leigh-Mallory provided due to 
conflicting views both within the British government and between it and the Services, 
which, as Meilinger argued, was particularly noticeable concerning air power.102 Most 
politicians, with the exception of Templewood, wished to abolish bombers, while the Air 
Ministry took a strategic view and suggested that such a move was short sighted if civil 
aviation was not also limited. Indeed, the RAF was not above using the levers of power to 
support its views; for example, in 1932, Portal, then Director of Plans in the Directorate of 
Operations and Intelligence, informed Trenchard, who, in 1930, was created a Baron and 
sat in the House of Lords, of the Air Staff’s position on various discussions including the 
abolition of air forces.103 One potential solution was the concept of the international air 
force, which both pre- and post-dated Geneva but was widely seen as the key method to 
managing the abolition of air power through a form of collective security based on the 
ideals of internationalism – the idea that increased co-operation between states generates 
greater rewards.104 The contradictory between the politicians and the Air Ministry placed 
Babington and Leigh-Mallory in a difficult and ambiguous position as they sought to 
provide effective advice that ran contrary to politicians’ aims. Additionally, the RAF was 
also in a difficult place, as if it supported abolition; it could have affected its own 
independence. However, Temperley, in his 1938 recollection of Geneva, noted that the 
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Chemical Warfare Commission was ‘the only one ever appointed […] that conducted their 
business in an impartial and scientific spirit, untinged by politics or national passions’.105 
Furthermore, Temperley argued that ‘When the politicians were confronted with an 
insoluble problem or wished to waste time, the invariable device was to appoint a technical 
committee’, while also suggesting that politicians used the commissions to shift blame 
when they failed to come to an agreement.106 Temperley’s views are useful given that 
Anthony Eden MP, who, as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, attended the 
conference, recorded that, despite divergent views, the latter became ‘an arbiter at Geneva’ 
in his area of expertise, thus suggesting that the former’s views cannot be dismissed. 
Ultimately, the British government did not believe in the conference’s ideas and what the 
country was being asked to forego.107 Despite being in a difficult position, Geneva’s failure 
did not unduly affect either Babington’s or Leigh-Mallory’s career trajectories, as both 
reached Air Rank, while the latter returned to the Air Ministry. This was because the blame 
for the conference’s failure fell on the politicians involved, and it is reasonable to presume 
that Leigh-Mallory’s  and Babington’s ‘visibility’ was enhanced by providing guidance to 
political leaders, though it could also have been because they represented the views of the 
RAF and defended its interests in a challenging context.  
It is possible, based on a taxonomy of roles encompassing staff, command and 
training duties, to classify an officer’s ability based on their first posting after attending 
Andover, which was, in part, created to educate staff officers. Chart 7.3 classifies postings 
under five headings, of which the most significant was staff duties, either in the Air 
Ministry or at command or group level. This is followed by command and 
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education/training positions, which the RAF valued. The final category includes those 
officers posted out to any positions, including squadron adjutants. Chart 7.3 can also be 
further separated amongst those posted to the Air Staff and those who went to other 
directorates in the Air Ministry. Nevertheless, the taxonomy does suggest a degree of 
success by certain officers who went on to reach senior command. For example, after 
attending Andover, Portal held a posting in the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence 
in 1923, while Douglas moved to the Directorate of Training. This taxonomy is 
complicated by factors such as postings being based on an officer’s suitability for an 
appropriate open vacancy. On completion of his course at Andover, for example, Leigh-
Mallory was posted to the Air Staff of 22 Group. Twenty-two Group was the controlling 
agency for many of the RAF’s education and training formations, which included the 
School of Army Co-Operation. Given the rhythms evident in Leigh-Mallory’s career and in 
those of his predecessors at the School of Army Co-Operation, Gossage and Boyd, it is 
reasonable to conclude that this posting was made so that he could gain useful Air Staff 
experience until he could replace Boyd as OC in 1927.  
AP1301 stated, ‘All staff appointments are made by or with the concurrence of the 
Air Council’, which highlights the relationship amongst socialisation, nurturing and the 
identification of talent for appropriate job assignments.108 While direct patronage is hard to 
identify, it is clear that, in the short-term, identification by senior officers could produce 
advantageous ACRs, which in turn led to nurturing through key job assignments and 
attendance at Andover. For example, Trenchard knew Leigh-Mallory during his first 
posting in the Air Ministry between 1923 and 1925; Leigh-Mallory served in both the 
Directorate of Training and the Deputy Directorate of Staff Duties in CAS’s department. 
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This is evidenced by the fact that Slessor, as a FL, who served in the Directorate of 
Training and Staff Duties at this time, recalled that Trenchard got Leigh-Mallory and he 
mixed up.109 As an SD3 in the latter directorate, Leigh-Mallory, as a SL, was responsible for 
‘Co-operation with Army’ and liaising with officers at education and training 
establishments.110 Again, this is an example of the RAF making appropriate appointments 
based on prior experience, and given that his next appointment was to Andover as a 
student, the RAF were clearly developing his professional knowledge for further nurturing. 
Furthermore, in 1964, Portal recalled that his work in the Directorate of Operations and 
Intelligence in 1923 as a SL ‘brought [him] into close contact with Lord Trenchard’.111 
Additionally, the Air Ministry’s small size made it easier to identify nurtured officers for 
further development through socialisation. More broadly, the socialisation inherent in staff 
duties filtered down to operational commands, with Willock, who served on the Air Staff at 
HQ Fighting Area between 1931 and 1933 as a WgCr, describing his work for his AOC, 
Bowhill, as a pleasure. Willock’s duties included liaison with stations and squadrons under 
the control of Fighting Area as well as the organisation of conferences examining 
operational matters and the refinement of fighter tactics.112 Thus, undertaking staff duties 
not only introduced officers to responsibilities like acting as a conduit for senior officers, 
but also, through socialisation, it made them more ‘visible’ for development.  
There was, however, one staff position that generated mixed results for an officer’s 
career progression. This was the conundrum of the Air Attaché. In 1918, it was recognised 
that the RAF required attachés to maintain relationships with foreign air forces, to act as an 
advisor supporting the work of British aviation companies overseas and as part of a semi-
                                                          
109 Slessor, The Central Blue, p. 46. 
110 TNA, AIR 20/7502, List of Staff and Distribution of Duties, p. 26. 
111 CC, Portal Papers, Recollections of Service in the Air Ministry, extracted from the AFD Society Journal 
(May 1964), p. 5 
112 IWM, Willock Papers, Unpublished Memoir, pp. 31-2. 
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official intelligence network; an Air Attachés line of accountability ran to the Deputy 
Director of Aerial Intelligence.113 This was a diplomatically sensitive position, which 
required an experienced officer to manage relationships, which, in part, explains why this 
appointment was not helpful to officers wishing to make themselves ‘visible’ for further 
development and promotion, due to the length of the appointment. Furthermore, officers 
accepting such appointments were out of sight of those who nurtured careers. Here, there 
was an inverse relationship amongst career patterns, ability and visibility, and it was one 
method of utilising experienced long-serving WgCrs/GCs who passed out of the zone of 
promotion and were unsuited to further development. For example, GC Malcolm Christie 
served seven years as Air Attaché in Washington and Berlin before retiring at this rank in 
1930 due to ill health, though it is unlikely that he would have been promoted further given 
his time in rank.114 Eleven officers from Appendix Three served as attachés; however, of 
these, 45 per cent retired directly after this appointment. Rising to 50 per cent once WgCr 
John Fletcher is added to this list, this figure illustrates that, despite its sensitive character, 
this was not a position that furthered an officer’s career. Fletcher served in one more 
appointment before retiring. Only three of these 11 officers, Gossage, Reid and Willock, 
reached Air Rank by 1939. Thus, Gossage, Reid and Willock clearly showed ability in other 
spheres that kept them ‘visible’ for promotion. For example, Gossage was well thought of 
                                                          
113 TNA, AIR 2/88, Copy of Instructions Issued to Air Attaché, Attached to a Letter to the Under-Secretary 
of State, Foreign Office, 19 February 1919. Directed to furnish appropriate information, they nevertheless 
provided evidence for various handbooks detailing the organisation, tactics, doctrine and equipment of 
overseas air forces, see: TNA, AIR 2/88, Memorandum on the Instructions for the Guidance of Air 
Attachés, Attached to a Letter to the Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 19 February 1919, p. 1. For an 
example of the handbook produced, see: TNA, AIR 10/1645, SD128 - Handbook on the German Air Force 
(1939). For an overview of the Air Attaché experience, see: Reid, Winged Diplomat, pp. 133-42. Reid details the 
experience of Ferdinand West as the first Air Attaché to Finland. For a modern view, see: Air Commodore 
Ian Elliott, ‘Viewpoint - The Life of an Air Attaché: Alcohol, Cholesterol and Protocol?’, APR, 13(1) (2010), 
pp. 81-4. 
114 Despite his poor health, Christie, as a business person in retirement, continued to furnish the RAF and the 
Defence Requirements Committee with vital information on German developments through the office of the 
Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Robert Vansittart, see: Wesley K. Wark, ‘British 
Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933-1939’, The Historical Journal, 25(3) (1982), 
pp. 636-8. 
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by the Air Ministry, and, even in 1916, he was considered as a liaison officer with the 
French Army.115 A common factor related to Gossage’s, Reid’s and Willock’s experiences 
and subsequent progress was their Staff College attendance, which other Air Attachés 
lacked, which reinforces the importance of military education to leadership development. 
 
7.4 Training and Teaching at the School of Army Co-Operation and the Army Staff 
College, Camberley 
The RAF, as a means of developing officers, and as part of its emerging culture, placed 
great value on training and education. Therefore, appointments at institutions such as 
Cranwell, training establishments and staff colleges were a common element in nurturing 
future senior leaders. In particular, 75 per cent of officers in Appendix Four undertook at 
least one of the above postings; however, only 26 per cent undertook the DS role, which 
was an important appointment. Focussing just on DS, this percentage decreases to 10 per 
cent when compared to those still serving in 1939 from Appendix Three. This figure 
excludes three officers, such as Clark-Hall, who had retired before 1939. Of these officers, 
85 per cent had reached Air Rank by 1939, and those excluded would do so during the 
Second World War. Thus, it is clear that such job assignments were reserved for nurtured 
officers whom the Air Ministry trusted. In particular, this job assignment allowed nurtured 
officers to act as trusted subject matter experts while transferring concepts that 
underpinned RAF developments both in a Service context and to the other services while 
also socialising with those with the influence to nurture careers. For example, in a 1928 
letter from Trenchard to CIGS, Field Marshal Sir George Milne, the former noted that he 
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Office, 7 April 1916. On liaison between the RFC and the French Air Service, see: Pugh, ‘Conceptual 
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wanted those conversant with the ‘Air Force faith’ as DS at Camberley.116 The RAF wanted 
officers involved in transferring knowledge to exhibit leadership skills, like setting an 
example and motivating those under tuition. Many officers in Appendix Four exhibited 
these attributes; for example, it is worth reiterating that, except for Brooke-Popham and 
Ludlow-Hewitt, three of Andover’s five inter-war Commandants are present in Appendix 
Four. These were Joubert, Freeman and Barratt. Two Commandants, Longmore and 
Mitchell, and three Assistant Commandants, Philip Babington, Barratt and Evill, of 
Cranwell are also present in Appendix Four. Furthermore, several officers, including 
Barratt, Evill, Freeman, ACM Garrod, Gossage, Hill, Joubert, Portal, Sutton and Tedder, 
served as DS at Andover, Camberley and the IDC. Of his time as DS at Andover, Evill 
recalled the socialisation aspects of his role that included teaching Leigh-Mallory, who, he 
recalled, was well liked.117 As Assistant Commandant at Cranwell, Evill also recalled the 
honour and enjoyment of teaching future RAF officers.118 Leigh-Mallory spent much of the 
1920s in training or education roles at the RAF’s School of Army Co-Operation and as DS 
at Camberley. These roles were linked, and Leigh-Mallory was selected for the latter 
position based on his performance at the former. 
With reference to Slessor, Leigh-Mallory’s successor as DS at Camberley, Meilinger 
wrote: 
When told by the Army chief […] that the RAF officer detailed to teach at the 
Army Staff College was unable to discuss […] the broader aspects of air power, 
Trenchard assured him that the next officer […] would be a fine tactician, a 
strategic thinker and someone well connected to the Air Staff who would be 
conversant with current policy. That person would be Jack Slessor.119 
 
                                                          
116 TNA, AIR 5/280, Chief of the Air Staff to Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 10 December 1928. 
117 RAFM, Evill Papers, “Recollections”, p. 20. 
118 Ibid, p. 23. 
119 Philip Meilinger, ‘John C. Slessor and the Genesis of Air Interdiction’ in Philip Meilinger (ed.), Airwar: 
Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 66. 
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This interpretation is wrong and representative of the distortion present in the 
historiography concerning both Leigh-Mallory and the development of tactical air power in 
the RAF. David Ian Hall’s work on British tactical air power up to 1943 was also illustrative 
of this distortion, as it did not engage with discussions from the 1920s, the role of Leigh-
Mallory or the School of Army Co-Operation.120 Gladman at least recognised the existence 
of the reports that emanated from Old Sarum, though he did not link them to Leigh-
Mallory.121 The implication of Meilinger’s assertion is that Slessor’s predecessor was an 
incapable DS, a clear indictment of Leigh-Mallory’s leadership development up to this 
point; however, the letter cited did not mention the former but the latter. It forms part of 
correspondence between Trenchard and the respective CIGS, Field Marshals Earl of Cavan 
and Milne, which dated from 1923 onwards and concerned broader issues of army/air 
force co-operation. The letter stated that Trenchard was unhappy with the current 
incumbent at Camberley, Boyd, as he was not able to instruct on subjects like ‘air strategy’, 
though the latter was limited by what was dictated to him by the War Office.122 Trenchard 
noted that Leigh-Mallory, as evidenced by a visit to the School of Army Co-Operation, was 
able to ‘give instruction in more advanced principles of Air Operations’.123 Trenchard 
suggested to CIGS that the next DS would ‘be qualified’ to lecture on broader aspects of 
air power employment.124 That this was Leigh-Mallory illustrates his engagement with RAF 
leadership development processes, including attendance at Andover. In addition, by being 
effective in his role at the School of Army Co-Operation, Leigh-Mallory made himself 
more ‘visible’ for further development. In addition, Trenchard knew Leigh-Mallory from 
                                                          
120 Hall, Strategy for Victory, pp. 13-40. 
121 Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support, p. 33. 
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the latter’s time in the Air Ministry and appreciated his ability, while the latter’s leadership 
competency developed steadily as he progressed through appropriately timed job 
assignments, though whether this was a case of patronage remains difficult to confirm due 
to the lack of sources. Milne, in his reply to Trenchard, also noted the possibility of finding 
an officer with psa to act as DS; a cultural symbol that Leigh-Mallory possessed, which 
made him an ideal candidate for the position.125 Neither of Leigh-Mallory’s predecessors, 
Gossage and Boyd, were Andover graduates. Leigh-Mallory’s tenure at Camberley ended 
early, not from any perceived incompetence, but because of the need to replace Boyd as 
DDSD. Trenchard’s influence, however, can be overstated, as illustrated by his displeasure 
with Boyd’s ability, as the latter still rose to be an AM.126 Nevertheless, Trenchard nurtured 
and identified potential talent, and this filtered through to further appointments.  
WgCr Leigh-Mallory was the third OC of the School of the Army Co-Operation to 
become DS at Camberley. WgCr Gossage, who stayed briefly after attending the staff 
course at Camberley, preceded Boyd.127 The appointment of RAF DS dated to 1922, when 
Ironside, Camberley’s Commandant, requested senior officers to deliver lectures; Salmond 
and Brook-Popham initially delivered these.128 The question of RAF DS for Camberley was 
a key topic for discussion at the first annual conference between the RAF and Army on 
combined training in 1923.129 Trenchard was concerned that there would not be enough 
work for DS, but supported the position’s establishment. Trenchard was also concerned 
over the use of junior students at Camberley to discuss aspects of air power employment 
outside their experience due to the potential for misrepresenting key elements of the RAF’s 
                                                          
125 TNA, AIR 5/280, Chief of the Imperial General Staff to Chief of the Air Staff, 14 December 1928. 
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views.130 This related to the question of relevant qualifications, specifically psa, which in 
turn links to Leigh-Mallory’s Andover experience that played a role in his appointment as 
DS. No corresponding positions appeared at Andover or Greenwich. However, relevant 
students and visiting Commandants did lecture at these establishments.131 This arrangement 
linked the small size of these establishments and the perceived inefficiency of attaching 
specialist DS from the other services. Leigh-Mallory’s principle responsibilities included 
delivering lectures to both the Junior and Senior Divisions on air power subjects as well as 
immersing himself in the life of Camberley. At this point, Leigh-Mallory encountered the 
future General Sir Miles Dempsey and Field Marshal Dill; the latter was then, as a MajGen, 
Commandant of Camberley and a future CIGS, while the former was a student and future 
GOC 2nd Army during the Normandy Campaign in 1944.132 During the 1920s and 1930s, 
lecture content did not significantly change and included themes like ‘The Function of the 
Royal Air Force’, ‘Air Co-Operation with the Army in the Advance’ and ‘Air in the 
Attack’.133 Leigh-Mallory was involved in battlefield tours, a key pedagogical method at 
Camberley that allowed students to apply theories and ideas taught.134 In 1931, Leigh-
Mallory led a tour to Cambrai to discuss the 1917 battle, which illustrates his willingness 
and ability to engage with a range of pedagogical processes and subjects beyond those 
                                                          
130 TNA, AIR 5/280, Minutes and Conclusions of the Conference between War Officer and Air Ministry, 13 
February 1923, p. 3; TNA, AIR 5/280, Commandant, Army Staff College, Camberley to Director of Staff 
Duties, War Office, 28 February 1923. 
131 TNA, AIR 5/280, Commandant, RAF Staff College to Secretary to the Air Ministry, 27 February 1923. 
132 On Dempsey, see: Peter Rostron, The Military Life & Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey: Monty's Army 
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directly related to air power.135 Given Leigh-Mallory’s experience with the Tank Corps in 
1918, this was an appropriate subject given the role of tanks in this battle.136 Dill was 
impressed with Leigh-Mallory’s work, and service at Camberley was the culmination of a 
decade of work in army co-operation, which, rather than hindering his career progress, 
actually marked him out as a capable officer.137 Leigh-Mallory was able to immerse himself 
in RAF culture while recognising the need to work with the other services.  
Leigh-Mallory’s time at the School of Army Co-Operation came in two phases. 
First, from 1921 to 1923, Leigh-Mallory commanded the Co-Operation Squadron that, in 
1924, became 16 (Army Co-Operation) Squadron, which was the School of Army Co-
Operation’s operational element and worked with the school and local Army units from 
Southern Command, such as the School of Artillery at Larkhill. Leigh-Mallory’s 
responsibilities largely matched those concerning his command of 8 Squadron in 1918. 
Second, Leigh-Mallory returned as OC in 1927 when the School of Army Co-Operation 
was intimately involved with the Army’s mechanisation experiments on Salisbury Plain. 
These assignments built on Leigh-Mallory’s expertise in army co-operation and saw him 
socialise with the Army, thus improving his ability to work across different organisational 
silos. In between these postings, Leigh-Mallory was still involved in developing and 
managing relations with the Army. For example, in September 1925, the Army held its first 
corps sized manoeuvres since the end of the First World War. Unlike the manoeuvres of 
1913, when the Army called on its own organic air arm, the RFC, the 1925 exercise 
required co-operation from the RAF to replicate modern battlefield conditions.138 The key 
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criticism levelled at the RAF in 1925 was the perennial problem of command and control, 
which was not solved until the Second World War, and was one Leigh-Mallory reiterated in 
his 1930 RUSI lecture.139 Appointed to the Conduct of Operations Staff for the 
manoeuvres DS, Leigh-Mallory served alongside AVM Webb-Bowen and was responsible 
for the management of resources between the two opposing forces.140 While at Andover, 
Leigh-Mallory was seconded to this appointment during the break between the first and 
second terms. Given his previous service, Leigh-Mallory was identified as an appropriate 
officer to support RAF functions during these manoeuvres while furthering his 
professional development. While nothing, in terms of doctrine, came out of the 
manoeuvres, Liddell Hart described them as being ‘worth doing, even more for their 
negative than their positive lessons’.141 Several other students from Andover also worked 
on the Air Staff, showing the importance of using Staff College qualified personnel to 
support exercises and present RAF views. WgCrs Barratt and Gossage, both at Camberley 
as a student and DS respectively, were involved, as was Boyd, then OC, School of Army 
Co-Operation.142 The RAF, through the mechanism of Andover, used this exercise as a 
means of developing officers in operational conditions related to large-scale manoeuvres 
with the Army. Including Leigh-Mallory, the names presented above represented four OCs, 
School of Army Co-Operation and these men went on to hold senior leadership positions 
during the Second World War. Apart from work with units on Salisbury Plain and the 
EMF, Leigh-Mallory’s key work on assuming command at the School of Army Co-
Operation involved delivering a variety of courses in army co-operation to RAF and Army 
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officers.143 Four key courses existed: one for mid-ranking Army officers designated Branch 
Intelligence Officers/Intelligence Liaison Officers and Squadron Artillery Officers; a 
Senior RAF Officer Course designed to familiarise officers with army co-operation 
practices before postings with operational squadrons; a general Army Co-Operation 
Course; and finally, a ten-day Senior Army Officer Course, which was designed to inculcate 
Army officers with RAF practices and ‘sell’ the conception and belief of ‘Command of the 
Air’. This course began under Leigh-Mallory’s tenure as OC and continued due to its initial 
success.144 This required Leigh-Mallory to relate to and socialise with senior officers; for 
example, the course held from 25 November to 4 December 1929 consisted of five 
MajGens and five Brigadiers.145 
The context to this job assignment was the relations between the RAF and the 
other services. The formation of the RAF raised questions over the apportionment of 
resources amongst the services and their role in the British defence establishment. As 
Chapter Six noted concerning articles on air power, this challenge centred on the 
conception of the belief in ‘Command of the Air’, which had implications for 
independence. Even at the tactical level, differences abounded over the ownership and 
indivisibility of air power. In 1935, Captain I. Macgregor wrote of the need for an ‘Army 
Air Arm’ in the pages of JRUSI.146 This brought the reply from an unidentified author who 
wrote that Macgregor did not understand that: 
The creation of a separate Army Air Arm appears to be a rather cumbrous 
method of solving the difficulty of adequate liaison between the Army and 
RAF.147  
                                                          
143 The term ‘EMF’ is used for consistency, even though in 1928 it was known as the Experimental Armoured 
Force, see: TNA, AIR 10/1759, AP1372, Army Co-Operation Report 1928, March 1929, p. 21. 
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This was even more prevalent at senior levels. Despite espousing the value of air power to 
officers of the EMF in September 1927, Milne insisted on describing the RAF as an ‘arm’ 
and not a service in a 1933 letter to the Secretary of State for War, Viscount Hailsham.148 
Milne argued that air power’s primary role was reconnaissance and air observation, 
therefore, control should be returned to the Army. Given this context, Leigh-Mallory’s 
command of the School of Army Co-operation had implications for nurturing relations 
between the RAF and Army. Leigh-Mallory was adept at influencing relationships linked to 
his command. Key amongst these was GOC 3rd Division, MajGen John Burnett-Stuart, 
who oversaw the EMF exercises in 1927 and 1928. French described Burnett-Stuart as one 
of the few Army officers to grasp the changing character of warfare in the 1920s, while J.P. 
Harris considered that he thought of himself as ‘progressive’.149 As cited below, the 
evidence indicates that Burnett-Stuart recognised the importance of air power and the work 
of Leigh-Mallory and the School of Army Co-Operation. The EMF was set up to test ideas 
around the use of tanks and disbanded in 1929 to examine other avenues. The 
contradictory position of the Army on mechanisation presented a challenge to the RAF, as 
it was the supporting force behind any developments undertaken. To sum up this position, 
Major B.C. Denning of the Royal Engineers wrote in JRUSI in 1927 that it was difficult to 
get the various arms to agree on what type of modernisation they were seeking.150 Adding 
independent air power into the mix made the whole process a challenging one that required 
an able officer to influence thinking on the subject.  
                                                          
148 LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1927/7, Copy of the ‘Address to the Officers of the Mechanized Force 
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While Leigh-Mallory did not broadly change Army views, he did have some impact, 
as evidenced by the correspondence between Trenchard and Milne cited above concerning 
DS at Camberley. Leigh-Mallory recognised that effective co-operation between air power 
and mechanised forces could bring mobility back to the battlefield, and of particular 
interest to the RAF during these experiments was how fighter aircraft could co-operate 
with ground forces despite continuing communication problems.151 In some respects, from 
a modern perspective, Leigh-Mallory acted as a transformational leader by seeking to enact 
change by identifying challenges and developing a shared vision for an evolving concept of 
operations, as illustrated by his 1931 RAFQ article, and an ability to apply RAF thinking to 
the problem.152 That Leigh-Mallory was not fully successful stems from factors outside of 
his control, such as difficult relations between the RAF and Army at the senior level. 
Furthermore, in a covering letter to General Officer Commander-in-Chief Southern 
Command, Montgomery-Massingberd, Burnett-Stuart drew out Leigh-Mallory’s role and 
importance. This set the tone of his later recollections in 1931 when appointed to the lead 
Southern Command and in his unpublished memoir.153 In the covering letter, Burnett-
Stuart described Leigh-Mallory’s co-operation as ‘invaluable’. Burnett-Stuart’s only criticism 
was that there might have been too much support and that he was concerned that ‘the 
Armoured Force ha[d] come to rely on it too much’; a portent of the degree of integration 
evident in the Army’s operational method during the latter half of the Second World 
War.154 The clearest indication of Leigh-Mallory’s ability to relate to the other services 
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appeared in a letter from the Army Council, who, on 13 December 1929, made their 
‘appreciation’ known to the Air Ministry concerning his services.155 The Air Ministry 
subsequently noted their ‘pleasure’ at the content of the letter, ensuring that Leigh-Mallory 
was made aware of this. Service as an army co-operation specialist clearly did not damage 
Leigh-Mallory’s career and potentially enhanced his ‘visibility’ for nurturing, as was the case 
for other officers, such as Gossage. 
A final indication of Leigh-Mallory’s ability in this area comes from the annual 
Army Co-Operation Reports that appear to have emerged during his tenure at the School 
of Army Co-Operation. While difficult to describe them as formal doctrine in the sense 
that they did not seek to espouse a concept of operations, they were a key element of the 
School of Army Co-Operation’s role by detailing RAF work in that sphere. Based on 
information provided by various commands and squadrons in the field as well as the work 
of the School of Army Co-Operations, the reports remained a key source of information 
on developments in army co-operation. Split into four sections, the reports covered 
training arrangements, the year’s work, communication and equipment. While signed by 
CAS, the School of Army Co-Operation acted as the co-ordinating organisation for the 
production of these reports. Leigh-Mallory provided a précis of the 1929 report in the first 
edition of RAFQ.156 While the OC did not write the reports on their own, Leigh-Mallory’s 
RAFQ contribution illustrates that they oversaw and co-ordinated its production, thus 
indicating that he worked with various stakeholders in army co-operation, like the Air 
Ministry, deployed squadrons and various commands. Published in 1928, the reports began 
                                                          
155 TNA, WO 339/28812, Secretary to the Army Council to Secretary to the Air Ministry, 13 December 1929; 
TNA, WO 339/28812, Secretary to the Air Ministry to the Under-Secretary of State, War Office, 30 January 
1930. 
156 For the reports written during Leigh-Mallory’s tenure as Commandant, see: TNA, AIR 10/1708, AP1313, 
Army Co-Operation Report 1927, January 1928; TNA, AIR 10/1759, AP1372, Army Co-Operation Report 1928, 
March 1929; TNA, AIR 10/1777, AP1390, Army Co-Operation Report 1929, January 1930; Leigh-Mallory, ‘Co-
Operation between the Army’, pp. 37-44. 
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in 1927 when Leigh-Mallory became OC, and no similar reports appear for comparable 
fields like naval co-operation, which suggests much about the attitude of the RAF towards 
the RN and maritime air power in this period.  
As during the First World War, Leigh-Mallory was an officer attempting to 
influence thinking at the tactical and operational level by informing the RAF of key 
developments. It is, of course, difficult to measure the influence the reports had; however, 
several indicators suggest that they were more than just ephemeral pamphlets. First, signed 
by CAS, they went through an Air Ministry approval process and were seen by various 
constituencies involved in relations with the Army, like the Directorate of Organisation and 
Staff Duties and the Directorate of Training, which suggests dissemination at least at the 
RAF’s senior level. However, they were probably more widely disseminated as they were 
produced as APs, which were not limited in their distribution within the RAF. Second, 
publication of Leigh-Mallory’s précis in RAFQ suggests an attempt to illustrate the wider 
implications of RAF co-operation.157 This is significant given that these articles went 
through an approval process. Finally, the reports continued after Leigh-Mallory’s departure 
from the School of Army Co-Operation; thus, his successors and the Air Ministry must 
have placed some value on their production.  
 
7.5 Summary  
While this chapter focused on Leigh-Mallory’s career specifically, it is possible to suggest 
from his experience that the RAF, while lacking a formal career planning system, did not 
ignore the need to nurture and appoint officers to job assignments cognisant with their 
experience and ability. Leigh-Mallory’s staff appointments in the Air Ministry are the 
                                                          
157 Leigh-Mallory, ‘Co-Operation between the Army’, pp. 37-44. 
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clearest indication of nurturing, as highlighted by his work as DDSD, which involved co-
operation with the Army; a field in which he was highly experienced. Through this job 
assignment, Leigh-Mallory underwent socialisation with key members of his peer group in 
the Air Ministry, but most significantly with senior officers who could further nurture his 
development. While there is no evidence to suggest that Leigh-Mallory corresponded with 
Trenchard, he was known to him through the former’s work at the School of Army Co-
Operation. While patronage is always difficult to map, Trenchard’s awareness and implicit 
belief in Leigh-Mallory’s abilities, as evidenced by the former’s 1928 letter to Milne, cannot 
have harmed the latter’s prospects. Appointment as DS at Camberley was a highly selective 
position, with only six officers holding this posting during this period. It was also unique 
amongst the staff colleges, with no reciprocal posts at either Andover or Greenwich. A 
degree of trust, similar to that placed on DS at Andover and the IDC, was placed in Leigh-
Mallory’s ability. The same argument can be posited concerning his service in Geneva. That 
Leigh-Mallory returned to a post in the Air Ministry supports the view that his nurturing 
continued post-Geneva despite the problems identified with the conference by historians. 
Finally, as noted in this chapter’s introduction, these various job assignments exposed 
officers to experiences that developed their leadership knowledge, like managing the 
transition to a position with unfamiliar responsibilities and succeeding, helping create 
change, and managing relationships both internally and externally, which helped mark them 
out for further advancement. 
Summary 
The ‘Peter Principle’? 
 
Leigh-Mallory’s appointment as AOC 12 Group in December 1937 remains a conundrum 
given his lack of experience in fighter operations. This cuts to the central question of how 
an officer with so many perceived detractors, reached senior leadership positions in the 
RAF. The challenge is that this author has not found any archival evidence as to why this 
appointment was made; therefore, there are two potential answers. First, based on the 
notion of the ‘Peter Principle’ – the idea that people are promoted based on their current 
position and rise to the level of their incompetence – Leigh-Mallory’s appointment was 
based on his previous service as SASO in Iraq, and that the RAF simply sought to fill a 
newly created position.1 Given the challenges identified concerning career management in 
the RAF, this might be a reasonable deduction. However, the evidence presented in this 
thesis suggests that the RAF tended to make appropriate appointments based on prior 
experience, which makes this seem unlikely. Therefore, the second possible answer is that 
the RAF nurtured Leigh-Mallory for senior leadership. While the RAF clearly did not 
understand terms such as networking, socialisation and job assignments that have been 
used in this thesis, the Service did recognise that it was responsible for developing its future 
senior leaders. Indeed, it is worth restating what is meant be leadership development, which 
Bolden described as: 
the facilitation of dialogue, experience, relationships and the recognition of 
shared values and purpose within and beyond organizations.2 
 
                                                          
1 Laurence J. Peter and Raymond Hull put this idea forward in their 1969 book, The Peter Principle: Why Things 
Always Go Wrong (New York: HarperCollins, 1969). This book has been continually reprinted with a new 
edition published in 2014. 
2 Richard Bolden, ‘A Yearning for the Vast and Endless Sea: From Competence to Purpose in Leadership 
Development’ in Jupp (ed.), Air Force Leadership, p. 113. 
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Through its culture and ethos, the RAF developed officers who were exposed to these 
factors. The RAF, as early as Trenchard’s 1919 ‘Permanent Organization’ paper, recognised 
the need to develop its officers to engender the value of the ‘Air Force Spirit’. By 
developing this element of RAF culture, the Service created organisational capacity to 
produce leaders who could drive it forward while defending the assumption of 
independence in an era of financial austerity. This emerging organisational capacity was 
generated by inculcating leaders with elements of its culture, which found it organisational 
outgrowth in the GD Branch. However, rather than using methods associated with modern 
leadership development such as mentoring, the RAF created structures and institutions 
such as Andover, which allowed the Service to nurture officers while developing their 
intellectual capacity through what would now be accepted as action learning, socialisation, 
and appropriate job assignments. This is because the RAF collegiately nurtured officers 
who made themselves ‘visible’ by interacting with the processes identified in this thesis. 
Indeed, for example, the award of psa and its relationship with succession planning in the 
RAF is a clear indication that the Service prepared and nurtured selected officers for future 
leadership roles. Thus, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the most likely 
scenario concerning Leigh-Mallory’s appointment to a senior position in 1937 is that 
throughout his career he had made himself ‘visible’ to the system. By successfully doing 
this, and interacting with both RAF culture and the Service’s leadership mores, Leigh-
Mallory was the type of officer desired; public school educated, a pilot with command 
experience, knowledge of staff duties and Staff College educated. Indeed, based on the 
patterns that emerged from the study of the prosopography population in this thesis, 
though recognising the challenge of correlating general patterns to specific individuals, the 
above fitted the RAF’s view of a typical senior leader. Furthermore, based on this 
comparison with his peers, such as Portal, Douglas and Tedder, it is clear that Leigh-
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Mallory’s experience during the inter-war years led him to gain a ‘balanced ticket’ that made 
him the type of officer that RAF wanted.   
While Leigh-Mallory was clearly nurtured by the RAF, it is worth reiterating the 
point made by Longmore in 1939 that, for all the training and education the former 
received, this might just make him an ‘an extremely intelligent and highly trained staff 
officer’.3 Indeed, it is further worth recognising that while the RAF perceived itself to be 
nurturing the right type of officer; there were challenges for the system. For example, the 
RAF’s early insistence on focussing on officers of the GD Branch reinforced Service 
cultural preferences, such as the idea that all officers should be able to fly. This meant that 
potentially capable officers from the Stores Branch, who did not represent Service ethos, 
did not receive the same opportunities as their GD Branch counterparts. Similarly, the 
preference for public school recruits reinforced class proclivities in the Service as 
highlighted by Evill’s 1931 Cranwell report, though the RAF clearly believed that recruits 
from this source had the best leadership abilities, which was an idea it shared with the 
Army and other professions at this time. Finally, the challenges of career management were 
never fully grappled with by the RAF. For example, the lack of an Air Secretary post-1923 
was a major issue as was finally recognised in 1956. Similarly, while the RAF sought to 
promote based on merit, as Chapter Three recognised, it was a system open to its own 
challenges, such as the qualitative use of metrics emanating from ACRs. Therefore, while 
the RAF nurtured potential senior leaders, and given some of the challenges noted, it 
would take the outbreak of the Second World War to test whether the decision by the 
Service to appoint Leigh-Mallory and his peers to senior positions was the correct one, and 
                                                          
3 Longmore, ‘Training for Higher Command’, p. 476. 
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whether they were able to translate the lessons learned from their prior job assignments to 
the challenge of high command in war. 
Appendix One 
 
The Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, KCB, DSO, psa, IDC 
 
This appendix covers Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’s promotions, 
appointments and awards received during his career. The information presented here has 
been compiled from a variety of personnel and operational records as well as The Air Force 
List. It includes Leigh-Mallory’s pre-service experience, though exact dates remain unclear.  
 
Year Date Promotion Appointment Award Other 
1892 11 July    Born in 
Mobberley, 
Cheshire 
1906     Attended 
Haileybury 
School 
1910     Attended 
Magdalene 
College, 
University of 
Cambridge on a 
History 
Exhibition 
scholarship 
1913     Graduated 
from 
Magdalene 
College, 
University of 
Cambridge with 
two 3rd Class 
degrees in 
History and 
Law 
1914 6 August Private 10th (Liverpool 
Scottish) 
Battalion, 
Liverpool 
Regiment, 
Territorial 
Force 
 Discharged on 
5 September 
1914 upon 
appointment as 
2nd Lieutenant 
 15 August 2nd Lieutenant 4th (Special 
Reserve) 
Battalion, 
Lancashire 
Fusiliers 
 Seniority 
backdated to 
this point. 
1915 6 April  2nd Battalion, 
South 
Lancashire 
Regiment 
  
 16/17 June    Wounded at 
the Battle of 
Bellewaerde 
Ridge 
 21 June Lieutenant    
 22 June  Home 
Establishment 
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on Leave 
 21 July  4th (Special 
Reserve) 
Battalion, 
Lancashire 
Fusiliers 
  
1916 4 January  No. 1 School of 
Aeronautics, 
Reading 
  
 7 July Flying Officer 
and seconded 
   
 22 February  12 (Reserve) 
Squadron, 
Central Flying 
School 
  
 31 March  20 (Reserve) 
Squadron, 
Central Flying 
School 
  
 13 July  7 Squadron, 
France 
  
 20 July  5 Squadron, 
France 
  
 2 November Flight 
Commander 
and Temporary 
Captain 
   
1917 22 April  Home 
Establishment 
on Leave 
  
 10 May  Officer 
Commanding, 
15 (Reserve) 
Squadron, 
Britain 
  
 14 May Squadron 
Commander 
and Temporary 
Major 
   
 27 November  Officer 
Commanding, 
8 Squadron, 
France 
  
1918 20 November  12 Wing for 
temporary 
duties 
  
 6 December  Officer 
Commanding, 
No, 8 
Squadron, 
France 
 Forms part of 
the Army of 
Occupation 
 30 December   Mentioned in 
Despatches 
 
1919 1 January   Distinguished 
Service Order 
 
 31 July  Home 
Establishment 
on Leave 
  
 1 August Squadron   Awarded 
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Leader Permanent 
Commission in 
the RAF. 
Seniority 
backdated to 1 
April 1918 
 15 September  86 Wing, RAF 
Kenley 
  
 1 October  1 
(Communicatio
ns) Squadron 
  
 28 October  Storage Park, 
RAF Kenley 
  
 15 December  Inspector of 
Recruiting 
  
1921 1 February  Officer 
Commanding, 
Operational 
Squadron, 
School of Army 
Co-Operation 
  
1922 22 September  For Course of 
Instruction at 
the British 
Army’s Senior 
Officers’ 
School, Woking 
  
 16 December  Officer 
Commanding, 
Operational 
Squadron, 
School of Army 
Co-Operation 
  
1923 7 May  Staff Duties, 
Deputy 
Directorate of 
Staff Duties, 
Directorate of 
Organisation 
and Staff 
Duties, 
Department of 
the Chief of the 
Air Staff 
  
1925 1 January Wing 
Commander 
   
 4 May  Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
psa  
1926 1 April  Supernumerary, 
7 Group, 
Inland Area 
  
 14 April  Air Staff 
Duties, 22 
Group, Inland 
Area 
  
1927 10 April  Commandant, 
School of Army 
Co-Operation 
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1930 1 January  Directing Staff, 
Army Staff 
College, 
Camberley 
  
 5 March    Lecture on ‘Air 
Co-Operation 
with 
Mechanized 
Forces’ at the 
Royal United 
Services 
Institution 
     Awarded 2nd 
Prize in the 
Gordon 
Shepherd 
Memorial Prize 
1931 7 August  Deputy 
Director of 
Staff Duties, 
Directorate of 
Organisation 
and Staff 
Duties, 
Department of 
the Chief of the 
Air Staff 
  
 1 December  Supernumerary, 
1 Air Defence 
Group, Air 
Defence of 
Great Britain 
 Appointment 
while serving as 
a member of 
RAF staff at 
the Geneva 
Disarmament 
Conference 
1932 1 January Group Captain    
 1 October  Deputy 
Director of 
Staff Duties, 
Directorate of 
Organisation 
and Staff 
Duties, 
Department of 
the Chief of the 
Air Staff 
  
1934 16 January  Student, 
Imperial 
Defence 
College 
IDC  
 19 December  OC, No. 2 
Flying Training 
School, 23 
Group, Inland 
Area 
  
     Awarded 2nd 
Prize in the 
Gordon 
Shepherd 
Memorial Prize 
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1935 22 November  Senior Air Staff 
Office, HQ 
British Forces 
in Iraq 
  
1936 1 January Air 
Commodore 
   
1937 17 December  Air Officer 
Commanding, 
12 Group, 
Fighter 
Command 
  
1938 1 November Air Vice-
Marshal 
   
1940 11 July   Companion of 
the Order of 
the Bath 
 
 11 July   Mentioned in 
Despatches 
 
 18 December  Air Officer 
Commanding, 
11 Group, 
Fighter 
Command 
  
1942 29 May   Polonia Restituta, 
2nd Class 
(Poland) 
 
 13 July Air Marshal 
(Acting) 
   
 18 November  Air Officer 
Commander-
in-Chief, 
Fighter 
Command 
  
 1 December Air Marshal 
(Temporary) 
   
1943 1 January   Mentioned in 
Despatches 
 
 1 July   Knight 
Commander of 
the Order of 
the Bath 
 
 15 November  Air 
Commander-
in-Chief, Allied 
Expeditionary 
Air Force 
  
 15 December Air Chief 
Marshal 
(Acting) 
   
1944 1 January Air Marshal 
(Substantive) 
   
 16 August Air Chief 
Marshal 
(Temporary) 
   
 15 October  Allied Air 
Commander-
in-Chief, South 
East Asia 
  
 14 November    Died in 
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Grenoble, 
France 
1945 30 January   Legion of 
Merit, Degree 
of Chief 
Commander 
(US) 
 
 30 January   Order of 
Kutuzov, 1st 
Class (USSR) 
 
 
Appendix Two 
 
Charts 
 
Chart 2.1 – Original RAF Branch Classification for Officers from Appendix Three as listed in The Air Force List of March 1919 (Source: Appendix Three) 
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Chart 3.1 – Secondary Education Experience for those Officers who reached Air Rank by March 1939 (Source: Appendix Four) 
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Chart 3.2 – Primary Post-Secondary School Experience for those Officers who reached Air Rank by March 1939 (Source: Appendix Four) 
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Chart 3.3 – Source of Military Training for those Officers who reached Air Rank by March 1939 (Source: Appendix Four) 
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Chart 3.4 – Experience of Staff College Education for those Officers who reached Air Rank by March 1939 (Source: Appendix Four) 
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Chart 3.5 – Promotion Rhythm of a Sample of Officers still Employed by the RAF in March 1939 (Source: Appendix Three) 
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Chart 3.6 – Rank of Officers still employed by the RAF in March 1939 (Source: Appendix Three) 
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Chart 4.1 – Father’s Occupation of Officers who reached Air Rank by March 1939 (Source: Appendix Four) 
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Chart 4.2 – Country of Birth of Officers who reached Air Rank by March 1939 (Source: Appendix Four) 
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Chart 6.1 – Annual Number of Officers joining the Royal United Services Institution from 1919 to 1939 (Source: ‘Secretary Notes’ in the JRUSI) 
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Chart 7.1 – Original Arms of Service or Branch for Officers from Appendix Three as listed in The Army List of March 1918 or The Navy List of January 1919 (Source: 
Appendix Three) 
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Chart 7.2 – Frequency of Sorties Flown by 8 Squadron RFC/RAF from February to November 1918 (Source: TNA, AIR 1/1669/204/109/8-9 and AIR 
1/1670/204/109/10-13, 8 Squadron Record Book, February to November 1918) 
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Chart 7.3 – Postings on Conclusion of Course of Instruction at the RAF Staff College (First four courses) (Source: TNA, AIR 29/527, Operations Record Books for the 
RAF Staff College, 1922-1926) 
Appendix Three 
 
Prosopographical Analysis of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory and his 
Peers 
 
This thesis utilised prosopography as a methodology to construct a comparative career map 
of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory and his peers as they emerged into senior 
leadership positions during the inter-war period. It utilised an EXCEL spreadsheet to 
layout the analysis, which necessitated the use of the attached CD-R. This thesis used The 
Air Force List to map the careers of Leigh-Mallory and 385 of his peers. This mapping 
exercise focused on officers rated as either Squadron or Wing Commanders in the March 
1918 editions of The Army List and the January 1918 edition of The Navy List; the latter was 
produced quarterly. Chosen as this was the last month before the RAF’s formation on 1 
April 1918, March 1918 provided an opportunity to compare officers of similar ranks and 
appointments from the RFC and RNAS. Officer careers were mapped through to the 
March 1939 edition of The Air Force List. The prosopography population divides into 295 
Squadron and 91 Wing Commanders, which were appointments rather than ranks. 
Squadron Commanders in the RFC held the rank of Major, while Wing Commanders were 
Lieutenant Colonels. These officers represented Leigh-Mallory’s peers and included notable 
names, such as Portal and Tedder. Of the officers selected, still listed as active in March 
1939 were 57 Squadron Commanders and 14 Wing Commanders. This thesis focused on 
patterns and rhythms extant in the careers of those 71 officers, though, more specifically, it 
engaged closely with the 43 who reached Air Rank by March 1939, which are outlined in 
Appendix Four. The primary information gained from this methodology split into ranks, 
date of seniority, appointment, and date of appointment. Additional information, such as 
appointments before the First World War and regiments/arms of service were also 
collected, which added an extra interpretative layer to the analysis found in Chapter Three. 
It is worth noting, however, that, as an evolving document, The Air Force List contained 
idiosyncrasies, like not listing date of appointments until 1922; hence certain gaps exist in 
the spread sheet. This methodology provided the social element of this thesis by comparing 
the shared experience of the officers under consideration. 
Appendix Four 
 
List of Officers Reaching Air Rank by March 1939 
 
Derived from Appendix Three, the following chart lists key demographic information relating to the 43 officers who reached Air Rank by 
March 1939. 
 
Name and 
Rank1 
Awards and 
Post-nominal2  
School or 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Osborne 
University or 
Cadet College 
Staff College  Imperial 
Defence 
College 
Member of the 
Royal Unites 
Services 
Institution 
(Date of 
Joining) 
Fathers 
Profession 
Date of Birth 
Air Marshal Sir 
Philip 
Babington 
MC, AFC, MiD 
(2) 
Eton College    1933 Zoologist 25 Feb 1894 
Air Marshal Sir 
John 
Tremayne 
Babington 
CB, CBE DSO, 
psa, LoH 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Osborne 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Dartmouth 
Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
 1924 Zoologist 20 July 1891 
Air Marshal Sir 
John Baldwin 
DSO, OBE, 
CB, psa, idc, 
Cwn, O, CdeG 
(B) 
Rugby School Royal Military 
College, 
Sandhurst 
Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
Student  Officer, Indian 
Army 
13 April 1892 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Arthur Barratt 
CB, CMG, MC, 
psa, Cwn, O, 
Cwn, C, CdeG 
(P), CdeG (B) 
Clifton College Royal Military 
Academy, 
Woolwich 
Student, Army 
Staff College 
Camberley 
 
Directing Staff 
and 
Commandant, 
  Officer, British 
Army 
25 February 
1891 
                                                          
1 Final rank and titles on retirement. 
2 Includes foreign awards and the number of times Mentioned in Dispatch received by March 1939. 
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RAF Staff 
College 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Charles Blount 
OBE, MC, psa, 
SMMV, Cwn, C 
Harrow School Royal Military 
College, 
Sandhurst 
Student, RAF 
Staff College 
  Officer, British 
Army 
26 October 
1893 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Frederick 
Bowhill 
KCB, CMG, 
DSO and Bar, 
SV4SB, R, C  
Blackheath 
School 
HMS Worcester  
 
(Royal Navy 
Volunteer 
Reserve) 
    1 September 
1880 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Charles Breese 
E.*, CB, AFC Magdalene 
College School 
Royal Naval 
Engineering 
College, 
Keyham 
    23 April 1889 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Charles 
Burnett  
KCB, CBE, 
DSO, N3, OSw 
(K) 
Bedford 
Grammar 
School 
Royal Military 
College, 
Sandhurst 
   Landowner 3 April 1882 
Air Vice-
Marshal Henry 
Cave-Browne-
Cave 
E.*, CB, DSO, 
DFC 
Dulwich College  Royal Naval 
Engineering 
College, 
Keyham 
Royal Naval 
Staff College 
Greenwich 
  Deputy 
Accountant 
General of the 
Army 
1 February 1887 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Christopher 
Courtney 
CB, CBE, DSO, 
psa, SA3, LoH, 
C 
Bradfield 
College 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Dartmouth 
Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Quetta 
 
Directing Staff, 
RAF Staff 
College 
 1923 Editor, 
Fortnightly Review 
27 June 1890 
Marshal of the 
Royal Air 
Force Lord 
Douglas 
DFC, MC, idc, 
psa, CdeG (F) 
Tonbridge 
School 
Lincoln College, 
University of 
Oxford 
Student, RAF 
Staff College 
Student and 
Directing Staff 
1922 Academic 23 December 
1893 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Douglas Evill 
N., DSC, AFC, 
idc, psa, LoH, C 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Osborne 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Dartmouth 
Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Camberley 
 
Student  General 
Practitioner 
8 October 1892 
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Directing Staff, 
RAF Staff 
College 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Wilfrid 
Freeman 
KCB, DSO, 
MC, psa, LoH, C 
Rugby School Royal Military 
College, 
Sandhurst 
Student, Royal 
Naval Staff 
College, 
Greenwich 
 
Directing Staff 
and 
Commandant, 
RAF Staff 
College 
 1922 Stone Merchant 18 July 1888 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Arthur Guy 
Garrod 
OBE, MC, 
DFC, idc, psa 
Bradfield 
College 
University 
College, 
University of 
Oxford 
Student, RAF 
Staff College 
Student 1922 Barrister 13 April 1891 
Air Marshal Sir 
Ernest 
Gossage 
CB, CVO, 
DSO, MC, qs 
Rugby School Trinity College, 
University of 
Cambridge 
 
 
Student and 
Directing Staff, 
Army Staff 
College, 
Camberley 
  Businessman 
and retired 
British Army 
Officer 
3 February 1891 
Air Vice-
Marshal Sir 
Douglas 
Harries 
AFC, SMSL, C Merton Court 
School 
 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Osborne 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Britannia 
   Merchant 31 March 1893 
Marshal of the 
Royal Air 
Force Sir 
Arthur Harris 
OBE, AFC Allhallows  Student, Army 
Staff College 
  Indian Civil 
Service 
13 April 1893 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Roderic Hill 
E., AFC and 
Bar, MC, psa 
Bradfield 
College 
University 
College London 
Student, RAF 
Staff College 
  Academic 1 March 1894 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
KCB, CMG, 
DSO, idc, psa, 
Harrow School Royal Military 
Academy, 
Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Directing Staff 1920 Officer, Indian 
Medical Service 
21 May 1887 
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Phillip Joubert 
de la Ferté 
SMSL, C, CdeG 
(I) 
Woolwich Camberley 
 
Directing Staff 
and 
Commandant, 
RAF Staff 
College 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Trafford 
Leigh-Mallory 
DSO, idc, psa Haileybury 
School 
Magdalene 
College, 
University of 
Cambridge 
Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
 
Directing Staff, 
Army Staff 
College, 
Camberley 
Student 1931 Clergy 11 July 1892 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Arthur 
Longmore 
KCB, DSO, idc, 
psa, Cwn, O, 
LoH, C, CdeG 
(F), SMSL, O, 
CdeG (I) 
Foster’s 
Academy 
(Australia) 
Royal Naval 
College, 
Dartmouth 
Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Camberley 
Commandant 1923 Stationmaster 8 October 1885 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Reverend 
Cuthbert 
Maclean 
CB, DSO, MC, 
LoH, C 
Wanganui 
Collegiate 
School (New 
Zealand) 
Auckland 
University 
   Clergy 16 October 
1886 
Air Marshal Sir 
Paul Maltby 
DSO, AFC, idc, 
psa 
King’s College 
Canterbury 
Royal Military 
College, 
Sandhurst 
Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
Student 1925 Tea Planter 5 August 1892 
Air Vice-
Marshal Arthur 
Maund 
CBE, DSO, psa, 
CdeG (P), 
CdeG (B), SS2, 
SV4 
St Pauls School  Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
  Explorer 30 July 1891 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
William 
Mitchell 
KCB, CBE, 
DSO, MC, AFC 
Wellington 
College 
Militia Route    Brewery Owner 8 March 1888 
Air Vice- CB, CBE, qs, St George’s  Student, Army    14 January 1882 
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Marshal 
Hazleton 
Nicholl 
LoH, C School Ascot Staff College, 
Quetta 
Air Marshal Sir 
Lawrence 
Pattinson 
CB, DSO, MC, 
DFC, qs 
Rugby School 
and Wesley 
College 
Melbourne 
Jesus College, 
University of 
Cambridge 
Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Camberley 
 1930  8 October 1890 
Air Marshal Sir 
Richard Peck 
OBE, qs St Paul’s School Brasenose 
College, 
University of 
Oxford 
Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Camberley  
 1930  2 March 1893 
Air Chief 
Marshal Sir 
Richard Peirse 
CB, DSO, AFC, 
idc, psa, CdeG (I) 
HMS Conway King’s College 
London 
 
(Royal Navy 
Volunteer 
Reserve) 
Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
Student  Officer, Royal 
Navy 
30 September 
1892 
Air Marshal Sir 
Patrick 
Playfair 
CB, CVO, MC, 
SS3S, DSM (US) 
Cheltenham 
College 
Royal Military 
Academy, 
Woolwich 
   Doctor 29 November 
1889 
Marshal of the 
Royal Air 
Force Viscount 
Portal 
CB, DSO and 
Bar, MC, idc, psa 
Wellington 
College 
Christ Church, 
University of 
Oxford 
Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
Student and 
Directing Staff 
1922 Own Means 21 May 1893 
Air 
Commodore 
John Quinnell 
N., DFC, idc, 
psa 
Royal School of 
Dungannon 
 Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
Student  Newspaper 
Owner 
7 January 1891 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
George Reid 
DSO, MC and 
Bar, idc, psa 
Malvern College  Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
Student 1926  25 October 
1893 
Air 
Commodore 
John Russell 
DSO, psa Fettes College  Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
   6 March 1895 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Richard Saul 
DFC, qs St Andrews 
College 
Ross College, 
Dublin 
Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Camberley 
   16 April 1891 
Air OBE, qs Oundle School Special Reserve  Student, Army     
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Commodore 
Sydney Smith 
Staff College, 
Camberley 
Air Marshal Sir 
Bertine Sutton 
DSO, OBE, 
MC, idc, psa 
Eton College University 
College, 
University of 
Oxford 
Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Camberley 
 
Directing Staff, 
RAF Staff 
College, 
Andover 
Directing Staff   Clergy 17 December 
1886 
Marshal of the 
Royal Air 
Force Lord 
Tedder 
CB, idc, psa Whitgift School Magdalene 
College, 
University of 
Cambridge 
Student, Royal 
Naval Staff 
College, 
Greenwich 
 
Directing Staff, 
RAF Staff 
College, 
Andover 
Student  Civil Servant 11 July 1890 
Air 
Commodore 
Arthur 
Thomson 
AFC, MC and 
Bar 
Wellington 
College 
Special Reserve     2 April 1895 
Air Vice-
Marshal John 
Tyssen 
MC Wellington 
College 
Territorial Force     20 June 1889 
Air 
Commodore 
Andre Walser 
DFC, MC, psa, 
CdeG (F) 
St Paul’s School University of 
London and 
Zurich 
University 
 
(Territorial 
Force) 
Student, RAF 
Staff College, 
Andover 
 1930 Silk Merchant 8 April 1889 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Robert Willock 
idc, qs Cheltenham 
College 
 Student, Army 
Staff College, 
Camberley 
Student 1938 Wine Merchant 17 December 
1893 
Air AFC, GI-O Stanley St John’s   1920  18 September 
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Commodore 
Arthur Wright 
Secondary College, 
Battersea 
1888 
Appendix Five 
 
List of Officers attending the First Ten Courses at the Imperial Defence College, 
1927-1936, including an indication of those reaching a minimum of One-Star Rank 
 
Course 
Date  
Royal Air 
Force 
Final Rank Royal Navy Final Rank British 
Army 
Final Rank 
1927 Wing 
Commander 
R.E.C Peirse 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain J.C. 
Tovey 
Admiral of 
the Fleet 
Lieutenant-
Colonel R.H. 
Haining 
General 
Wing 
Commander 
W.S. 
Douglas 
Marshal of 
the Royal Air 
Force 
Captain R. 
Leatham 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel A.F. 
Brooke 
Field 
Marshal 
Wing 
Commander 
E.L. 
Tomkinson 
 Captain H.R. 
Moore 
Admiral Colonel 
W.H. 
Gribbon 
 
Squadron 
Leader G.C. 
Pirie 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain E.L.S. 
King 
Rear-
Admiral 
Colonel C.G. 
Liddell 
General 
  Captain A.F. 
Pridham 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel 
A.G.C. 
Dawney  
Major-
General 
  Lieutenant-
Colonel R.D. 
Ormsby RM 
Lieutenant-
General 
Lieutenant-
Colonel C.G. 
Ling 
 
1928 Wing 
Commander 
J.E.A. 
Baldwin 
Air Marshal Captain W.S. 
Chalmers 
Rear-
Admiral 
Colonel E.H. 
Kelly 
 
Wing 
Commander 
C.C. Miles 
 Captain H.T. 
England 
Rear Admiral Major H.C. 
Lloyd 
 
Squadron 
Leader 
L.G.S. Payne 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain R.H.T. 
Raikes 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel E.F. 
Norton 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
A.W. Tedder 
Marshal of 
the Royal Air 
Force 
Captain G.P. 
Thomas 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel 
J.H.T. 
Priestman 
Major-
General 
  Captain N.A. 
Wodehouse 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel E.K. 
Squires 
Lieutenant-
General 
    Lieutenant-
Colonel M. 
Kemp-Welch 
 
1929 Squadron 
Leader C.J. 
Mackay 
 Captain T.P.F. 
Calvert 
Rear-
Admiral 
Lieutenant-
Colonel 
A.P.Y. 
Langhorne 
Major-
General 
Squadron 
Leader 
C.E.H. 
Medhurst 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain A.B. 
Cunningham  
Admiral of 
the Fleet 
Lieutenant-
Colonel 
W.G. 
Lindsell 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
Marshal of 
the Royal Air 
Commander 
V.H. 
Rear-
Admiral 
Lieutenant-
Colonel 
General 
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C.F.A. Portal Force Danckwerts B.C.T. Paget 
Wing 
Commander 
C.W.H. 
Pulford  
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain J.W.S. 
Dorling 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel T.S. 
Riddell-
Webster 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
J.C. Quinnell 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain J.G.P. 
Vivian 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel H.J. 
Simson 
 
1930 Wing 
Commander 
R.M. Bayley 
 Captain G.F.B. 
Edward-Collins 
Admiral Colonel the 
Honourable 
H.R.L.G. 
Alexander 
Field 
Marshal 
Wing 
Commander 
N.H. 
Bottomley 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain G. 
Layton 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel L. 
Carr 
Lieutenant-
General 
Squadron 
Leader R.M. 
Drummond 
Air Marshal Captain P. 
Macnamara 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel 
M.H. Dendy 
 
Squadron 
Leader 
J.W.B. 
Grigson 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain A.H. 
Taylor 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel 
H.R.S. Massy 
Lieutenant-
General 
Squadron 
Leader D.F. 
Stevenson 
Air-Vice 
Marshal 
Captain F.L. 
Tottenham 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel P. 
Neame VC 
Lieutenant-
General 
    Lieutenant-
Colonel F.P. 
Nosworthy 
 
1931 Squadron 
Leader J.J. 
Breen 
Air Marshal Lieutenant-
Colonel A.G.B. 
Bourne RM 
General Lieutenant-
Colonel Sir 
R.F. Adams 
General 
Wing 
Commander 
D.G. Donald 
Air Marshal Captain 
B.W.M. 
Fairbairn 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel G.J. 
Giffard 
 
Wing 
Commander 
P.C. Maltby 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain H. 
Fitzherbert 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel A.E. 
Grasett 
Lieutenant-
General 
Squadron 
Leader 
F.H.M. 
Maynard 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain H.H. 
Harwood  
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel T.J. 
Hutton 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
W.A. 
McClaughry 
Air-Vice 
Marshal 
Captain H.D. 
Pridham-
Wippell 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel 
A.F.A.N. 
Thorne 
General 
  Captain C.P. 
Talbot 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel F.E. 
Hotblack 
Major-
General 
1932 Wing 
Commander 
F.G.B. Hards 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain A.R. 
Dewar 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel H.C. 
Harrison 
 
Wing 
Commander 
M. 
Henderson 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain R.H. 
Halifax 
 Colonel 
V.H.B. 
Majendie 
Major-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
G.R.M. Reid 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain N.F. 
Laurence 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel R.P. 
Pakenham-
Major-
General 
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Walsh 
Squadron 
Leader H.K. 
Thorold 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain R.W. 
Oldham 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel H.R. 
Pownall 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
A.T. 
Williams 
 Captain R.R. 
Turner 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel J.N. 
Thomson  
 
  Captain L.F. 
Potter 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel the 
Honourable 
E.H. 
Wyndham 
 
1933 Wing 
Commander 
C.B. Dacre 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain E.B.C. 
Dicken 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel 
W.P.J. 
Akerman 
Major-
General 
Group 
Captain 
D.C.S. Evill 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain the 
Honourable G. 
Fraser 
Rear-
Admiral 
Lieutenant-
Colonel 
S.C.M. 
Archibald 
Major-
General 
Group 
Captain 
A.G.R. 
Garrod 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain W.H. 
Gell 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel R.L. 
Bond 
Major-
General 
Group 
Captain R.H. 
Peck 
Air Marshal Captain L.E. 
Holland 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel 
G.N. 
Macready 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
R.H.M.S. 
Saundby 
 Captain C.E. 
Kennedy-
Purvis 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel E.L. 
Morris 
 
  Captain I.B.B. 
Tower  
 Lieutenant-
Colonel 
H.B.D. 
Willcox 
Lieutenant-
General 
1934 Group 
Captain 
J.S.T. 
Bradley 
Air Marshal Captain R.S. 
Benson 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel R.H. 
Dewing 
Major-
General 
Squadron 
Leader O.R. 
Gayford 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain H.H. 
Bousfield 
 Colonel R. 
Evans 
Major-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
A.W.F. 
Glenny 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain J.H. 
Edelsten 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel E.G. 
Miles  
Major-
General 
Group 
Captain T.L. 
Leigh-
Mallory 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain L.H.K. 
Hamilton 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel R.B. 
Pargiter 
Major-
General 
Squadron 
Leader 
A.P.M. 
Sanders 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain C.E. 
Morgan 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel V.V. 
Pope 
Major-
General 
  Captain W.G. 
Tennant 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel J.G. 
des R. 
Lieutenant-
General 
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Swayne  
1935 Wing 
Commander 
G.B.A. Baker 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain A.W.S. 
Agar 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel F.G. 
Beaumont-
Nesbitt 
Major-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
the 
Honourable 
R.A. 
Cochrane 
Air Chief 
Marshal 
Captain H.C. 
Bovell 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel 
F.H.N. 
Davidson 
Major-
General 
Group 
Captain C.C. 
Darley 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain C.S. 
Daniel 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel G. 
LeQ Martel 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
H.H. Mcl. 
Fraser 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain I.G. 
Glennie 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel F.N. 
Mason-
Macfarlane 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
A.S.G. Lee 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain H.B. 
Rawlings 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel R.N. 
O’Connor 
General 
  Captain A.G.B. 
Wilson 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel A.E. 
Percival 
Lieutenant-
General 
1936 Group 
Captain R. 
Graham 
Air Vice-
Marshal 
Captain L.H. 
Ashmore 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel 
N.M.S. Irwin 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
B.J. Silly 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain J.G.L. 
Dundas 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel S.W. 
Kirby 
Major-
General 
Squadron 
Leader R.S. 
Sorley 
Air Marshal Captain J.W. 
Durnford 
Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel 
O.M. Lund 
Lieutenant-
General 
Wing 
Commander 
J.L. Vachall 
Air 
Commodore 
Captain C. 
Moody 
Admiral Lieutenant-
Colonel C.C. 
Malden 
 
Wing 
Commander 
H.A. 
Whistler 
 Captain A.J.L. 
Phillips 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel 
H.G. Martin 
Lieutenant-
General 
  Captain R. 
Shelley 
 Lieutenant-
Colonel C.A. 
West 
 
Total 48 57 59 
 
Percentage of Officers attending the Imperial Defence College reaching a minimum of One-Star 
Rank 
Royal Air Force Royal Navy British Army 
85% 68% 75% 
Source: LHCMA, Personal Papers of Major-General Denis Talbot, TALBOT 4/8, The Imperial Defence 
College Register, 1927-1967 compared with the Survey of the Papers of Senior UK Defence Personnel, 1900-
1975 
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Admiralty Files 
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ADM 116 – Admiralty Record Office Cases 
ADM 203 – Correspondence and Papers related to the Royal Naval Colleges, Dartmouth 
and Greenwich 
 
Air Ministry Files 
AIR 1 – Air Historical Branch Papers (Series I) 
AIR 2 – Registered Files of the Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence 
AIR 4 – Aircrews’ Flying Log Books 
AIR 5 – Air Historical Branch Papers (Series II) 
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Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (Air), and 2nd Tactical Air 
Force 
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The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
 
Bibliography Page 356 
 
T 161 – Registered Files (S Series) of the Supply Department of HM Treasury 
T 225 – Registered Files (DM and 2DM Series) of the Defence Policy and Materiel 
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War Office Files 
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1.2 Christ Church Archive, University of Oxford 
Personal Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Portal 
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Personal Papers of Air Vice-Marshal Sir George Ranald MacFarlane Reid 
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1.4 Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham 
Staff Ride Records 
Army Staff College Lectures 
 
1.5 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London 
Personal Papers of Field Marshal Sir John Dill 
Personal Papers of Group Captain Eric Douglas 
Personal Papers of Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham 
Personal Papers of General Sir John Burnett-Stuart 
Personal Papers of General Baron Ismay 
Personal Papers of Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart 
Personal Papers of Field Marshal Baron Milne 
Personal Papers of Major-General Denis Talbot 
 
1.6 Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, London 
AIR 69 – Reports and Papers of the Royal Air Force Staff College, Andover 
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DC 76/48/1-4, Typescript of h. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918-
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Personal Papers of Group Captain George Carmichael 
Personal Papers of Air Chief Marshal Baron Dowding 
Personal Papers of Air Vice-Marshal Charles Edmonds 
Personal Papers of Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Claude Strathern Evill 
Personal Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris 
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Personal Papers of Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hazleton Nicholl 
Personal Papers of Air Marshal Sir Lawrence Pattinson 
Personal Papers of Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse 
Personal Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Salmond 
Personal Papers of Air Marshal Sir Bertine Sutton 
Personal Papers of Group Captain John Sowrey 
Personal Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard 
R021812, AP837 – Handbook for Adjutants of the Royal Air Force, June 1921 
X004-0415 – Report of the Committee on Royal Air Force Administration, 1939 
 
1.7 Royal Aero Club, London 
Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committee of the Royal Aero Club 
 
1.8 The Liddle Collection, University of Leeds 
AIR 189, Trafford Leigh-Mallory, History of Tank and Aeroplane Co-Operation, 31 
January 1919 
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1902 [Cd. 982] Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of 
the Army. 
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Mean of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. 
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1917-18 [Cd. 8642] Report of the Committee on Promotion of Officers in the Special Reserve, New 
Armies, and Territorial Force, together with a note by the Army Council. 
1922 [Cd. 1619] Proceedings of the Second Air Conference, held on 7th and 8th February, 1922. 
 
2.3 Official Manuals 
Air Ministry, AP818 – Royal Air Force Drill and Ceremonial (Provisional), Second Edition 
(London: HMSO, 1926). 
_____, AP1301 – Royal Air Force War Manual Part II – Organization and Administration of the 
Royal Air Force, 1st Edition with Amendment List No. 10 (London: Air Ministry, 
1939). 
_____, AP1300 – Royal Air Force War Manual, Part I – Operations, Second Edition (London: 
Air Ministry, 1940). 
War Office, Cavalry Training (London: HMSO, 1907). 
_____, Field Service Regulations Part 1 – Operations (London: HMSO, 1909). 
_____, Infantry Training (London: HMSO, 1914). 
_____, Manual of Physical Training, 1908 with 1914 Amendments (London: HMSO, 1914). 
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HMSO, 1915). 
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